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 Physicalism as universally construed is the thesis that everything in the world is 
either physical or a consequence of physical facts.  Certain consequences of physicalism 
for free will, religion, and so on make it unpalatable to some.  Physicalism should not be 
dismissed merely on its unpalatability.  Nonetheless, we should be very sure it is true 
before accepting it uncritically (as much of science and philosophy now do).  Physicalism 
is a contingent thesis, taken as true on the basis of strong inductive evidence and an 
inference-to-the-best-explanation that specifies it as the best theory over any of its 
competitors to provide an ontological account of the universe.  So long as there is no 
contrary evidence to the claims of physicalism, then it stands relatively uncontested.   
 I argue that there is a body of well-attested empirical evidence that falsifies 
universally-construed physicalism by violating an essential assumption of the theory – 
 vii
causal closure of the physical domain.  I present a detailed account of this closure-
violating evidence.  So that those who are unfamiliar with the body of evidence on offer 
may judge its validity, I include brief summations of experimental designs, findings, and 
analyses, plus some controversies pertaining to the data and their resolutions.  I then 
argue why this body of empirical evidence should count against universal physicalism, 
argue for the evidence’s scientific legitimacy, and discuss criticisms which have been 
lodged against it, then explain why these criticisms lack force.   
 I conclude that the evidence I present is sufficient to falsify the universal 
construal of physicalism as supported by today’s and by foreseeable future 
understandings of the physical world.  I acknowledge, though, that nothing can be 
guaranteed against an indefinite “wait-and-see” argument for some implausible “fully-
realized” physics that may be able to reconcile the evidence I propose with such a fully-
completed formulation of physicalism.  I suggest that if this is the best physicalists can 
come up with, then their position is weak and the inference-to-the-best-explanation that 
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 One of the thorniest problems remaining to the philosophy of mind is how to 
reconcile phenomenal and other features of human mentality with the rest of nature, 
given the truth of physicalism.  By physicalism I mean the general assertion that all 
causality is strictly physical and all events are physical events; that all entities are either 
literally physical, physically realized, or a consequence of only physical facts or states of 
affairs.1  For decades now there has been an ongoing argument between physicalists and 
anti-physicalists as to whether physics really is ontologically privileged to provide the 
one true explanatory framework for the universe.  Though the contest seems to be going 
in favor of the physicalists, it is by no means yet settled.    In this project I aim to 
discover what it would take to prove physicalism false.  My first goal is to explore what it 
would take to show physicalism to be true, on the way to finding out what it would take 
to prove it false.  I will argue that the former is much harder to do than the latter.  
 
 It is uncontroversial that science research programmes2 must be embedded in 
broader theoretical contexts.  Such contexts provide a framework for any new research 
results that are produced, within which these can interpreted and integrated.  When once 
                                                          
 1I will have more to say about the definition of physicalism later in this chapter. 
 2I use this term in the sense proposed by philosopher of science Imre Lakatos, as a 
guiding framework of core theory and complementing auxiliary hypotheses that guide a 
broad scientific research campaign.  It is roughly the same level as but somewhat 
different from a Kuhnian “paradigm.” 
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confirmed, these results provide additional context for yet newer experimental results and 
their interpretation and integration.  It is only slightly more controversial to suggest that a 
large majority of those involved in these programmes (the scientists and researchers), as 
well as those on the periphery (funders, interpreters, observers of scientific process), 
believe the theoretical context to actually be more or less true.  I also take it as relatively 
undisputed that physicalism provides that context for the vast majority of scientists 
occupied in the various pursuits of science and for philosophers engaged in examining 
and wrestling with certain classes of questions posed by or about science. 
 Physicalism is not, however, just a methodological framework for scientific 
research.  It is an ontological doctrine that grounds virtually all of science and 
particularly, for our interests here, those philosophical theories where ontology is 
relevant.3  Further, when fully realized, physicalism promises profound social, legal, and 
practical implications with important consequences for society as a whole.   
 There is little question that the doctrine holds the high ground in relevant 
ontological debates, particularly concerning philosophy of mind.  According to Crane 
and Mellor (1990), “physicalism is now almost orthodox in much philosophy, notably in 
much recent philosophy of mind.”  Andrew Melnyk notes, “a huge preponderance of 
current philosophers of mind happily call themselves physicalists” (2003a, 5) (even if, as 
                                                          
 3All that follows assumes a general notion of scientific realism.  The question of 
whether physicalism is true or false has little relevance outside such a realist context.  As 
Crane & Mellor (1990) note, “physicalism is not a doctrine about universals or other 
abstract objects, but about the empirical world, and specifically about minds.  It says that 
mental entities, properties, relations and facts are all really physical.”  Physicalists, they 
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he suspects, they are often “simply taking physicalism for granted”).  David Papineau 
agrees: “[N]early all analytic philosophers in this area . . . now accept that the mind is in 
some way constitutively connected with the brain” (Papineau, 2001).    
 Despite its widespread acceptance, the physicalist doctrine remains controversial. 
If physicalism were only about the mind-external physical world, there would be 
relatively few problems, as there is little controversy to the physicalistic-nature of 
explanations in physics and nearly all of the special sciences.  The trouble mostly starts 
when we try to make sense of mind.  As Jaegwon Kim puts it: “[G]iving up the Cartesian 
conception of minds as immaterial substances in favor of a materialist ontology does not 
make the [mind-body] problem go away.  On the contrary, our basic physicalist 
commitments can be seen as the source of our current difficulties” (Kim, 2005, 9).  Most 
philosophers of mind would likely agree. 
 But this raises a question: Whether “our current difficulties” are only due-course 
problems that merely require a bit of tidying up, or instead indicators that the move to 
link all aspects of mind to some physical substrate might at least be partly on the wrong 
track.  The history of science shows that believing a current theoretical context to be true 
(no matter how passionately), and its actually being true, are two very different things.  If 
history is a guide, the current faith in the truth of the physicalist paradigm (to use Kuhn’s 
now thread-bare term) may eventually turn out to be at least partially misplaced.  Many 
of physicalism’s own disciples would agree with this at least conditionally, choosing to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
further observe, “all grant physical science a unique ontological authority:  the authority 
to tell us what there is.” 
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phrase their claim approximately thus: “Physicalism as we now formulate it likely isn’t 
fully true; but it is much closer than anything science has developed thus far.  And in 
those areas where physicalism is wrong, we’re sure it won’t turn out to be very wrong.” 
 
1.  The Problem 
 Robinson (2001) offers this summation of the problem physicalism encounters 
with respect to mind: 
“In order to vindicate a materialist theory of the mind it is necessary to show how 
something that is a purely physical object can satisfy psychological predicates.  
Those features of the mind which seem to be, prima facie, incompatible with this 
physicalism – such as consciousness and the intentionality of thought – must, 
therefore, be explained in a way that purges them of their apparently Cartesian 
elements, which would be incompatible with materialism” (128) 
 
 Our strongest intuitions lead us to believe that by virtue of our being conscious 
we are the masters of our bodies, we have free will, that our apparently autonomous 
minds make a difference in a world which to all appearances is otherwise physical and 
deterministic.  Many react with a shock of disbelief when first hearing that there seem to 
be good reasons to believe that our choice of what to have for breakfast day after 
tomorrow may well have been determined many millennia ago by the circumstances that 
obtained milliseconds after the Big Bang (perhaps jostled around a bit here and there in 
the meantime by random events owing to quantum phenomena, etc.).   
 Kim captures the issue neatly:  “When physicalism is accepted as a basic 
framework, the foremost metaphysical question about the mind is where in the physical 
world our minds and mentality fit – indeed whether minds have a place in a physical 
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world at all.” (Kim, 2005, 149-50).  Certain apparently essential features of physicality 
get in the way of intuitions about our mental nature – features such as determinism and 
indeterminism, the requirement for causal closure, the “completeness” of physics, and the 
causal exclusion principle (which aims to avoid the violation of parsimony presented by 
overdetermination of physical causes by mental ones).  If these and other principles are 
true with regard to mentality, then prospects of being able to justify our intuitions about 
the nature of human mentality look rather grim.   
 Certainly, if physicalism is true, there are consequences for our understanding of 
mind: We may have to abandon our beliefs in the uniqueness of human mentality – 
intentionality, consciousness, and undetermined cognition.  Importantly, it becomes 
unclear how we warrant free will.  Despite their best efforts, compatibilists have been 
unable to convincingly show how we can maintain a robust notion of agency in the face 
of deterministic and indeterministic forces that come as part of physicalism’s package-
deal.  Libertarian/incompatibilists are even more at a loss.  “The problem of determinism 
threatens human agency and skepticism puts human knowledge in peril,” observes Kim.  
“The stakes seem even higher with mental causation, for this problem threatens to take 
away both agency and cognition” (1998, 32). 
 The implications of physicalism’s turning out true extend beyond just our 
conception of ourselves.  Societal consequences could prove to be profound.4  If we 
discover that physicalism really is fully true, and free will cannot finally be satisfactorily 
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rescued (as seems the likely outcome for now), broad social consequences may affect 
everything from governance, to judicial systems, to education, to parental rights.  Further, 
if physicalism proves fully true, then all notions of God and religion can be relegated to 
the dustbin of history (some physicalists are ready to do that now – for example Jeffrey 
Poland, who worries that “ ghosts, gods, and the paranormal are genuine threats to 
physicalism” (1994, 228)).  While many may applaud such a move (and I am not 
interested here in arguing the merits or demerits of either theism or religion in general), 
nonetheless conclusive evidence that led to the dissolution of religion would have 
profound human consequences, both for good and ill.   
 These are just a few examples of perhaps a multitude of effects we might expect if 
physicalism asserts the full influence it promises.  They are not meant as arguments 
against physicalism.  After all, if physicalism is fully true and our intuitions about mind, 
religion, and so on are false, that would be important to know.  We may have to put up 
with interim personal and social upheaval on the way to a better awareness of who we are 
and what our place in the universe really amounts to.5 Thus, according to Jaegwon Kim: 
If physicalism is to survive as a worldview for us, it must show just where we 
belong in the physical world, and this means that it must give an account of our 
status as conscious creatures with powers to affect our surroundings in virtue of 
our consciousness and mentality. (2005, 31) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 4Indeed, we are already seeing some of these consequences begin to emerge, 
given the influence of physicalist beliefs already present in science and philosophy as 
they are practically implemented in the outward culture. 
 5On the other hand, we also would not want to jettison possibly true beliefs on the 
basis of an only partially-completed theory that, when completed, might turn out be 
fundamentally misconstrued or outright false. 
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 Nonetheless, evolving philosophical and scientific debate over the past century 
increasingly  supports the notion that mental properties and states are just a special case 
of the interaction of physical properties.  The emerging conclusions (and consensus) is 
largely underwritten by principles firmly rooted in physicalist doctrine. 
 But the situation remains somewhat less rigid than the holders of more radical 
physicalist positions would prefer.  As physicalist Andrew Melnyk (2003a) remarks, “It 
is best to admit candidly that the evidence for regarding mental phenomena as physical or 
physically realized is much weaker than the evidence for regarding chemical, biological, 
geological, and similar phenomena as physical or physically realized” (p.281).  
Consequently, there remains worry about –  and some resistance to – the physical-mind 
thesis.  It seems we have much to lose if we must surrender the fondly-held belief of 
mind being causally relevant by virtue of being mind, and not just as a complex 
realization of underlying physical facts.  
 
2.  Figuring out Physicalism:  What physicalism is...and isn’t 
 Though physicalists tend to present a united front when resisting anti-physicalist 
arguments, they continue to struggle among themselves over the question of how to 
delineate a complete and sufficient formulation of their own physicalist doctrine.  The 
problem rests in how to specify boundaries that capture everything that needs inclusion 
among the set of things that are physical or physically-dependent, while eliminating 
anything that is not in some fundamentally-justifiable sense ontologically physical.   
 7
 Broadly construed, definitions of physicalism don’t drift too far from a central 
core of agreement.  According to Papineau, for example, “Physicalism is the doctrine that 
everything, including prima facie nonphysical stuff is physical” (2001, 12).  Latham 
proposes that physicalism be  “…understood as the view that the world is governed by 
laws of succession with purely physical antecedents” (2001, 153).   Gene Witmer (2001), 
after thorough deliberation on a series of ever more precisely-formulated specification 
statements for the doctrine, arrives at the following.  Physicalism requires that: 
Every law of nature and every particular fact is either physical or to be explained 
by the physical in such a way as to imply that the nonphysical facts are nothing 
over and above the physical facts, where the physical facts include the actual 
distribution of physical properties and the laws of physics” (69)  
 
And Kim (2005) provides us with this: 
 
The most fundamental tenet of physicalism concerns the ontology of the world.  It 
claims that the content of the world is wholly exhausted by matter.  Material 
things are all the things that there are; there is nothing inside the spacetime world 
that isn’t material, and of course there is nothing outside it either.  The spacetime 
world is the whole world, and material things, bits of matter and complex 
structures made up of bits of matter, are its only inhabitants. (p.150) 
 
 The preceding formulations tacitly subsume the ontological status of the mental 
under the physical.  Other philosophers, however, mention mind more explicitly.  For 
one, Barbara Montero (2003, 179) describes one popular view as being that “physicalism 
with respect to the mental should be understood as the thesis that the mental is reducible 
to (or composed of, or otherwise determined in some sense by) the non-mental.”  
Georges Rey divides physicalism into sub-categories, the second of which he labels 
“substantive, explanatory physicalism,” which he hopes eventually will provide “some 
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genuinely explanatory framework in which psychological states can actually be 
understood as some kind of physical state” (2001, 116)  
 Just what that framework might be is where one level of the debate begins.  
Modern philosophy of mind began with the central-state materialism (or mind-body 
identity) theory.  When it became evident that direct mental-property-to-physical-
property reductions were unlikely to succeed (thanks in varying degrees to the multiple-
realization argument and intractable shortcomings in neuroscience investigative 
technologies) alternatives such as functionalist theories of mind and non-reductive 
physicalism were developed to fill the gap.  Functionalism distances mental-as-physical 
explanations from precise reductionist mechanisms, while non-reductive physicalism 
stipulates that, though the mental depends ontologically on the physical, precise 
reductions of the mental to the physical are metaphysically impossible. 
 Wording and construal in formulations of physicalism vary in how their 
proponents characterize them, but conceptually they hew to a general line of argument.  
Physicalism defines all that the universe contains.  And physicalism is defined by the 
facts contained within and the entities investigated by the discipline of Physics.   
 But this is where the main difficulty begins.  What exactly does physics itself 
contain and investigate?  This, it turns out, is by no means as clear as we would like.  Not 
long after physicalism coalesced into a distinct doctrine, Carl Hempel (1969, 1980; but 
more explicitly stated in Hellman, 1985) defined a core difficulty.  If we intend to use 
what is physical to delineate physicalism, we must first know what it means to be 
physical.  The discipline of physics defines for us what is physical.  But what do we mean 
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by physics?  Do we mean physics as we understand it today?  If so, then we must 
conclude that it is false, since we know that the physics of today is undoubtedly flawed or 
mistaken in at least some of its aspects, and certainly incomplete in its descriptions and 
explanations of the world.  So if present physics is at least partially false and incomplete, 
then the alternative is to define physicalism in terms of a future, fully-realized physics.  
But that becomes question begging.  We have  no clear picture of what a future, fully-
realized physics would even look like, making that of little use to us now as we try to 
define physicalism.  We know what physicalism is: it is the doctrine that the world is 
fully and solely physical.  But we don’t know (for sure) what “the world is physical” 
fully means.  This seems to leave an unsatisfactory vagueness lurking at the heart of the 
physicalist doctrine.6  
 A number of philosophers are less intimidated by the bite of  Hempel’s dilemma.  
Loewer (2001, p.40), for example, follows Papineau (1993) in using possible-worlds 
language which “require[s] that fundamental physical predicates (the atomic predicates of 
the language in which the complete physical description of the world is expressed) are 
not mental” [by ‘mental’ he means ‘intentional’ or ‘phenomenal’].   This seems rather 
                                                          
 6Crane & Mellor (1990) use a version of Hempel’s Dilemma to attack the notion 
of “reducibility in principle” (“RIP” – that all phenomena are ‘in principle’ reducible to 
physical facts).  If present physics is incomplete or false, then it can’t be reliably used as 
a reduction base, even an in-principle one.  But to rely on a reducibility-in-principle 
notion to specify what a future physics will have to include “if is to cover everything 
physical, is obviously viciously circular.”  They conclude that we can’t define the 
physical as “what is reducible in principle to physics,” whether that physics is the current 
version or an ideally-realized future version. 
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ontologically unsatisfying, in that it appears merely to define away the problem posed by 
Hempel’s dilemma, rather than to solve it. 
 Papineau (2002) provides a somewhat different version of the argument.  It is not 
necessary to know what a complete physics would include, he believes, so long as we 
“know what it won’t include” (p.41).  Supposing for the sake of the argument that we 
identify those things that count as mental.  We then label everything else as “non-
mentally identifiable.”  If we then presume that our sense of physical includes the 
requirement that non-mentally identifiable effects are always and only the result of non-
mentally identifiable causes, then we are forced to conclude that mental properties (since 
they clearly have effects manifest in the non-mental world) are “identical with (or 
realized by) something non-mentally identifiable.”  At first this appears circular, since it 
seems to merely demand that mental properties, even if we linguistically identify them as 
uniquely mental, must nonetheless be the product of physical properties – thus assuming 
the consequent of what we are trying to prove.  But for Papineau’s argument we must add 
the further condition that the physical domain be causally closed (this is a version of the 
argument from causal closure, which I will discuss below).  Given that essential 
stipulation, the argument seems sound.7
 Melnyk (2003a, 12-13), after discussing how Jeffrey Poland and Frank Jackson 
both attempted unsatisfactory responses to Hempel’s dilemma, offers a more complex 
analysis, which boils down to this:  If physicalism is explicated according to current 
 11
physics, and given a physicalist as one who weighs scientific hypotheses according to a 
scientific-realist view of the world (that is, hypotheses are “true or false in virtue of the 
way the mind-independent world is” [p.229]), then just because the presumed 
incompleteness/falseness of current physics renders today’s formulations of physicalism 
equally false or incomplete, this “provides no reason by itself to abandon being a 
physicalist; one can remain a physicalist, even though physicalism is unlikely, just so 
long as it is more likely than its relevant rivals” (p.234)    
 This strategy seems less than compelling as well.  Rather than provide a 
successful dodge around Hempel’s dilemma, it seems instead to misdirect us from the 
major point.  Melnyk’s argument doesn’t resolve the dilemma, but only makes it “okay” 
to remain a physicalist and still retain one’s dignity and integrity simply because  
physicalism is just slightly more likely to be true than its competitors.8  But this integrity 
is maintained at the cost of seriously vitiating the pull of physicalism which, after all, 
relies crucially on its presumption of truth.  Melnyk appears to want us to continue to 
accept the implications of physicalism while leaving us much less warrant to believe the 
physicalist argument itself. 
 As it stands, there seems no clear way around Hempel’s dilemma, but that doesn’t 
seem to matter.  Many, indeed probably most philosophers of mind are aware of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 7We will discover in the next chapter that this is more problematic than it 
presently appears – that in fact the causal closure argument merely pushes the circularity 
back one level. 
 8Integral to Melnyk’s argument is his reliance on abduction, “inference to the best 
explanation,” which I will soon consider in some detail in chapter 3. 
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problem (Papineau, 2002; Montero, 1999 & 2003; Melnyk, 2005; Loewer, 2001; Crane 
& Mellor, 1990; and Poland, 1994, among others discuss it, and some, as mentioned, 
have tried to tackle it).  In the absence of a survey, it is impossible to know whether many 
scientists are cognizant of the dilemma.  But whether they know of it or not, it is not 
unreasonable to speculate that (based on their actions and utterances) most scientists and 
many philosophers are inclined to ignore the obstacle presented by Hempel.  Recalcitrant 
as the problem is, it seems not to have dissuaded anyone from embracing physicalism.  
Perhaps this is due to a feeling of (at least) some confidence that, if today’s version of 
physical theory is not fully correct, it is at least largely so, and in fact is sufficient for us 
to recognize when some claim (say, that ghosts exist) clearly violates a reasonable 
construal of what it means to be physical.  Otherwise, Melnyk’s assertion (cited earlier) 
that, “a huge preponderance of current philosophers of mind happily call themselves 
physicalists” would be difficult to support.  As Barbara Montero suggests,  
Some may argue understanding the term ‘physical’ is no more difficult than 
understanding the term ‘table.’  They may point out that while we cannot provide 
necessary and sufficient conditions for tablehood, we nonetheless understand the 
concept because we can readily identify things that are clearly tables as well as 
things that are clearly not.  And the same is true, they may argue, of our notion of 
the physical. (1999, 183-84)9
 
 There clearly remain slippery issues in trying to form a more rigorous definition 
of what is meant by “physical,” but there does seem to be a consensus of sorts – just not 
what we normally expect of a consensus upon hearing that term.  It is this: That for most 
                                                          
 9Montero herself does not wholeheartedly endorse this view, arguing that even if 
we can identify central cases of physically-constituted objects, we need a broader theory 
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philosophers these days physicalism (in this respect much like pornography) is something 
you know when you see it.  As Frank Jackson (2006) put it “it has always seemed to me 
that we have a good enough idea of what physicalists have in mind to make sense of the 
debate over physicalism” (p.234). 
 With this final consideration, vague though it may be, of how we might define 
physicalism, I now embark on the balance of my project.  This will unfold as follows.  
Chapter two explores the notion of what it would take to prove the truth of physicalism.  
We shall quickly see that is not so easily done, and that physicalism (for now) is not so 
much “proved” to be true, as that its truth claims are accepted on the basis of an 
admittedly very robust inference to the best explanation.  
 Chapter three covers arguments that have been launched against physicalism, yet 
eventually concludes that these arguments go aground on epistemic shoals, falling to the 
strength of the inference to the best explanation just mentioned.  In chapter four I propose 
an alternative strategy that, depending on one’s point of view, either threatens or 
promises to defeat  physicalism’s truth claims by falsifying the induction that underwrites 
the inference to the best explanation supporting the physicalist doctrine.  I explain that 
physicalism’s vulnerability lies in the causal closure assumption, and that empirical 
evidence with certain properties is necessary to defeat closure. 
 I begin chapter five by making explicit the set of evidence I will offer as a 
counterexample to causal closure and, thus, to physicalism.  The rest of chapter five, and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to tell us “how we are supposed to go on from there” in determining less obvious 
instances of physical entities. 
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chapters six through eight will give a detailed account of the evidence and its 
provenance.  Chapter nine will begin a consideration of the philosophical status of this 
evidence which will be completed in the first section of chapter ten.  The remainder of 
the chapter examines the criteria we should require of evidence for it to count as 
scientific, and argues that the evidence I present meets those criteria.  In chapter 11 I will 
engage and (hopefully) put to rest some of the more prominent objections that might be 
lodged against the evidence, and then will argue that, if the evidence I am presenting is 
rejected as insufficiently meeting the criteria of acceptability, then the legitimacy of 
conventional scientific evidence may be called into question as well on similar grounds.  
In the final chapter I entertain implications and the conclusions they lead to that 
physicalism is false...or, perhaps, just not as true as we thought it was. 
 15
Chapter 2:  The Case For Physicalism 
 
 Even if the state of current physics’ incompleteness means there may be no fully 
sufficient definition of physicalism, there are certain important features typically 
attributed to or required of the doctrine that help us better define physicalism’s 
boundaries.  I would argue that, in fact, the acceptance of these features helps boost the 
confidence for many physicalists that physicalism, while based on an incomplete physics, 




 Physicalist doctrine relies on various underlying assumptions, but for important 
reasons one that is indispensable is causal closure.  The causal closure stipulation 
requires all causal chains to be instantiated entirely within the physical domain, as a 
consequence of underlying physical facts. 
 There are a number of ways of formulating causal closure (Montero, 2003).   For 
one, Kim (1998) puts it this way: “no causal chain will ever cross the boundary between 
the physical and the nonphysical.”  Thus, “if you pick any physical event and trace out its 
causal ancestry or posterity, that will never take you outside the physical domain” (p.40).   
Melnyk proposes that physicalism “entails the closure thesis that for every physical token 
there is a preceding physical condition that is sufficient for it, given the physical 
laws....For suppose there were a physical token that had no preceding sufficient condition 
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that was physical; since, by universal determinism, this token must have some preceding 
sufficient condition, this condition would have to be in part nonphysical and 
nonphysically realized, which would contradict the assumption of [physicalism]” 
(Melnyk, 2003a, 222). 
 If (as I stated in the opening paragraph in chapter 1) physicalism requires all 
causation, events, and entities to be “literally physical, physically realized, or a 
consequence of only physical facts or states of affairs,” then causal closure must 
necessarily be true if physicalism is to be true.  For if closure is false, causes can enter 
from outside the physical domain, thus rendering physicalism false.  Because of this, the 
causal closure principle is taken as foundational for physicalism, and treated 
axiomatically.  Raymont declares that, “every good physicalist endorses the principle of 
closure” (2003, 225)  And as Melnyk observes, “[I]f this closure thesis were found to be 
false, then, so long as the assumption of universal determinism was retained...physicalism 
would have to be rejected as false also” (2003a, 222).1   
 
Causal Exclusion 
 Other candidate principles have been offered as necessary to a full-fledged 
physicalism.  Causal exclusion (Kim, 2005; Raymont, 2003; Yablo, 1992) seeks to avoid 
overdetermination of physical causes by mental ones.  Exclusion requires that an event in 
the physical world with a sufficient physical cause not be overdetermined by the presence 
                                                          
 1As will shortly be discussed, there is some question whether determinism is even 
necessary to this formulation. 
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of any non-physical mental cause aimed at the same event.  If closure is true, it eliminates 
the possibility of extra-physical sufficient causes intruding on physical causal chains.  
But that by itself leaves room for fundamentally-mental (hence non-physical) forces to 
add superfluous layers of (non-necessary, non-sufficient) causation to otherwise 
sufficiently physical events.   
 Such overdetermination is offensive in two respects: first, it violates our desire for 
parsimonious explanations; if one set of causes is sufficient, why populate an explanation 
with more when there is neither need nor evidence for them?  Since physicalists maintain 
that mental causes are just physical causes, then there is no reason to include talk of 
mental causes in our causal explanations.  The second reason for the exclusion principle 
is that to postulate such mental causes (or even simply epiphenomenal mental states) in 
addition to physical ones is to dilute our notions of physicalism.  If non-physical mental 
causes or states exist, no matter how causally ephemeral they may be, it still undermines 
the physicalist’s claim to physicalism’s exclusivity, and leaves the door open to anti-
physicalists who want to entertain the possibility of more efficacious non-physical causal 
states. 
 Notably, exclusion doesn’t enjoy the same universal endorsement from 
physicalists as does closure.  There are various arguments against it, amounting in effect 
to a concern that the worry about overdetermination is somewhat unparsimonious itself.  
Exclusion is not necessary to a weakened form of physicalism, in which epiphenomenal 
mental properties and overdetermination by mental causes are not particularly 
objectionable, just so long as physical causes are still decisive in all causation in the 
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universe.  For if an event has a sufficient physical cause, plus a non-necessary, 
overdetermining mental cause, then that event is still physically determined, no matter 
what extraneous role the mental cause might play. 
 One philosopher puts it this way:  There is no convincing reason why “...there is 
anything problematic in the notion of multiple explanantia bearing down on a single 
explanandum...Merely to allow for such explanatory overdetermination is not yet to 
vindicate the causal relevance of mental properties, for it must also be shown that they, at 
least some of the time, make a novel explanatory contribution.”  But if it is ever shown 
that mental properties actually do have relevant causal properties, there would be “no 
reason to deny that they stand in causal relevance relations to both mental and physical 
explananda” (Raymont, 2003, 240).  In other words, either non-physical mental causes (if 
they exist) are overdeterminate and superfluous, or they are epiphenomenal and can 
safely be ignored.  On the other hand, should they ever be found to actually have causal 
relevance, they would need to be included in our ontology.  If physicalism thus requires 
at least that much amending, that is the price of arriving at a fuller understanding of the 
universe.  But either way, the exclusion principle may thus itself be superfluous, given 
the truth of closure. 
 
Determinism 
 A further principle important to physicalism is determinism, the oft-demonstrated 
principle that events must have sufficient causes; that causes must themselves have a 
fully-sufficient causal history traceable in-principle back as far as the universe goes (with 
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some exceptions governed by truly indeterministic, yet still physical events); and that all 
causes are consistent with all other neighboring causes in the metaphysical context they 
share.  
 While it is evident that determinism is an important feature in our world, we must 
question whether it is essential to a specification of physicalism.  Can we conceive of a 
physical world that is profoundly indeterministic, where no facts determine any other 
facts?  In other words, a world that is completely and only indeterministic (yet still 
physical)?  There seem to be two ways such a world might be constituted:  It might be 
fully chaotic in the classical sense (not in the determinate sense chaos theory is 
understood today), but there is no reason that we know to resist the idea that such a world 
could still be fully physical.  Perhaps, though, certain deterministic relations develop 
necessarily any time a sufficient number of fundamental physical entities populate a 
physical domain.  It might then be reasonable to entertain the possibility of an 
indeterministic world so long as that world were sufficiently sparsely populated.   
 In either case, it seems fully possible to conceive of a physical world without 
determinism, so determinism appears not to be essential to physicalism.  We can propose 
that, perhaps, determinism is a necessary consequence of physicalism.  But it is perhaps 
open to question whether determinism is necessary for physicalism.2
 
                                                          
 2Interestingly, Papineau (2002, 236-241) is persuaded that, while physical 
determinism can preclude strictly mental causes, determinism in and of itself does not 
necessarily preclude the presence of non-physical mental causation within the physical 
domain.  This is because it is possible that a causal mental, non-physical state could itself 
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The “Completeness” of Physics 
 The term “completeness of physics” has two meanings.  It can refer to the hope 
that our incomplete understanding of physical laws and phenomena will eventually be 
remedied, and we will arrive at a full (complete) picture of physics.  But it can also refer 
to another specified feature of physicalism, that the physical world is complete in the 
sense that it contains all that is needed to fill out reality, and therefore there is neither 
room nor need for any sort of (presumptive) non-physical causes or entities.  It might 
seem obvious that this is largely just a matter of perspectival difference from 
formulations of physicalism’s other features, such as closure, exclusion, and 
determinism/indeterminism.   But there is a difference in perspective, at the very least. 
 Though other philosophers sometimes make use of the “completeness” locution, 
Papineau is its main proponent (Papineau, 2002; 2001).  He does not avail himself so 
much of the ‘closure’ or ‘exclusion’ terminology, choosing instead to talk of the 
‘completeness of physics.’  From the perspective of causation, the physical world is 
necessarily complete.  But the concept parses differently than causal closure, in that there 
is a sense in which causation in the physical world is affirmed as being fully sufficient, 
rather than defined by eliminating the possibility of any other kind of causation.  In other 
words, as opposed to the sense in which causal closure uses language to seem to actively 
exclude extra-physical causes, completeness stipulates only that there is no need of or use 
for non-physical causes.  So, “all physical effects are fully caused by purely physical 
prior histories” (Papineau, 2002, 17 – though in a footnote he offers a stricter formulation 
                                                                                                                                                                             
behave deterministically. 
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to take indeterministic events into account, as well). In a certain sense, an overt causal 
closure stipulation is unneeded because the only causation that is effective, indeed the 
only causation that exists, is already present exclusively here in physicality. 
 Of course, the notion behind causal closure was never one of blocking extra-
physical causes that existed but should not be allowed admittance to physicality.  Rather, 
the presumption has always been that no such extra-physical causes exist, and closure 
was formulated as it is merely as a convenient way of specifying the boundaries of 
physical causation.  In that sense, the completeness formulation is merely a different way 
of stating closure in that completeness, like closure, denies the presence of extra-physical 
causation. 
 
 In concluding this section, it seems apparent that the crucial feature of 
physicalism is the causal closure principle. The exclusion principle, while (perhaps) 
useful, is unnecessary.  Determinism, which gives physicalism its bite with regard to the 
free will and agency issue, may be entailed by, but does not seem to be necessary to 
physicalism.  And completeness seems to derive its efficacy from the closure principle.  
What this boils down to, it seems, is that physicalism is true only if causal closure is true.  
We will discuss this in additional detail shortly. 
 
Proving Physicalism True 
 It may seem strange that we don’t know to be fully true a doctrine (physicalism) 
that the preponderance of scientists and philosophers seem to accept almost implicitly as 
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true.  But that is the situation physicalism confronts us with – a situation that leads to the 
question: How can we finally prove physicalism to be true?  For the physicalist, the 
answer may prove discouraging. 
  What would prove physicalism true?  Answering this question (and the one to 
follow: What would prove physicalism false?)  requires that we understand what sort of a 
thesis physicalism is.  I paraphrase an argument I heard in 1996 from Professor Georges 
Rey:  “We know physicalism is true,” he said, “because we have many instances where 
something was believed to be non-physical, but which after rigorous scientific 
investigation turned out after all to be physical.  And we know of none that, after a 
thorough examination haven’t turned out to physical.  And once we have been able to 
thoroughly examined the mind, I’m sure we will find it to be physical, too.”   
Subsequently, he made a roughly similar argument in a paper defending physicalism.  
  [I]t appears as though every regularity in the spatio-temporal world is, in one way 
or another, susceptible to an ultimately physical (and/or mathematical) 
explanation....[I] think there can be no doubt that paths through [successive 
reductive] levels, each one providing, inter alia, more fine-grained mechanisms 
than the last, appear to exist at least for every nonmental regularity.  One reason 
for applying the strategy to the mind is the reasonable expectation that mental 
regularities, particularly those involving patently spatiotemporal phenomena, will 
not prove to be some odd exception. (Rey, 2001, 100-101) 
 
 This is a general formulation of what is often referred to as the “success of 
science” argument against non-physical explanations of mind.  Melnyk echoes Rey’s 
position by arguing that the preponderance of the evidence from other fields suggest that 
ultimately the mental will turn out to be physical as well (Melnyk, 2003a, 258).   Melnyk 
further elaborates on the theme – the success of physics so far in “finding sufficient 
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physical causes...provides inductive evidence that all physical events, including both 
unexamined physical events and examined-but-as-yet-unexplained physical events, have 
sufficient physical causes” (p.289). One begins from this to gain a basic understanding of 
the underlying argument for physicalism.  Indeed, my discussion here is not an argument 
so much as a reminder.  Physicalistic assumptions are taken to be so fundamental that we 
often forget that physicalism is not an a priori position, but rather one that is a 
posteriori.3  “But of course the world is physicalistic,” one might say.  “What else could 
it be?” 
 Philosophy traditionally prefers a priori analyses since, among other things, these 
are less vulnerable to mistakes or changes in human perceptions of the world, mistakes in 
interpreting contingent and necessary truths, and gaps or confusions in our understanding 
of nature.  When philosophers entertain empirical or a posteriori content at all, it is 
usually only to the extent that it informs the philosophical context in some useful way.   
 Physicalism, however, is an unusual departure from this, in that it is at root a 
posteriori, a covertly empirical proposition that despite this inherent empirical nature is 
pressed into service to ground subsequent logical and ostensibly a priori argumentative 
structure (Papineau, 2001; Poland, 1994; Melnyk, 2003a).  I use “covert” here not 
because physicalism’s empirical content would be denied by its advocates if cornered, 
but because in arguments which appeal to the doctrine for justification its own empirical 
origins are often tacitly ignored and physicalism treated as if it were as settled as if 
                                                          
 3I am momentarily side-stepping the a priori vs. a posteriori physicalism debate, 
but will engage it before the end of this chapter. 
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established on an a priori basis. 
 A simplistic formulation (though Melnyk lodges a similar argument – see 
Melnyk, 2003b, 160-161) of one leg of the physicalist argument might run somewhat as 
follows: All phenomena that have been investigated thoroughly by Physics have turned 
out to be physical in nature.  Because of Physics’s success in describing/explaining the 
universe in exclusively physical terms, it is highly likely that phenomena not yet fully 
elucidated in physical terms will one day be found to be fully amenable to physical 
explanation. [A corollary: Even for phenomena not yet explained, we may have plausible 
conjectures as to how they might fit into a fully-realized physical theory.]   Any 
phenomenon that can’t be reconciled with a physical explanation is likely not a real 
phenomenon.4
 Thus formulated, this argument looks very much to be circular.  If evidence for 
any non-physical phenomena was ever found to exist, it would be ruled not to exist no 
matter how robust because no physical explanation could be found.5  In the interest of 
space, I will not attempt to review arguments defending against circularity accusations 
                                                          
 4 The step from not-physical to not-real might be deemed objectionable or 
tendentious by some.  However, I believe there are more than ample grounds to 
characterize the position this way.  For example, in his book Physicalism, Jeffrey Poland 
(1994) mentions strategies physicalists might deploy for rejecting possible 
counterexamples to physicalism.  In one such strategy, physicalists might argue that 
“...some phenomenon that does not fit into the [physicalist] system is not objectively real 
and...claims about it are not objectively true or false” (243), echoing logical-positivists’ 
rejections of metaphysical claims in general as “non-sense” (sinnlos). 
 5 Bringing to mind the old joke about the only two rules enforced at one’s new 
place of employment: “Rule 1: The boss is always right.  Rule 2: In the event the boss is 
ever wrong, see Rule 1.” 
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here.  I believe such arguments fail in that at root, physicalist arguments are inherently 
circular, largely because physicalism is based on an induction which, when treated as if it 
presents an a priori conclusion, begs the question (I will have more to say about this in 
what follows).  Nevertheless, most physicalists seem to merely take for granted the 
empirical content of their defining theory – some tacitly, often without much comment, 
while others are more vocal about it.   
 Again citing Melnyk, “. . . physicalism is a contingent thesis, true at those 
possible worlds at which the only causal or contingent tokens are either physical or 
physically realized.”   He then observes: “because empirical investigation is obviously 
required to determine what sort of causal or contingent tokens the actual world contains, 
empirical investigation will be required to determine whether. . . physicalism is true” 
(2003a, 27).  And as the closing statement to one of his seminal papers on physicalism 
(2001), Papineau addresses those who doubt the completeness of physics:  “I see no 
virtue in philosophers refusing to accept a premise that, by any normal inductive 
standards, has been fully established by over a century of empirical research” (p.33). 
 Since physicalism (whether about the universe in general or the nature of mind 
specifically) rests almost exclusively on inductive evidence, no a priori argument can 
conclusively undermine it.   Melnyk tacitly admits this when he declares that such 
notables as Chalmers, Kripke, and Jackson have “failed” in trying to mount 
philosophically-based anti-physicalist arguments (Melnyk, 2003b, 166, n. 12).  Whether 
or not his assessment of this “failure” is correct, Melnyk is saying in essence that 
exclusively philosophical arguments against physicalism have failed, and since there is 
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clear empirical evidence for the thesis and (as far as he can tell) no evidence counting 
against physicalism (Melnyk, 2003a, 189; 2003b, 161), then the case is closed.  
 Nevertheless, because the nature of inductions is such that they can at any time be 
shown to be false by a sufficiently robust counterexample (providing the ontology of the 
world allows there to be one), those whose theory rests largely or exclusively on 
inductive evidence are always on the lookout for arguments that bolster their positions 
and strengthen resistance to contravening evidence.6  In the case of physicalism there are 
a few of these. 
 
Supporting Arguments for Physicalism (And Against Dualism) 
 Physicalists avail themselves of a number of arguments to help reinforce the 
fundamentally contingent nature of the doctrine they espouse.  As we shall see, none of 
these arguments are immune to objections, but in aggregate they do strengthen 
physicalist convictions. 
 
Argument from Causation 
 The argument from causation tries to show that physicalism must be true because, 
the ontology of causation being what it is, physical causation must be fully capable, 
without being overdetermined, of accounting for mental effects in the world.  Papineau 
(2002) summarizes the argument from causation as: 
                                                          
 6That is, the stronger the inductive position is, the easier it is to cast doubt on or 
marginalize anything but the most weighty falsifying evidence. 
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Many effects that we attribute to conscious causes have full physical causes.  But 
it would be absurd to suppose that these effects are caused twice over.  So the 
conscious causes must be identical to some part of those physical causes. (P.17) 
 
The argument rests on three premises (Papineau, 2992, 17-18; I rearrange the premises 
here to strengthen the impact of the argument): 
 
 (1) All physical effects are fully caused by purely physical prior histories.  
 
 
This is a re-statement of completeness (discussed above).  Effectively, there is no need to 
go beyond the physical world to find sufficient causal explanations for phenomena found 
within the bounds of the physical universe. 
 
 (2) Conscious mental occurrences have physical effects. 
 
 
As it stands, this statement is unclear.  Do conscious states held internally but which 
remain externally unexpressed count as “physical”?  Papineau’s examples involve only 
conscious states expressed through physical behavior (e.g., going to the fridge to retrieve 
a beer because one is thirsty).  But it seems reasonable to extend the intent of premise (2) 
in this fashion: Even internally-held, externally-unexpressed conscious states cause 
changes in the neuronal configurations, synaptic firing sequences, and so on.  These 
count as physical effects.  Hence the premise applies not only to conscious states 
manifest by externally-executed behaviors (such as going to the fridge for a beer), but 
also to internally-held, externally-unexpressed conscious states (such as “merely wanting 
to”, but taking no action). The only conscious states unaddressed would be any that 
express no physical effects and, since we (presumably) have no physical evidence for 
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these, we have no reason to suspect there are any.  The third premise is: 
 
(3) The physical effects of conscious causes aren’t always overdetermined by 
distinct causes. 
 
This amounts to the causal exclusion argument and, as Papineau tells us “materialism 
now follows.”  A point of interest about this argument comes in premises (2) and (3), 
neither of which are universally quantified.  But that doesn’t matter for the full force of 
the argument to come through.  If only some conscious states – those with physical 
effects – are physical, there should be little reluctance to conclude that all conscious 
states are likely physical.  And if at least some physical effects of conscious causes are 
not overdetermined, then why should any of them be?7
So here is the full argument: 
 (1) All physical effects are fully caused by purely physical prior histories.  
 (2) Conscious mental occurrences have physical effects. 
(3) The physical effects of conscious causes aren’t always overdetermined by 
distinct causes.   
 
We then infer from this the conclusion that: 
 




 An objection raised against this argument by Robert Bishop (2006) is aimed at 
what I number here as premise (1) (it is premise 2 in the original argument).  Bishop 
                                                          
 7The third premise adds some confusion to the argument.  Since it is not 
universally quantified, it seems to miss the full force of the exclusion principle – 
allowing, it seems, the existence of some instances of overdeterminism in mental states.  I 
have found no commentator who has successfully accounted for this, and I have not yet 
found anywhere that Papineau himself has clarified what he had in mind. 
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worries that there is a further, hidden premise that is necessary to make the causal 
argument work.  He considers premise (1) to be a “typicality condition,” in that “prior 
physical events and the physical laws bring about subsequent physical events,” only “in 
the absence of nonphysical influences.”   Thus, “all physical effects are fully caused by 
purely physical prior histories” in every case where nonphysical influences do not 
intrude.  Bishop then argues that a tacit assumption lurks behind the scenes to keep the 
causal argument, meant to state the ontological exclusivity of physicalism, from being 
weakened by this loophole that leaves open the possibility of non-physical causes or 
entities.  This “hidden premise” is that “the only efficacious states and causes are 
physical ones,” which must be added in order for the full-bodied form of physicalism 
desired by Papineau and others to follow, since without this premise Papineau’s 
argument seems to beg the question as to whether all states, including mental ones, are 
physical.  Bishop’s objection then becomes that the causal argument fails through the 
logical fallacy of assuming the consequent. 
 This objection is responded to in a short paper by Francois Loth (Loth, n.d.).  
Loth pleads the case of completeness over closure.  “Closure is an ontological thesis,” he 
observes.  “It is the conclusion of the causal argument,” and “cannot be used as a premiss 
in the argument intended to prove it.”  However, what I have listed as premise (1) (that 
all physical effects have exclusively physical histories), when “interpreted as a necessary 
method of physical science, does not contain the ontological conclusion of the argument” 
(pp.3-4).  In other words, the assertion that “physical effects have only physical causes” 
(strong closure – at least, as identified by Loth – asserting an ontological claim) should 
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be contrasted with Papineau’s premise “all physical effects are fully caused by purely 
physical prior histories,” with this latter being a methodological assumption of scientific 
practice that does not assert an ontological claim.   
 Now, Loth’s objection appears to hang on a rather finely-parsed distinction, 
perhaps best summarized as “while strong closure insists that everything is physical, 
Papineau’s formulation only claims that, to the best of our ability to tell, only physical 
causes precede physical effects.”  Whether Papineau would actually agree with this, it 
does seem to capture the flavor of completeness as Papineau conceives it. 
 In this case, the argument does appear to go against Bishop, but not very tellingly.  
The hidden assumption, if there is one,8  doesn’t seem so much to be a closure statement 
in principle.  But there does seem to be a hidden assumption, or the causal argument 
would not follow.  The assumption is this:  That the assertion that “all physical effects are 
fully caused by purely physical prior histories” is actually true.   
 Now, someone could object by observing that premises in an argument are 
supposed to be assumed true.  But the presumed truth-value is not so obvious in this case.  
The premise in question is not a necessary fact nor is it an obvious contingent fact. It is 
instead a contingent assertion whose truth value rests on sufficient empirical evidence.  
But that begs the question:  has sufficient evidence been provided for us to be confident 
                                                          
 8It is unclear in his paper whether Bishop notices the work being done by the 
phrase “purely physical” in premise (1) (“All physical effects are fully caused by purely 
physical prior histories”).  This appears to be Papineau’s signal that the statement is 
meant to be stronger than a mere specification of physical causal sufficiency that still 
allows superfluous mental causes as well (and of course, premise (3) presumably takes 
care of mental overdetermination in any case). 
 31
that the claim in premise (1) is true?   In trying to answer this question we discover the 
real potential for circularity in the causal argument.  In order for us to accept premise (1) 
as true, we have to first accept the causal argument itself as true.  And to accept that, we 
have to feel confident that all physical effects really do have purely physical prior 
histories.  But given the contingent and unfinished state of scientific inquiry, we can have 
no certainty that the “all” in the premise actually holds. 
 But shouldn’t we be reasonable?  Since it is unreasonable to expect us to know 
that “all” physical effects have purely physical causal histories, can’t we fairly trust they 
do if we have sufficient inductive evidence, absent any warranted counterexamples, to 
accept the causal argument as rational and (if only provisionally) sufficient?  I think the 
answer is yes, and this is the best defense of the causal argument that remains.  We may 
not have sufficient a priori warrant to accept premise (1), but our a posteriori evidence 
gives us strong reasons to accept it.  This seems to be how Papineau and others mean to 
justify their faith in premise (1), and therefore what justifies the conclusion of the causal 
argument.  If we can ground premise (1) strongly enough in empirical evidence, then we 
have a good-enough solution that saves the causal argument from being condemned for 
its circularity.  In large measure, this justification rests in two empirically-based 
arguments, the argument from the success of science, and the argument from physiology. 
 In discussing the inductive nature of the evidence supporting the physicalist 
doctrine, we have already touched on the “success of science” argument above.  It runs 
roughly like this: “All phenomena in the world that have been thoroughly investigated by 
science have proved to be physical.  We have no reason to doubt that remaining 
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phenomena, once they are thoroughly investigated, will also turn out to be physical.”  
Little needs to be said further here about this argument, except to note that, in the absence 
of any good reason to believe otherwise, the argument seems to be plausible.  More needs 
to be said, however, about the argument from physiology. 
 
Argument from Physiology 
 The argument from physiology (AFP) appeals to the successes of modern 
neuroscience as being strongly evidentiary in establishing the truth of physical/mental 
identity and the falsity of non-physical (dualistic) explanations of mind.  Some of the 
most prominent physicalist theorists take it as a knock-down argument in favor of 
physicalism.  For, after all, if physicalism is true, one would reasonably expect the tools 
of physical science to be efficacious in establishing the thesis.  Jackson (1996, cited in 
Montero 2003, 178) puts it this way: 
[I]t is widely believed that the physical sciences, or, rather, some natural 
extension of them, can in principle give a complete explanation for each and 
every bodily movement, or at least can do so up to whatever completeness is 
compatible with indeterminism in physics. In this regard we do not differ from 
motor cars or plants. It is not plausible that in order to explain the behaviour of a 
motor car we need to go outside the resources of the physical sciences, and the 
same goes for the growth of plants since the demise of vitalism. I will take it for 
granted that the same goes for us...  
And Montero herself (2003,184) provides one of the simplest formulations: “The 
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physiological argument claims that we have good inductive evidence for the view that the 
mind is fundamentally nonmental, which is not something dualists can accept.”   
 There are really three prongs to the argument from physiology.  The first might be 
thought of as the “absence of evidence” argument which, simply put, runs like this:  
Despite years of research, neuroscience has never found any evidence for non-physical 
causes in the brain (and science has not found non-physical mind-related evidence 
elsewhere).  Hence, regarding mental “sensations’ (qualia or other sorts of 
phenomenological experiences): 
[T]he empirically discovered sufficiency of certain neural occurrences for certain 
sensations constitutes evidence for the physicalistic hypothesis that the sensations 
in question are either physical or functional but physically realized.  And the same 
discovery surely also provides evidence, albeit weaker evidence, that all 
sensations are either physical or physically realized, for it would be somewhat 
surprising if only some, but not all, sensations were physical or physically 
realized. ( Melnyk 2003a, 306) 
  
 Papineau (2001, 30) maintains that most, perhaps all natural phenomena are 
explainable “by a few fundamental physical forces.”  Further, “...detailed modern 
research has failed to uncover any such anomalous physical processes.”  Hence, “if there 
were such forces, they could be expected to display some manifestation of their presence.  
But detailed physiological investigation failed to uncover evidence of anything except 
familiar physical forces” (p.31).   Georges Rey (referring to Foster, 1991, 200) first 
specifies dualism’s claim  as being “that the brain is subject to certain non-physical 
influences which do not affect the other physical systems which science investigates.”  
He  then counters that “there has certainly been sufficient investigation of the brain to 
refute this.  At a certain point, the absence of evidence of any physical violations 
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becomes evidence of absence” (p.115). 
 Melnyk (2003a) agrees:  “...if interactive dualism...were true, then there would be 
human behaviors for which no sufficient neurophysiological  case can be found by 
tracing efferent neurons back into the brain; and discovering such behaviors would 
clearly provide spectacular support for the dualist hypothesis...However, neuroscientists 
have as yet failed to find any such behaviors, and my strong impression is that they do 
not expect to” (p.187). 
 A second branch of the AFP again appeals to neuroscience, but this time as an 
explanator of prima facie non-physical mentalistic phenomena.  So, for example – 
schizophrenic hallucinations might once have been thought to be caused by malicious 
demons interfering with the subject’s mental or “spiritual” processes.  Yet 
psychopharmacological intervention successfully ameliorates such hallucinations, 
bringing these patients back to a semblance of rational functioning.  We can then 
conclude that the physiological brain mechanisms the respective psychoactive drugs alter 
must at root be the cause of the malady, and not some supernatural presence for which 
there is no actual evidence other than the now-remediated symptomology.9
 Other psychoactive drugs also have significant effects on individual behavior, 
expression of personality, and the presence or absence of conscious experience.  Injuries 
or diseases that affect brain structures and processes, as well as direct manipulation and 
stimulation of the brain also have related effects.  Since aspects of consciousness, 
                                                          
 9Of course, this is not the only evidence that schizophrenia has physical, rather 
than supernatural causes. 
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personality, and character have long been considered to be essential elements of our 
mental landscape, yet now seem imminently alterable through neurological intervention 
of various sorts, physicalists’ confidence grows that all mental states are reducible to 
physical processes.  That neuroscientists using new neuroimaging technologies can look 
on as various behaviors and reactions occur in correlation with neurochemical processes 
unfolding in the brain adds further to the levels of confidence. 
 A newly-developed specialized form of this second branch of the AFP is being 
used to deflate a dualistic strategy I shall refer to as the “argument from mysticism.”  The 
argument from mysticism (or AFM) runs something like this: There are humans that 
sincerely report certain subjective experiences, among them near-death experiences, out-
of-body experiences, and mystical experiences. Even though such phenomenal events 
apparently leave no trace that can be objectively demonstrated to anyone other than the 
experiencer, these states are nonetheless real, have an other-than-physical quality, and 
therefore constitute evidence of sorts against the sufficiency of physicalist claims.  
Therefore, unless and until a satisfactory physicalistic explanation for such experiences 
can be demonstrated, physicalism cannot fairly claim to provide a full explanation of the 
world.   
 Recently, however, a counter to this attack has emerged.  Loosely dubbed 
“neurotheology,” the discipline attempts to show that these subjective phenomena, 
particularly out-of-body experiences and mystical states can be detected and analyzed, or 
even duplicated in human subjects merely by neurological intervention in specific brain 
functions, either by directly or indirectly stimulating certain brain structures or observing 
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and measuring the effects of certain brain disruptions.   
 For instance, in an experiment with an epilepsy patient, electrical stimulation of a 
brain structure called the right angular gyrus induced the sensation in the subject of her 
consciousness becoming detached from her body, similar to accounts of out-of-body 
experiences (Blanke, et al, 2002).  Other experiments using low-strength, frequency-
modulated magnetic fields applied sub-cranially, evoked in many subjects the feeling of a 
“sensed presence” of an entity or force to which they often ascribed divine or 
supernatural attributes or personalities (Persinger, 2001, 2002/2003).  In studies of 
experienced meditators (Franciscan nuns, Buddhist monks), neuroimaging techniques 
were able to isolate the brain structures involved in meditative practice, suggesting a 
plausible neuroscientific account for peak meditative and mystical experiences 
(Newberg, et al 2002; Newberg, et al, 2003).  An array of other neuroscientific 
approaches have produced related neurological correlates of mental states previously 
taken as evidence of non-physical mental activity (Newberg & Iverson, 2003; Newberg 
& Lee, 2005). 
 Neuroscientists make the argument in this way: If brain manipulation can 
reproduce these phenomena, then we may conclude that yes, such mental states are real; 
but they are only neurologically and experientially real – they do not serve as evidence of 
non-physical states, even if people are right in reporting them as real (if misinterpreted) 
events.  Since it is only the subjective interpretation of such states’ etiology that is 
mistaken, then the fact of their being real poses no threat to physicalism.  As one scientist 
puts it, 
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If we realize that mystical experiences originate from the same neurological 
mechanisms that underlie hallucinations from sensorial deprivation and drug-
induced ‘visions,’ I bet dollar to donut that the reality experienced by meditating 
Buddhists and praying nuns is entirely contained in their mind and is not a 
glimpse of a ‘higher’ realm, as tantalizing as that idea might be. (Pigliucci, 
2002/2003, 270) 
 
 Each of the preceding arguments counts powerfully in support of the crucial 
completeness premise of the argument for causation.  But their contingent nature means 
they can never be immune to counterargument.  The argument from the success of 
science (that all phenomena examined by science have turned out to be physical) could in 
principle be undermined by a phenomenon fully examined by science that turns out not to 
be physical or physically-explainable.   
 And against the “absence of evidence” prong of the argument from physiology, 
Barbara Montero has this to say:  “It is not clear,” she says, “That lack of evidence for the 
fundamentally mental amounts to evidence that the fundamentally mental does not exist” 
(2003, 185).  We might flesh this out in more detail by asking, why should we assume 
that mere absence of evidence is persuasive?  After all, there are two ways science might 
be missing evidence of non-physical mental causality.  One is if our neuroscience is still 
too coarse-grained to detect subtle non-physical mental influences as they interact with 
physical brain processes to generate causal cascades that lead to manifesting initially-
internal, non-physical mental states in outwardly-observable, physically-mediated 
behavior.   
 On the other hand, why should mental causal influences be observable by 
neuroscience in the first place?  If those anti-interactionists who argued against Descartes 
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are right, a non-physical substance would be unable to influence a physical substance, 
given the ontologically orthogonal natures involved.  Assuming (for the sake of 
argument) this to be true, why should we expect that mental states would ever even 
register on the instruments of physical science?  On this argument, a living human brain 
might be heavily populated with non-physical causal influences, yet an EEG, fMRI, PET 
scanner, or MEG might be totally incapable of detecting the fact.  Effects from non-
physical causes might simply be attributed to some plausible physical explanation or 
other.  One might argue that trying to find and measure non-physical interactions in the 
brain using physical detection mechanisms would be analogous to venturing a 
measurement of the distance between Austin and Lubbock, Texas with a thermometer. 
 This suggests an angle of attack against one variation of the “success of science” 
argument.  Referred to by some as the Methodological Naturalism argument for 
physicalism, the argument asserts that “the metaphysical picture of the world that one is 
led to by the methods of natural science is physicalism” (Stoljar, 2005 )  But if one 
counter to physicalism is that there are non-physical causes, properties, and entities, and 
if the methods of natural science only elucidate these which are physical, then even if 
there are non-physical causes, properties, and entities, they will not be directly detectable 
by the methods of natural science, so the methods of natural science are unreasonably 
biased towards finding physicalism true. 
 The argument from neurotheology invites a different sort of attack.  In this case 
the counterargument (which I dub the “argument from transduction”) might run 
something like this: “Of course there are structures in the brain that when stimulated 
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generate experiences very similar to mystical or religious ecstatic states.  How else might 
non-physically-generated veridical mystical or religious ecstatic states be experienced?  
There must be mechanisms in the brain that transduce a non-physical ‘signal’ into a 
physical one so that this ‘signal’ can have the causal impact on the percipient that God 
(or Allah, or Vishnu, or the Tao, or whatever supernatural source one might choose) 
intends.”  Such an argument suggests that certain brain features act as “receivers” and 
transducers for non-physical causal influences.  This argument doesn’t have to be made 
from a strictly religious or mystical perspective, of course.  It could be adapted to fit a 
spectrum of dualist or dualistic proposals. 
 I won’t treat rebuttals to these counterarguments here.10  But the arguments 
themselves are indicative of a fundamental problem in attempting a conclusive proof of 
physicalism.  Thanks to the weaknesses inherent in induction as a truth-making 
methodology, all arguments for physicalism are inevitably inconclusive.  So long as any 
lacunae in the physical description of the world exists that are either not satisfiable by 
scientific fact or the solution to which is not logically (deductively) implied by other 
known facts and laws in the physical world, there is always the possibility that there is 
some small corner of the universe where something non-physical or extra-physical lurks.  
                                                          
 10In an interesting way there aren’t any fully satisfactory rebuttals, as they would 
prove very similar to the “God of the Gaps” argument often attributed to proponents of 
the Intelligent Design (ID) theory.  In ID theory, the arguments in support of the theory 
often appeal to areas of unknowns in science.  Hence, for example, since scientists thus 
far have no strong evidence (nor even a persuasive theory) for a fully-physical 
abiogenesis, theists can argue against science that whatever role evolution does or does 
not play in the transformation of organisms, it is plausible to think that God played the 
primary role in the actual creation of life.  
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Therefore, to prove physicalism fully true would require the following: 1) the full and 
complete explication of the natural world in physical terms, and 2) The complete and 
unambiguous reduction of all phenomena belonging to all other sciences to physics.  In 
other words, we have to examine every crow before we can certify beyond doubt that all 
crows are black.11    
 So the only way one could conclusively say that the universe is physical is by 
examining all facts, laws, and phenomena and discovering nothing there that is not 
physical, or that is not at least a consequence only of physical facts and principles.12  The 
prospects for this happening in the lifetime of the human race are, of course, less than 
negligible, but there seems no other solution for establishing physicalism that could be as 
conclusive.  Unless and until such an unlikely feat is achieved, physicalists must put up 
with their chosen theory being vulnerable to counterexamples – should any exist.  
 There is one fairly recently-developed strategy that tries to provide an a priori 
                                                          
 11In a version of the classic “one-white-crow” example (expressed most famously 
by William James), even conclusive evidence based on DNA samples from representative 
crows showing only alleles for blackness in the chromosomes is insufficient to guarantee 
without chance of contradiction that all crows are black.  There is always a possibility of 
a heritable random mutation causing an individual crow and its progeny to be grey or 
even white.  This sort of exception poses only a superficial threat to the “all crows are 
black” kind of induction, since a white crow doesn’t undermine the inherent ontology of 
all crows.  However, the induction grounding physicalism is a different breed of crow.  A 
single provable instance of non-physical causation could in principle falsify the 
physicalist claim to ontological exclusivity. 
 12This is a consequence of the “total evidence’ requirement most famously 
expressed by Carnap (1950) and elaborated on by Hempel (1960 & 1965).  I shall have 
more to say about this in chapter 9, but suffice it for now to mention that McGlaughlin 
(1970) argues persuasively that, no matter how attractive the requirement is, it is 
impossible to meet. 
 41
analysis of physicalism that, though it cannot completely escape its a posteriori 
foundations, at least allows a move toward relatively firmer a priori ones.  This has come 
to be known as “a priori physicalism.”  A priori physicalism argues that from a complete 
catalogue of all the physical facts, all the truths of the world can be shown to follow a 
priori.  According to Gene Witmer (2006), the thesis is “that the non-physical truths in 
the actual world can be deduced a priori from a complete physical description of the 
actual world.”  More specifically,  “our world’s physical nature a priori necessitates its 
mental nature” (Jackson, 2005, 252).  Most of the debate between a posteriori and a 
priori physicalism turns on relatively subtle nuances that do not concern us here 
(McLaughlin, 2005).  But a specification of what is being argued by a priori physicalism 
helps highlight the point I just made above. 
 The a priori physicalist approach turns on a doctrine generally agreed to by 
physicalists,  the ‘MPD’ principle, that a minimal physical duplicate of the world is a 
duplicate simpliciter of the actual world (Witmer, 2006; McLaughlin, 2005).  The 
purpose of this claim and the arguments used to support it is to define the actual world as 
all and only constituted by the physical and nothing else except that which 
straightforwardly derives from the physical.   To arrive at MPD requires what Witmer 
calls the Physical Entailment thesis, (PE), demanding first a “comprehensive physical 
description of the actual world” using specifically only the “vocabulary that would be 
found in an ideal microphysics.”  This then gives us   
 (PE) Necessarily, if PT, then A,  
where P is the comprehensive microphysical description of the actual world, T is a 
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constraint (borrowed from Chalmers and Jackson, 2001) standing for “that’s all there is,” 
thus yielding A, the “comprehensive true description of the actual world.”  ‘Necessarily’ 
is to be understood in the strictest sense of necessity, as strong as that “in which it is 
necessary that everything is self-identical” (p.186).    This then leads us to the Physicalist 
Material Conditional,  
 (PMC) If PT, then A.    
But for PMC to hold, PE must be a true sentence.  As do many others who discuss a 
priori physicalist arguments, Witmer turns to Kripke’s necessary a posteriori thesis, 
water = H2O, where it is a posteriori that water is H2O, but the identity then follows as a 
necessary truth, once it has been established by empirical observation.   This analogy is 
supposed to show for a priori physicalism that (very roughly) once all the a posteriori 
empirical work has been done, then the complete description of the actual world follows 
in an a priori manner from all the facts – hence PE and, therefore, PMC. 
 The problem with using this analogy is that in the water case a definitive identity 
can be found and can be stated with confidence, whereas we as of now cannot infer A, 
whether a priori or a posteriori, because it requires that we know both P and T.  In other 
words, we must know all the facts (including laws, properties, relations, and entities) of 
the physical universe (P), plus we must also know that is all there is (T)  – and we don’t 
know either one, nor have we hope of knowing so any time soon!  And that, of course, 
leaves us off with the conclusion that in order to fully prove physicalism true would 
require first knowing all the physical facts of the universe. 
 In discussing the confirmation of scientific hypotheses, Braithwaite (1953/1983) 
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affirms this:  “...it is clear that [just] one piece of evidence is insufficient to prove the 
hypothesis...It is perfectly possible for the hypothesis to hold in this one instance, but to 
be false in some other instance, and consequently false as a general proposition. And, 
indeed, this is the case however many times the hypothesis is confirmed.”  And it doesn’t 
matter how many confirmatory instances  
 ...have been examined and found to confirm the hypothesis, there will still be 
unexamined cases in which the hypothesis might be false without contradicting 
the observed facts.  Thus the empirical evidence of its instances never proves the 
hypothesis: in suitable cases we must say that it establishes the hypothesis, 
meaning by this that the evidence makes it reasonable to accept the hypothesis; 
but it never proves the hypothesis in the sense that the hypothesis is a logical 
consequence of the evidence.  (46) 
  
 What I have just said about what it would take to prove physicalism conclusively 
true may sound gloomier and more pessimistic than might really warranted.  Even as far 
short as we are of having an exhaustive explanatory catalogue of all facts and laws, 
physicalists can feel well-justified in their belief in the truth of physicalism.  With each 
new bit of knowledge added to what is already known consistent with physicalism 
(always with the caveat in mind:  “in the absence of contravening evidence”) physicalism 
gains added support and justification.   
 There is historical warrant for such optimism.  Based on ever-increasing volumes 
of generally-accepted evidence supportive of physicalism, the Bayesian probability of 
physicalism’s truth has dramatically increased.  Note that the argument from physiology 
and neurotheology are really descendants of the success of science argument.  But 
success of science lends important support to its offspring in that, since science has done 
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so well in explaining the non-mental features of the world (geology, biology, chemistry, 
meteorology, etc.), physicalists are justified in their increasing confidence that science 
will have similar success with psychology.  We in effect extrapolate from the past 
success of science and infer a high likelihood of equal success in the future. 
 But how does one get from noticing the growing volume of evidence for the 
physicalist thesis to the conclusion that physicalism is true?  A brief examination of the 
epistemology of non-deductive inference will hopefully answer this question. 
 
Inductive and Abductive Inference 
 I need now to revisit my earlier brief comments on the inductive nature of the 
grounding for physicalism.  There is reason to think that enumerative induction itself is 
not the mechanism by which physicalists arrive at the presumed truth of their thesis, 
because induction “should not be considered a warranted form of nondeductive inference 
in its own right,” since technically an enumerative induction in and of itself only tells 
towards the next instance that we encounter (Harman, 1965, 88).    
 There may be a number of reasons for finding induction deficient as a source of 
warranted inferences. In a succession where an A is always observed to be followed by 
the appearance of a B,  inductive inference may give us increased confidence with every 
new occurrence that the next time we observe an entity of kind A we should not at all be 
surprised that an entity of type B soon follows.  Yet, while that (may) enhance our ability 
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to predict the appearing of a B,13  it does not seem to contribute much towards explaining 
why B’s follow A’s.  Further, evidence from an induction may support two or more 
explanatory hypotheses without giving any reason why we should prefer either or any of 
them.  Auxiliary arguments, or ‘lemmas,’ in Harman’s usage, are often needed to either 
generate an explanation from inductive evidence, or allow us to choose the better of 
competing hypotheses supported by the same inductive evidence.  But these ‘lemmas’ go 
beyond the information and warrant supplied by the inductive evidence itself.  “I assert,” 
Harman says, “that even if one permits himself the use of enumerative induction, he will 
still need to avail himself of at least one other form of nondeductive inference” (p.90). 
 A number of philosophers (Pierce; Harman, 1965; Boyd, 1983; Lipton, 2000; 
Melnyk 2003a), have concluded that this “other form” of nondeductive inference 
(especially in the case of  scientific explanation) is a related form of inference often 
called abduction or “inference to the best explanation” (ITBE for short).  An ITBE is 
reached by assessing the available evidence (generated either through a standard 
enumerative inductive processes or collected from available sources – or both) and then, 
with the aid of lemmas and other auxiliary evidence, weighting the relative probability of 
truth of each of the competing explanations and selecting the one that best seems to fit 
                                                          
 13As Hume famously argued, inductions always invite caution, as a regular 
procession of A’s succeeded by B’s does not always portend either that all A’s are B’s 
nor that a B will always follow an A.  Goodman’s famous grue example illustrates this, 
as do finite successions (so, for example, in observing thousands of Sun risings we have 
high inductively-inspired confidence that the Sun’s setting tonight will be followed by its 
rising again tomorrow.  However, from other evidence we know that Sun risings are a 
finite series in that at some point in the (hopefully) far-distant future the Sun’s setting 
will not be followed by a further rising. 
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the data and surrounding circumstances.  According to Harman, “All cases in which one 
appears to be using [enumerative induction] may also be seen as cases in which one is 
making an inference to the best explanation.” 
 An important challenge in developing an ITBE is determining which competing 
explanation counts as the best.  “Presumably,” Harman suggests, “such a judgment will 
be based on considerations such as which hypothesis is simpler, which is more plausible, 
which explains more, which is less ad hoc, and so forth” (1965, 89).  Melnyk (2003a) 
agrees that parsimony is one of the crucial discriminators in making the selection of the 
best explanation. 
 Lipton (2000, 184) proposes we think of ITBE as a “self-evidencing” explanation, 
that relies on the explanandum (the phenomenon which is to be explained) to provide 
important justification to ground the explananda that are marshaled to account for it.  
These sorts of self-evidencing explanations demonstrate a mild circularity that Lipton 
judges to be “benign.”  In fact, ITBE makes this “a common situation in science,” since 
“hypotheses are supported by the very observations they are supposed to explain.”  
Indeed, “the observations support the hypothesis precisely because it would explain 
them.”  As Melnyk points out, the traditional strategy for physicalists has been just this 
sort of inference to the best explanation.  “If a certain hypothesis is the best explanation 
of certain facts, then those facts provide evidence for that hypothesis” (Melnyk, 2003a, 
242).  I would argue that, based on strong inductively-derived data, supporting evidence 
and auxiliary arguments, physicalists use ITBE to conclude that the physicalist thesis best 
explains the world.   
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 If this is correct, then physicalism’s inference to the best explanation is grounded 
on the strongly supportive inductive evidence provided by the success of science 
argument and argument from physiology (with its various offspring) that provides the 
justification for the problematic first premise in the Causal Argument.  Therefore, though 
we don’t have the air-tight guarantees a valid deductive argument would provide us for 
the truth of the statement that “all physical effects are fully caused by purely physical 
prior histories,” we nevertheless have very good reasons for accepting it as true.  This 
rescues the Causal Argument from circularity and/or question begging, and gives 
physicalists warrant for their beliefs in physicalism, in the absence of any credible 
counter-evidence. 
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Chapter 3:  Failing to Prove Physicalism False 
 
 In the preceding chapter, we considered principles deemed either important to 
physicalism, such as exclusion, completeness, and determinism, or essential to it, such as 
causal closure.  We discovered that to conclusively prove physicalism is for all practical 
purposes unlikely to be feasible.  But we discovered that there is a “probably good 
enough” solution in the form of inference to the best explanation, informed by the 
immense overburden of inductive evidence developed by and accessible to science.  But 
now that we have explored some of the strategies and resources available to bolster 
convictions that physicalism is true, perhaps we can gain further insight by looking into 
what would be required to prove physicalism false, if that were possible. 
 Though it presents the majority view, physicalism is by no means universally 
accepted. Implications and consequences, such as those mentioned in the introduction, 
which follow from its being accepted as true motivate resistance to the physicalist thesis.  
Intuitions that one or another feature of human mental life seems to go beyond what 
physicalist accounts can hope to explain also provide strong motivations for anti-
physicalist views.  Some philosophers remain suspicious of physicalism because of what 
they see as significant metaphysical and other philosophical problems the theory 
presents.   
 These anti-physicalist positions have led to a number of influential arguments 
which have nevertheless failed to score decisively against physicalism.  A sampling of 
arguments against physicalism in terms of mind include the ‘knowledge’ argument; 
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conceivability arguments;  arguments from intentionality; and the explanatory gap 
argument.  I can’t begin to address the large number of variations on these arguments 
here, but I will mention a representative set of them and explain why in the end none of 
them succeed against physicalism. 
Argument from Intentionality 
 The first of these I shall consider is the argument from intentionality.  This 
strategy owes its genesis to Franz Brentano, who observed that “the reference to 
something as an object is a distinguishing characteristic of all mental phenomena.  No 
physical phenomenon exhibits anything similar” (1874/1973).  The intuition here is that 
there is a certain distinct sense of “aboutness” or “awareness-of” present within any 
conscious human thought or perception that is directed towards an object, circumstance, 
etc. This “aboutness” seems  prima facie to be wholly unavailable to physical, non-
mental objects.   Humans thus mentally fix the subject of their deliberations, cognitions, 
regardings, or other such mental act in a way that goes beyond what mere brain-state 
processing seems able to explain.  Intentionality must thus involve some non-physical 
aspect, and therefore fully-fledged physicalism is false.  To illustrate the force of the 
argument, Georges Rey (1997, 43) suggests we ask ourselves “...what physical fact 
makes it true  that some state of a person’s mind is about snow, or cats, or ‘Caesar’?  It 
doesn’t seem to be any sort of local physical relation, since we and words can refer to 
most anything anywhere in the world.” 
 John Searle (1980) illustrates the pull of intentionality in his “Chinese room” 
thought experiment.  Consider a system for translating Chinese to English that consists in 
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a room with inputs and outputs (perhaps slots through which slips of paper may be 
passed).  A human occupies the room, and receives slips with Chinese words written on 
them that are passed through the slots.  She uses a look-up table to match the string of 
Chinese symbols with slips containing appropriate English words, and passes the latter 
through the output slots.  Voila, translation occurs – only the translator has no idea of 
what the Chinese words mean.  Indeed, she need not even know what the English words 
mean.  What is seemingly missing from this system is intentionality, and this point is 
often used to argue that no syntactic system can capture the semantics of human 
mentality.  Thus far, our best explanatory frameworks for mental functioning embody 
some kind of physical computational system.  Such systems notoriously can only capture 
syntax, and are unable to manage intentional semantics  – and no physical system that has 
been proposed or imagined has managed to deal with semantics.  Antiphysicalists point 
to this as a supporting argument that intentionality represents a feature of mentality that is 
over and above any plausible physical or physically-realized mental system. 
 Variations of the intentionality argument propose that intentionality is really an 
admixture of phenomenal experience with more prosaic psychological representations. 
Proponents of these theories try to tease apart the phenomenal aspects from the 
(presumably) physically-explainable processes.  This then renders the argument as one 
which more straight-forwardly involves phenomenal experience, along the lines of the 




 Perhaps the most influential antiphysicalist argument is the “knowledge 
argument.”  Made famous in Frank Jackson’s article “What Mary Didn't Know” (1982), 
the argument runs something like this: Mary, a famous color scientist, has been 
sequestered in a colorless, black and white environment since infancy.  She has been 
fully educated in every aspect of human color perception.  She knows all the physical 
facts.  Yet when one day she steps outside of her colorless room and encounters for the 
first time color in its natural habitat, something new happens for her – she encounters the 
actual phenomenal experience of color.  The intuition here is that there is something 
different that can only be experienced, “something” that is over and above the physical 
facts of color.  Thus, physicalism is false – at least so far as it pertains to color qualia 
(though the argument could be extended to auditory, gustatory, tactile, and olfactory 
qualia as well).   
 There is another well-known form of the knowledge argument, sometimes 
informally referred to as the “what-it-is-like” argument, made famous by Thomas 
Nagel’s classic article “What Is it Like to be a Bat?” (Nagel, 1974).  The intuition at the 
root of this argument trades on the difference in experience one might expect in an 
organism whose perceptual apparatus differs profoundly from those of humans.  The 




 Knowledge arguments are a form of conceivability argument.  Conceivability 
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arguments aim to establish that some feature which must be necessarily true for 
physicalism to be true can be conceived to be otherwise.  If something can be conceived 
to be otherwise, it is possible to be otherwise, and if it is possible rather than necessary, 
then physicalism must be false (Melnyk, 2001, 2005; Chalmers 1996).  Importantly, 
conceivability is meant as a technical term, not to be confused with ‘imaginability’ 
(Levine, 2007).  This distinction presumably lends a modal force to conceivability which 
inclines some to take it seriously, though others remain suspicious of just what can 
actually be counted on to follow from it.    
 David Chalmers (1996) champions the use of conceivability strategies in the 
mind/brain debate, arguing that the very fact that we can conceive of conscious 
phenomenal experience “coming apart” from underlying physical processes is powerful 
evidence that qualia are extraphysical entities, and that physicalism, at least with respect 
to phenomenal experience, is false.  He does this by proposing that one can plausibly 
conceive of a ‘zombie’ – a creature that functions, decides, reports mental experiences 
and interests, and so on just like we do – yet has no actual phenomenal experiences.  
Though this seemingly fully-human individual says that she sees the color blue, she has 
no inner blue experience but just a reliable means of recognizing the right electro-
magnetic frequencies associated with the color blue.   
 This intuition is supposed to persuade us that phenomenal experiences are 
something over and above their physical correlates, and hence non-physical, thus proving 
physicalism false, at least as far as human conscious experience is concerned.  Chalmers’ 
zombies would be perplexed by the assertion that they have no phenomenal inner life.  
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As far as they know, they accurately recognize blue, and have all the inner experience 
there is to the color blue.  However, the zombie’s inner experience is severely 
impoverished when compared to that of phenomenally-endowed humans.  
  
 Each of these arguments turns on a similar intuition: that there are features of 
human mentality which physicalism cannot explain.  A.D. Smith (1993) gives what is 
probably the most bare-bones summation of the generic argument:1 “Physicalism 
excludes qualia from its account; qualia are genuine features of reality; physicalism 
pretends to be a comprehensive inventory of the world; so physicalism is false” (p.228).  
To be sure, some versions of physicalism acknowledge that humans have phenomenal 
experiences (qualia) and other mental features such as intentionality.  But to preserve its 
legitimacy as a doctrine, physicalism must provide a plausible account of these mental 
features.  Lacking that, it must either merely assume these features into the physicalist 
fold, or assert their non-existence.  Thus physicalists have resisted antiphysicalist 
arguments in various ways, some more or less successful, most somewhat satisfying to 
the philosopher who lodges them but unpersuasive to those whose arguments are so 
attacked. 
 Certainly, based on our current epistemic state it is possible that theories of 
nonphysicality are true.  Typically the question is asked, “how could insensitive matter 
give rise to this experience – say the look of magenta, the sensation of warmth, a feeling 
                                                          
 1Smith references qualia in this passage, but any of the mental features in question 
could be substituted without changing the argument’s terms. 
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of relief?” thus implying that such experiences cannot possibly be physically explained.  
And thus far, no physicalist has been able to come up with a completely satisfactory and 
sufficient answer which brings phenomenal experience convincingly into the physical 
fold.2   Well-formed arguments that trade on the apparent difference between 
phenomenal experiences and the sensory inertness of matter (knowledge and what-it’s-
like arguments) can’t fail, barring disproof by some future incontrovertible neurophysical 
evidence.  But no matter how well-formed they may be, they can’t succeed, either.  
Intuition plays an important role in many philosophical arguments, but most 
antiphysicalist arguments depend crucially on it:  That conscious, phenomenal 
experiences are of a quality such that they can only be over and beyond the physical 
world.   
 So the catch for antiphysicalists wielding phenomenal-type intuition arguments is 
that they can’t actually prove that phenomenal states are non-physical.  Nor can they 
even so much as provide evidence that is less-than-proof that supports the claim, since 
arguments for phenomenal experiences are based on introspection of subjective states.  
Arguments that depend one way or another on phenomenal experience can only be 
asserted, as the available empirical evidence is insufficient for a conclusion one way or 
the other.  Further, these arguments must largely depend on the hearers of the argument 
to introspect their own inner states to find support for the arguments’ truth. 
 In the case of Mary the color scientist, the success of the anti-physicalist 
                                                          
 2Perhaps, given the profoundly subjective nature of these phenomena, even a 
sufficient answer – should one be discovered – would always be unsatisfactory to first-
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conclusion rests on whether the new experience Mary has is convincingly non-physical.  
Antiphysicalists seem assured by their intuitions of its truly non-physical status.  And 
many physicalists are troubled enough to attempt sometimes rather complex rebuttals to 
it.  But can the experience be certified to be non-physical?   
 Various physicalist arguments have been launched against the knowledge 
argument.  For example, Lewis (1988) argues that Mary merely acquires a new ability, 
the ability to recognize the color red from experience.  This argument, however, appears 
to fail merely on the notion of ability.  It doesn’t seem that Mary acquires any new ability 
that is relevant.  After all, she already has the innate ability to experience red, as 
demonstrated by her immediate recognition that she has encountered something new.   
But there is also her long acquaintance with related abilities, such as recognizing black, 
white, and shades of grey.  What she acquires is not a new ability to experience red, but 
merely the experience of what red is like, and the linguistic and much less ontologically-
significant ability to be able to point to red and acknowledge “this is red!”.  But it is the 
experience itself that the Mary argument hangs on, not any new linguistic or memory-
recall ability, so Lewis’s attack does not go through.   
 Papineau (2002) rejects Lewis’s strategy, but he commits the same error in a 
different way.  He sets out to show “in each case that there is no legitimate argument 
from before-after difference to distinct phenomenal properties.  The Mary argument does 
                                                                                                                                                                             
person perceivers. 
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not establish any dualism of properties” (p.55).   According to Papineau, our intuitions 
about Mary are the result of what he calls an “antipathetic fallacy,” an error in reference, 
brought by attributing distinctions we believe exist between what he calls ‘material’ and 
‘phenomenal’ identities.  The experience of sinking one’s teeth into a surprisingly sharp 
jalapeno pepper seems completely unrelated to a pulsing lump of brain matter that is 
(presumed to be) processing the qualitative experience of the consequences of the act 
even as we bite into the pepper.  But, Papineau argues, despite our intuitions the 
experience itself and the pulsing grey matter (and all the relevant processes it contains) 
really do constitute ontologically the same event.  He says we should note “that there is a 
sense in which the material concepts ‘leave out’ the phenomenal properties.  And from 
this it is very easy to slide, fallaciously, into the conclusion that material concepts cannot 
refer to phenomenal properties” (p.104).  
 Unfortunately, this argument misses the point just as badly as does Lewis’s.  
What Papineau –  and others who lodge similar arguments – miss, is that the Mary 
example hinges not on knowledge3, nor use, nor reference per se, but on the experience 
itself.4  For the sake of the argument, it doesn’t matter whether Mary even knows that the 
red experience is properly verbalized as ‘red,’ or whether she can use ‘red’ appropriately, 
or whether she can point to other instances of red, or even whether she can in the future 
                                                          
 3Jackson’s construction of the so-called ‘knowledge argument’ is flawed in that 
respect, that his choice of words misleads us somewhat into thinking it has to do with 
knowledge, thus making it sound like an epistemic rather than a metaphysical issue. 
 4“Recall,” A.D. Smith says, “that qualia are properties, not mental objects: they 
are the various intrinsic characteristics of certain conscious experiences” [Smith, 1993, 
227].) 
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recollect the experience of red.  What matters is the experience itself – the fact that this 
experience that we generally label as ‘red’ is one that can be experienced for the first 
time, that is qualitatively different from any other experience, and that what the 
experience is like is something Mary can’t possibly discover from any other source than 
direct exposure to the stimulus itself.5
 There have been other similarly-construed attacks on the knowledge argument (by 
Churchland [1985, 1989] and others), but none of them are fully persuasive, as they rely 
on often rather speculative connections between mental phenomena and physical causes, 
none of which have yet been scientifically demonstrated – nor seem likely to be 
demonstrated. 
 If knowledge arguments cannot prove that Mary’s phenomenal experience is non-
physical, and if physicalists cannot prove to the contrary that the experience is physical, 
and if neither side can satisfactorily defeat the other’s argument, the issue remains 
inconclusive.  This yields a stalemate between physicalists and antiphysicalists.  But a 
stalemate leaves antiphysicalism at a disadvantage, since a stalemate for antiphysicalism 
gives physicalism the upper hand, thanks to the weight of the trove of objective evidence 
supporting physicalism, and the seeming rationality of the well-grounded inference to 
best explanation (ITBE) asserting that physicalism is the most likely account of the 
                                                          
 5I am suspicious of suggestions by some philosophers of the possibility of 
imaginatively interpolating an otherwise un-experienced (for example) color experience 
if the proposed color might lie between two closely-related adjacent colors.  Despite my 
early experience as an art student and artist, all my attempts at testing this thesis by 
introspection seem to utterly fail.  Perhaps others might be able to pull off such a feat.  
But how would we ever know? 
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world. 
 Conceivability arguments and arguments from intentionality suffer similar fates. 
Conceivability arguments depend on a kind of intuition of the nonphysicality of qualia 
which is related to the knowledge arguments.  David Chalmers’ functionally isomorphic 
zombie doppelgänger lacks not only qualitative experiences, but also the necessary 
constitutive features to make them possible.  Mary, on the other hand, has the required 
features even if she thus far, alas, has been denied the experiences.  But we must not 
allow ourselves to be distracted by the details.  At their core, the qualia-lacking zombie 
and color-scientist Mary are really merely different instances of the same case.  Were the 
zombie through the addition of some corrective gene suddenly to experience a rose of a 
certain shade of red, his would be a similar experience to Mary’s when she emerges from 
her black-and-white world for the first time to see a rose of that very same red hue.  In 
this respect conceivability arguments are no more vulnerable, but also no more 
conclusive, than knowledge arguments.    
 But conceivability has its own peculiar difficulties.  Many philosophers question 
the legitimacy of drawing metaphysical conclusions from what seems to be a merely 
conceptual argument, and are not fully persuaded that the move from speculative 
“imaginability” to a presumably more robust “conceivability” truly succeeds in adding 
force to the argument.  Melnyk (2001), for example, argues that most conceivability 
arguments conflate the reference with the actual property itself, thus failing to identify a 
metaphysically-real possibility.  “[T]he conceivability. . .of a proposition does not in 
general entail its possibility,” and “it is because the reference of our concepts is an a 
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posteriori matter that conceivability (in the sense specified) does not entail possibility.”  
Thus, “traditional conceivability arguments fail because they rest on a false assumption 
in the philosophy of mind and language: that one knows, simply on the basis of one’s 
competence with a concept, what property the concept picks out” (p.332). 
 However, according to Melnyk at least one conceivability argument against 
physicalism does not fall prey to this weakness – that raised by Chalmers.  Chalmers’ 
argument “employs a different and proprietary notion of conceivability according to 
which the inference from conceivability to possibility is unproblematic” (p.333).  Though 
acknowledging that at least this one flavor of conceivability argument has not been 
successfully blocked by physicalists, Melnyk is not so quick to let Chalmers off the hook, 
and thinks he has cast sufficient doubt to seriously wound Chalmers’ position, noting that 
Chalmers’ argument, “as it currently stands, is therefore inconclusive” (p.345).  So this 
puts conceivability in a similar boat to the knowledge argument: Even if conceivability 
arguments can’t be proved false by physicalism, they are at least inconclusive and, once 
again, the ITBE that grounds physicalism captures the high ground. 
 Intentionality arguments, on the other hand, at first appear to differ from 
knowledge, what-it-is-like, and conceivability arguments.  But looking more carefully we 
can see they actually all bear a certain resemblance to one another.  Though intentionality 
doesn’t (necessarily) require the same sort of obligation to recognize a particular 
phenomenal experience as nonphysical, it does require the recognition of the distinctive 
feeling of “aboutness” when regarding objects, whether introspectively or externally.  
The same question can be raised concerning this sense of aboutness as concerning the 
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look of emerald green or the feeling of satiation:   Why should we necessarily believe 
that sufficiently complex configurations of matter are not able to give rise to these kinds 
of experiences?  Just because we don’t know now why such experiences seem to us as 
they do does not mean there isn’t some fully physical explanation that we just (for now) 
don’t have the wit to discover. 
 Kim (2005) thinks intentionality is reducible, as do others (though, as I will 
mention again below, Kim no longer believes that qualia are).  Daniel Dennett (1987) has 
based much of his career on and written a book arguing that there is nothing 
ontologically special about intentionality.  Chalmers (1996) agrees on the reducibility of 
intentionality, excepting any aspect of intentionality that may possibly involve 
phenomenal experience.6  But even if they are all mistaken and intentionality is not so 
reducible, we can still see that merely asserting the impossibility of reducing intentional 
states is insufficiently strong to successfully undermine our faith in physicalism.  As Kim 
has argued (2005), it is not unreasonable to believe that many (perhaps most) mental 
states, and along with them perhaps intentional states as well might yet be reducible at 
least in part, and thus turn out to be physical through and through after all.  The argument 
from intentional states does not introduce enough uncertainty to outweigh our physicalist 
convictions.  So unresolved is the intentionality issue that it has brought the authors of 
one philosophy textbook to lament that “we do not understand intentionality well enough 
to say with any confidence what it implies for the mind/body problem.  For this reason it 
                                                          
 6Chalmers suggests that intentionality can be used in antiphysicalist positions 
only to the degree that it can be shown to incorporate phenomenal experiences.   
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cannot be used as an argument for anything” (Brook & Stainton, 2000, 113). 
 Whether or not such a defeatist position as that or Brook and Stainton is 
warranted, a similar complaint can be raised against arguments such as the Mary 
argument or conceivability which rely at least somewhat on the non-physicality of 
phenomenal experience.  If, in the deepest recesses of the brain, neuroscientists someday 
discover it is really true that qualia are the result of neurophysical processes, and if it is 
true (as it is) that we thus far are unable even to recognize how that can be the case, then 
perhaps we just haven’t yet figured out the right kind of detector – one that works as well 
as the biological qualia-detectors nature has devised and installed in humans and other 
presumably “conscious” organisms.  You don’t, after all, measure temperature with a 
stethoscope.  A stethoscope couldn’t tell that anything such as temperature even exists.  
 
 To show what antiphysicalists are up against – how difficult it is for their 
argument to gain ground in what is for them an essentially up-hill fight – it might be 
useful here to consider one defense of physicalism mounted by Colin McGinn (2001).  
McGinn believes that finding a solution to the mind-body problem would require a 
concept of pain which “would connote precisely those properties of pain that render its 
connection to matter and the brain entirely perspicuous.”  But he “also think[s] that we 
are unlikely to discover anything with such consequences” (p.301).   Type-identity 
theories of mind can’t be defended against qualia-type arguments because there seems to 
be no way of establishing an identity between, for example, neurally-realized pain (or 
other qualia-type) states and the phenomenal “feel” pain has.  Thus he concludes (p.305) 
 62
that a knowable empirically-true identity is unavailable, with the consequence that only a 
conceptually-true identity statement will do (McGinn: “There has to be such a concept as 
no other option is feasible” [p.300]).  But that is probably not possible to establish, as it 
would require a “mind-of-God” sort of perspective that can omnisciently inspect both 
brain and phenomenal states.  After all, how would you know if something were 
‘conceptually-true’ if you couldn’t establish at least some of the facts that verify its truth?   
Hence, physicalism is true because it has to be, not because we can prove it to be.   
 McGinn’s approach has been styled the “mysterian” view, since it proposes that 
the restrictive limits of the human ability to know may place some aspects of nature and 
the universe permanently outside our epistemic reach.  Antiphysicalists find this view 
understandably unsatisfactory, as it seems to leave the status of physicalism as simply 
assumed to be true, based on the ubiquitous ITBE. 
 Unfortunately, McGinn’s (as in different ways are Papineau’s, Melnyk’s, and 
others’) seems the sort of strategy that Kim (2005, 30) warns against.  According to Kim, 
blaming our system of concepts, or our language, for philosophical difficulties is a 
familiar philosophical dodge of long standing.  To motivate the discarding of a 
framework, we need independent reasons – we should be able to show a theory to be 
deficient, incomplete, or flawed in some fundamental way, independently of the fact that 
it generates puzzles and problems with which we are unable to deal.  Declaring 
ontological problems to be nothing more than a confusion of terms seems a suspicious 
move to those doubtful about the foundations of currently proposed solutions to such 
problems.   Nonetheless, if McGinn is right then that is the strategy to which physicalists 
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must resort. 
 In any event, if qualia, intentional states, and other mentalistic phenomena really 
are strictly physical phenomena, resulting from fully physical processes then, for 
example, zombies are impossible in all physical worlds sufficiently similar to our own, 
and Mary may indeed learn something new upon leaving her room – but whatever it is, it 
is not something outside the physical world.  The problem is, as I have said several times 
now, that we can’t tell for now whether qualia and intentionality are not physical, and in 
the absence of knowing, the best that can be said of arguments that hinge on phenomenal 
experience (if they can’t shown to be conclusively false) is that they are inconclusive. 
 
 Thus the antiphysicalist arguments have not been resolved – they have neither 
been proved true nor false.  On the one hand, Chalmers, Jackson, Nagel, and others have 
given provocative reasons to question aspects of physicalism.  But they have not been 
able to show that these phenomena unquestionably fall outside the physical world.  For 
their part, physicalist apologists have themselves failed to arrive at a convincing and 
armor-plated explanation that brings these phenomena firmly within the physicalist tent.  
As Chalmers observes: “[I]f a physicist or a cognitive scientist suggests that 
consciousness can be explained in physical terms, this is merely a hope ungrounded in 
current theory, and the question remains open” (1996, viii).7
 No less a theorist that Jaegwon Kim has thrown in the towel on the qualia debate, 
                                                          
 7Thus we have Jackson (2005, 259) making the following observation:  “The hope 
of a new tool to counter the challenge of the zombie argument, and its many partner 
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willing to leave that one small corner of human mentality outside the physicalist fold, his 
most recent book declaring his allegiance to physicalism, “or something near enough” 
(2005).  He decides that if everything pertaining to mind and the non-mental universe 
with the exception of qualia can be fit into the physicalist world view, then he’s willing 
to exempt conscious phenomenal experience from being fully physical – though he sees 
this as only a minor concession.   
 Antiphysicalists on the other hand, have as we have seen failed as well to provide 
sufficient reasons as to why we should believe there can’t be a physicalist resolution to 
the controversy.  Physicalists always have some available response which, though 
perhaps no more conclusive than the antiphysicalist argument they are meant as an 
antidote for, nonetheless is sufficient to hold the field against their opponents.  Thus, 
because of the vast explanatory successes physicalism can point to in its own support, 
inconclusiveness or stalemate is, in the face of the inductive pressure science’s past 
successes generate, sufficient to hold nonphysicalism at arms’ length.  Since knowledge, 
conceivability, and intentionality arguments are all inconclusive they are, hence, 
unsuccessful against physicalism with its robust ITBE as a trump card. 
  Perhaps in recognition of this, Gillett (2001) offers a unique quasi-antiphysicalist 
argument against the presumption that physicalism is the ultimate arbiter of scientific 
truth, at least for appraising new theories.  His argument is approximately like this:  
Physicalists mistakenly argue that only the methods that have successfully been used in 
other scientific disciplines should be used to explore empirically-explorable areas, and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
arguments from intuitions or possibility, for dualism, has not been realised.”  
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that physicalistic criteria have been used historically to sort out acceptable theories from 
unacceptable ones.  However, Gillett disputes the idea that physicalist criteria have 
historically been used to appraise theories.  Instead, a different approach, not overtly 
dependent on physicalistic criteria has been used (he labels this the “minimal criterion”) 
in which a “local” approach applies.  Theories are appraised and accepted not by how 
well they adhere to some physicalist dictum or other, but rather how well they cohere 
with theories with which they must interconnect.  Gillett’s goal seems to be to show that 
physicalism does not exert quite the domination over theory-acceptance that is generally 
believed. 
 While this is a provocative argument, and if widely accepted could be (perhaps 
mildly) nettlesome to the physicalist hegemony, it is not a blow to physicalism itself but 
only, perhaps, to its pride.  Indeed, a question seems obvious here: Even if Gillett’s 
argument is right – that much more important to theory appraisal is how well a theory 
coheres with its theory-neighbors –  it seems that irredeemably physicalist criteria would 
still be the outer fence surrounding all of the local theory “neighborhoods.”  Physicalist 
standards would establish the allowable terrain within which a new theory must fit or be 
rejected, and would specify the outermost frontiers beyond which no new theory may 
venture.  In this respect, in its “global” construction (as Gillett himself styles it), this 
“physicalist criterion” would be used to measure every theory for orthodoxy, and justify 
the exclusion of any which fails to pass muster.  Indeed, it would seem that any theory 
with non-physicalistic content would automatically fail to cohere even with its most 
proximate theoretical neighbors, who themselves do meet the general physicalist criteria. 
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 We have seen that arguments within the philosophy of mind against physicalism 
often amount to presenting intentionality and qualia as irreducible aspects of mind that 
can’t be reconciled to purely physical explanations.  Arguments against physicalism 
based on qualia, intentionality, and so on make little headway not because they are false, 
but because they are inconclusive.  Ironically, such arguments could finally be proved 
conclusively false – if they are – only if true mental-to-physical identities are discovered.  
And it may turn out that they could only be shown conclusively true under the same 
conditions in which physicalism itself could be proved conclusively true:  when every 
fact and law about the universe is finally known.  Until then, physicalists fend off such 
arguments by pointing to the ever growing strength of the inductive evidence supporting 
physicalism, just as Georges Rey did in my philosophy class in the fall of 1996. 
 Most intuition-based antiphysicalist arguments remain a live option because they 
exploit a thus-far un-bridged gap in our scientific base: That full, or even partial, 
reduction of mental phenomena to underlying brain processes or configurations remains 
unachieved.  Die-hard materialist that he is, Papineau grudgingly acknowledges this, and 
he remains pessimistic of the prospects of being able to eliminate anti-physicalist 
arguments.  “There are questions about the referents of phenomenal concepts that 
[science] is quite unable to answer” he notes (2002, 11).  Further,  
How should science proceed if it wants to identify the material referent of our 
phenomenal concept of pain, say?  As it happens, I think that science can provide 
far fewer answers to such questions than many people suppose...It is a mistake to 
suppose that research into phenomenal consciousness can proceed just like other 
kinds of scientific research (176). 
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 Papineau is not the only pessimist.  McGinn (2001, 300-301) argues that “...there 
is no solution to the mind-body problem within the limits of our current concepts of mind 
and brain,” and that “...we are unlikely to discover anything with such consequences.”  
He goes on to express faith that “such a solution exists but is not discoverable by us,” 
since “discovering empirical correlations between mental and physical concepts is never 
enough to entitle us to assert psychophysical identities.”  This fundamental pessimism is 
what motivates McGinn to opt for the “mysterian view” of mind-body interaction. 
 Even as enthusiastic a physicalist as Andrew Melnyk (2003a) acknowledges that 
“the evidence for physicalism about the mental is markedly weaker than that for 
physicalism about everything else,” and that he “cannot make an empirical case for 
treating mental phenomena as physical or physically realized” by using the typical 
arguments that establish such things as physics, geology, and biology as being physical 
(p.4 & 283).  Thus lacking a full catalog of physical facts and relations, and hence 
missing conclusive proof for physicalism, many physicalists employ a strategy to 
rationalize their way around the obvious problems that block the path to a satisfactory 
reduction of mind to physics.  This is the well known recourse to supervenience 
theories.8   
 
Status of Supervenience as a Solution 
 Supervenience theories serve a number of ends – they fill in the gaps when no 
                                                          
 8In my discussion, I only consider supervenience in relation to philosophy of 
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suitable reduction can be found; they allow for the retention of a physicalist account in 
the face of multiple-realizability; and for non-reductive physicalism (NRP) theories they 
preserve at least the appearance of autonomy for the mental while reassuring us of the 
physical dependency that is presumed to hold necessarily between the seemingly mental 
and the rest of the otherwise apparently physical universe  (Kim, 2005, 15). 
 Supervenience theories also help to insulate physicalism-of-the-mental claims 
from attack.  As Kim notes:  “Just as normative/moral properties are thought to supervene 
on descriptive/nonmoral properties without being reducible to them, the psychological 
character of a creature may supervene on and yet remain distinct and autonomous from 
its physical nature.”  But this begs an interesting question:  If you can’t reduce, how do 
you know that supervenience is actually the proper relationship?  And if you can reduce, 
will a supervenience relation then come to nothing much beyond a difference in 
terminology?9
 The resort to supervenience appears to be either a consequence of epistemological 
difficulties, or metaphysical ones, or both.  If  metaphysical, then it seems that 
supervenience theories claim a causal connection between the supervenience base and the 
superstructure which is left unspecified.  If that connection is not merely brute, then it is 
hard to tell how causation attributed to a supervenience relation would differ from a 
Humean constant conjunction or some other form of regularized correlation between 
                                                                                                                                                                             
mind. 
 9John Searle (1992) observes, “once you recognize the existence of bottom-up, 
micro to macro forms of causation, the notion of supervenience no longer does any work 
in philosophy” (p.126). 
 69
events.  On the other hand, if the concern is epistemic, then all supervenience seems to 
amount to is a tacitly-held agnosticism as to just what the causal connection is between 
base and superstructure. 
 If that is so, then we seem to encounter a set of nested assumptions.  In Mind and 
the Physical World Kim notes the following: “We may know that B determines A (or A 
supervenes on B) without having any idea why this is so – why A should arise from B, not 
C, or why A, rather than D, arises from B” (Kim, 1998, 18).  By this I take it he means to 
typify the sort of body-mind supervenience relation broadly popular in many theories of 
mind held today, along with the epistemic lacunae with which we must deal in trying to 
assess such physical-to-mental dependencies.  
 But this appears to beg a question: How do we even know that A supervenes on B 
(or, more concretely, that mental state A supervenes on brain state B)?  The unfortunate 
reality is, that aside from some perceptual processes (in which, for example, an fMRI can 
interpolate an image that is being processed within a subject’s brain) we don’t.  Finding 
and identifying brain states that fill the role as subvenient bases for mental states has 
proven more difficult than was perhaps previously envisioned by early identity theorists.  
The notion of supervenience has been adopted in some measure because no such 
coupling of the right kind has conclusively been shown, leaving philosophers obliged to 
develop some rationale (other than that of the failed type-physicalism) with which to 
reconcile the requirements of physicalism pertaining to the mind with the absence of full 
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evidence that it is true.10  The assumption that the mind just is the brain nests within the 
broader assumption that physicalism provides a full and complete framework for the 
universe.  But then our presumed certitude about the truth of physicalism about the 
mental begins to look more tenuous than its advocates may prefer.  Supervenience 
explanations can seem to come uncomfortably close to hand waving, and other ways of 
trying to account for the mental by reduction, type physicalism, functionalism, etc., either 
fail or give us as yet no clear path through to a clearly-established, fully-physical account 
of mind.    
 Some otherwise committed physicalists are coming to question the supervenience 
enterprise.  Kim (1993, 1998, 2005) voices numerous reservations, and suggests that the 
physicalist/antiphysicalist debate must be solved through reduction and the finding of 
clear mental/physical identities.  Melnyk also has concerns that, to succeed, 
supervenience theories may have to postulate a brute-fact relationship between the 
microphysical facts and the sciences (2003a, 49ff.), and he finds this unsatisfactory for 
grounding the truth of physicalism.  Supervenience, then, seems to provide a convenient 
way of describing mind-brain relationships in the absence of a sufficiently-detailed 
reduction.  And it may describe a relationship that really holds in a world (perhaps ours) 
in which McGinn’s mysterian view of physicalism is the best we can hope for.  But in 
terms of providing a solution for the mind-body problem which, after all, is the crux of 
the debate over physicalism, supervenience seems neither to promote nor undermine 
                                                          
 10The argument from physiology (discussed) provides some evidence (but as yet 




 Just as anti-physicalist arguments remain elusively inconclusive, pro-physicalist 
arguments are not conclusively grounded, either, and it is not clear they can be.  So if we 
can’t argue to a conclusion whether physicalism is true or false, is there any threat to the 
physicalist hegemony that remains?  Given the empirical foundation to the inductions and 
ITBE that found physicalists’ certainty as to the truth of their doctrine, it would seem that 
only an empirically-based attack would challenge it.  To succeed, physicalism’s 
opponents would have to defeat the inference to the best explanation that founds 
confidence that physicalism is true by presenting empirical evidence that casts doubt on 
the soundness of the evidence.  But how might they pull that off?  There does seem to be 
a way. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
physicalists with hope of ultimately achieving this Holy Grail. 
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Chapter 4:  How to Prove Physicalism False 
 
 Falsifiability was an essential criterion which Karl Popper thought requisite to 
establish the scientific soundness of a given theory.  Indeed, he attacked Freudianism and 
Marxism on their propensity for self-justification based on ad hoc explanations that 
seemed to insulate both from arguments or tests for soundness.  Though the falsifiability 
criterion remains controversial, it is still widely embraced by scientists and some 
philosophers.  Even those less enthusiastic towards it would still regard with some 
suspicion any important theory that without good justification failed to admit some 
possibility for falsification.   
 Some philosophers worry that physicalism, if not carefully formulated, ends up 
unfalsifiable.  In a discussion of the difficulty Hempel’s Dilemma presents for arriving at 
a successful formulation of physicalism, J.L. Dowell notes that (as we discovered in 
chapter 1) relying on present physics as the standard against which to formulate the 
doctrine of physicalism essentially guarantees that physicalism will at best be incomplete 
and at worst, false.  But formulating it in terms of a future complete and ideal physical 
theory threatens to make it “so vague and indeterminate [that] its truth-value becomes 
impossible to evaluate” (Dowell, 2006a, 3).  And Smith (1993) observes 
It is clearly neither necessary or sufficient for an item to be purely physical that it 
be describable in the vocabulary of current physical science; and who knows how 
future, or ideally completed, science will pan out? 
 
It is not hard to see why physicalism flirts with unfalsifiability.  If present physics is 
unable to deliver a fully comprehensive and correct delineation of just what counts as 
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physical, relying for a final solution on an unlikely-to-be realized completed physical 
theory, then any unfamiliar or inexplicable phenomenon encountered as we explore the 
world can be waved off as something that “some day” we will be able to show is fully 
explainable within a physicalist explanatory context.  But this begins to resemble the ad 
hoc strategies which Popper found so dubious in Freudianism and Marxism.  Essentially, 
physicalists want a strong theory.  But they can’t afford to have it so strong that it is 
easily defeasible.  Yet the weaker they make it, the more it flirts with epistemic vacuity. 
(Crane & Mellor, 1990) 
 So, under what conditions might physicalism be falsifiable?  If we accept closure 
and exclusion, then we arrive at the following circumstance: “[P]hysics is causally and 
explanatorily self-sufficient; there is no need to go outside the physical domain to find a 
cause, or a causal explanation, of a physical event” (Kim, 2005, 16).  But this is true only 
so long as we never encounter well-attested evidence of a physical event that has a cause 
that can only have originated external to the physical domain, and Kim doesn’t tell us 
what to do in that case.  Evidence of a violation of causal closure seems to be the most 
likely chink in physicalism’s armor. 
 We need, then, to consider conditions which countervailing evidence would have 
to meet in order to falsify closure.  First, such evidence would have to be objective, 
producing data accessible to those properly equipped to replicate it and evaluate it.  
Second, such evidence would have to be established through some process at least as 
reliable as sound scientific practice.  Third, and substantively most important, it would 
have to show a clear violation of closure – a violation for which the best explanation 
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would be that the closure principle was false.1   As Melnyk (2003a) notes, a sufficiently 
attested lacuna in a physical causal chain would produce “...a counterexample to the 
claim that the physical is causally closed” (p.295). 
 
Characteristics of a Counterexample To Physicalism 
 My analysis so far shows that the keystone to physicalism, any physicalism no 
matter how construed, is the principle of causal closure.  If closure turns out to be false, 
no formulation of physicalism will survive unscathed.   We would suspect closure to be 
false only if we were to find a counterexample of some sort – an instance, a 
circumstance, a phenomenon – where closure evidently failed.  What would be required 
of such an instance, or circumstance, or phenomenon?  First of all, since we are 
concerned about causal closure, we would want to find some evidence of causation 
entering the physical domain.  The idea of “entering” obviously implies that such a 
causal chain would need to initiate somewhere external to the physical world.  This in 
itself is a challenging concept to work out.  What do we mean by external to the physical 
world?   Since when we say external we seem to be speaking in spatial terms, do we 
mean a spatial expanse or domain outside the physical one we inhabit?  This notion in 
itself may be seen as begging a number of questions from anyone who might advocate it.  
If there is an “outside,” how do we know whether it is spatial in the same sense we 
                                                          
 1  One further condition would require that there be an abundance of such 
evidence.  As Popper (1959) noted, because we can’t trust that our observations are error 
free, only one or two instances, though logically sufficient, would not be found 
persuasive by staunch physicalists. 
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understand it here “inside”?   And what is the ontological status of that “outside”?  Is it 
non-physical, or merely extra-physical – or perhaps physical in some extended sense?  
More fundamentally, how can we assert an “outside,” when physicalism (at least in its 
strongest and most widely accepted formulations) denies that anything exists outside the 
physical universe, since the physical universe is (presumably) all there is?  Yet that begs 
a question of the physicalists in turn, since that is the very assertion the truth of which we 
are looking to test.  For, as things stand right now, that the physical is all there is can only 
be an assertion, albeit one that rests on a broad foundation of inductive evidence and a 
very persistent inference to the best explanation (ITBE). 
 For our purposes here, we can leave the resolution of the question of what may lie 
outside the physical universe, how it might be configured, or even precisely what 
“outside” means for another occasion.  All we need now find in a promising 
counterexample is that a candidate causal chain either not initiate, or not remain fully 
contained within the physical domain (that is, from start to finish).  We are generally 
quite comfortable with the notion of being “inside” the physical universe, and, relying on 
our intuitive grasp of the concept, can simply specify that anything causal that isn’t 
internal must be external.   Specifying this distinction precisely is an important task, but 
responsibility for it falls to the physicalist, who needs an internal/external distinction as 
much as a physical/nonphysical to make the physicalist thesis complete.  The general 
structure of my argument is this:  1) It is not obvious that physicalists can explain what 
'physical' means in a way that makes their thesis neither vacuous nor clearly false.  2) 
Even if it turns out they can, they will need both an account of 'physical' and also of what 
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it means for a causal chain to originate from, and remain entirely within, the physical 
realm.  It is unclear that they can do either.  3) But, again, suppose they can -- their 
theory is thus open to the possibility of falsification, so long as we can find causal chains 
that, according to the physicalists’ own criteria, originate outside the physical domain or 
stray outside it.  I will argue that, on any construal of 'physical' and of ‘originating and 
remaining within the physical domain’ that is plausible and rules out the kinds of things 
physicalists typically want to rule out (e.g., gremlins, ghosts, spirits, etc.), such causal 
chains can be found.   
 To identify a candidate closure violator, we need first to specify how we 
recognize that something external – specifically the antecedent to a relevant causal chain 
– has intruded into the physical world.  This may at first seem difficult to do.  After all, 
we cannot (it seems) get outside to identify the source of such a causal chain.  Further, if 
the external components of such a causal chain are in some way ontologically different 
from any we deal with physically, then we may not even have means to observe or 
analyze them – they could be effectively invisible to us. 
 Yet there is, it seems to me, a way to identify such chains even from our restricted 
vantage point here within the physical universe.  A causal chain that honors the closure 
principle by originating, proceeding, and terminating all within physicality would be 
deterministic (though in certain cases it might arise as an indeterministic event such as 
from nuclear decay) and presumably fully traceable.  In practice, of course, not all fully-
physical causal chains are traceable, given the practical limits of our instrumentation and 
heuristic methodologies.  But even many partially-untraceable causal chains can be 
 77
reliably inferred to be fully contained within the physical universe based solely on the 
evidence we do have of them.  But a closure-violating chain would (ideally) be traceable 
in this way: starting at its completion point (a certain event), we could follow each 
preceding causal link in reverse order back to the chain’s point of origin.  We might 
outline a typical (non-closure-violating) causal chain somewhat along these lines:  
Confronted with a broken lamp, we wish to know how the breaking transpired.  
Investigation reveals the following links in the causal chain:   
 
5)  The breaking occurred as the lamp impacted the floor; 
 
4)  The lamp impacted the floor upon being knocked off its stand by Christopher;  
 
3)  Christopher fell against the lamp when bumped by the dog;  
 
2)  The dog bumped Christopher when startled by the exploding ceramic 
casserole dish;  
 
1)  The casserole dish exploded when the babysitter thoughtlessly heated ravioli 
in it on the stove-top burner.  
  
 
Nothing is controversial in this causal account (other than perhaps the choice of 
babysitter in this unfortunately very real historical event).   
 What if, however, the causal chain we are attempting to trace has as its point of 
origin an event that seems to have emerged “out of thin air,” as it were – that is, it has no 
detectable physical antecedents previous to a particular link in the chain?  I shall call 
these “truncated causal chains,” or TCCs.  Let’s examine the same causal chain and give 
it a different origin:  How did the lamp break?   
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5)  The breaking occurred as the lamp impacted the floor;  
 
4)  The lamp impacted the floor upon being knocked over by Christopher;  
 
3)  Christopher knocked over the lamp when bumped by the dog;  
 
2)  The dog retreated into Christopher when startled by the hideous, shrieking 
Gremlin that suddenly materialized from thin air;  
 
1)  The Gremlin...well, where did the Gremlin come from?   
 
 
A causal chain originating outside but terminating inside the physical universe – a TCC – 
would from its terminating event backward appear like any other deterministic causal 
chain – that is, until our trace arrives at the chain’s point of irruption into the physical 
domain, whereupon we can trace it no further.  
 I used the preposterous Gremlin example only to make the account clear.  Let me 
give a different example that rings less absurdly in our ears ( in the interest of space I will 
combine some of the steps).    
 
5)  I take a sip of Diet Dr. Pepper from the can I hold in my hand;  
 
4)  I reach my hand forward, grasp the Diet Dr. Pepper can and raise it to my lips;  
 
3)  I decide to take a sip of Diet Dr. Pepper instead of regular Dr. Pepper;  
 
2)  I observe that someone has placed open cans of both Dr. Pepper and Diet Dr. 
Pepper before me;  
 
1)  I note that I am thirsty.  
 
 
This is a more complex example, since it involves possibly two causal chains – one 
deterministic and likely to be fully physical, and the other that perhaps fits neither 
 79
criteria.   
 The first, physicalistic, chain involves the feeling of a need to quench thirst, the 
recognition that a substance suitable for quenching thirst is present, and the reaching for 
the liquid refreshment to quench the thirst.  (While some antiphysicalists might wish to 
dispute the point, I am willing for the sake of the present argument to grant that the 
“thirst-> recognition -> arm movement -> drink” causal chain is fully physical, 
originating in and controlled by body/brain processes.)  But the “decision -> arm 
movement direction -> choose Diet Dr. Pepper” causal chain, though sharing part of its 
action with the “thirst” chain, appears (at least prima facie) to arise without an 
antecedent, and hence to be a possible instance of a TCC.   
 This, of course, is the assertion of some antiphysicalists:  Though causally-
relevant non-physical mental events (if they exist) may partially integrate with 
accompanying physical causal chains, they do not arise from a physicalistic (or, at least, 
not an exclusively physicalistic) causal context.2   We might thus capture this more 
complex causal network somewhat along the lines of the following diagram: 
 
             (Physical)                                                                                         (Non-physical) 
 
 
4)                                      Sip from can of Diet Dr. Pepper 
                                               /                                                 \ 
                                             /                                                     \ 
                                           /                                                         \ 
                                         /                                                             \ 
                                                          
 2This raises questions of overdetermination, but they are not important here.  The 
overdetermination issue will be considered in chapter two. 
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3)    Grasp a can of soda                                        3a) Choose to grasp the Diet Dr. 
Pepper 
                                       |                                                                 | 
                                       |                                                                 | 
2) See two cans of soda before me                          2a) Notice they are Diet and 
Regular 
                                       |                                                          Dr. Pepper 
                                       |                                                                 | 
                                       |                                                                 | 
1)                 Feel thirsty                                          1a) Notice feeling of thirst 
 
 
The reason I expressed reservations about the actual status of the decisional causal chain 
(“appears prima facie” to be a TCC) is because there are two ways of accounting for the 
seeming “out of thin air” initiation of the chain’s impetus.  One is ontological, the other 
epistemic.  The ontological account harmonizes with my current examination of what 
might evidence the extra-physical origination of a causal chain.  From a primitively 
dualistic view wherein at least some mental events are not subject to physical constraints, 
“deciding” as a causal event might have antecedents that originate outside the physical 
domain.  In such a case, the apparent “decision” point in the chain (“I think I’ll choose 
diet over regular Dr. Pepper”) would not just be a (physical) causal event, nor the 
initiating event spawning its own causal chain.  Rather, it might be the point where the 
chain irrupts into physicality.   
 At least, that’s one way to look at it.  But the case is ambiguous.  On the Diet Dr. 
Pepper account, instead of being evidence against closure, the decisional “irruption” 
might really be only a matter of superficial appearance, owed to the fact that our 
neuroscience has not progressed sufficiently to show how thirst-quenching behavior and 
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“deciding” for Diet Dr. Pepper are merely different branches of the same entirely 
physical causal chain.  As you can see, I am not staking anything necessarily on 
“decisioning” as originating extra-physically.   Decision-events may turn out to really be  
just brain events.  I use it here only for exemplary/explicatory purposes.   However, how 
I use the example is but a little distance removed from the way antiphysicalists argue that 
the nature of intentionality (or of qualia, for that matter) challenges the sufficiency of 
physicalism in accounting for human mentality.  And my vaguely physicalist-rejoinder is 
not far removed from how physicalists argue against claims that qualia are non-physical. 
 As discussed above, the qualia, intentionality, and other antiphysicalist arguments 
are inconclusive for the same reasons that prevent my “deciding for Diet Dr. Pepper” 
example from carrying through: the fact that we can’t tell whether the chain has an origin 
external to the physical domain, or whether instead we are merely ignorant of earlier 
steps in what could turn out to be a perfectly physical causal process after all.  We are, 
effectively, stymied by inconclusiveness. 
 This, then, presents us a potentially major set-back in laying out how we might 
identify a possible violator of causal closure and, hence, a counterexample to 
physicalism.  The difficulty lies in deciding whether a causal chain that seemingly 
materializes “out of thin air,” really does thus materialize, or is instead merely the 
consequence of hidden physical causal linkages that humans lack the wit or the 
instrumentation to detect.   
 If we could persuasively demonstrate well-attested large-scale TCCs, the 
argument might still go through.  If, for example, shrieking gremlins frequently popped 
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abruptly into existence and  under reliable controls were often both directly observed and 
caught on film doing so, we might have a strong contender for a persuasive TCC.  
Unfortunately, such things are notoriously elusive.  Unless we can find a something-out-
of-nothing causal chain that we can guarantee has no fully-physical genealogy the facts 
of which we merely happen to be ignorant, all we have to fall back on as closure-
violators are subjective, intra-human properties such as qualia and intentional states 
which, for all we know now, may eventually turn out to be fully grounded in our 
neurological circuitry.  This is the sort of argument that Chalmers’ conceivability 
argument for property dualism fails to gain sufficient traction against.  Truncated causal 
chains in and of themselves may perhaps at times be interesting, and even evidential.  But 
they seem of only limited help in finding solid evidence in our search for violators of the 
closure principle. 
 There is, however, another possibility.  Earlier, I touched on the idea that there are 
actually two ways a causal chain might violate closure.  One is when the chain simply 
irrupts into the physical universe with only an extraphysical causal antecedent.  I’ve just 
finished considering this sort of “entering”-type truncated causal chain, and rejected it as 
a sufficiently unambiguous candidate for closure-violator status.  Another violation of 
closure could occur were a causal chain to initiate within the physical domain, erupt out 
of it, then irrupt back into the world at some point distant in space or time.  This might be 
called an “exiting-and-reentering” chain or – to keep my nomenclature parallel – an 
“intermittently truncated causal chain,” or ITCC. 
 This sort of closure-violator would possess some virtues TCCs do not.  An ITCC 
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would originate within the physical world, so if such an ITCC could be found, we could 
in principle observe its initiation, and perhaps even watch a few subsequent links of the 
ensuing causal chain unfold.  But if it were a true closure-violator, we would then see it 
suddenly “disappear” as it exited physicality.  Of course, if it never re-entered the world 
we would be epistemically no better off than with a standard TCC, since in isolation we 
might not always be able to distinguish the “exiting” portion of an ITCC from an event 
part of which is merely hidden from our view or has simply exhausted its causal 
properties.  If, however, the chain were to reenter the physical domain elsewhere, and we 
were able to spot it and identify it as the very same ITCC which we previously observed 
exiting, then we may have discovered a plausible candidate for a violator of the causal 
closure principle and, hence, a counterexample to physicalism. 
 But (one might object), how do we know that this presumed ITCC’s missing 
causal links are not physical after all and just occluded from our limited view in the way 
that many altogether fully physical causal chains are?  Or might this presumed ITCC not 
just present a case analogous to that of our “decisional” causal chain described above 
where, because of epistemic issues, its mental vs. physical status is simply not yet 
resolvable by current science?   
 The relevant question might be put this way:3
An evolutionary biologist, say, can explain a path from A to B, and later from C 
to D, but has not yet found a way to get from B to C. An astrophysicist can 
explain how a star, in going nova, goes from state A to B, and then from C to D, 
but as yet has no explanation for the B to C transition.  There are explanatory 
gaps here, but I take it they don't challenge physicalism in the way [an ITCC 
                                                          
 3Daniel Bonevac, personal communication, November 23, 2009. 
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might].  What is distinctive about the gaps to which an ITCC points? 
 
 There are a number of ways to respond to this question.  First, the kinds of “gaps” 
suggested in this passage differ in important ways from a gap that might serve as a 
candidate ITCC.  Our evolutionary biologist or astrophysicist is indeed presented with a 
definite “explanatory gap” which he or she must resolve to achieve a completed theory.   
But the entities or relations that can reasonably be expected (“might be predicted by 
theory”) to fill that gap are in most cases obviously and plausibly of the same ontological 
character as the entities and relations that are known to exist on either side of the gap.   In 
many, if not most cases, a scientist can readily extrapolate what kinds and natures of 
things would most reasonably fill in the missing parts, even if there is uncertainty as to 
which entities or relations will eventually be shown to do the filling.   Astrophysically 
speaking, for example, we may not know which things are going to bridge the gap from B 
to C in the causal story of a supernova, but we know that the possibilities are limited to 
certain categories of substances and forces, and we also know that further specific kinds – 
and only those kinds – of  exploration and testing techniques are the appropriate tools to 
resolve the issues and fill the gaps. 
 However, the sorts of explanatory gaps we should look for in ITCCs are those 
which, on the contrary, seem to be at ontological odds with each (clearly physical) side of 
the gap in question – the ”gap filler,” in other words, would be unlikely to be explainable 
in terms of (or compatible with) the kinds and natures of things that mark the edges of the 
gap we seek to fill.  For our purposes, we are mostly interested in causes.  So if the most 
obvious gap filler requires causation of a character that cannot be accommodated fully 
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within the physical domain, we have discovered a candidate ITCC.   But how do we 
certify that we have found such a thing? 
 In the absence of the ability to actually track the links of an ITCC that are external 
to the physical universe, the only way to ascertain that an ITCC has components that 
really do exit the physical domain requires that we eliminate all possible physical 
mechanisms that might account for it.  If we can with reasonable confidence eliminate 
every physical explanation, then we are left with an extra-physical account as the most 
plausible solution.4   This would be fairly weak “proof.”  But assuming for the sake of 
argument that closure really is false, and assuming limits on our ability to see past the 
boundaries of the physical universe, TCCs and ITCCs demonstrate the only way such a 
state of affairs could ever appear – even if we did know all the facts and laws of the 
physical universe.   
 Let’s briefly consider the sorts of causal explanations that we would have to be 
able to eliminate to have good confidence we have found a suitable ITCC.   First, as we 
shall see beginning with the next chapter, the sorts of causally-related ITCCs that are 
most likely to fit the bill involve unmediated causation (of some species or other) at a 
distance or over time.  This might be referred to as “non-local” causation.5   It will be 
useful here to distinguish between “local” and “non-local” causation.    
                                                          
 4As Holmes says to Watson in Sign of the Four: “How often have I said to you 
that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, 
must be the truth?” 
 5For our purposes here, though, we should not confuse “non-local causation” with 
the quantum physics phenomenon known as “quantum nonlocality,” which I will shortly 
mention here, and which will be discussed in some detail in chapters nine and ten. 
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 Marc Lange (2002) has given a helpful analysis of the notion of “local” causation.  
Importantly, local causation is a spatiotemporal concept, which partakes of aspects of 
both spatial locality and temporal locality.  Roughly, spatiotemporal locality requires 
“that there can be no gap in space or time between a cause and its direct effects” (p.7).   
But spatiotemporal locality requires more than a mere additive function between the two, 
since a cause could conceivably violate the one and not the other (p.14).  For example, 
Lange specifies spatial locality somewhat along the following lines:  For spatially local 
causation to hold, event E must have a complete set of causes that occur in sufficiently 
close spatial proximity to the event.  Thus, spatial locality requires “a complete set of 
causes...no member of which is separated from the effect by a finite non-zero distance” 
(p.292).    
 Temporal local causation is construed similarly, but in terms of time rather than 
space – event E must have a complete set of causes that occur in sufficiently close 
temporal proximity to the event.  For spatiotemporal locality to exist, both conditions 
must apply.  But it is conceivable (though not physically demonstrable) for E to have 
sufficiently proximate spatial causes, which are, nonetheless, insufficiently proximate 
temporally (and, or course, vice versa).  If causation could occur in such a case, it would 
have to be “non-local” – which violates our notions of physical causation (p.14).   But it 
is just such violations we are looking for in ITCCs.   
 As near as I can tell, there are only four possible ways of accounting for any sort 
of action or causation at a distance:  mechanical transfer of causal influences, 
electromagnetism, quantum nonlocality, gravitational influence, and mere brute causal 
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connections.   I will consider the first three (mechanical, electromagnetic, and quantum 
nonlocal effects) in chapters 9 and 10 in some detail, so I will not go over them here.   
And since it is implausible that gravitation is information-bearing, and thus cannot 
account for the kinds of ITCCs I will soon identify, I will dismiss it from further 
consideration.  However, the notion of brute relationships I will briefly treat here. 
 Lange (2002, 95-107) wonders what it takes for causation to count as “local.”  He 
decides that under “local causation” we understand that causation which transfers across 
space and time by means of some medium, force, or field (it appears that mechanical and 
electromagnetic causation fulfill the criteria for local causation).  But why does causation 
have to be “local,” he further wonders?   It turns out that there is no absolutely knock-
down reason beyond that we are accustomed to associating with all causation the need for 
intervening steps, connections, or media to pass causal influence from its initiation on to 
its resultant effect  (“...the argument for locality is inconclusive even granting its 
assumptions about the explanations that a local account would supply” [p.107])  Whether 
because we have only ever experienced causation in this way, or because of our 
psychology, we seem constitutionally indisposed to find any other sort of “non-mediated” 
causation congenial – at least as far as physical explanations are concerned (cf., Lange, 
2002, 1-3).   
 The issue becomes further complicated by the question of whether the fields that 
are clearly so important to electromagnetic causality are themselves “real” in a relevant 
sense, since the only way to know a field is “there” is the propensity for an entity of the 
right kind with the right properties to behave in a certain way if it approaches sufficiently 
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close to the field’s (apparent) sphere of influence.  Without the effects fields have on 
such entities (iron filings, particles, radio antenna, EMF meters), and other detectable 
influences they might produce, a  field might be non-detectable – and hence, perhaps 
non-existent.  So if a field is only identifiable by its effects, how is this any evidence that 
the causation is anything other than “nonlocal”?   Perhaps this kind of action/causation-
at-a-distance really is unmediated – that is, just a brute relationship that obtains by virtue 
of the way the universe is.6
 If this is so, then it endangers the idea of ITCCs.  In the case where apparently 
unmediated action/causation-at-a-distance occurs, we could merely subsume it under the 
category of “brute causation at a distance.”  The mystery is solved, with no threat to 
physicalism.  But I suggest this solution would strike any rational person as 
unreasonable.  Surely we want a more satisfactory response than this (and I am not 
suggesting anyone advocates it – but it is still something to be dealt with).  In fact, this 
approach  seems to beg more questions of physicalism than it answers.  If causation-at-a-
distance is merely brute, how could we possibly certify that the causation involved is 
physical?  Indeed, brute causation would seem to be just as plausibly explained in 
nonphysical terms rather than physical.  For, after all, how could we tell the difference?  
Anyone choosing to lodge a “brute causation” defense against an ITCC-based argument 
would seem to create more problems than solutions, especially for physicalism.  If 
                                                          
 6Note that Lange is not committed to this position.  He later presents arguments to 
support the reality of fields – but even then ends with the admission that whether talk of 
fields describes real entities or merely employs a useful convention to describe a form of 
unmediated action-at-a-distance remains somewhat inconclusive.  (Lange, 2002, 40-42; 
 89
causation-at-a-distance is merely brute, that would (it seems) effectively limit science’s 
ability to come up with the full account of the universe it seeks to achieve by rendering 
much of the necessary causal architecture obscure (and, incidentally, prove Hume 
prescient!).    
 In the light of these problems – plus the strongly apparent local nature of at least 
some of the causal relations so far explored by science (mechanical transfer of forces, 
electrical conductivity, and so on), it seems most plausible that physical causation is local 
through and through.  So, if we can reasonably be doubtful of brute physical causation as 
an explanatory contender, what then might an ITCC look like in terms of our Gremlin 
example?   
 Suppose we could confine a Gremlin in a laboratory so that he7 could not escape 
through any physical means, and we outfit him with a non-removable tracking collar.  
We record with our instruments and observe as the Gremlin dematerializes and the 
tracking signal suddenly disappears, after which we certify that there is no physical 
Gremlin present in the laboratory, nor has any been detected leaving the premisses.  At 
likely Gremlin reappearance points elsewhere, we have stationed further observers and 
monitoring instrumentation has been set up.   
 At one of these points  thousands of miles away, the Gremlin, still wearing his 
collar, suddenly materializes and we again detect the tracking signal.  Calibrated atomic 
clocks show that the disappearing and reappearing occurred as close to instantaneously as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
296-297) 
 7  For the sake of this thought experiment we assume that all Gremlins are male. 
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can be determined, down to the finest decimal place that our clocks are capable of 
measuring.   
 Clearly, something causal happened.  The Gremlin was in one location, but now 
is somewhere else miles away.  It seems evident that no physical account can give a 
satisfactory causal explanation, nor is there a plausible physical theory that even 
promises an explanation.  The best explanation at this juncture would be that closure was 
violated.  
 This discussion of ITCCs does raise a couple of important objections.  First, how 
do we know that even if we manage to exclude every known physical mechanism that 
might otherwise account for the “missing” links of an ITCC, we might not later discover 
other physicalist explanations that are unknown today?   This is an important question, 
but one which I shall defer to a later chapter for consideration.   Second, why should we 
even worry that such things as closure-violators exist?  If they did, wouldn’t we have 
noticed one long ago?  This concern we can begin to answer shortly.8
 In principle, a standard TCC is metaphysically sufficient to falsify closure.  But 
due to the issues just discussed, TCCs fall short of providing sufficient evidence.  Though 
                                                          
 8 In an insight I owe to Dan Bonevac, we are not without experience in dealing 
with these kinds of questions, at least by analogy.  Through careful observation, data 
collection and analysis we can, for example, identify influences entering seemingly-
closed physical systems.  ecosystems may exemplify self-contained, mostly self-
sufficient worlds.  But through observing atypical or seemingly-anomalistic (for that 
system) changes and developments within the ecosystem, we can get our first alert that 
some new, heretofore unidentified influence is making itself felt from outside the system.  
In another example suggested by Bonevac, suppose the inhabitants of a spaceship moving 
at constant speed through the galaxy with no means of external observation were to 
experience an abrupt jolt orthogonal to their line of travel.  They might conclude (likely 
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metaphysically ITCCs tell no more strongly against closure than TCCs, they are 
evidentially much stronger, and so we should be most interested in finding ITCCs.   
 What might such an ITCC look like in our (presumably) non-Gremlin world?  I 
will give here a brief notional example.  Suppose someone in a sealed, electrically-
shielded room in Austin, Texas were to sit at a table and mentally “transmit” a sketch she 
was drawing, while a second person in a similar, sealed and electrically-shielded room in 
Freiburg, Germany were to attempt to mentally “receive” the sketch, with no intervening 
sensory or technical means of communication available.  Suppose further, that the second 
person did indeed succeed in reproducing a reasonable facsimile of the sketch, not hours 
or even moments later, but at what calibrated clocks attested was exactly the same time 
as the person in Philadelphia was creating her sketch. 
 This would seem to meet the criteria for an ITCC.  The front end of the causal 
chain – the sketching in Austin – is apparent, and can be monitored.  The back end of the 
causal chain, the reproducing of the sketch in Germany, is also apparent.  But in the 
obvious absence of any known physical means of communication (indeed, even of any 
plausibly speculative physical means of communication), the presence of closure-
violating causal links becomes a possibility that must be taken seriously.   
 The question is, do such real examples exist to be found?  I think they do, and it is 
the task of the next few chapters to point them out and assess how well they fit the 
criteria we have specified to qualify as a closure violator. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
correctly) that the jolt was the result of some external cause. 
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Chapter 5:  Counterexample to Physicalism 
 
 In previous chapters I argued that universal physicalism has become the dominant 
paradigm in both science and philosophy, thanks to an inference-to-the-best-explanation 
(ITBE) grounded in the vast accumulation of inductive evidence which supports physical 
explanations for the phenomena contained in the world.  I argued further that a priori 
philosophical arguments could not defeat physicalism because physicalism is at root 
empirically-based, and therefore only empirically-based arguments could make any 
headway against it.  These empirically-based arguments would require a certain kind of 
evidence with specific unusual features.  Unless such evidence exists, physicalism 
remains the best account of the universe.  In this and the following three chapters, I will 
make an inventory and assessment of just the sort of empirical evidence that can support 
counter-arguments to physicalism.  
 The kind of evidence with the best prospects for threatening physicalism must 
directly challenge the validity of the assumption of the causal closure of the physical 
domain.  Causal closure stipulates that all physically-relevant causal chains must initiate 
and remain fully within the physical domain throughout their life-spans.  The truth of 
closure is, like physicalism, assumed on the strength of the inductive evidence for 
physicalism and an ITBE which asserts that the phenomena we encounter in the world 
can best be explained if we consider the physical universe closed to external causal 
 93
influences.  If we show that the physical universe is not causally closed, then closure is 
falsified and with it physicalism as a sufficient explanation of the universe.1
 But does evidence exist that proves closure false?   I argue that it does: 
specifically, the evidence produced by scientific parapsychology.  In what follows I will 
soon consider how it counts against closure.  What is ‘scientific parapsychology’?   One 
definition says that parapsychology is “the study of interactions between behaving 
organisms and their external environment, which occur under conditions precluding 
participation of the sensorimotor system” (Dean, 1970).  The problem with this definition 
is that in many parapsychology experiments a subject’s sensorimotor system does seem 
to be engaged locally, even though affected by some apparent non-local influence.  A 
better definition is that offered by the Parapsychology Association, an affiliate of the 
AAAS: 
parapsychology studies apparent anomalies of behavior and experience which exist apart 
from currently known explanatory mechanisms which account for organism-environment 
and organism-organism information and influence flow. (Parapsychology Association, 
1989) 
 
 Another source identifies parapsychology as “the scientific study of experiences 
which, if they are as they seem to be, are in principle outside the realm of human 
capabilities as presently conceived by scientists” (Irwin & Watt, 2007, 1).2  
                                                          
 1Notice that this falsification doesn’t render physicalism toothless – it merely 
redefines the boundaries of the types of phenomena that physicalism can fully explain. 
 2I will put off until later consideration of whether and to what degree such 
locutions as existing “apart from currently known explanatory mechanisms” and “outside the 
realm of human capabilities as presently conceived by scientists” actually matter to my 
overall argument. 
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Parapsychological phenomena seem to violate the facts and laws of science as presently 
understood and, according to many scientists and philosophers, cannot be accommodated 
within physicalism.   
 The term parapsychology was coined in 1897 by German philosopher Max 
Dessoir and adopted in the 1930s by pioneer parapsychologist J.B. Rhine (Rhine, 1934, 
7; Dessoir, 1889).  An unsigned editorial in the March 1937 maiden issue of the Journal 
of Parapsychology argued for adoption of ‘parapsychology’ as a label for the newly-
emerging controlled laboratory research on so-called ‘psychic’ phenomena, and 
distinguish it from field work on apparitions, trance mediumship, and other anecdotal 
types of phenomena which had come to be identified with ‘psychical science,’ the term 
then in common use.   I have above specified scientific parapsychology to emphasize it is 
this distinction I have in mind, to avoid potential confusion generated by less precise 
popular usage of the term that has accreted to it over the decades since its adoption. 
 There are two general branches of parapsychological research.  One has to do 
with so-called extrasensory perception (ESP3); the other is generally referred to as 
psychokinesis, or PK – often informally termed “mind over matter.”4   ESP is a relatively 
                                                          
 3
As an alternative term to “ESP,” I shall also use the label “psi” from time to time, since 
this is used by some researchers as a replacement term.  “Psi” is the first letter of the 
word “psyche” has been adopted by many parapsychologists to stand for, roughly, “the 
thus-far unknown feature of the universe that facilitates ESP experiences.” 
 4ESP and PK and the terms for which they are acronyms are often considered 
obsolete terminology, presumably replaced by “anomalous cognition” (AC) and 
“anomalous perturbation” (AP).  Due to serious deficiencies (which are not relevant to 
consider here) in these more recent terms, I will default to ‘ESP’ and ‘PK’ as both are in 
my view more descriptively accurate and more widely understood. 
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passive activity usually involving apparent information transfer from targets or “senders” 
sequestered from the human perceiver by distance, intervening shielding, or displacement 
in time, or a combination of these.  PK is an active phenomenon in which non-mental 
matter is apparently physically affected by the conscious or, in some cases, unconscious 
intentionality of a human subject.  (Broughton, 1991) 
 My focus will be primarily on ESP.  Because of problems regularly encountered 
in producing PK and replicating it in experimental environments, I will consider PK only 
in passing in my discussion.  Further, I will not consider at all other traditional areas for 
parapsychological research, such as hauntings, poltergeist phenomena, death-survival 
evidence, and so on.  These phenomena are typical truncated causal chains (TCC), which 
I argued in the preceding chapter were evidentially the most problematic.  Second, 
though all this material does count as evidence for closure violation, it is largely 
anecdotal, not well controlled, and subject to variations in interpretation.  I make no 
commitment nor draw any conclusions as to the nature or reality of this assortment of 
phenomena. 
 I recognize that parapsychology as a body of evidence is highly controversial.  
Indeed, except for the comparatively few occasions when it is under attack, it has been 
largely ignored or outright dismissed for a reason I shall now briefly assert: and later treat 
in more detail:  ESP and other parapsychological effects are once acknowledged to be 
real, this seems to imply that closure and, hence, physicalism (as it is construed today), is 
false.  I will consider the various aspects of the controversy in chapters 11 and 12.   
Suffice it for now to say that many philosophers agree that, were its claims proven to be 
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legitimate, parapsychology might pose a threat to physicalism.  Poland, cited in chapter 
1, notes that the job of physics is to study all and only what exists in nature.  And for that 
reason “ghosts, gods, and the paranormal are genuine threats to physicalism: they appear 
to be in nature in various ways, but they are not encompassed by physics” (1994, 228).  
And as Melnyk notes,  
 
[I]f the mind were discovered to have causal powers (e.g., telepathic or 
psychokinetic powers) that it would be impossible, according to current physics, 
for a physically realized system to possess, then the mind could not be a 
physically realized system.  So the discovery of (e.g.) telepathic or psychokinetic 
powers would simultaneously falsify realization physicalism and support dualism. 
(2005, 189) 
 
 But now, before considering all the arguments made against taking 
parapsychology evidence seriously as evidence against physicalism, I will examine what 
the evidence actually amounts to (since there is much confusion about it).  Additionally, I 
must consider what properties sufficiently well-attested parapsychological phenomena 
have that suit them to be taken as a counterexample to physicalist claims.  By engaging 
primarily with ESP-type experimental regimens, I deal for the most part exclusively with 
in-and-out causal chains – what I am calling ‘intermittently truncated causal chains’ or 
‘ITCCs’ – since they provide the most persuasive and accessible evidence for closure 
violations, as explicated in the previous chapter.  The experiments I will cite are designed 
to force a situation where, if there is to be a result at all, it must be the consequence of an 
intermittently truncated causal chain.  The experimental paradigms I will consider are 
these: 
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• Presentiment Experiments. – which show that human subjects can experience an 
autonomic response and have limited pre-conscious cognition of emotionally-
charged stimuli as many as several seconds in advance of actually being presented 
the stimuli. These experiments appear to violate closure through precognition 
(that is, becoming aware in the present of a state of affairs in the future). 
 
• Distant Mental Interaction with Living Systems or DMILS – which show that 
human subjects can detect autonomically and sometimes be consciously aware at 
a distance of the focused attention of another human, though fully shielded from 
sensory awareness of such attention. There are two sub-categories: Remote 
Mental Interaction (RMI) and Remote Staring Detection (RSD), both of which 
seem to demonstrate closure violations with either nonphysically-mediated 
action-at-a-distance, or remote awareness, or both. 
 
• Remote viewing (“anomalous cognition”) experiments, which show that human 
subjects can perceive and accurately describe physical locations, objects, persons, 
etc., even when sequestered from any and all known forms of sensory or technical 
sources of information.  This perception occurs without artificial means or 
sensory connection to targets separated from the perceiver by intervening 
shielding, by distance – up to thousands of miles – or by time (e.g., past, distant 
past, or near future). This demonstrates remote awareness and nonphysically-
mediated perception-at-a-distance. 
 
• Associative Remote Viewing (ARV) experiments, – a specialized approach to 
remote viewing in which human subjects are asked to describe a target that will 
not be presented to them until some time (ranging from minutes to days) into the 
future as a means of predicting the outcome of a (usually binary) future event. 
These experiments seem to show both remote awareness and precognition. 
 
 There is a much larger set of experimental paradigms in parapsychology that 
might prove equally illustrative.  Though I will likely touch on any number of these, I 
will only consider in detail the four I have mentioned, for two reasons: for the sake of 
space and these are especially straightforward examples of ITCCs.   I will consider each 
of these four research paradigms in turn, and in detail (one will be covered in this 
chapter, one in chapter 6, and one each in chapters 7 and 8).  
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 The first two paradigms I will consider fall under the category sometimes referred 
to as “unconscious psi” (Radin, 2006), since they involve non-cognitive or pre-conscious 
human psychological systems that function outside of awareness (for example, assessing 
autonomic nervous system reactions) (Radin, 2004, p. 254).  The first I consider below, 
and a further, perhaps somewhat related variation (with its two sub-categories), will come 




 The idea behind presentiment experiments owes its genesis to two different 
sources.  One is the corpus of anecdotal parapsychological reports, typified by the many 
instances of foreboding or premonition that are reported to have preceded some dire or 
emotionally-charged event that was yet in the experiencer’s future.  Since these are all 
anecdotal accounts which can only be assessed retrospectively from field reports, 
researchers decided to explore whether the essence of the experience could be abstracted 
away from subjective experience and distilled down into a controllable experimental 
framework suitable to a laboratory environment.   
 The second impetus for the presentiment protocol comes from the large body of 
psychology and parapsychology research using physiological monitoring techniques for 
detecting and measuring autonomic arousal evoked by subconsciously-perceived stimuli.  
These two traditions came together in the mid-1990s to inspire the first presentiment 
experiments (Lobach, 2008; Radin, 1997, 2006) 
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 The word “presentiment” literally means pre-sentiment, or subjective, emotion-
based “sentiments” that are experienced by a subject in advance of an exposure to an 
emotionally-charged stimulus.  Presentiment experiments exploit the “orienting 
response,” a well-attested psychological reflex that serves to prepare individual 
organisms, including humans, to respond to important changes in their environment, such 
as a threat from a predator or a dangerous natural event or, conversely, a suddenly 
available mating or feeding opportunity.  This is a non-cognitive response, in which the 
reticular activating system (which governs attention and wakefulness) and 
parasympathetic nervous system (the branch of the autonomic nervous system concerned, 
among other things, with the “fight or flight” response) are particularly involved.  When 
confronted with a startling, sudden or unexpected event, the orienting response 
automatically initiates to bring an organism’s perceptual resources to bear in determining 
whether the event portends a threat or other major stimulus and, if so, what action to take.  
The response is accompanied by significant autonomic arousal in the form of increased 
heart rate and skin conductance levels, and lower blood volume (as measured in the lab 
by finger tip sensors).  
 Researchers speculated that if indeed there was any substance to reports of 
premonitions which preceded fearful or highly emotional events, then these “pre-
sponses” should also be accompanied by a semblance of an orienting response – albeit 
less pronounced given the lower intensity of the not-yet-experienced stimulus.  If such 
were the case, then the autonomic markers of such orienting “presponses” should in 
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principle be detectable with the proper instrumentation and statistical methods, given a 
future stimulus with the right properties and of sufficient intensity. 
 Researchers who carry out these experiments are interested to see if there might 
be an effect that is temporally displaced, whether as a backwards-looking 
“retrocausative” effect or a forward-looking “precognitive” effect.   
 Typical presentiment experiments require a strong contrast between calm and 
emotional stimuli.  Sets of such stimuli are constructed by gathering a body of photos 
with widely-varied affective (emotional or otherwise arousing) content.   A target photo 
set is constructed from a mix of calm photos and emotionally-charged, “disturbing” 
photos.  Calm photos may be pastoral scenes, tranquil settings, and so on.  Emotionally-
charged photos include three categories – erotic, violent (including gruesome subjects 
such as accident aftermaths and autopsy photos), and disgusting/aversive/fearful (such as 
snakes, spiders, etc.).5
 The photo target set is digitized and loaded into a desktop computer system.   
Software in the computer is configured in most cases to display photos individually only 
after the participant initializes the trial (usually via a mouse click) and then only after a 
delay.6  What photo is shown and whether it has calm or disturbing content is fully 
randomized within the computer.  The photo is usually not chosen by the randomization 
protocol until just before it is displayed. 
                                                          
 5Such a scientifically-validated photo set is available in the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS), which has been widely used for many other research 
purposes beyond parapsychological experiments. (Lobach. 2008) 
 6Some of the more recent experiments present the images on a fixed schedule. 
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 A typical presentiment experiment unfolds in this way: A participant takes a seat 
in front of the computer in an isolation room.  The participant is connected to autonomic-
system monitoring equipment, typically for skin conductance, heart rate, or blood volume 
(fingertip photoplethysmograph), or combinations of all three.  Once ready to begin, the 
participant presses the mouse button to start the stimulus sequence.  There is a delay for a 
set number of seconds during which the computer randomly selects a photo and the 
participant’s physiological markers are monitored.  Monitoring continues as the photo is 
displayed for the participant to view for a set number of seconds.  At the end of the 
observation period, the computer screen returns to a blank state for a rest period.  At the 
end of this rest period, the computer screen displays a message asking the participant to 
initiate the next stimulus sequence when he or she is ready.  This process continues for 
the specified number of trials – for example in one early set of experiments it was 40 
trials at a sitting. 
 Experimenters expect to see the usual dramatic increase in the participant’s 
autonomic indicators after a disturbing photo is displayed, and a much less pronounced 
increase in those indicators with the calm targets.  But if there is a time-reversed or 
forward-time displaced presentiment effect, there should also be a slight but still 
noticeable anomalous autonomic arousal in advance of the presentation of 
disturbing/emotional photos which is not present prior to the display of calm ones.  And 
this is indeed what was found over several such experiments conducted in different 
laboratories around the world.   
 As Dean Radin, the designer of the original presentiment experiment puts it:  
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The idea of presentiment assumes that we are constantly and unconsciously 
scanning our future, and preparing to respond to it.  If this is true, then whenever 
our future involves an emotional response, we’d predict that our nervous system 
would become aroused before the emotional picture appears.  If our future is 
calm, we’d expect to remain calm before the picture appears.  Of course, after an 
emotional or calm picture appears the response is well understood as the 
“orienting reflex.”  This is the body’s predictable reaction to a novel stimulus, in 
which it momentarily tenses up while evaluating whether to fight or flee. (2006, 
p.166) 
 
 Since the participants are biological systems, there are conflating issues that must 
be taken into account in order to assess whether or not an anomalous effect has occurred.   
Some factors work to reduce the magnitude of possible real results.  For example, 
habituation – the tendency of organisms (including humans) to become both consciously 
and physiologically accustomed to a repeated stimulus.  As participants become 
habituated to the disturbing photos in the target set, they may demonstrate increasingly 
less autonomic arousal.  This would cause a decreasing effect across a set of trials, 
producing a diminished significance level in the data.  Measures taken to minimize this 
effect include mixing a higher ratio of calm versus disturbing photos into the target set, 
and limiting the number of trials a participant executes  at one sitting. 
 Fatigue and boredom can also present problems.  If a session lasts too long, or if 
the participant begins already in a fatigued state, the orienting effect both before and after 
display of the target photos may be attenuated.  A participant’s level of alertness versus 
inattentiveness overall can affect the data.  A cough or sneeze, wandering attention, or 
other distraction can adversely impact the effect being studied. 
 Idiosyncratic responses between participants can be a further conflating variable.  
Individual humans manifest varying reactions to or tolerance for stimuli.  For example, 
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participants from the Netherlands demonstrate less reaction to erotic pictures; emergency 
room personnel may not react to violent or gruesome images.  And, as at least one study 
shows, females may react more strongly to violent images than do males.  Protocol and 
statistical measures can be employed which adjust somewhat for these considerations, but 
they do not always fully ameliorate these complications. 
 There are other issues to consider that could work as sources of error – to indicate 
an effect when none is actually present or, when there is an effect present, to indicate the 
effect is stronger than it really is.  Presentiment researchers have a number of these that 
they consistently check to make sure that observed effects are not merely the product of 
an artifact of experiment design or human nature. 
 For example, Radin (1997b) explored six possible alternative explanations to 
account for the highly significant findings reported in his study.  These were, along with 
his explanations:  
1) Results were due to chance – Statistical analyses employing two different 
approaches showed this not to be a tenable explanation.  According to Radin, 
“differences larger than those observed in the actual data would be unlikely with 
p = .008," showing that “chance is not a viable explanation for the observed 
results”  (p. 175).  
 
2) Inadvertent cuing (as one example, perhaps through sounds emitted by the 
computer that were different before display of disturbing vs. calm images) – 
Experimental design makes this impossible.  A random number is generated, but 
does not select a calm vs. disturbing photo until the instant the photo is displayed.  
This occurs in RAM processes, so there is no hardware operation to create subtle 
sound variations.  Further, software design eliminated the possibility of 
inadvertent display of images outside the specified time windows.  Experimenters 
with a knowledge of the image pool were not present during trials, and in any 
case were unwitting as to presentation order of the photos. 
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3) A fault in analysis of the pre-stimulus period – Analysis techniques showed a 
false-positive during the pre-stimulus period of interest.  This is also unlikely, as 
the same type of analysis was performed on the well-understood post-stimulus 
orienting response epochs, and yielded precisely the values that would normally 
be expected.  It would therefore be reasonable to assume that since the same 
analytical method was applied uniformly to both pre- and post-stimulus periods, 
the results would be equally trustworthy. 
 
4) Faulty randomization in presentation of disturbing vs. calm targets – Allow 
participants to guess at a higher than chance level of success.  A post-hoc 
examination of the order of target presentation using three different statistical 
measures confirmed that the sequence had indeed been fully random, making 
participant guessing an unlikely explanation.    
 
5) Disturbing images not as pronounced as intended – An examination of 
experimental data showed that calm pictures did not produce an orienting 
response, whereas the disturbing ones did.  Further, a jury of six persons (three 
men, three women) rated all photos employed in the experiment in a randomized 
sequence according to a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being most extreme, 1 being most 
calm.  This subjective ranking confirmed the apparent significant affective 
dichotomy between the two categories.  A further statistical test was performed to 
verify whether this subjective assessment of the degree of extremity among 
disturbing targets correlated with the pre-display response (“presponse”) of the 
subjects during the experiment.  This test confirmed that it did. 
 
6) The effect was due to anticipatory strategies – A worry exists that, as a 
sequence of calm photos is presented, a participant’s anticipation grows that soon 
a disturbing image “has” to be presented just by the laws of chance (this is a 
version of the gambler’s fallacy).  This could result in “false positives,” thus 
skewing the data.  Radin employed a statistical Monte Carlo test, simulating a 
participant working within an optimal anticipatory strategy, and found that the 
“arousal levels [were] far too small to account for the observed physiological 
effects” (p. 177). 
 
 It is important to consider these and other possible alternative explanations for the 
data since, as noted in the base argument, one must rule out all physical explanations in 




 The first set of four presentiment experiments was conducted at the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas in 1996 by Dean Radin, the originator of the presentiment 
experimental paradigm, and published in a 1997 paper (Radin, 1997b).  Altogether, 31 
participants were presented a total of 1,060 photo targets.  The presentiment effect was 
demonstrated at a highly significant value of p = .002, or odds against chance of 1 in 500 
(Radin, 2006, 324).   
 In Radin (2000) he repeated his own results.  Two experiments – the first 
involving 48 participants, the second with 50 – once again tested the presentiment effect, 
but added two new (but related) hypotheses: 1)  that participants who showed the most 
consistent response to calm stimuli would also demonstrate the strongest presentiment 
response to disturbing photos, and 2) that there would be a positive correlation between 
level of arousal before emotional stimuli and the emotionality ratings of the photos for 
this same group of consistent responders.7  Results across both experiments for 
hypothesis 1 (that consistent responders would show a greater presentiment effect) 
yielded p = 0.04 and for hypothesis 2, p = 0.008, which supported the reasonable 
conjecture that greater contrast between disturbing vs. calm content would produce a 
stronger presentiment effect.    
 This showed a further dimension of replication, in that the presentiment measure 
seemed sensitive both to variations in individual human nature, as well as in more 
                                                          
 7The second, 50-subject experiment introduced a couple of other measures, as 
well – a 6-second pre-stimulus recording period, rather than the previous 5-second period 
(it was suspected that the presentiment effect might actually begin to manifest earlier 
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generalized human emotional response, just as one would expect to see if it were a real 
effect rather than an artifact of the design.  Analyzing all aspects of the study’s two 
experiments “provided evidence for an unconscious time-reversed effect in the human 
nervous system” to the level of p = .001 (Radin, 2000, 1).  
 Further replications were carried out in the Netherlands by Professor Dick 
Bierman at the University of Amsterdam.  These were first briefly reported in Bierman & 
Radin (1997), but more thoroughly treated in Bierman (1997) and Bierman & Radin 
(2000).  These involved three experiments of varying configurations.  The first, using 16 
subjects, was a replication of Radin (1997b), with one change – instead of drawing 
targets from a large pool, three sets of photos with different ratios of calm-to-disturbing 
photos in each set were chosen randomly to assure that the set which was chosen for each 
participant and the ratio of photos within the set was unknown to the experimenter.  The 
second experiment involved 32 subjects who were shown 10 photos, all of which were 
calm with the exception of one disturbing photo mixed in randomly.  The participants 
were unaware that they might view a disturbing photo.  The third experiment involved 
the same 32 participants, now informed that there would be occasional disturbing photos.   
 The various modifications to the three experiments were all intended to test for 
the presence of an invalidating anticipatory strategy, in addition to testing for the 
presentiment effect.  Results of the first experiment were statistically significant at p = 
0.016.  (In this experiment, of the disturbing photos, the violent images elicited more of a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
than previously supposed); and the execution of 30 trials per participant, rather than the 
40-trial sets of previous experiments (this was hoped to alleviate fatigue). 
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response than did erotic ones among the largely female participant set, which contained 
13 females, to three males.  This trend was indicated in later experiments as well.)  The 
second experiment produced results in the positive direction, but fell short of statistical 
significance – at least partially because of its much smaller statistical power (however, 
the same results-trend between violent and erotic images was indicated).  The third 
experiment showed a stronger, but still non-significant positive result.  Here, also there 
was a differential for violent vs. erotic photos. 
 Other full or partial replications include Norfolk (1999), Wildey (2001), 
Spottiswoode & May (2003), Broughton (2004), McCraty et al (2004a, b), Radin (2004), 
Bem (two studies – 2003 & 2005), May et al (2005), Hinterberger et al (2007), and 
Bierman (2007).  Some of these warrant further discussion here.  (Others I will elaborate 
on subsequently.) 
  Broughton (2004) for instance, reports only a partial replication of the 
presentiment effect.  This study attempted to link sensitivity to presentiment with certain 
personality measures – notably extraversion and intuition, as measured by the Myers-
Briggs Type Inventory (MBTI) personality assessment tool, and the Openness to 
Experience factor in a similar personality instrument, the NEO  – which had been 
reported in the literature to correlate with general success at ESP-type tasks.   Overall, 
and despite using different statistical measures to evaluate the results, no presentiment 
effect was noted.  However, in an analysis of how the presentiment effect correlated with 
personality variables, there were two significant results –  for those participants who 
scored high on the MBTI  Intuition scale (p = 0.021), and for those who scored high for 
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the Openness factor in the NEO (p = 0.012).  What this means is that, as hypothesized, 
participants with those particular personality traits did manifest a statistically-significant 
presentiment effect.  The overall results in Broughton’s presentiment study were 
disappointing, but that the personality aspect of the experiment reached significance was 
intriguing. 
 Radin (2004) collected and reanalyzed three experiments reported in Radin 
(1997)8 and Radin (2000), plus reported a further experiment done with another six 
participants.  Combined, the experiments included 4,569 trials contributed by 133 
participants.  Two of these experiments had results in the positive direction but did not 
reach statistical significance.  The combined statistics were nonetheless highly significant 
at p = .000013.  (Radin, 2004, 265) 
 Wildey (2001) added a unique twist.  Using the standard presentiment protocol, 
he performed 314 trials with 15 human subjects, yielding a positive result which fell just 
short of statistical significance.9  But to test a further hypothesis about consciousness,10 
he also performed 231 trials (using an unpleasant vibration as a noxious stimulus) on 
earthworms.  This also yielded results in the positive direction, but still non-significant. 
                                                          
 8Leaving out two that were too dissimilar for combining but were themselves 
independently statistically significant. 
 9Data was presented in chart form, so extrapolating p values was not feasible. 
 10That proposed by Roger Penrose and Stuart Hammeroff, that consciousness is a 
consequence of quantum functions inherent in certain structures within all neurons, 
including those present in lower orders of life. 
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 McCraty et al (2004a) took a different tack.  Whereas standard presentiment 
experiments monitored electrodermal activity (EDA), using changes in skin conductance 
as the indicator of autonomic arousal (with some including heart rate and blood volume 
measures as well), McCraty (2004a) added ECG (electrocardiogram) monitoring to 
complement the SCR measure.  The ECG tracked acceleration and deceleration trends in 
heart rate.   
 Using 26 participants (11 males, 15 females) and a standard disturbing/calm 
image target pool, this experiment generated 2,340 trials.  Results for the skin-
conductance were non-significant, though there is a slightly observable increase in EDA 
prior to display of disturbing photos under the study’s second condition.11  The ECG 
data, though, showed a clear pre-stimulus presentiment effect prior to display of 
disturbing photos, as measured by a heart-rate variability index.  Cross-subject results 
were highly significant for condition 1 (p = 0.001), and was higher for female 
participants (condition 1, p = 0.004; condition 2, p = 0.01) than males  (condition 1, p = 
0.03; condition 2, non-significant).   
 McCraty concluded that physiological heart response “occurred approximately 
4.75 seconds before the stimulus was actually presented.  This is where the slope of the 
heart rate deceleration curve for the emotional trials clearly starts to diverge from the 
slope for the calm trials” (McCraty, 2004b, 331).    Since the heart is also governed by 
                                                          
 11This research had as a secondary purpose testing the efficacy of a meditation-
like technique which was expected to modify participants’ response to emotional stimuli.  
Condition 1 was non-meditative state, while condition 2 was a post-meditative state. 
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autonomic functions, this does provide a plausible alternative to EDA monitoring as a 
measure of presentiment.   
 
 There is a further sub-class of this type of research, called “pre-stimulus 
response” (PSR) experiments, which are related to and suggested by the presentiment 
protocol, but which introduce variations on the original presentiment design.  Though the 
experimental design for each of these may differ from the classic presentiment case, PSR 
experiments could be considered conceptual replications of the presentiment paradigm – 
or at the very least of the same category and class of experiment.  This is because in both 
PSR and presentiment experiments the effect under examination involves non-cognitive 
perceptual experiences which are temporally-displaced in the same direction by 
approximately the same magnitude.       
 Spottiswoode and May (2003), for example, followed the general presentiment 
experimental protocol.  But they recognized the problem of statistical “noise” which can 
be introduced by individual participants’ idiosyncratic responses to certain photographic 
subjects (e.g., emergency room nurses not finding gruesome photos as startling as a pre-
school teacher might), and decided to forego the usual disturbing vs. calm image pool 
altogether.  As a replacement for disturbing photos they elected to use a 97db burst of 
white noise as a startling sound stimulus.  This was juxtaposed with short periods of 
silence as a control (which took the place of calm images).  Sessions contained 20 
stimulus periods, divided randomly between periods of silence and bursts of white noise.  
Using 125 participants, results as determined by skin conductance measures were found 
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to be highly significant (p = .00054, odds against chance 1 in 1,900), meaning that a pre-
stimulus effect was consistently detected before the loud sounds, but no effect was 
observed in advance of the periods of silence.12
 This experiment was subsequently replicated at a college-level educational 
institution in Hungary by May et al (2005) with a set of 50 participants.  Two researchers 
who had not participated in earlier presentiment experiments conducted two identical 
sub-experiments (Vassy - 21 participants; Paulinyi - 29 participants) yielding closely 
similar effect sizes, with overall results which were also highly significant, at p = 0.0018. 
 Cornell University psychologist Daryl J. Bem’s (2003) “Precognitive 
Habituation” (PH) experiment turned around the classic presentiment experiment to take 
advantage of the usually troublesome habituation effect.  In this case, he exploited a 
version of habituation based on the “Mere Exposure Effect,” a heavily-researched 
psychological feature in which increased frequency of exposure to a stimulus produces an 
increased tolerance to or preference for the stimulus. 
 Bem’s experimental design was carefully crafted, but somewhat complex. In 
effect, he describes it as a Mere Exposure study run in reverse.  As he explained: 
Instead of exposing a participant to repeated exposures of a stimulus and then 
assessing his or her liking for it, the PH procedure reverses the sequence: On each 
trial, the participant is first shown a pair of photographs on a computer screen and 
asked to indicate which picture he or she prefers. The computer then randomly 
selects one of the two pictures to serve as the “habituation target” and displays it 
subliminally several times. If the participant prefers the picture subsequently 
designated as the target, the trial is defined as a “hit.” (Bem, 2003, 2) 
                                                          
 12Spottiswoode & May devoted a substantial part of their paper to a systematic 
analysis of plausible non-ESP ways of accounting for the data, and were able to 
satisfactorily dismiss each in turn.  In the interest of space I will not cover those here. 
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This experiment exploited two features of the Mere Exposure effect.  1) The ME effect 
operates unconsciously – in fact, it is enhanced through subliminal exposure and, 
conversely, is inhibited by conscious processing; and 2) stimuli rated as strongly 
affective by a subject on the first exposure are reported to be noticeably less extreme 
after repeated subliminal exposure.   
 In Bem’s experiment, the measure of ESP effect was the difference between 
whether the image chosen by the participant as the preferred image in the set of two 
images presented, matched what the computer subsequently randomly chose and 
subliminally exposed numerous times to the participant.  More simply put, the test was to 
see whether the ME habituation effect was “transmitted” back in time to influence the 
participant’s initial choice between photos.  As Bem noted “The Precognitive Habituation 
hypothesis is that the repeated exposures of the target can reach back in time to diminish 
the arousal it would otherwise produce, thereby rendering negatively arousing targets less 
negative and positively arousing targets less positive” (p.4). 
 Photo pairs matched for valence and arousal13 were selected for negative-affect 
(violent, horrifying) images, positive-affect (erotic) images, and neutral (“calm”) images.  
The prediction was that no precognitive habituation effect would be noted for the neutral 
images, but there would be such an effect observed for positive and negative affect 
images. 
                                                          
 13Emotion can be assessed along two dimensions, valence and arousal.  Valence is 
a measure of where on a spectrum between positive and negative an emotional indicator 
might fall; arousal captures the intensity of an emotion from neutral to extreme. 
 113
 Chance results (e.g. no precognitive habituation effect present) should reflect a 
flat 50% hit rate (that is, the target photo subsequently selected by the computer should 
match that chosen by the participant only half the time).  And this was in fact the 
outcome for the neutral targets, just as predicted.  In six basic experiments involving 260 
subjects (159 women and 101 men), the hit-rate on neutral targets produced results at 
chance.  On the other hand, results for the negative affect images produced hits highly 
significantly above chance (p = 0.0008), while erotic (positive-affect) images scored 
significantly below chance (p = 0.031), both in the directions anticipated. 
 Bem ran two more experiments, testing the “supraliminal” condition, wherein the 
post-selection habituation process by the computer was presented consciously to 
participants, rather than subliminally.  Consistent with the known parameters of the Mere 
Exposure effect, the precognitive habituation effect was eliminated or seriously 
degraded.14
 A fortuitous discovery (styled by Bem as a “serendipitous finding”) made during 
the course of the experiments was a phenomenon Bem refers to as “precognitive 
boredom.”  It was found in an earlier pilot study, and then confirmed in later iterations of 
his basic PH experiments, that if repeated subliminal exposures to all three categories 
(negative, positive, and neutral) of images is increased sufficiently, a threshold is reached 
                                                          
 14Though a final, ninth PH replication conducted this time by a skeptical 
colleague took some lessons learned from Bem’s two preceding supraliminal experiments 
and in a third supraliminal trial achieved a marginally significant effect (p = 0.061) for 
negative affect target images with 87 participants.  (Interestingly, a subset of 32 




at which point the hit rate for neutral targets also drops significantly below chance (p = 
0.04).  Further tests confirmed this finding.  Bem proposed that “the many repeated 
exposures (precognitively) render the target picture boring, or even aversive, and hence 
less attractive than its matched non-target” (p.13).  The “precognitive boredom” 
phenomenon is consistent with other literature on the Mere Exposure effect.  Because this 
was an unanticipated finding, it adds weight to the evidentiary value of the PH 
experiments. 
 Savva et al (2004) attempted a replication of Bem’s PH experiment, substituting 
less objectionable (but they hoped equally aversive) photos of spiders in place of what 
they judged as “ethically problematic” negative and erotic images used in the Bem 
studies.  These spider photos, along with a set of neutral photos were then presented to 23 
male and 27 female subjects, some of whom were scaled as “spider fearful” and some 
who were categorized as “no fear.”  The results were weaker than those produced by 
Bem,15 but still suggestive: the spider-fear group scored at a marginally-significant hit 
rate of 54% (p = 0.051), and showed a differential response between spider and neutral 
images at a statistically significant rate (p = 0.021).  On the other hand, the no-fear group 
had a non-significant hit rate of 49%.  “This suggests,” report the authors, “that for the 
spider-fear group performance on the PH task seems to be significantly different when 
the stimuli are spider related than when the stimuli are low-affect” (p.226). 
                                                          
 15Perhaps because the valence and arousal factors for the spider stimuli differ in 
impact from the affective images in Bem’s target pool, or because the smaller number of 
participants yield less statistical power. 
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 In 2005, Bem reported a new experiment that was a variation of his precognitive 
habituation (PH) protocol.  He called this new protocol  “precognitive aversion” (PA) 
since it capitalized on the “precognitive boredom” effect he had discovered earlier when 
evaluating the PH experiment results. Two hundred participants were involved, including 
140 women and 60 men, each performing 24 trials.  While the experiment produced 
overall non-significant results, the subject-populations most likely to show a response 
(those who scored low in either an Arousability measure or for Boredom Tolerance) did 
produce a significant result (p = 0.006 overall).   Those participants measuring low in 
Arousability showed significant precognitive aversion (p = 0.036), while those measuring 
low in Boredom Tolerance showed significant precognitive boredom (p = 0.005) for 
positive affect images, which was consistent with experimental expectations. 
 A couple of years prior to Bem’s precognitive habituation experiments, Radin & 
May (2001) reported a successful experiment which exploited a well-known human 
psychological phenomenon known as the Stroop Effect.  Stroop (1935) observed that 
when humans are asked to read a series of words naming specific colors, some printed in 
the same color as the word names (e.g., the word “red” printed in red ink), and others 
printed in different colors than the ones they name (“red” printed in blue ink; “green” 
printed in red), there is a variety of cognitive dissonance created, which slows the rate at 
which the reader can recognize and read a word written in the wrong color.  
 The Radin/May experiment explored whether the Stroop Effect might displace 
backwards in time, creating a sort of cognitive presentiment effect.  It was designed along 
these lines:   
 116
 Individual participants are presented with a randomly-selected colored patch on a 
screen, and type the first letter of the word describing the color they saw.  The time it 
takes from being shown the color patch and their typing the letter is measured and called 
“reaction time 1" or ‘RT1.’  Because there is no dissonance between presented color and 
response, reaction times (RT1) for each trial of color presentation/appropriate response 
would be expected to be fairly uniform for each participant.    
 Immediately after this response, participants are shown a color word.  The word is 
displayed in the color they have just seen, but the word itself might actually name a 
different color.  So, for example, a participant might be shown a red patch, then after a 
delay shown a word printed in red.  That word might indeed be the word ‘red’ printed in 
red, but the participant could also be randomly shown either of the words ‘yellow,’ 
‘green,’ or ‘blue’ printed in red, depending on what the computer decides.  The 
participant then would be expected to type either a Y to indicate ‘yes,’ meaning the word 
and the color it was printed in matched (in the case of ‘red’ printed in red), or N for ‘no,’ 
that the word and the color it was in did not match (in the case of either ‘yellow,’ or 
‘blue,’ or ‘green’ printed in red).  
 The time delay between seeing the color/word combination and the typing of 
either Y or N is measured and designated reaction time 2, or ‘RT2.'   A color-word 
mismatch condition (i.e., ‘yellow’ written in red) would present the cognitive interference 
noted in the Stroop effect.   According to the Stroop effect, if there is a color/word 
mismatch, it will take longer for the participant to decide whether to type either Y or N 
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than if the color/word matched.  This means that RT2 for mismatches will be longer than 
for matches. 
 
 The hypothesis in this experiment was that there would be an increase in the RT1 
beyond normal expectation when the future color/word combination is a mismatch, and 
there will not be an increase in RT1 when the future color/word combination matches.  
The notion is that some of the normal cognitive delay caused by the Stroop Effect in 
color/color word mismatches will retroactively (e.g., displace in time backwards) slow 
down the reaction times for RT1.   (Normal expectations would be that RT1 should not 
be affected, and thus all RT1 times should remain approximately the same value, affected 
only by such factors as eventual participant fatigue or distraction.)  Radin and May 
referred to this retro-causative effect as  “time reversed interference” (TRI), which would 
produce change in RT1 times that should correlate with the variations in RT2 times.  
Thus, “the TRI hypothesis predicts a positive correlation between [the change] in RT1 
and [the change] in RT2, under the assumption that the interference that caused the 
[change in] RT2 difference will leak backwards in time and affect the [change in] RT1 in 
a similar way” (p.6).  They conducted four studies, the results of which were as follows: 
Study 1:  (Pilot study) one participant, 500 trials, showing a positive statistical 
trend, but which was not statistically significant (p = 0.345). 
 
Study 2:  Ten participants, producing 1,852 usable trials.  Results were nearly 
significant (p = 0.079). 
 
Study 3:  Ten participants produced 111 sessions of 20 trials each, plus 1 session 
of 30 trials.  1,110 were in the color mismatch condition, and 1,160 in match 
condition. (47 trials were eliminated for procedural reasons) = 2,223 usable trials.  
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This study produced a strong correlation, and was statistically significant, 
yielding p = 0.005. 
 
Study 4:  Two participants performed 720 trials (366 mismatched, 354 matched), 
producing a statistically significant correlation (p = 0.037). 
 
 
Combined results of the four experiments were statistically significant (p = 0.001), with 
odds against chance of one out of a thousand. 
      
 Given the relative dependability of the presentiment effect as manifest in various 
external measures, some researchers found it plausible that neural correlates of the effect 
might be detected using brain imaging or monitoring techniques.  Accordingly, a small 
number of experiments have been done using either fMRI (functional magnetic resonance 
imaging) or EEG (electroencephalogram)16 equipment to look for indicators of 
presentiment in participants’ brain functions.  As part of McCraty’s 2004 experiment 
(McCraty et al, 2004a,b), study participants were monitored by an EEG during the 
experimental trials (this was in addition to EDA and ECG monitoring as described 
above).  The EEG measured two dimensions – cortical event-related potentials (ERP) 
which arise in response to internal or external stimuli, and heartbeat-evoked potentials 
(HBEP), a measure of brain-related heart activity.  Since this was part of the same 
experiment as in McCraty (2004a), the same two conditions were tested under the general  
presentiment model (disturbing vs. calm images): the first in a “non-meditative” 
                                                          
 16In an interesting irony, electroencephalography was invented by German 
psychologist Hans Berger (b. 1873) as a consequence of his life-long interest in 
parapsychology and telepathy. 
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condition and the second in a “meditative” condition.17  For the whole group in 
Condition 1, McCraty reported a significant difference between calm vs. disturbing 
photos in the prestimulus period at two associated EEG measurement points, FP1 and 
FP2, beginning four seconds prior to display of the stimulus photo (p < 0.05).   
 But once again, the male-female differences in results were intriguing.  Under 
Condition 2 (“meditative” condition) the female group demonstrated further ERP 
markers at two locations (O1 and T5)  different from those observed in the non-
meditative Condition 1 (p < 0.05).  But for the males under Condition 1 McCraty found 
differences in ERP between the calm and disturbing images at three locations: O2, T5, 
and FP1 (p < 0.05).  Under Condition 2, indicators were manifest at four sites: T5 (p < 
0.05), P3 (p < 0.01), O1 (p < 0.05), and O2 (p < 0.05) – all occurring four seconds prior 
to display of the stimulus (McCraty, 2004b, p.330).  McCraty also notes statistically 
significant differences (p < 0.01) in waveforms monitored at O1 and O2.  Similar 
differences between conditions (though generally at different locations) were noted for 
females in heart-beat evoked potentials, but except for one instance under Condition 2, 
males showed no significant effect in this measure. 
 A more recent experiment by Hinterberger, et al (2007) also used differences in 
ERP before display of disturbing or calm images, this time with the further addition of a 
non-meaningful checkerboard pattern as a more stable baseline stimulus.  As a further 
control, a series of trials were run with the computer display covered in opaque material 
                                                          
 17I place these terms in quotes because the technique employed in condition 2 by 
the participants is not a classical meditative practice.  But such a general categorization 
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while a randomized series of calm, disturbing, and checkerboard images were presented 
to participants, to test whether some subliminal sensory leakage could account for 
experimental results during trials where the screen was not thus masked.   
 Twenty participants were monitored by an EEG while being shown the typical 
randomized series of disturbing vs. calm photos (with intermixed checkerboard patterns).  
Hinterberger reported that “the analysis of all cortical channels merged revealed a 
significant increase of the EEG activity before presentation of an affective picture (z = 
2.02, or p = 0.0217) compared to the 1000 arbitrary intervals.”  No such effect was seen 
in the screen-covered condition or checkerboard condition.  (A further purpose was to see 
if the meaningless checkerboard pattern elicited the same or less presentiment effect than 
meaningful calm images.)   
 A study by Bierman & Scholte (2002) used an fMRI to explore whether a 
presentiment effect would show up under this sort of brain imaging technology.  Ten 
participants (four female, six male) were involved in the experiment.  Each was presented 
with 48 trials of randomized calm vs. disturbing images while his or her brain was 
imaged by the MRI.  To analyze the results, the males and the females were pooled 
separately, as the experimenters suspected different types of disturbing stimuli would be 
processed differently by male and female brains.  This turned out to not necessarily be 
the case.  Bierman and Scholte reported that for individual participants “the presentiment 
effect was widely distributed over many brain regions,” though individual brain regions 
from which the composite analysis was developed did not themselves “show striking 
                                                                                                                                                                             
simplifies the discussion and the differences are not significant for my purposes here. 
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differences in anticipation before emotional and neutral stimuli” (p.7).  The single 
exception for this was that there was a generally consistent activation pattern across all 
participants centered in the area located around Talairach coordinates (130, -80, 10).18  
Of additional interest was the fact that females showed a differential reaction to the two 
types of stimuli (violent/gruesome) not displayed by the males.  The males displayed no 
pre-stimulus response differential between violent and neutral (calm) images, but did for 
the erotic ones (p < 0.05).  The females, on the other hand demonstrated a 22 % 
difference four seconds before display of erotic stimuli (p < 0.05) and a difference of 
19% before the violent stimuli (p < 0.05).   
 Bierman replicated this experiment (Bierman, 2007) using a set of experienced 
meditators.  Sixteen participants were involved, eight controls and eight meditators (five 
males and three females).   They were first acclimated to the confining and noisy fMRI 
environment, after which they were tested with the standard randomized disturbing/calm 
image presentation procedure.  This experiment produced remarkably strong evidence of 
a precognitive effect, resulting in a Z score of 5.6 (p = 0.000003).  In an interesting twist, 
it was discovered that the meditators’ reaction to the violent stimuli all but disappeared 
altogether, but reaction to the erotic stimuli increased, to a very highly statistically 
significant level (p < 0.000001).19
                                                          
 18The Talairach coordinate systems allows locations in the brain to be specified 
independent of individual differences in brain conformation. 
 19Bierman urges caution regarding such a strong statistical result, since it is hard 
to disentangle statistical measures to clearly distinguish non-dependent effects due to the 
statistically-noisy fMRI environment. 
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 Finally, suspicion developed that, if the presentiment effect, even if subtle, was as 
persistent across paradigms as results seems to indicate, there might be evidence for it 
that had gone unnoticed in mainstream research because no one had thought to look for 
it.  Unfortunately, since most mainstream studies are generally meant to explore 
conscious reactions, they begin autonomic monitoring immediately before presentation of 
stimuli, and therefore miss any presentiment effect that might be present.  However, in a 
broad literature search Bierman (2000) discovered three mainstream studies that 
indicated the presence of a presentiment effect.  One study tested speed of onset in 
individuals with animal phobias as compared to control subjects.  The second examined 
differences between risky and non-risky choices in gambling behavior.  The third study 
looked at how emotional priming affected evaluation of Japanese characters.  In his 
report, Bierman reviews each of the three studies, including methodology, participants, 
analysis, and results (from the standpoint of presentiment).  Although only one study 
reached significance at the 0.05 level, all three showed strong positive trends in the 
direction supporting a presentiment effect.  A combined analysis thus shows evidence for 
the presentiment effect across the three studies that is highly statistically significant (Z = 
2.748, p = 0.003). 
 
 Critics often allege that to improve their case, parapsychologists may suppress 
negative data and present only what is successful (this is the crux of the so-called “file 
drawer” effect, which I will discuss in more detail in chapter 11).  Investigation has 
shown that this accusation is seldom true.  But in the interest of openness, I have tried in 
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my discussion of the presentiment research to discuss both positive and negative findings 
in the context in which they belong.  I will do the same in the following chapters as well.  
There is a danger in this, as in the eyes of the reader it may seem to undermine the 
strength of the results.  So I will take a moment here to add a little more context.  There 
can be a number of the reasons for apparently failed replications (i.e., attempts to repeat 
an experiment which yield non-significant results).  As I shall discuss in chapters 10 and 
11, one common reason for failure to repeat results in the parapsychology experiments is 
departure from the original, successful protocol.  Though sometimes this is due to sloppy 
work, or misunderstanding by the attempting replicator of some feature of a previously 
successful recipe, it is often intentionally done, as experimental parameters are tweaked 
to see which conditions are necessary or sufficient for the effect, or if a different 
configuration of background conditions and variables might enhance the results.  May’s 
use of quiet vs. noxious sounds instead of photos was a successful example of this.  It is 
inevitable that some changes will weaken or even extinguish the effect.   
 A further issue is the fact that we don’t understand the causality – there are 
distinct gaps in our ability to follow it from initiation to culmination (which fact is, of 
course, important to my overall argument).  For that reason there are times when, for no 
reason that can be specified the presentiment is not strongly present (as studies that are 
nearly significant or trend in a positive direction suggest), at least to the degree that an 
arbitrary p = 0.05 level is reached. 
 What is important to notice here is that if there is no ESP effect present in a given 
body of this kind of research, one would expect at most one study out of 20 to produce 
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statistical significance at the 0.05 level by chance alone.20  I have thus far identified 23 
studies that fit within the presentiment paradigm as discussed here.21  Of those, by 
chance we might expect one and a fraction studies to be significant.  However, my 
evaluation shows that 12 out of 23 produced statistically significant results, and another 
three produced results which, though non-significant, were in the positive direction.22  
This is obviously far more than the one significant experiment expected by chance alone, 
provocative evidence of the presence of an effect. 
 
 It is time to assess how the body of presentiment research stacks up against the 
criteria expected of a violator of causal closure.  The results seem to indicate either a 
causally-important time-displacement of up to several seconds into the past, or an equally 
causal access from the present into the future.  Either seems to violate not only our 
normal concepts of cause/effect relationships, but also the standard rules of physics.  
Could this be evidence of a violation of the causal closure assumption?  It seems that if 
sufficiently well attested, it likely is.  Since within the physical domain time and 
causation only flow forward, retro-causation seems to require a violation of causation, 
                                                          
 20Though arguably even one out of 20 may be too many. 
 21This does not count Bierman’s discovery of three studies in the mainstream 
literature which displayed presentiment features, and three very recently-reported 
presentiment studies, each of which were statistically significant.  Results for two studies 
are unavailable – Norfolk, 1999 & Parkhomtchouk et al, 2002. 
 22Despite some effort I have not been able to obtain the reports, but have been 
told in personal conversation with Dean Radin that Norfolk, 1999 and Parkhomtchouk et 
al, 2002 produced statistically significant results as well, though I am unaware of to what 
magnitude. 
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strongly implying a closure violation.  On the other hand, “precognition” (even if, on the 
presentiment account, the “cognition” part is absent) implies a jumping ahead and 
skipping over of intervening parts of the future, presumably which haven’t happened yet, 
which even more strongly suggests that the causal closure principle is being violated.   
 As will be more fully considered in chapter 8, the rules of scientific inference and 
evidence lay particular weight on corroboration of experimental findings across varying 
experimental models, independent replications, varied subject bases, and monitoring 
techniques.  If an effect persists despite changes in approach, experimenter, subject pool, 
and monitoring method, then confidence grows that it is no artifact, but a real effect.   
 This discussion of presentiment sets the stage for a consideration of the second 
form of “unconscious psi” evidence, to which I will now turn. 
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Chapter 6:  Further Evidence: Staring and DMILS 
 
 In the preceding chapter I considered one form of unconscious psi, that which is 
demonstrated in presentiment/pre-stimulus response experiments.  Now I shall consider 
what is broadly termed Direct Mental Interaction With Living Systems, or DMILS.  
 
DIRECT MENTAL INTERACTION WITH LIVING SYSTEMS (DMILS) 
 Claims that human intentionality can have a distant effect on humans or other 
living organisms in the absence of any known or reasonably conceivable physical causal 
linkages have persisted among various cultures for centuries.  Recent attempts to 
rigorously and objectively investigate these supposed phenomena have resulted in a 
broad literature embodying a range of experimental paradigms.  I shall focus on two of 
these, and consider them generally as one set, as they seem closely related and may, in 
fact, be merely different manifestations of the same effect.  The first of these is variously 
referred to as “the sense of being stared at,” “unseen gaze,” or “staring detection.”  I shall 
follow Baker’s usage as most descriptive:  “Remote Staring Detection” (Baker, 2005).  
The second approach is often referred to more specifically as “distant intention” or 
“remote influencing.”  For reasons I will explain, I will refer to this paradigm as “direct 
mental interaction” or DMI.  Both can be considered subsets of the experimental category 
known as Direct Mental Interactions with Living Systems, or DMILS.   
 
Remote Staring Detection 
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 Remote staring detection (I will use interchangeably RSD or “staring,” for short) 
is a further refinement of a more prosaic experimental procedure that derives from a 
commonly-reported folk-notion that people can become aware of others’ stares without 
any (apparent) alert from the physical senses.  This is referred to by one of its more 
prolific advocates, Rupert Sheldrake (2005) by the phrase “the sense of being stared at.”  
Individuals describe staring events of this sort as a feeling of discomfort either suddenly 
noticed or of gradual onset, as if one is being stared at, and upon turning to look 
discovering that someone is indeed observing one intently.   
 Sheldrake, in particular, has taken this concept and turned it into a sort of folk 
experiment, and has even published a simple protocol which has been replicated 
numerous times for school science projects and in other relatively informal research 
situations.  Sheldrake calls the main form for this experiment  “direct looking.”1  A 
typical direct looking experiment proceeds in the following way: One person (the 
“subject”) sits in a chair with her back to a second person (the “looker”), who also sits in 
a chair, but positioned several feet behind and out of sight of the first person.  An audio 
signal (a chime, buzzer, etc.) indicates the start of an episode, either staring or non-
staring, selected by a random means.  The subject has ten seconds to guess whether she is 
being looked at or not.  Guesses are immediately recorded, followed by a brief rest period 
until the next episode.   
 Success is indicated if the ratio of total correct vs. incorrect guesses by the subject 
                                                          
 1Recently a new term, ‘scopesthesia,’ has been coined for the sense of being 
stared at.  (Carpenter, 2005)   
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is statistically significant.  Stare/non-stare periods number approximately 20 in a session, 
and several sessions with different starers and starees are usually conducted.  The 
experiment is elegantly simple, and Sheldrake (2005) reports “tens of thousands of trials” 
which have shown a consistent 55% hit rate as opposed to the 50% accorded by chance.  
The effect size is large, resulting in what he calls an “astronomically significant” 
statistical effect yielding a p value of 1X10-20 (as of 2002, this represented 30,803 
“guesses” derived from all 21 of Sheldrake’s own previous experiments, plus 37 
experiments consisting of many trials performed independently in various schools and 
colleges.  Of the total trials, 16,849 of the 30,803 were correct when by chance only 
about 15,400 should have been) (Sheldrake 2005, 14-15).  
 Impressive as these results are, they can only be taken as suggestive, since a 
number of evaluators have found the protocol too vulnerable to possible sensory cuing 
and other artifacts, which may weaken the data significantly (Atkinson, 2005; Burns, 
2005; Radin, 2004, Lobach & Bierman, 2004, Colwell, 2000).  This does not rule out a 
real effect (given the robustness of the effect size, even a consistent 51% hit rate rather 
than the reported 55% would still be highly significant).  But at the very least one cannot 
altogether eliminate the possibility of alternative explanations to the effect being 
claimed.2  However, there is a more tightly-constructed approach to the staring 
experiment which has generally passed muster for rigor and careful controls.  This is the 
                                                          
 2Sheldrake recently published a new staring study controlling for most of the 
artifacts in previous staring studies – 2,800 individual trials, of which 1,477 were hits and 
1,323 were misses, yielded a hit rate of 52.8%, p = 0.002.  A further ‘sign test,’ which 
gives equal weight to each test, yielded a result significance at p = 0.0005.  (Sheldrake & 
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Remote Staring Detection (RSD) protocol, using closed-circuit television cameras. 
 Typically, the experiment is done under carefully shielded and controlled 
conditions to preclude cuing, sensory leakage, and other mundane intrusions that could 
contaminate the data.  The person being “stared at” (often called a “subject” in this 
protocol) is sequestered in a windowless, double-walled, acoustically- and electronically-
shielded room, and the person doing the “staring” – often called the “agent” –  is also 
confined in an isolation room some distance away, usually in the same building.  A 
direct-channel closed circuit television camera monitors the face of the subject, which is 
then displayed to the agent on a television screen in the isolation room.  Staring and non-
staring episodes are interspersed with rest periods of seconds to minutes duration, and the 
order of staring/non-staring conditions is fully randomized.  In most cases non-staring 
conditions are facilitated by temporarily interrupting the camera feed to the observer’s 
display screen by an automated process during both non-staring and rest conditions.   
 If there is a staring effect, anecdotal reports suggest it begins unconsciously, and 
eventually comes to conscious awareness if it persists.  If this is so, then it seems 
plausible that the person being stared at would experience a subconscious, autonomic 
arousal in advance of conscious awareness that should be detectible by standard 
autonomic monitoring techniques.  One measure of autonomic arousal is change in 
electrical conductivity of the skin, most often referred to in these studies as ‘EDA,’ or 
electrodermal activity.3  In the classic RSD protocol, the effect is measured by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Smart, 2008). 
 3EDA was briefly discussed in chapter 5.  It may also be referred to as 
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monitoring changes in EDA.  If an effect is present, EDA measures should remain at or 
near baseline during non-staring and rest conditions, while they should depart from 
baseline during staring episodes.  Statistical analysis then yields the degree of departure 
that correlates with staring episodes as compared to non-staring conditions. 
 The first staring experiment using EDA monitoring was performed in the late 
1980s by William Braud and his colleagues and first reported at a science conference in 
1990 (Braud, et al, 1993; 2003).  This study was an improvement on a handful of 
previous staring experiments done by Titchener (1898) and Coover (1913),4 both of 
which produced null results (Titchener published no data), and Poortman (1959), 
Peterson (1978), and Williams (1983), all three of which did produce significant results.   
 Braud followed the DMI procedure as outlined above, using 32 participants, 24 of 
whom were females and 8 were males.  Thirty-two remote staring sessions were 
conducted while EDA of the subjects (“starees”) was monitored.  Each session consisted 
of 10 staring and 10 non-staring sessions presented randomly.  This generated 20 
episodes per sessions which could be statistically evaluated.  However, as a more 
conservative measure a single session score was generated using the mean of the staring 
versus non-staring responses.  This was then used for statistical analysis.   
 A further variable was introduced by dividing the experiment into two phases, as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“electrodermal response,” or the sometimes-preferred ‘SCR,’ for “skin-conductance 
response.”  I will continue to use EDA here to preserve continuity with the standard 
usage in most of the early studies. 
 4Though in Coover’s case there is some controversy.  Later analysis showed that 
at least some of his experiment did in fact produce above-chance results, but he set the 
threshold for statistical significance arbitrarily high (Radin, 2006; Irwin & Watt, 2007). 
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follows.  Besides determining whether a detectable remote mental interaction effect 
might be observed, there was also some thought that subjects who had become 
acclimated to the steady regard from second parties might manifest a regularized EDA 
effect different from those who were not so accustomed.  Consequently, the participants 
were divided in half.  The first half were considered “untrained,” while the second half 
were put through a 20-hour “connectedness training” program designed to make them 
more comfortable being under the scrutiny of a second party.  Phase 1 tested the 16 
“untrained” subjects, while Phase 2 used the 16 subjects who had received connectedness 
training.    
 After conclusion of the experiment and analysis of the results, the “untrained” 
subjects from Phase 1 showed 59.38% mean percent electrodermal activity, rather than 
the base rate of 50% that would be expected if there were no effect.  This is statistically 
significant at p = 0.018, or odds against chance of 1 in 56.  For the phase 2 “trained” 
subjects, results were 45.5% (p = 0.048; odds against chance of 1 in 21).  The untrained 
were thus more activated and the trained more calm.  An independent-group t-test5 
comparing the two sets directly shows a result yielding p = 0.002 (odds of 1 in 500). 
 Braud decided to use a meta-analysis to analyze his own results together with 
those of all staring studies for which there were results up to that time.  From the 
perspective of an overall statistical analysis, though, there is a problem – the above-
threshold results of the ‘trained’ subjects would tend to cancel out the below threshold 
                                                          
 5A t-test is a statistical test used to determine whether or not the observed 
difference between two means is statistically significant.  This test showed that the 
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results of the ‘untrained’ subjects when combined for analysis, despite the evidence of a 
substantial, if opposite effect for each set.  Since, depending on the assigned condition, 
the results were dependably either negative or positive in line with the anticipations that 
drove the original parsing of the study into Phase 1 and Phase 2, it makes sense to 
combine the absolute values of the two, rather than the positive and negative.  Under 
these terms, the overall results for all five staring studies from Coover’s up through this 
first one of Braud’s were significant at p = 0.000011, or odds against chance of 1 in 
91,000 (Braud, et al, 2003, 158-161). 
 After this first experiment, Braud and his associates performed two more staring 
experiments, plus a “sham” experiment which was conducted exactly as the others but 
where no staring actually occurred.  This sham experiment was meant to serve as a 
control, to ensure that the results produced by the other staring EDA experiments were 
not merely some undiscovered artifact of the monitoring equipment or the experimental 
protocol itself.  Results for Braud’s “Replication 1" experiment (30 subjects, producing 
30 sessions of 20 staring/non-staring episodes each) were nearly significant at  p = 0.06, 
while Replication 2 (16 participants, 16 staring/non-staring episodes each) was 
significant at p = 0.05.  The “sham” experiment (which was a sub-portion of Replication 
2) involved 16 sessions consisting of 8 non-staring episodes intermixed with 8 pseudo-
staring episodes (in which everything was maintained as in the staring portions of the 
experiment, with the exception that the monitor was off and the agent/starer focused 
mentally and visually on something other than the subject).  This produced a total of 256 
                                                                                                                                                                             
differences were not attributable to accident or bias. 
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non-staring vs. pseudo-staring episodes, which yielded non-significant results of p = 0.76 
(1 chance in 1.3), in the range of what was anticipated.  (Braud, 2003, 174) 
 Not long after Braud published these results, Schlitz & LaBerge (1997) conducted 
their own replication.  The study employed six starers (three males, three females) and a 
total of 39 subjects (19 males, 20 females).  They performed 48 EDA-monitored staring 
detection sessions, each containing 32 episodes divided evenly between staring and non-
staring, and presented in randomized order.  Overall results were statistically significant 
at p < 0.005.  Of the subjects, 26 (66.7%) had greater skin-conductance levels during 
staring episodes than during non-staring, while 13 (33%) showed lower EDA measures 
during staring trials than during non-staring episodes (p.191).   
 As Schlitz and LeBerge report (p.192), “This research provides an independent 
conceptual replication of the covert-observation experiments conducted by Braud, et al, 
under conditions that ruled out conventional sensory exchange between experimental 
participants.  The work builds upon an increasing database suggesting that people are 
able to interact with one another at nonsensory levels, including the mental influence of 
one person upon another person’s physiology.” 
 Wiseman & Schlitz (1997) collaborated on a rather unique RSD study.  The study 
involved two procedurally identical experiments performed concurrently in the same lab, 
with the same equipment, and with participants drawn from the same pool to determine 
whether there is a so-called experimenter effect.  In the ‘experimenter’ effect, participants 
managed by a researcher skeptical of ESP effects often produce only chance results, 
while participants managed by an experimenter who believes in the reality of the 
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phenomenon produce results indicative of a psi effect, even when all other experimental 
conditions are identical.  Wiseman is a well-known skeptic of ESP who had carried out 
four earlier staring studies, only the first of which demonstrated a significant result (but 
which was later attributed to a statistical artifact).  Schlitz, on the other hand, was known 
for her extensive contribution to successful ESP experiments in the past.   
 Their joint study, conducted in Wiseman’s lab in England, used EDA to monitor 
for a possible effect, and the staring was conducted via closed-circuit television.  Thirty-
two subjects participated, each performing one session containing 16 staring vs. 16 non-
staring episodes (each 30 seconds long) according to a randomized pattern.  The 
experimenters themselves acted as the observer/starers for their respective experiments.    
 Results were strongly indicative of an experimenter effect: Wiseman’s participant 
group produced a non-significant effect (p = 0.64).  Schlitz’s group, however, produced 
results significant at p = 0.04.  Both experimenters were able to mutually discount any 
differences in protocol, as they interacted throughout the series, and there were multiple 
structural and other safeguards to prevent cheating.  They concluded that the most likely 
explanation was that the ‘skeptic’ had perhaps negatively influenced his participants, 
causing them to doubt their ability to be successful in the task, whereas the ‘believer’ was 
able to encourage her group of participants to be successful.6   
                                                          
 6Other studies (Roe & Davey, 2006; Watt & Baker, 2002; Watt & Brady, 2002) 
have subsequently been done to explore the experimenter effect phenomenon, providing 
further suggestive evidence such an effect exists.  In the Wiseman/Schlitz experiment, a 
further, seemingly less likely, possibility for the split outcome was suggested, that the 
experimenters either unconsciously applied or didn’t apply their own psi abilities to 
influence participants’ performance.  However, nothing arcane or esoteric need be 
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 The two researchers followed up this experiment with another one (Wiseman & 
Schlitz, 1999) where both researchers used identical procedures, but this time the work 
was done in Schlitz’s lab in the United States.  Results were very similar to the previous 
experiment, Wiseman’s being non-significant at p = 0.69 (vs. p = 0.64 in the previous 
study) and Schlitz’s results significant at p = 0.05 (vs. p = 0.04). 
 A later analysis by Schmidt, et al (2004) found 15 EDA-based staring studies that 
had been performed by a variety of researchers in a number of laboratories in three 
countries.  A meta-analysis showed that the results overall were significant at p = 0.01 (or 
odds against chance of 1 in 100).  While more than exceeding standard requirements for 
statistical significance, for any sort of consistent effect this is a relatively weak showing 
for combined results across 15 studies.   
 Further problems arose for the staring paradigm due to a report by Schmidt & 
Wallach (2000) concerning less-than-optimal application of EDA measurement 
techniques in some of the staring and remote mental interaction studies (I address these 
problems in more detail later in this chapter).   A further attempt at replication by 
Schmidt and others in a staring-type experiment using EDA measures failed to show an 
effect (though results did trend in the positive direction) (Müller, et al, 2006).   
 However, RSD experiments have been conducted in other ways, and they tend to 
corroborate positive findings from many of the EDA-measured RSD experiments.  For 
                                                                                                                                                                             
proposed to explain it.  There are suggestive reports that experimenter demeanor, 
rhetorical characteristics, etc. may have respectively encouraged or discouraged 
participants, and either enhanced or diminished participants’ confidence in their ability to 
succeed at a psi task (Sheldrake, 2005). 
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example, Radin (2005) reports a meta-analysis of 60 standard (non-EDA) staring studies 
(including Sheldrake, Poortman, Radin, Lobach & Bierman, Colwell, and Coover) of the 
type requiring the subject to consciously determine and report if he or she has the feeling 
of being stared at during staring vs. non-staring episodes in an experiment.  Most of these 
were the “close-proximity” types of studies popularized by Sheldrake which, as 
mentioned above, have been called into question.  Radin’s meta-analysis indeed found 
problems with the majority of these studies which cast additional questionable light on 
their results.   
 However, a subset containing 10 of these studies were performed differently.  In 
these studies, the observer/starer was separated from the subject/staree usually by yards 
rather than mere feet (as is usually the case in the Sheldrake model) and sat in a separate 
room behind either a window or a one-way mirror, significantly lessening the possibility 
of inadvertent sensory-cuing,7 implicit-learning effects that the close-proximity design 
was believed to allow.  Radin found that these 10 best-controlled studies, using the 
through-the-window model, yielded results significant at p = 4.8 X 10-17. 
 An even better-controlled study (Radin, 2004b) was done using 
electroencephalographic (EEG) measures of event-related potentials (ERP) in subjects’ 
brains.  The experiment, involving 26 participants, comprising 11 pairs of adult friends 
and two mother-daughter pairs tested two hypotheses:  First, that the brain of a 
subject/staree would show event-related potentials that correlated with those episodes 
                                                          
 7Unintentional conveying of information to the subject through other than ESP 
means, such as non-verbal actions, sounds, etc. 
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when the respective observer/starer would view a live closed-circuit television feed of the 
subject/staree.   And the second was that the magnitudes of the subjects’ ERPs would 
also be strongly correlated with the magnitude of the ERPs the observer experienced as 
he or she viewed the live image of the subject.   
 The results showed that for the first hypothesis, the correlation between the ERPs 
of the subjects with the display of their images to the observer/starers was highly 
significant at p =0.0005.  Results for the second hypothesis showed that the magnitude of 
ERPs for both observers and subjects was also significant, at p = 0.0008.  A further 
analysis demonstrated that the trend was relatively consistent across the observer-subject 
pairs and not attributable to one or two exceptional performers.   
 As mentioned before, the larger DMILS remote mental interaction model includes 
two subsets – staring and direct mental interaction, or DMI.  The two approaches seem to 
involve merely different modes of the same overall effect.8  In the direct mental 
interaction (DMI) paradigm, the agent9 does not “stare’ at the receiver, but rather directs 
attention towards him or her without the aid of a visual image or direct observation.  But 
one could think of ‘staring’ in similar terms.  Whenever the agent is regarding the 
receiver visually, the agent’s attention is also focused there as well.  While there does 
seem to be an interesting effect present with the staring experiments, they are less 
                                                          
 8Stevens (2000, p.406) tends to agree this is likely as well. 
 9“Agent” and “receiver” are terms often employed in these experiments.  These 
roles may also be signified by “sender” and “receiver,” and other labels.  For this set of 
experiments I will generally use the agent/receiver locution where human subjects are 
concerned. 
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persuasive than if we consider them in terms of a larger body of attentional sorts of 
experiments.  I turn to those now. 
 
Direct Mental Interaction 
 The second DMILS experimental paradigm I shall discuss has been variously 
labeled “Distant Mental Influence,” “Distant Intentionality,” “Remote Mental Influence,” 
or “Direct Mental Influence.”  For reasons suggested in Braud (2003), I shall opt for 
Direct Mental Interaction (DMI).   “Remote” or “distant” suggests that “targets” 
(receivers) are spatially distant.  Yet that is not always the case in these studies.  
Receivers may instead be blocked by shielding or intervening obstacles, in addition to or 
instead of distance.   Further, “influence” seems to suggest an active, one-way 
intervention from ‘agent’ to ‘receiver.’  However, the actual causative factors are 
somewhat ambiguous.  Resulting effects often seem equally explainable in terms of 
passive acquisition of information by the receiver, as much as by some sort of influence 
employed consciously or unconsciously by the agent.  They are thus nearly as likely to be 
an ESP effect as one due to some form of influence  (Delanoy, 2001, p.34; Braud, 2003, 
pp. xxvii).  Along with Braud, then, I will adopt the notion of “interaction” as a more 
neutral term. 
 A typical DMI protocol is set up in the following way (Delanoy, 2001; Braud, 
2003; Radin, 1997, 2006, Schmidt et al, 2004): As in RSD experiments, the receiver is 
typically enclosed in a shielded room, and is monitored for EDA changes (in some DMI 
experiments, the agent is also similarly monitored).  The agent is also isolated in a 
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separate room.  In many DMI experiments, the agent is asked to direct his or her mental 
activity towards an attempt to initiate either a calming tendency or an active tendency in 
the receiver’s autonomic system, according to a randomized schedule.  A 40-episode 
DMILS session would typically be divided between 10 activating and 10 calming 
periods, interspersed between 20 rest periods.  The agent attempts activation episodes by 
using internal imagery, directed thought, or any other strategy that seems appropriate for 
conveying influences to the receiver’s system.  In many of these experiments, the agent is 
presented a real-time trace of the autonomic system being monitored, to encourage a 
more focused approach and give immediate feedback of progress.  The receiver, on the 
other hand, is always blind to all such information.  Again, the object is to look for 
deviations from the receiver’s autonomic baseline that correlate with purposeful attempts 
by the agent to mentally affect active versus calm episodes.   
 There are variations on this model.  For example, researchers have applied 
versions of the DMI protocol to non-human receiver populations.  Some experiments 
have explored human influence on swimming patterns of electric knife fish (a variety of 
fish native to murky Amazon River waters).  Others have demonstrated changes in 
behavior of Mongolian gerbils correlated with intentionally-directed human mentation  
(Braud, 2003).   
 One remarkable study changed the paradigm even more radically by employing a 
small robot whose movements were controlled by a random event generator.  A group of 
newly-hatched chicks were imprinted on the robot, then confined in a pen next to the area 
within which the robot performed a random walk.  Over time the robot’s random 
 140
movements became coherent, focusing on the side of the enclosure closest to the chicks’ 
location.  I will consider a number of these experiments in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
 But there have also been more conventional studies using other measures of effect 
besides changes in EDA.  Some of these have monitored other physiological measures, 
such as muscle tension, tremor, and unconscious muscle movement; blood pressure, heart 
and breathing rhythms.  (Braud 2003).  More recently, DMILS experiments have 
involved EEG and fMRI monitoring.10   And there are DMILS protocols that involve no 
monitoring apparatus at all, relying on conscious reports of perceived helping influences 
and increased concentration on a focusing task. 
 
EDA-Monitored DMILS Studies 
  William Braud and his associates performed the first EDA-measured remote 
mental interaction experiment.  During the 1980s Braud conducted 13 DMI experiments.  
Six of these experiments or 40%, produced statistically significant results,11 where only 
5% (less than one experiment) should have been significant by chance alone (Braud, 
1989/2003).   Overall results for these 13 studies were significant at p = 0.000023.   
 Additional series of these experiments were continued in Braud’s lab until a total 
of 37 had been performed, including 19 involving EDA measures – with the balance 
                                                          
 10E.g., Wackermann, et al, 2003; Kittenis, et al, 2004; Standish, et al, 2004; 
Richards, et al, 2005; Achterberg, et al, 2005). 
 11Of these, the lowest significance was p = 0.043, and the highest was p = 0.0065. 
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using other means of measurement.  Altogether, the work involved 449 receivers, 153 
agent/senders, and 13 different experimenters, producing a total of 655 sessions, each 
involving multiple individual trials (Delanoy, 2001).  Braud and Schlitz (1991) calculated 
the results to be highly significant at p = 2.58 X 10-14.  Of these 37 experiments, 57% (or 
21 experiments) were independently statistically significant, where again by chance one 
would expect only 5%  being significant – or slightly less than two of them. 
 An experiment conducted by Sah and Delanoy in 1994 (Delanoy, 2001) tested 
whether unconscious, autonomic responses of a DMI effect were more reliable than 
conscious report.  The study involved 32 sessions, each of which was comprised of 16 
activating episodes randomly dispersed among 16 calming episodes.  For half of each 
session (hence 16 activate/calm episodes), the receiver was also asked to guess whether 
the preceding episode had been an activation or a calming one.  At the conclusion of the 
study, correlations between autonomic arousal as measured by EDA and the randomly-
selected calming vs. activating episodes showed an effect significant at p = 0.043.  The 
episodes involving conscious response were non-significant.   
 In a two-part DMI experiment in Germany also described in Delanoy (2001), the 
first part of the experiment involved training sessions for novice experimenters, who 
traded off duties as their own agents and receivers.  This half of the experiment produced 
slightly below-chance results.  However, when these experimenters worked with their 
own untrained subjects in a more typical DMI environment, results once again neared 
significance (p = 0.08, or odds against chance of 1 in 13). 
 Stevens (2000) preformed a more in-depth evaluation of the physiological 
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measures behind two DMILS studies, one reported by Watt, et al in 1999, and the other 
by Delanoy et al, also in 1999.  The Watt study involved two experiments, and as an 
added feature attempted to determine if distant mental interaction could be intentionally 
blocked by the receiver.  The first experiment produced non-significant results – in their 
view because there were fewer participants and hence less statistical power – and neither 
supported the possibility of blocking.12  However, the second experiment, with a larger 
number of receivers, was significant at p = 0.038. 
 The Delanoy study (80 participants), explored whether related agent/receiver 
pairs would be more or less successful than agent/receivers pairs that were strangers to 
each other.  Results indicated that, contrary to the experimenters’ expectations, the 
unrelated pairings showed the stronger effect.13
 Stevens reevaluated data from both studies, and examined all three conditions 
present in each – activate, calm, and rest periods.  What he discovered was that the 
difference in effect between the activate and calm periods was relatively minor – and  
much less than that between calm/activate (“influence”) periods and rest periods.  Most 
DMILS EDA studies assume a “sensory-like” effect on autonomic measures, and focus 
only on relative difference between calm vs. activate periods (a difference which the two 
studies being evaluated found to be relatively marginal), ignoring the differential between 
either and the rest condition.  Stevens reevaluated the data not just between calm/activate 
                                                          
 12In fact, receivers’ attempts to block interaction seemed to slightly enhance the 
effect. 
 13The overall results in this experiment, however, were in the positive direction 
but fell short of the statistical significance threshold. 
 143
episodes, but also between both of those and the rest periods which were interspersed 
between.   
 He discovered that it was the difference in EDA between the rest condition and 
both the calm and activate conditions that seemed to be the most significant measure.  
The reason for this, he concluded, was that for both calming and activating conditions the 
agent was trying to influence the receiver to do something, whether that was to be calmed 
or autonomically aroused.  It made sense, then, that the receiver experienced both sorts of 
attempts as merely differing activation effects.  Results for both studies turned out to be 
highly statistically significant when evaluated according to Stevens’ analysis. 
 Schneider, et al (2001) reported a further study, which tested whether receivers 
would experience significant changes in EDA when a sender/agent participated than 
when there was no agent, even when the receiver believed there was.   Seventy 
participants performed one multi-episode session each.  Half of each session was 
performed under the with-sender condition, and half under the without-sender condition.  
Which half constituted which condition was assigned randomly, and the receivers were 
kept unwitting as to whether a sender was involved.  The experiment’s results showed a 
highly significant difference between the sender/no-sender conditions as measured by 
EDA (p = 0.005). 
 
Criticisms of the EDA-monitoring Protocol 
 In general, the DMI methodology and controls are of sufficient quality that they 
have withstood most critical objections (Delanoy, 2001).  But they have not been 
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completely immune.  One of the most serious criticisms was presented by Schmidt & 
Walach (2000), who analyzed the state-of-the-art psychobiology measurement standards 
published in 1981 (and current at the time of their analysis), then compared them to EDA 
measurement techniques employed in the DMI and RSD experiments performed during 
the previous 20 years.  They found that the published DMI reports either failed to 
describe the EDA monitoring methods with sufficient detail to judge how closely they 
complied with the standards, or their descriptions revealed various inconsistencies and 
departures from standard procedures.14  Schmidt & Walach concluded that the errors 
made it difficult to rule out two possible (and opposing) consequences for the research: 
either a spurious positive effect might be demonstrated or real effects might not be 
detected.  These findings were further examined and elaborated on in an extensive series 
of statistical analyses and a pilot study using the proposed new standards in Schmidt et al 
(2001).15
 This finding raised questions about the results of most of the EDA-based DMI 
research  – not that they were discredited, but precisely how robust the growing evidence 
was for the effect was now uncertain.  However, a number of points should be kept in 
mind.  The Schmidt & Walach findings did not necessarily mean that all results of the 
experiments were faulty, only that the possibility existed that they were.  Irwin & Watt 
(2007, 17) note that, though they found the report worrisome, discovery of non-standard 
                                                          
 14Although it should be noted that several of the studies predated introduction of 
the standards. 
 15Though the pilot study nonetheless produced highly significant results, 
somewhat unexpectedly.  
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methodology in a study does not in itself necessarily account for the effect that was 
demonstrated in the research.  Indeed, as the authors acknowledge in Schmidt et al 
(2001), “the question of which [measurement] component would be more appropriate – 
or, in statistical terms, which would be more powerful for detecting this effect – remains 
unanswered.”   
 Still, the Schmidt/Walach study seemed to render the EDA subset of data less 
trustworthy. The DMI researchers could respond with a couple of important rebuttals.  
First, control experiments conducted at the same time as some of the DMI research using 
the disputed EDA measurement methods (for example, the ‘sham’ experiment reported in 
Braud, 2003, and the conceptually similar work done in Schneider, et al 2001) produced 
null results and no false-positive effects, just as the model predicted.  Yet the “live” 
EDA-measured DMILS experiments done in conjunction showed statistically significant 
effects, some robustly so.  Thus, if the DMI experiments showed positive results, while 
the control experiments did not, this was evidence that failure to comply with the 
presumed standards was not as much of a problem as Schmidt & Walach suggested.16
 But if Schmidt and Walach were right about the standards for EDA measurement, 
what could account for the clear difference between the real condition and the control 
condition in these experiments?  The DMI protocol itself may have worked to filter out 
the “noise” attributable to less-than-optimal applications of EDA measurement 
procedures.  Recall that the effect was determined by the difference between the EDA 
                                                          
 16Interesting to note, the standards being urged by Schmidt and Walach were 
proposed by the laboratory with which they were affiliated. 
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measures for the ‘activate’ episodes when compared to ‘non-activate’ EDA base rates.  
But both conditions were being monitored by the same methods.  Even if these methods 
turned out to follow non-standardized procedures which may produce a confounding 
effect on measurements, it would have affected both activate and non-activate 
measurements equally.  Since it is the difference between the two that registers the 
results, it would seem that the effect would still come out in the statistical analysis, even 
if the measuring methods were flawed, so long as the same methods were employed for 
both. 
 To test whether an effect was still detectable in the data from the earlier 
experiments when steps were taken to adjust for the flaws, Schmidt et al (2004) 
reanalyzed 36 DMILS and 15 staring experiments that relied on EDA measures to detect 
an effect.  The studies being evaluated were weighted for quality according to various 
measures, including the EDA measurement issues reported earlier in Schmidt & Walach 
(2000), eliminating or discounting data that might be affected by a non-standard 
approach.  Schmidt, et al reported that “higher overall study quality seemed to be related 
to lower effect sizes” (p.241).  Yet even with data eliminated or weakened through the 
weighting and error correction process, the 36 DMI studies evaluated still showed “a 
small significant effect size,” with a p value of = 0.001.  The 15 staring studies retained a 
more robust effect size but yielded somewhat less significant results at p = 0.01.  Schmidt 
et al concluded that when evaluated according to weighting deemed sufficient to adjust 
for the standards specified in Schmidt & Walach (2000) and Schmidt et al (2004),  the 
body of EDA-based research did not reliably demonstrate as strong an effect as originally 
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believed.  Yet the authors also conceded that there was still evidence for an effect 
present, and additional, more rigorous studies were warranted. 
Non-EDA-Monitored Studies 
 A different set of non-EDA experiments support the results of the EDA-measured 
DMILS experiments.  One set of these involves a focused-attention approach which for 
its measure employs an indirect form of conscious self-report from receivers, rather than 
any special autonomic monitoring techniques and equipment.  Other experiments involve 
human mental interaction aimed at modifying the behavior of living non-human 
biological systems.  And there is even direct mental interaction between biological 
systems (both humans and animals) with machines.  I will discuss these in somewhat 
more detail shortly, but first I must discuss the rationale that underlies these experiments 
and to a degree all the DMILS/Staring research. 
 The virtue of using living systems (and some mechanical or electronic systems 
driven by random event generators) in DMILS studies is their high degree of lability, or 
systemic changeableness.  “Lability,” as Delanoy explains it, “refers to the target 
system’s intrinsic variability or its ability to change, and thus its ability to respond to 
external influences” (2001, 34).  According to Braud, “[s]ince living systems possess a 
great deal of lability or free variability, they would seem to be excellent candidates for 
sensitive and effective detectors of distant mental influence” (2003, 127).  The reasoning 
is thus: If any system in the world is susceptible to subtle mental influences remotely, it 
stands to reason that living systems (and certain randomly-driven non-living systems) 
would be the most likely prospects because their internal controlling systems are so 
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highly malleable.  Accordingly, some of the DMILS research went beyond the format 
typical of EDA-measured studies.  I cite several of them below (Braud, 2003, 86-98): 
 
Ideomotor reactions.  Three experiments of 10 sessions each were conducted 
with properly isolated agents and receivers to try to influence subconscious 
muscle motion (the so-called “ideomotor response”) involving movements of a 
freely-swinging pendulum held between a receiver’s fingers.   Agents attempted 
to influence receivers to perform either circular or linear pendulum movements 
according to a randomized schedule.  The scoring was done double-blind by the 
receivers themselves.  Results from experiment 1 were significant at p = 0.0158.  
Experiment 2 was significant at p = 0.000011.  Experiment 3 was non significant 
at p = 0.891. 
  
Blood pressure. Two DMI experiments were performed that monitored blood 
pressure as an alternative to EDA as an indicator of autonomic activation.  There 
were eight 2-minute epochs per session, measured automatically by 
electrosphygmomanometer (a blood pressure measuring device).  Experiment 1 
(which used only one receiver) was significant at p = 0.025.  The second 
experiment, which involved 40 sessions, was non significant, but in the positive 
direction at p = 0.23 (odds against chance of 1 in 4). 
 
Spatial orientation of freely swimming fish.  This unique experimental design 
involved four experiments with ten sessions each, attempting to alter the 
swimming pattern of an electric knife fish.  These fish emit a weak electrical 
body-field that is presumed to guide them in their murky Amazon environment.  
Electrodes were placed around the sides of the tank to detect changes in the fish’s 
orientation, with the goal being to influence the fish to adopt a perpendicular 
orientation with reference to electrodes at the ends of the tank.  Experiment 1 was 
significant at p = 0.00492, experiment 2 at p = 0.00433; experiment 3 at p = 
0.035; but experiment 4 was non-significant though (again) slightly in the positive 
direction at p = 0.314 (odds against chance of 1 in 3.2).  
 
Activity rate of a small mammal.  In another study involving an animal target 
rather than a human, in four experiments (ten sessions each) a human tried to 
influence a gerbil to run more vigorously on an exercise wheel during influence 
periods as opposed to during non-influence periods.  Chart recorder pen 
deflections caused by rotations of the wheel were blind scored.  In this case, 
experiment 1 was marginally non-significant at p = 0.0839 (odds against chance 
of 1 in 12); experiment 2 was significant at p = 0.035; experiment 3 at p = 0.0224; 
and experiment 4 at p = 0.00894. 
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In vitro cellular preparation (hemolysis).   In a fairly complex set of three 
experiments, an agent attempted to “protect” as many of a colony of red blood 
cells placed in an inhospitable saline environment as possible.  Hemolysis, or the 
process of disruption of cell membranes and destruction of the cell can be 
detected by light transmission through the mixture of cells and saline solution – 
the more advanced the level of hemolysis, the more transparent the mixture.  
Using light transmission as measured by a spectrograph as the indicator, the three 
experiments produced the following results:  Experiment 1 (10 sessions) was 
significant at p = 0.0000056; experiment 2 (32 sessions) was clearly non-




 An alternative approach to EDA-measured DMILS can be termed “attentional” or 
“focusing” studies.  There are a number of variations, but in general agents serve as 
“helpers” to assist receivers (often termed “helpees”) concentrate or focus on a simple 
task of extended duration.  Typically, agents and receivers are isolated in separate rooms, 
usually some distance apart so there is no possibility of sounds or other sensory cues 
being communicated between the two.  A series of randomly-varied help vs. no-help 
episodes are generated and presented to the agent, usually by computer.  During help 
episodes, the agent mentally directs encouraging thoughts toward the receiver, forms 
visual imagery of the receiver concentrating, or employs other similar mental strategies 
that will hopefully remotely assist the receiver in concentrating on the task.  
 The receiver, on the other hand, is unaware of the sequence of help vs. no-help 
episodes, and merely tries to focus on the task throughout the trial period (usually 20 to 
                                                          
 17However, in Palmer (2007) a possible artifact in this experiment was reported 
which, if valid, would decrease the significance of the results, indicating “a genuine 
directional effect in Braud’s data, but only suggestively” (151). 
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30 minutes).  He or she is directed to indicate whenever his or her attention wanders from 
the task, usually by pushing a button held in one hand, which then is recorded 
automatically in a computer.  Results are indicated by whether the number of button 
presses during helping periods is significantly lower than during no-help sessions, 
indicating that the remote “help” has indeed improved concentration. 
 The first of such experiments was again performed by Braud and three of his 
colleagues (1995).   In this experiment, a “helper” agent sequestered in an isolation room 
attempted to assist the receiver (“helpee”), also isolated in a separate room some distance 
away but in the same building, to concentrate for an extended period in a meditative way 
on a flickering candle on a table a few feet away.  The receiver was to press a button 
whenever his or her mind wandered from the task.  During each 20-minute experiment 
period there were 16 episodes divided randomly between 8 helping and 8 control (no 
help) periods.  Each period was announced to the agent by a notice on a computer screen 
in the agent’s isolation room, and a low tone played through headsets worn only by the 
agent.  During helping periods the agent concentrated on a candle in his or her own room 
and directed encouraging thoughts about concentration toward the receiver. During the 
control periods the agent/helper was to avoid attending to the candle and to think about 
other things than the person being helped.    
 Altogether, this first experiment involved 60 subjects, each providing a session 
(thus 60 episodes of 16 each), and three “remote helpers,” each of whom worked with 20 
subjects.  At the conclusion of each session, the receiver was asked to complete a number 
of questionnaires and psychological assessments.  The difference between the tally of 
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button presses during help vs. no-help episodes would demonstrate any effect that might 
be present.  As Braud put it, “The primary experimental hypothesis was that the 
participants’ distraction scores (button presses) would differ for Control (baseline) versus 
remote Helping periods.”   An analysis was performed to certify that the results of all 
three agents were statistically consistent, then all responses were pooled. 
 The results showed the mean number of distractions per 16-trial session to be 
13.60 for the control condition and 12.43 for the helping condition, which averages to 
1.70 distractions vs. 1.55 distractions in each of the 16 control vs. helping episodes in 
each session.  This turned out to be significant at p = 0.049.  Of further interest was the 
comparison of experimental results to the patterns demonstrated in the participants’ 
responses to the psychological and personality assessment questionnaires each had 
completed at the end of his or her session.  Of the 10 psychological/personality 
dimensions that were measured, five were independently significantly correlated with the 
experimental results.   
 One particularly relevant factor that strongly correlated was “need-relatedness” –  
those 19 participants who were measured as “more needy” by the psychological 
instruments (in other words, had a harder time concentrating or focusing on tasks in 
everyday life, or had stronger need for support and assistance from others) were more 
successful at concentrating during the ‘help” episodes to a statistically-significant degree 
(p = 0.01; odds against chance = 1 in 100).  On the other end of the scale, the 19 
participants judged less needy by psychological assessment scored non-significantly just 
below chance.  In this case, “needy” receivers were responsible for the entire effect. 
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 These findings have some interesting (and confirmatory) implications for the 
DMILS research.  If there is a real effect, one could plausibly expect participants with a 
higher level of neediness to respond with more sensitivity to the help of others, while 
those with much lower levels of neediness would also show a much lower effect, and 
this, of course, is what was demonstrated.  However, “more-needy” and “less-needy” 
participants were not identified until after the experiment had been run and responses 
collected, so the fact that results correlated not only with helping sessions, but also with 
‘neediness’ measures adds a further degree of confirmation to the evidence of an effect. 
 This experiment was replicated by Brady & Morris in 1997.  Using the same 
research design, they produced a fairly large effect size r = .27) with results significant at 
p < 0.05.  
 Not all attention-faciliation DMILS studies have produced significant results.  
Two experiments conducted by Braud and associates, and reported in Braud (2003) 
deviated from the original DMI model to explore whether receivers who were attempting 
to guide a metal stylus through a small hole in a metal plate could be assisted by distant 
“helpers.”  If the stylus contacted the edge of the hole, an electrical circuit would be 
completed and a buzzer would sound, indicating a “miss,” which would also be recorded.  
Agent/helpers were to remotely assist with the task as directed by a randomized schedule.  
According to the stated hypothesis, there would be fewer “misses” under the helping 
condition.  This study, however, produced non-significant results – the first study, with 
10 sessions yielding a p value equal to 0.81 (odds against chance of 1 in 1.2) and the 
second with nine sessions yielding results at p = 0.48 (odds of 1 in 2).  This outcome is 
 153
not surprising, given the physically more demanding task, and the introduction of a task 
the tolerances of which are considerably more strict than in other concentration-focusing 
approaches.  There is therefore some question a priori whether the task tested here is 
optimal for demonstrating a distant “helping” effect.  
 Parapsychologist Caroline Watt, along with various co-researchers, performed 
four experiments, the primary goal of which was to explore different possible causal 
aspects of the so-called “experimenter effect” (the apparent tendency of some researchers 
to consistently get positive results in parapsychology experiments, while others 
consistently fail).  All four experiments involved  remote facilitation of attention DMILS 
studies as the ESP test.   
 Watt, together with Claire Brady (Watt & Brady, 2002) performed two 
experiments, each involving 60 participants, 30 of whom were assigned to a group with 
positive expectations of the experimenter’s success in ESP experiments, and 30 to a 
negative expectation condition.  This was accomplished by having each of the members 
in one 30-participant positive-attitude group read a fictitious article about Dr. Brady’s 
consistent success in psi experiments, and each of the 30 members of the negative-
attitude group read an article about her consistently failing to achieve above-chance 
results in her research.  The groups would then be split up into 15 pairs each, and the 
attention facilitation trials undertaken as usual.   
 Unfortunately, a computer error rendered all the data from this first experiment 
unusable.  The second experiment was a nearly-identical replication of the one just 
described.  Results from the attention-facilitation portion of this study were non-
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significant, and in a slightly negative direction.  (There were 12.58 mean button presses 
in the help condition, and 12.20 under the control (no-help) condition.18 ) 
 A third such study (Watt & Baker, 2002) involved 40 pairs of friends who 
participated alternately as agents and receivers.  The agents  “helped” the receivers to 
concentrate on a burning candle for one session, and then they traded roles for a second 
session.  According to a randomized schedule, the experimenter made either supportive 
or non-supportive comments about psi and the prospects for success of the experiment to 
each pair of participants as part of a pre-test orientation period, which required them to 
fill out various assessment questionnaires.   The performance of the remote attention-
facilitation task followed.  The results showed that, overall, the mean number of button 
presses during the help-condition were 10.35, compared to 10.76 under the control 
condition (p = 0.151, or chance of 1 in 7) – This was again non-significant, but in the 
positive direction. (No experimenter effect one way or the other was detected in this 
experiment.) 
 The final experiment in the series (Watt & Ramakers, 2003), explored a different 
facet of the experimenter effect, again using a remote attention study.   The 
experimenters (who also worked as agent/helpers) were comprised of two groups.  One 
group were actual believers in the reality of psi, while another group were actual 
disbelievers.  Two groups of participants were distributed between them.  The 
experimental design was, again, the same as Braud’s (1995) and Brady’s (1997), 
                                                          
 18No p-value was calculated, because the trend was in the opposite direction from 
what was predicted, making the one-tailed binomial calculation required by the design 
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involving an agent “helping” a receiver focus on a burning candle, with scores being 
measured by button-presses when the receiver’s attention strayed.  Altogether, 36 
subjects participated, with nine believer experimenter/helpers and five disbelievers.  At 
the conclusion of the experiment, mean overall help presses were 12.03, while no-help 
presses were 13.47, a statistically-significant result (p = 0.02),  showing “significantly 
fewer distractions during the epochs when they were being remotely helped compared 
with the control epochs” (p.109).   
 The believer vs. disbeliever scores were somewhat revelatory.  Receivers working 
with believing helpers showed 12.25 presses under the helping condition, compared to 
14.54 for the control condition, which was significant at p = 0.005.  On the other hand, 
those who worked with the disbeliever helpers scored 11.58 to 11.33 – nearly a chance 
result (though even here slightly in the positive direction, at p = 0.415, or one chance in 
2.4). 
 Of the attention-facilitation DMILS studies I have described, three of the six that 
were completed produced significant results, two of the others were not statistically 
significant but showed effects in the positive direction, and only one was negative, 
though only slightly so (the failed study showed strongly positive results, but it is 
impossible to know how much of that could be attributed to the artifact caused by the 
computer scoring error). 
 Two further attention-facilitation DMILS studies continued to explore the general 
candle-focusing/button press experimental design, but changed the context from England 
                                                                                                                                                                             
not possible. 
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and the US where most of the previous work had been done to Bali.  In the first Balinese 
study, 40 subjects performed a total of 35 usable sessions, each consisting of 16 one-
minute segments randomly divided between eight helping and eight non-helping 
episodes.  The experimenters hoped to shed light on three hypotheses.  Hypothesis 1 was 
that button-press averages would be lower during helping periods and higher during non-
helping periods (the usual standard with this experimental paradigm).  This hypothesis 
was supported significantly at p < 0.02.   
 Hypothesis 2 explored two conditions – that needy helpees (assessed by 
questionnaire) would show a stronger psi effect, and that needy helpers would be less 
helpful agents.  As in the Braud experiment, needy receiver/helpees did in fact show a 
stronger effect (supported at p < 0.01).  However, they were not shown to be less helpful 
when performing as agents (p < 0.53).    
 The third hypothesis was that meditation training would have an effect on 
agent/receiver results (half of the participants had received preliminary meditation 
training to test this condition).  This was not supported in the case of the 
receivers/helpees (meditators did not perform any better as receivers/helpees than non-
meditators), but was nearly significant for agents/helpers who had meditation experience, 
at p = 0.058 (odds against chance of 1 in 17).  
 The second Balinese experiment was a conceptual replication of the first.  Though 
the same candle-focus, button press model was followed, the agent/helpers were 
specifically selected for being meditation-trained, though a mix of regular meditators vs. 
infrequent meditators was intentionally selected to test this condition in remote attention-
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facilitation.  The receiver/helpees were also specifically selected to rate high on the 
“neediness” scale, as explored in earlier similar experiments.  A total of 15 agents and 15 
receivers participated.  Results again supported the presence of an attention-facilitation 
effect, significant at p < 0.02.19   
 
Physiological, Electroencephalographic, and fMRI Measures   
 Other independent support for the DMILS EDA results comes from alternative 
means of autonomic and nervous-system monitoring.  Schmidt et al (2001) questioned 
whether the DMI effect on autonomic functioning was a global one, broadly impacting a 
spectrum of autonomic measures, or whether instead it was restricted to just EDA  Since 
EDA had shown fairly consistent indications of the DMI effect, and since change in 
respiration has been found to influence changes in EDA (p.67), Schmidt and his 
colleagues decided to monitor both EDA and respiration in an experiment.20  From a total 
of 26 sessions of 20 epochs each (10 calming, 10 activating, randomly ordered with 15 
second rest periods between), Schmidt was able to establish a robust effect (p values 
ranging from 0.038 to 0.017, depending on the statistical method used21)  from both EDA 
                                                          
 19The fact that this result is similar to that of the previous study suggests that in 
this experiment at least, either meditation experience or “neediness’ factors, or both do 
not play a role. 
 20Two of the authors of this study, Schmidt and Walach, were the co-authors of 
the earlier study alerting DMILS researchers to the failure to meet modern standards in 
EDA measurement practice. 
 21One of the goals of the project was to evaluate the advantages and shortcomings 
of various statistical measures.  Four different methods were used, and compared to the 
“overall mean” approach used for previous EDA studies (in which all positive results 
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and respiration measures, even using the more stringent state-of-the-art standards 
specified in his earlier paper.  
 A further, interesting approach involves brain monitoring during DMILS 
experiments.  Just as was found in the preceding chapter with the presentiment research, 
EEG and fMRI brain imaging devices are a further resource that can be used to detect 
neural activation patterns consistent with a DMI effect, and a number of experiments 
have exploited this approach.   
 
EEG Studies 
 The use of EEG monitoring to explore DMI dates to 1963 (Tart, 1963), in a study 
that showed some evidence that receivers in an isolation chamber experienced EEG 
activation correlated with episodes when a sender was subjected to an electrical shock at 
randomized intervals.  A further early study, published in Science (Duane & Behrendt, 
1965), reported correlations between increases in EEG alpha rhythms in one 
monozygotic twin’s brain with the closing of the other twin’s eyes22 (subjects were 
isolated in separate rooms 20 feet apart).  Further research reported by Targ & Puthoff 
(1974) in Nature showed significant results in extended experiments with one receiver, 
yielding statistically significant results of p < 0.03.  The receiver, sequestered in a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
were pooled and one mean for the entire set be taken, and the same for negative results).  
Interestingly, this traditional approach was shown to seriously under-represent the effect, 
yielding a positive but non-significant p value of 0.123, rather than the more significant 
result the stricter measuring techniques produced. 
 22Typically, alpha rhythms increase substantially when an individual closes his or 
her eyes. 
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shielded room, was reacting to the photo stimulation (using a flashing light) of an 
agent/sender isolated in a room approximately 22 feet away.  A sham experiment using 
the same parameters but no receiver showed null results.  Other experiments by Orme-
Johnson et al (1982), Grinberg-Zylerbaum & Ramos (1987), and Grinberg-Zylerbaum et 
al (1994) pushed this experimental paradigm yet further, with some reported success.23
 However, Fenwick et al (1998) produced only slight positive indications in a 
replication of the Grinberg-Zylerbaum et al (1994) experiment (though Fenwick used 
clicking sounds instead of visual stimuli, which may have had less impact on the 
receiver’s brain activity).  Sabell et al (2001) produced non-significant results, also using 
a small audio signal as stimulus.  Other recent studies using more up-to-date analytical 
methods and EEG equipment show more robust results. 
 For example, Wackerman et al (2003) conducted an experiment to see if the EEG 
measures of a receiver would correlate with the EEG measures of an agent/sender when a 
visual stimulus (a flickering lighted grid pattern) was flashed in the sender’s eyes at 
randomized intervals.  Participants were in adjacent (but not adjoining) acoustic and 
electrically-shielded isolation chambers.  There were 38 participants (17 pairs and four 
individuals) divided into two “experimental” groups and two control groups.  The first 
experimental group was made up of pairs of people who were related to one another, 
while the second group contained pairs of unrelated people.  Of the two control groups, 
the first was made up of three related pairs, while the second contained four unrelated 
                                                          
 23Though Grinberg-Zylerbaum & Ramos were subject to some criticism for 
insufficiently rigorous controls. 
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individuals.   
 Before testing, pairs in the ‘related’ group spent 20 minutes in each others’ 
physical presence “tuning in,” to enhance the feeling of psychological and emotional 
connectiveness.  Members of the ‘unrelated’ group were kept apart from their pair-
partners and, in fact, were unaware there was a another person in the other isolation 
chamber during the experimental phase.  EEG data was recorded from both participants 
in the pairs from each experimental group over a six minute period while the visual 
stimulus was presented on a cathode ray screen 72 times to the agent on a randomized 
schedule interspersed with periods of randomly-assigned lengths.  In the case of the 
control group with the three related couples, the experimental session proceeded just as 
with the previous groups (included EEG monitoring of both participants), except that the 
monitor was hermetically covered so there was no stimulus presented to the agent, and 
thus nothing ‘transmitted’ to the receiver.  The second control group, conversely, only 
had a participant in the receiver role – there was no agent/sender and that isolation 
chamber remained empty.  Results showed “no difference between the experimental 
groups...but strong deviation from the control group” (p < 0.01), indicating “a high co-
incidence of variations of the brain electrical activity in the non-stimulated subjects with 
brain electrical responses of the stimulated subjects” (pp.63-64).24  (In a later paper, 
Wackerman (2004) describes a further conceptual replication of this experiment which 
                                                          
 24Interestingly, there was no consistent direction of the correlated brain-voltage 
change between participants – it could present as an increase or decrease.  Further, the 
effect seemed somewhat more “global,” or involving several areas of the brain, rather 
than being localized to a specific brain region.  
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produced significant results, but in unexpected ways.  Details were preliminary, and 
insufficient for a more thorough evaluation here). 
 In a joint NIH-funded study (Standish et al, 2004) between researchers at the 
University of Washington and Bastyr University, 60 participants divided into 30 
agent/receiver pairs were tested in separate isolation rooms for correlated EEG responses 
when the agent of the pair was stimulated by a flickering light pattern.  Each member of 
the pair served once as receiver and once as agent, yielding a total of 60 experimental 
sessions.  Five of the participants demonstrated independently-significant results above p 
= 0.01 (the threshold set for significance in this experiment).  EEG data analysis over all 
60 participants showed results were significant at p = 0.0005.   According to the authors, 
these effects could not be explained by “spontaneous EEG correlations [since] 
statistically significant (p = 0.01) correlations were only found in the receiver’s brain 
activity associated to the sender’s stimulus-on conditions.  No correlations were found 
associated with the stimulus-off condition...there were no false positives” (p.313). 
 Kittenis et al (2004) conducted an experiment, the goal of which was to see if 
EEG-measured potentials evoked in the agent by a light flash would be correlated with 
event-related potentials (ERP) in the sender.  Both agent and receiver were placed in a 
mildly altered state by an audio-recorded  progressive relaxation exercise, with further 
audio of rhythmic drumming at specific frequencies being subsequently added to increase 
the uniformity of the altered state between agent and receiver.  The agent/sender wore 
dark glasses with eight white LEDs, four over each eye, which flashed or did not flash 
according to a randomized computer process which simultaneously entered an event 
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marker on the EEG trace.  These flash periods were interspersed randomly with event 
markers placed in the data but without a flash occurring.  Of the 41 participants, there 
were 13 pairs that were related, five pairs that were unrelated, and five unpaired 
individuals who participated as controls.    
 When the results were tabulated, they showed a clear positive effect demonstrated 
by both unrelated and related receiver pairs, while that for the five control subjects was 
just as clearly null.  The difference between the stimulus and control conditions for the 
related pairs was p = 0.023.  When the unrelated pairs’ results are also included, the 
effect was more pronounced, at p = 0.007.  The unrelated pairs showed a stronger effect, 
but there were fewer of them, so the authors recommended caution in drawing 
conclusions about their results. 
 
fMRI Studies 
 Finally, an additional measurement dimension that adds support for the EEG data 
involved two studies employing  functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and 
both produced positive results.  The first was another collaboration between Bastyr 
University and the University of Washington, and funded by the NIH.  Richards et al 
(2005) used a successful agent/receiver pair from the Standish et al (2004) EEG study to 
perform an experiment with the receiver ensconced in an fMRI.  While the receiver was 
being monitored within the MRI, a flickering vs. a static visual grid pattern was shown to 
the agent according to a random schedule.  Participants alternated roles in two sessions of 
two trials each.  The agent was stimulated by a flicker pattern, while the receiver was 
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fitted with goggles which presented a relaxing static (and non-stimulating) image.  Any 
effect registered by the fMRI would be attributable to “decrease in fMRI brain activation, 
relating to blood oxygenation” (p.958).  Results for the first receiver in both standard and 
replication trials showed a significant effect at p = 0.017.  When the roles were reversed, 
the second subject showed no significant effect for the first trial, but the replication trial 
showed significant results – also at p = 0.017.   This p value of 0.017 represents a 
conservative statistical threshold set to guard against a false-positive and corresponds to a 
t-score of -4.8.  As anticipated, brain activations correlated with stimulus periods and, 
more interestingly, occurred in the same brain regions of both receivers – the occipital 
region, consistent with optical stimulation.  This finding adds further confirmation to the 
presence of a real effect.  
 Finally, Achterberg et al (2005) performed an fMRI study at the Department of 
Radiology, North Hawaii Community Hospital in Waimea under supervision of the 
University of Hawaii.  The study involved 11 Hawaiian healers (three men, eight 
women), each with a selected partner (also 3 men, 8 women) with whom they felt a 
connection, to act as receiver.  The selected receivers were scanned in the MRI as the 
healers ‘projected’ their own particular form of remote influencing toward the partner 
over 12 two-minutes episodes (six activate, six control) arranged randomly between 
active and control periods.  Results showed highly significant differences between 
activate and control periods (p = 0.000127, or odds against chance of nearly 1 in 8,000).   




 Finally, I shall consider a small number of experiments that do not fall strictly 
within the DMILS paradigm but seem to share some features between DMILS and 
certain mind/machine and micro-psychokinesis research formats which have produced 
highly-significant results.  The reason I consider this small experimental set is because 
they involve apparent intentional interaction with non-biological, yet animate, highly-
labile systems – the movements of which are driven by true-random event generators 
(REG). 
 The first of these involve rather whimsical but nonetheless effective experiments 
involving newly-hatched chicks as agent-participants.  Both were conducted by René 
Peoc’h at the University of Nantes (Peoc’h, 1995).  In the first experiment, young chicks 
were imprinted on a small robot programmed to restrict its movements within an 
approximately 12 square-foot rectangular space according to a fully-random pattern.   
The chicks were enclosed in a transparent cage placed just to the side of the robot’s 
random-walk area, affording them a full view of the robot’s movement area.  The robot 
was recorded as having spent 2.5 times more time in the half of the area closest to the 
chicks than it did under two control conditions – when no chicks were present, and when 
chicks which were not imprinted on the robot were in the cage.  Significance for this 
experiment was at p < 0.001. 
 A second experiment did not involve imprinting the chicks on the robot, but 
exploited their desire for light during active periods.  Twelve hundred chicks were 
hatched in the dark and divided into 80 groups of 15, then raised for seven days in a dim 
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to dark environment.  They were fed automatically and had no exposure to the 
experimenter until prior to completion of the experiment.  During the trial period, 
individual groups of 15 chicks were placed in a transparent cage at the edge of the robot’s 
random-walk area as in the first experiment.  In this case, though, the room was 
darkened, the only source of light being a lit candle on the top of the robot.  The test was 
to see whether the robot spent a statistically-significant portion of the 20-minute 
experimental period in the vicinity of the cage.  Each set of 15 chicks repeated the 
experiment three times on consecutive days.  Of the 80 sets of chicks, 57 of them, or 71% 
showed increase dwell-time of the robot in vicinity of the cage, which was statistically 
significant at p < 0.01.25
 The “chick studies” were replicated, albeit with less robust results, using humans 
who specified in advance whether they would attempt to intentionally influence a small 
REG-driven robot to perform in certain ways (Jahn et al 2007).  Under the hypothesis 
that “an anthropomorphic resonance with the behavior of such a robot would enhance 
anomalous alterations of its random trajectory, with corresponding departures of the 
digital output of the REG unit directing it” (p.28), an appropriately-sized randomly 
functioning robot and a suitable platform were constructed.26  Agent-participants would 
                                                          
 25Interestingly, it was observed that on occasions when the chicks went to sleep 
during experimental periods, there was a noted repulsive effect, in that the robot spent 
more time in the opposite half of the area away from the chicks.  The researcher 
speculated that perhaps once in sleep mode the chicks found the light source bothersome.  
Of further note, degree of illumination emitted by the candle (e.g., as determined by 
height of candle and length of wick) seemed to affect the strength of results for individual 
sets of 15. 
 26For visual interest, the robot was enclosed in a dome-shaped case resembling “a 
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seat themselves to one side, then prior to start of the experimental be directed by the 
experimental protocol whether to attempt to influence the robot to perform one specific 
set of maneuvers or another.  One set, for example, required the agent/operator to cause 
the robot to exit the maneuver area either in front of the agent’s seated position or 
directly across from that position (zero degrees vs. 180 degrees).  Participants acting as 
agents included individuals, pairs, and groups.  Overall results were non-significant, but 
the female sub-group (scores from all females aggregated) showed significance at p < 
0.05, and group scores were somewhat stronger yet. 
 A second maneuver set involved “duration” experiments – to cause the robot to 
stay longer or exit sooner from the operating area, or to execute longer or, alternatively, 
shorter movement segments.  These results were overall non-significant, but in the 
positive direction, and several individual agents approached significance with one 
exceeding it at p = 0.0043. 
 
 I here conclude my consideration of two “nonconscious” modes of ESP.  In 
advance of moving to the next chapter, I pause to take a brief inventory of the research 
covered in this and the preceding chapter.  The first experimental paradigm considered 
was presentiment and pre-stimulus response – the apparent ability for humans to detect or 
be influenced or autonomically affected by emotional, unsettling, or otherwise influential 
stimuli which will not actually be presented to them for up to several seconds in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
miniature Zamboni machine” upon which “a toy frog perched in a driving position” 
(p.28). 
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future.  The effects persists across a spectrum of stimuli, experimental designs, and 
measuring methods.  Effects have been produced in wide variety by several different 
researchers in different labs and universities.  They also show up as correlations in brain-
imagery and EEG monitoring. 
 The DMILS/Staring material demonstrates similar ubiquity.  The basic design has 
been successfully replicated numerous times by different researchers in varied research 
settings at several locations around the world.  Yet the results persist across a number of 
different measuring and detecting methods – some, again, involving brain-imaging and 
monitoring techniques that pursue evidence of the effect even into the inner reaches of 
the human nervous system.  They also show up in experiments involving other biological 
and labile systems besides humans. 
 I have discovered 68 DMILS studies, including a handful of staring experiments 
using appropriate controls and measures to warrant inclusion here.  Of these, 40 were 
statistically significant.  Of the remainder, six were significant but demonstrated mixed 
results (for example, the Schlitz/Wiseman experimenter-effect research).  Eight were 
non-significant but indicated a positive direction.  And for six I either could find no 
record of a statistical outcome, or none was reported.  Of the 11 “failed” experiments, 
several were attempts to alter the formula to see how that would change the effect.  Of 68 
experiments, one would expect by chance to see at most just over three turn out 
significant at the p = 0.05 level.  Yet more than ten times that many produced 
significance, from several different laboratories and groups of researchers.  As in the case 
of the presentiment paradigm, this is provocative evidence for a real effect. 
 168
 The detail in which I have described this material, while perhaps at times tedious, 
also serves to point up the rich technical depth and breadth in which the research has 
progressed.  It illustrates a serious and productive research programme demonstrating 
phenomena which, though at times recalcitrant, are neither ephemeral nor transient.   
 As I just pointed out, not all replications have succeeded.  But as in any other 
scientific pursuit, these have led to a refinement of the process which has then produced 
improved design – and further significant demonstrations of the effect – showing that 
even as careful examination and self-criticism within the community tightens the controls 
and increases understanding of the protocols involved, the effects clearly continue to 
persist.   
 Before going on to examine the evidentiary legitimacy of these facts (in chapter 
10), I will first look into two research paradigms which provide not only statistical, but 
also objectively observable prima facie evidence for consciously-perceived psi effects. 
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Chapter 7:  Counterexample to Physicalism: Remote Viewing 
 
 
 In previous chapters I considered experimental paradigms pertaining largely to 
unconscious manifestations of ESP.  In this chapter and the next I will examine two 
paradigms that involve consciously-detectable instances of ESP.  These, too, are related 
to each other, but involve somewhat different modes of evaluation, rendering them 
sufficiently distinct that I will consider them separately.  The first of these is generally 
called “remote viewing” (or RV – though some protocols refer to it instead as “remote 
perception”).  The second is referred to as “associative remote viewing,” or ARV.  Even 
more so than in my previous discussions of ESP evidence, I will frame my discussion of 
remote viewing in a historical-narrative style more typical of a history-and-philosophy-
of-science treatment, since the import of evidence I present and its implications are best 
understood within the scientific dialectic from which they emerged. 
 
REMOTE VIEWING/REMOTE PERCEPTION 
 Remote viewing grew out of a series of what were intended to be “out of body” 
(OBE) experiments conducted at the City College of New York and the American 
Society of Psychical Research.  The subject in these experiments, a New York artist and 
parapsychology researcher named Ingo Swann, modified the OBE protocol in such a way 
that it developed into a new experimental approach to test for clairvoyance.  Swann came 
to the attention of a theoretical physicist named Harold Puthoff who was a staff scientist 
at what was then a research institute belonging to Stanford University (this research 
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facility later became independent, and was renamed SRI-International).  In 1972 the 
Puthoff and Swann collaborated on a successful experiment, the report of which attracted 
the interest of the Central Intelligence Agency.  At the time, the CIA was looking for a 
science entity to clandestinely explore parapsychological research to determine if a 
discipline then being tested in by the Soviet Union might eventually pose a threat to the 
United States’ security interests.  The CIA formed a program around Puthoff and other 
researchers at Stanford Research Institute (now SRI-International).  Little more need be 
mentioned of the history of this program, other than to say that its management was 
eventually passed on to the Department of Defense where it remained until the program 
was terminated in 1995, after the end of the Cold War.  (Kress, 1977/1999; Puthoff, 
1996; Targ,, 1996; Bremseth, 2001; Smith, 2005) 
 
Remote Viewing Procedures and “Modes” 
 Remote viewing is based on the notion that humans have the capability to obtain 
perceptual material from remote or shielded locations via some as-yet undiscovered 
extra-sensory perceptual means.  Developers of the protocol hoped to bypass problems 
with the forced-choice experiments that had been the mainstay of such researchers as J.B. 
Rhine and others during the 1930s through the 1960s.1  Insights gleaned from work done 
                                                          
 1Forced-choice experiments – involving a limited target pool from which the 
participant must select (examples are card-guessing trials using either standard playing 
decks or specially-designed Zener decks) – have the virtue of facilitating easy 
quantitative analysis.  On the other hand, since thousands of repetitions are required, 
participants often witness a decline effect, typified by significant boredom or “burnout.”  
Further, there is little qualitative material to assess, and the utilitarian value for possible 
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by novelist Upton Sinclair and his wife Mary (Sinclair, 1930) and French 
parapsychologist René Warcollier (Warcollier, 1948), among others, were incorporated 
into the remote viewing process.   
 There are three main modes for conducting remote viewing experiments.  The 
first of these is commonly called the “outbounder” or “beacon” protocol (Puthoff & Targ, 
1978).2  In a typical beacon remote viewing experiment, the percipient remains in a 
sealed and shielded room, usually in the company of a second person serving as an 
“interviewer” or “monitor.”  Meanwhile an “outbound” or “beacon” team has randomly 
and “blindly” selected a target envelope from a pool of identical envelopes (each with 
different contents from all others in the pool).  Inside the envelope are directions to guide 
the beacon team to a specific geographical location.  The envelope is opened in a setting 
where the remote viewing subject and any experimenters associated with him or her will 
have no opportunity to gain knowledge of the chosen location.   
 The instructions direct the beacon team to arrive at this location at a specified 
time, and to remain there for a specified duration, at the end of which they return to the 
site of the experiment.  The viewer begins the remote viewing process at the agreed upon 
time, and ceases at the end of the specified period.  The process involves verbal, written, 
and graphical (sketching and drawing) reports of what the viewer perceives to be at the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
applications is negligible.  Free-response experiments, alternatively, often provide rich 
qualitative data, and have high potential for applications once refined.  But this is at the 
cost of often difficult quantitative assessment (Schlitz & Gruber, 1980). 
 2I shall standardly use the term “beacon” and will for the purposes of this project 
refer to it as BRV for short. 
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chosen location to which the beacon team has been directed.  Before the return of the 
beacon team, the viewer’s results will have been secured against tampering.  At this point 
the viewer is provided feedback of what the target location had been, either through 
photos or video footage, or by physically visiting the site.   
 Evaluation can be by prima facie assessment, but for scientific purposes is usually 
instead by a double-blind judging process in which an evaluator, unwitting as to the 
chosen target location, examines the viewer’s description and compares it to the set of all 
possible targets in the pool, selecting the one the judge feels is a “best match.” This 
provides a means of converting a subjective judging processes into an objective, 
quantitatively-assessable one.  If, for example, there were five possible targets in the 
pool, there is a 20% probability that the judge will match the viewer’s results to the 
correct target just by chance.  If, over the course of ten experiments, the judge matches 
the correct target to the results five out of the ten times, this produces odds against 
chance of 1 in 40 or a statistically significant value of p = 0.03.   
 However, rather than the simple single-match “best choice” approach illustrated 
here, many RV experiments use a somewhat more fine-grained process, where the judge 
rank-orders the transcribed results of each individual remote viewing trial against each 
possible target in the experimental target pool.  The ranking goes according to which 
transcript the judge thinks matches the actual target best, which matches second best, and 
so on.  This “sum-of-ranks” procedure generates a matrix of rankings which, through 
simple addition and statistical manipulation yields a more nuanced statistical measure 
that can help data fall out of an otherwise noisy perceptual channel, and provides some 
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accommodation for relative quality of detail in the results.  Later research adopted a more 
sophisticated procedure called direct-count-of-permutations which was not sensitive to 
target-order dependence3 and other artifacts that could bias a statistical analysis (Puthoff, 
et al, 1979).4
 Many people are confused about the nature of extrasensory perception, and think 
it is all simply different forms of telepathy.  Because the use of a ‘beacon’ in the remote 
viewing mode I have just explained may suggest to some that telepathy is involved, it is 
important to stress the difference between remote viewing (a form of clairvoyance) and 
telepathy.  In telepathy, a distant person’s (a “sender’s”) mental contents presumably 
become available to the perceiver (“receiver”).  If there is any transfer of information 
about the location where the “sender” is, it would be through the “receiver’s” access to 
the sender’s mental contents.   
 However, in remote viewing the beacon person or team is not meant to be a 
“sender” of data.  Rather, the beacon merely demarcates the target location, on which the 
viewer “homes in” to find the correct site.  Remote viewers seem not to detect telepathic 
impressions from beacon persons at the target, and they are able to obtain impressions 
from features of the target to which the beacons have no access nor of which they have 
                                                          
 3In a sum-of-ranks procedure, skewed statistical measures can result from a 
“process of elimination” strategy when some matches are obvious and increase the 
chances of correctly matching the remainder (think of doing well on a multiple choice 
question to which one has no idea of the answer because one can eliminate some of the 
choices). 
 4Though direct-count-of-permutations provided a more statistically-secure 
evaluation, in many instances it produced significant results not importantly different 
from that produced by the sum-of-ranks method.  
 174
no knowledge (e.g., details of building roofs, structural interiors, features hidden by 
shrubbery, etc.).5  This distinction between remote viewing as a clairvoyant phenomenon 
and telepathy is important, for two reason.  For one, if an experiment is intended to be a 
remote viewing experiment, but is set up as if it involved telepathy, it may not succeed 
well.  Second, as I will shortly explain, successful remote viewing can be conducted with 
no beacon involved at all. 
 The second remote viewing mode follows the same procedures as the beacon 
process except that the remote viewing session is preformed some hours or days prior to 
the target being randomly and blindly selected, and the beacon excursion conducted.  
This is the precognitive remote perception protocol (PRP), and was explored primarily at 
Princeton University in the Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research (PEAR) lab. 
 The final primary remote viewing mode uses instead of a beacon, an abstract 
referent (geographic coordinates, encrypted coordinates, target reference numbers) to 
focus a viewer on the intended target, and the viewing process generally follows a more 
structured methodology.  This was originally termed “coordinate remote viewing,” but is 
now standardly referred to as “controlled remote viewing” or CRV, though a number of 
offshoots (named variously by their developers as TRV, SRV, etc.) have recently been 
developed by hobbyists and entrepreneurs in the civilian community.  In principle, these 
offshoots generally follow a similar tasking mode and methodology as their CRV 
progenitor.  The purpose of this and the other tasking methods is to direct the viewer’s 
                                                          
 5Indeed, there is an ongoing debate in parapsychology whether there is actually a 
such thing as strict telepathy.  Many instances of what is taken to be telepathy are 
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awareness toward the desired target without revealing any details or information about it 
to the viewer.  (The majority of remote viewing research considered here and in the next 
chapter was conducted in ‘beacon’ mode.) 
 No matter what mode of remote viewing tasking is employed, correct protocols 
require that the viewer be at least double-blind (that is, neither the viewer nor anyone else 
who associates with him or her before or during the session should have knowledge of 
what the designated target is, its location, or any details about its nature).  The viewer 
should be isolated from any aspect of the tasking process that might convey such 
information, and the tasking means should convey no meaningful information about the 
target.  Hence, in the case of BRV and PRP, the viewer is (usually) acquainted with the 
members of the beacon team in advance of their receiving their target and departure, but 
has no knowledge of where they will be sent, or even of what targets may be included in 
the target pool from which the destination has randomly been drawn.  In the case of 
CRV, except in earlier trials where geographic coordinates were used, the referral 
number will also be empty of information. 
 How the viewer is able then to focus on the correct target and provide veridical 
information in the absence of cognizable targeting information has been speculated upon 
but is thus far unknown.  Based on resemblances between remote viewing responses and 
certain types of subliminal and subconscious behavior, it is speculated that the viewer 
acquires some awareness at the subconscious level of the intentionality associated with 
the designated target, and this drives the localization and acquisition of target-related 
                                                                                                                                                                             




Remote Viewing Idiosyncracies 
 There are certain idiosyncracies of the remote viewing process that must be taken 
into account by any practitioner or researcher, and I will consider some of these briefly.  
The first and perhaps most important of these is can be generally characterized by the 
term “mental noise.”  Mental noise is that overlay of memories, conjectures, inferences, 
concept-associations, pattern-fitting, speculation, conclusion-jumping, and so on that 
tends to compete with the comparatively ephemeral ESP signal which apparently 
emerges from subconscious perceptual channels.  This “noise” must be taken into 
account in consciousness-mediated ESP phenomena such as remote viewing.  If not, 
veridical data may become embroidered with speculative or inferred conflations that 
render otherwise-accurate data “false.”   There is good evidence to think this conflation 
of data with conscious mental processing occurs when the language-centered left 
hemisphere7 attempts to interpret or “explain” the output of a small-bandwidth perceptual 
channel based on information insufficient to make an accurate judgment.  (See Puthoff & 
Targ, 1976; Puthoff & Targ, 1975; Smith, 2005.)  
 A second characteristic of the remote viewing phenomenon is that, while 
                                                          
 6I recognize the vagueness of this explanation. But extensive trials and research 
carried out in this subject-area indicate a correlation between viewer behavior and RV 
results that support this speculation fairly strongly. 
 7Designated the “Left-Brain Interpreter” by psychologist Michael Gazzanniga 
(Phelps & Gazzaniga, 1992; Gazzaniga, 1991. 
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perceived data can often be quite robust and provide striking matches with the intended 
target, it can frequently instead tend towards vagueness and a somewhat disconcerting 
mix of vivid, accurate details with poorly defined generalities and some outright 
inaccuracies.  Though novice remote viewers on occasion can produce high-quality 
results, accuracy and clarity tend to improve with practice and experience – though even 
accomplished remote viewers will provide less-than-optimum results from time to time.  
Since the actual causation is not understood for ESP phenomena in general, including 
remote viewing, it is not always certain why some results are better than others, and what 
boundary conditions and parameters may facilitate or hamper the process.  Some 
headway has been made in recent years that seems to have improved RV performance in 
those cases where they have been applied (in the consideration of space and the relative 
complexity of the topic I will forgo further discussion of these). 
 The requirement for feedback is another important feature of remote viewing.  
Though experienced remote viewers have been shown not to need it in all cases, 
receiving veridical confirmation of what the target was that the viewer has remote viewed 
contributes to remote viewing success.  This is particularly so with the novice subjects 
who typically have made up many of the participant pools for remote viewing 
experiments.  Feedback may consist of the viewer being taken to the chosen target after 
the session to see what it was the she was meant to have viewed, or it may in some cases 
instead be photographic or video depictions of the target site.  It is only provided after the 
completion of the remote viewing trial and after all results have been secured from 
tampering.  When feedback is given, it must be fairly soon after the trial, and in any case 
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should not be delayed until after the viewer has performed other remote viewing trials, 
and especially not delayed so long that feedback from other trials has already been 
presented to the viewer.  To do otherwise risks conflating a viewer’s descriptions of the 
various targets, which can detract from the overall results of the remote viewing 
experiment. 
 A phenomenon that tends to affect novice remote viewers is sometimes called the 
“first time” effect (Targ & Puthoff, 1977, 100; Puthoff & Targ, 1975, 49ff; 330; Smith, 
2005, 175-176).  Often, when someone attempts remote viewing for the first time, a fairly 
high-quality result is produced, and may continue through another one or two 
experimental trials.  But after this, there is a tendency towards a decline in quality which 
lasts for a nonspecific number of attempts, depending on the novice’s aptitude and 
perseverance.   With varying amounts of time and experience, quality begins to improve 
again.  There is a possible explanation for this, which is not important here.  But the first 
time effect may be relevant to the many remote viewing experiments which use novice or 
inexperienced subjects over a series of trials – especially if the  
trials occur too closely together, which can lead to fatigue or “burnout.” 
 
Remote Viewing Research 
 Of all the most recent ESP research paradigms, remote viewing may well be the 
most extensively tested.  This research has, however, followed a somewhat different and, 
to some degree, obscure path.  Since much of the research was done on behalf of the 
United States military and civilian intelligence establishments, a large portion of it was 
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hidden behind a barrier of classification and generally outside the standard peer-review 
process.  To make up for that, the research was continuously overseen by federally 
constituted research boards to which accredited and often prominent scientists were 
appointed.  Periodically, inspection boards of scientists were also appointed to provide 
third-party assessments of progress and scientific viability. 
 Since the majority of the government investigation and application of the remote 
viewing phenomenon was classified, there are two research threads to follow – one 
pursuing the standard civilian trajectory more or less typical of other parapsychological 
disciplines, and the other behind the wall of classification.  The latter body of research 
emerged in small increments over the 23-year life of the program, but the bulk of it 
became available in 2004 with the CIA’s declassification and public release of 90,000 
pages of archives from the by-then defunct program. 
 The first published results from the Stanford Institute Research (SRI) program 
appeared in Nature in 1974 (Targ & Puthoff, 1974).8  Three sets of results were reported.  
The first of these was a test of Israeli psychic entertainer Uri Geller’s alleged ability to 
remotely-perceive and reproduce hand-drawn graphics generated by second or third 
parties out of his line of site (usually in another room).  Puthoff and Targ established 
rigorous controls, conducting a series of 13 trials under double blind and acoustically, 
visually, and electromagnetically-shielded conditions.  In 10 of the 13 trials Geller 
                                                          
 8It may at first seem odd that a classified program would publish results in an 
open-source, peer-reviewed science journal.  Since it would be difficult to keep the fact 
secret that a research organization of the stature of SRI was engaging in ESP research, 
CIA officials decided it would actually help security to publish non-sensitive basic 
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produced accurate reproductions of the sketches, but ‘passed’ on three others.9   A 
second research series involved an early form of the DMILS paradigm to determine if 
percipients could autonomically detect a flashing light, as demonstrated by an 
electroencephalograph (EEG) trace.  One of the participants twice produced statistically-
significant results.    
 The third experiment was of most interest from the perspective of remote 
viewing.  This consisted of a series of beacon remote viewing experiments with an 
unusually successful subject named Pat Price.  To ensure the blinding condition for the 
target pool, an SRI administrator not otherwise associated with the experiment created 
and maintained the target pool.  Out of the presence of the remote viewer an 
experimenter blindly and randomly selected the target for the beacon team at the start of 
each trial.  The standard beacon protocol was followed, with the viewer and monitor 
sequestered, the beacon team members opening the sealed envelope only after entering 
their automobile, then proceeding on to arrive at the designated target at the specified 
time, and so forth.   
 As explained in more detail in a later paper (Puthoff & Targ, 1976), at the close of 
the experiment series the results were independently blind-judged twice – once by an SRI 
research analyst who was unaffiliated with the project, and a second time by a panel of 
five SRI scientists also otherwise unaffiliated with the experiment (judging was 
                                                                                                                                                                             
research results on a recurring basis. 
 9Contrary to contemporaneous media reports and skeptical claims, the SRI 
researchers specifically stated they did not confirm Geller’s claims about paranormal 
metal bending. 
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performed twice as an added quality check for the judging process).  In all cases, the 
transcripts were presented to the judges unlabeled and in random order for comparison.  
A judge would visit each of the locations, and rank the verbal and sketched responses in 
each of the transcripts for correspondence from best to worst to each of the target 
locations.   This yielded a 9 X 9 matrix where a perfect score would be nine and the worst 
score 81, while chance would be 55.  The results for the completed judging yielded seven 
direct hits of the nine possibilities, and a very high sum-of-ranks score of 16 yielded 
statistical significance at p = 2.9 X 10-5 (Puthoff & Targ, 1976, 335). 
 This later paper was published in the Proceedings of the IEEE10, two years after 
the Nature paper appeared, and reported a number of other successful experiments.  
Among these was another nine-target series against a different target-set by novice 
remote viewer Hella Hammid, which proved highly significant at (p = 1.8 X 10-6).  
Replication experiments were also performed with four additional subjects, two of whom 
were experienced viewers and two who, like Hammid, were also novices.  Each did four 
sessions, but for evaluation purposes (to provide a statistical base for comparison as close 
as possible to the Price and Hammid series) transcripts from the sessions of the two 
experienced viewers were combined for judging.  The same was done for the novices 
(although in this case there were only seven rankings possible, since one target came up 
twice in the randomization process).  The sum-of-ranks procedure gave a significance 
value of p = 3.8 X 10-4 for the two experienced viewers and came up just short of being 
                                                          
 10The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 
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statistically significant, for the novices, at  p = 0.08.11
 The experimenters had adopted a further experimental practice which allowed an 
assessment of how successful unselected participants might be with the remote viewing 
process.  Puthoff and Targ would often persuade visitors to the laboratory to serve as 
remote viewing participants.  These were designated ‘Visitors’ (as in V1, V2, and so on), 
and each contributed one or more sessions to the data base.12  At the time the IEEE paper 
was published two ‘visitors’ had contributed five sessions.  Of the five, three were first-
place matched and one was second-place ranked, with statistical results significant at p = 
0.017.   
 Another series of trials were run to assess the resolution capabilities of the remote 
viewing technique.13  Five remote viewers (two of whom were visiting government 
scientists)  performed 12 remote viewing trials against randomly selected targets that 
were mid-scale technological equipment, including a floor drill press, Xerox photocopier, 
IBM Selectric typewriter, video terminal and so on (since the target pool was with 
replacement – that is, target were put back into the pool after being used – some of the 
targets came up twice).  Results were significant at p = 0.036.14
                                                          
 11Though even in this series there were two first ranked hits and two second ranks 
out of the seven in the series (Puthoff & Targ, 1976, 340). 
 12The ‘visitor’ designation was often used as a euphemism to disguise the fact that 
the visitor-participants were actually CIA scientists come to observe the research. 
 13This was part of an overall strategy to see what if any role electromagnetism 
played in remote viewing.  This will be covered in more detail in chapter 10. 
 14In an interesting alternative evaluation method to illustrate quality of the work, a 
visiting scientist randomly selected one of the 12 transcripts and submitted it to an 
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 Altogether, the IEEE paper reported 55 trials with 12 subjects, roughly grouped 
into seven experiment sets.  Of these seven experiments, six had yielded statistically-
significant results, some highly so.  Only one was non-significant, and even in that case 
the results were nearly significant. 
 
Replications of the Early SRI Work 
 This newly-developed protocol sparked considerable interest in both the scientific 
parapsychology and critical/skeptical communities.15  A number of both close and 
conceptual or in-principle replications followed.  Hastings and Hurt (1976), using a 
beacon RV model with 36 individuals in a group setting  reported significance at p = 6 X 
10-7 against an outbounder target selected blindly and randomly from, then judged 
against, a six-target pool.   
 A more ambitious group experiment was conducted by Whitson, Bogart, Palmer, 
and Tart (1976).  One goal of the study was to determine if RV ability might be 
widespread even in untrained, unselected populations.  Using as subjects two art classes 
at the University of California at Davis ( n = 27, and n = 14, respectively), and following 
a still more carefully controlled beacon protocol than that followed by Hastings and Hurt, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
engineer for blind, independent analysis (e.g., “what does this verbal description and 
these sketches describe?”).  The engineer’s analysis concluded that the target was most 
likely a “man-sized vertical boring machine.”  The target which corresponded to the 
transcript was in fact the free-standing floor-mounted drill-press.  (Puthoff & Targ, 1976, 
344-346) 
 15I will have more to say about criticisms and skeptical responses later in this 
chapter and in the next. 
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the experiment produced composite results significant at p = 0.03 against a target selected 
from a ten-target pool.16  
 Vallee, Hastings, and Askevold followed with a novel approach to the remote 
viewing protocol, using one of the earliest examples of computer conferencing over 
ARPANET (predecessor to the Internet) as the mechanism for remote viewers to report 
their impressions.  This allowed viewers to be insulated by distance from sensory 
leakage17 and other sorts of extra-experimental artifactual cuing, plus allowed 
verification that submissions of results were properly made according to experiment time 
lines through a machine-based time/date. 
 Another novel feature of the experiment was that, instead of geographical 
locations, samples of commercially important minerals were used as targets.  There were 
10 samples, including halite (macro-scale crystals of NACL, regular table salt), opal, 
gold ore, magnetite, cinnabar, and so on.  The ‘beacon’ was a geologist who, on a pre-
designated schedule on the specified day, briefly removed and handled an arbitrarily 
selected mineral sample, after which the viewers typed their perceptions into their 
computer terminals and forwarded them to the central terminal.  There were two parts to 
the experiment – the “open” condition where the geologist interacted with the mineral 
                                                          
 16Results from the first art class were impressive, with the correct target ranking 
in first place out of ten.  The second art class demonstrated much less enthusiasm for the 
project, and produced noticeably lesser-quality transcripts – yet the correct target still 
came in third out of ten in the judges’ rankings. 
 17Inadvertent, non-ESP-derived disclosure or communication of information 
about the target to the viewer from sources or persons possessing such target-relevant 
information. 
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samples, and the “double-blind” condition, in which an undisclosed second sample was 
left in a sealed, opaque, randomly-numbered envelope and placed in a designated 
location for the balance of the specified day. 
 Altogether, six novice viewers participated, producing 33 descriptions which, 
when blind-judged, yielded eight first place matches out of the 33 where chance 
expectations would be just over three matches in 33.  Odds of this happening by chance 
are less than one in 100.   The experimenters reported that features most accurately 
described by the viewers included color, shape, “relative weight, presence of crystals, 
type of material (e.g, metallic) and geological formation process (e.g. volcanic)” (Vallee, 
et al, 1976, 1552).   But they almost always got the location where the sample had been 
found wrong.  Of further interest was that the double-blind results were of the same order 
as the “open” ones, suggesting that a human “transmitter” (in the sense of telepathy) was 
not essential to remote viewing success (this finding was further substantiated in a 
number of later experiments). 
 Bisaha and Dunne (1979b) explicitly attempted a replication of the SRI research 
in the Chicago area, but used a modification suggested in the Puthoff/Targ IEEE paper in 
which the remote viewer provided his or her impressions precognitively, before the blind, 
random selection of the target and the dispatch of the beacon.  The experiment was 
conducted in spring 1976, and involved two percipients (one performing two sessions, 
the other six, solely based on their availability), with one beacon (or “agent,” in Bisaha’s 
and Dunne’s parlance).    
 The beacon departed in advance of the session, carrying 10 identical envelopes 
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from the 100-target pool.  After driving around aimlessly for a set time, she randomly 
drew one envelope from the container, and followed the instructions contained therein to 
arrive at the indicated target 20 minutes after the percipient had completed the session.  
After all eight trials were finished, all data was collected and collated.  Eight judges were 
independently presented with only one transcript each, plus the entire set of eight target 
photos and descriptions made by the beacon while on site (which were randomized 
before being passed to the judges).  Each judge was to rank his or her transcript from 1 to 
8 against the eight possible targets.   A sum of ranks analysis of all eight judges’ scores 
was  20, yielding p < 0.008.   Four transcripts were ranked in first place (chance would 
have been only a single transcript being so ranked), and one each was ranked as 2, 3, 5, 
and 6.    
 In a subsequent attempt to repeat their success with the Chicago study, but this 
time with more percipients, Bisaha and Dunne (1979a) engaged seven inexperienced 
remote viewers in an experiment that produced a total of 14 remote viewing trials 
following the  usual beacon protocol, modified as before to accommodate the 
precognitive element.   In each session, the remote viewing was done 20 minutes before 
target selection and 35 minutes before the beacon person arrived at the target site.  The 
resulting transcripts were judged by six independent judges following a somewhat more 
complex procedure that it was hoped would determine comparative quality across session 
transcripts. 
 In this procedure, two judges each ranked half (7) of the 14 transcripts.  A sum of 
ranks (SOR) analysis of one judge’s results scored 15, which is significant at p < 0.01.  
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The score for second judge’s SOR was 13, which is even more significant at p < 0.005 (in 
sum of ranks, a lower score means higher correspondence, due to a greater number of 
first or second place matches for the correct target).  Two more judges were asked to 
blind-rank the other half (each had SOR ratings of 15, for significance at  p < 0.01).  The 
remaining two judges compared one set of transcripts against the other, trying to match 
the ones that were descriptions of the same targets as a determination of quality.  The 
SORs for these two judges were 12 and 14 respectively, yielding p < .001 and p < 0.005. 
This produced altogether 42 judging matches, of which 17 were direct hits/matches, 
nearly three times chance expectation of six out of 42.   
 A second series of experimental trials by Bisaha and Dunne were conducted long-
distance, with the percipient in Wisconsin and the beacon in Eastern Europe.  The 
percipient attempted to describe five locations on each of five days where the beacon 
would find himself 24 hours and 30 minutes in the future of each remote perception 
attempt.  The percipient’s sessions were tape recorded and transcribed, as were those of 
the beacon, who also took photos of the targets.  Five sets of transcripts were produced, .   
 Upon return of the beacon to Wisconsin, he gave the viewer the photos and 
descriptions of the target locations in random order for her self-judging.  At the same 
time, the viewer had randomized the transcript order and expurgated them of any 
comments or descriptions that would give clues as to proper order, and passed them on to 
the beacon for his own judging.  Finally, a third party unconnected with the experiment 
blind-rank-ordered the randomized transcripts to the beacon’s target descriptions and 
photos.  The evaluations showed the viewer’s rank-ordering to be significant at p < 
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0.025; the beacon’s rank-ordering also significant at p < 0.025; and the independent 
judge’s was significant at p < 0.05.   The experimenters believe this second experiment 
“demonstrated the capability of an individual to extend this ability over extensive spatial, 
as well as temporal, distances” (Bisaha & Dunne, 1979a, 110) 
 Another long-distance remote viewing replication was performed by Schlitz and 
Gruber (1980/2001), this time with the viewer (Schlitz) in Detroit, Michigan, and the 
beacon (Gruber) in the Rome, Italy, area.  A pool of 40 possible targets was selected, 
from which the target for each daily trial was blindly and randomly drawn, as determined 
by the output of a random number generator.  Altogether 10 trials were performed in the 
series, at the end of which photocopies of all 10 transcripts were prepared for judging by 
a third party otherwise unconnected with the experiment, two sets of copies made, one of 
which was forwarded to researcher Hans Bender in Germany as a neutral broker.  The 
transcripts were then translated into Italian, and checked to make sure no inadvertent 
ancillary hints or cues were included that might skew the judging process.  Five blind 
judges were recruited in the Rome area, and they scored and ranked every transcript 
against every site, plus gave a subjective rating of session quality.  Transcripts were 
randomized differently for each judge, and a direct-count-of-permutations statistical 
evaluation method used for evaluation of both their rankings and ratings, which yielded 
two combined scores, both highly significant.  The score for the judges rankings was p = 
5.8 X 10-6; and for their quality ratings, p = 4.7 X 10-6.18
                                                          
 18In evaluating this first experiment, Schlitz & Gruber recognized that some 
statistical anomalies could creep into the evaluation method they used, so in a later paper 
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 In 1980, Schlitz and Haight (1984) performed a further replication of the 
Schlitz/Gruber long-distance experiment.  This experiment, too, comprised 10 trials, with 
the respective targets randomly drawn without replacement from a larger pool of 
geographical locations, this time in the Cocoa Beach, Florida, area (the viewer remained 
in Durham, North Carolina).   The viewer received no feedback for several weeks after 
the end of the experiment.  Results were sent to a disinterested third party for preparation 
for judging, after which they were passed to two independent judges in the Cocoa Beach 
area.  The judges personally visited the sites in random order, and compared the 
randomized, expurgated transcripts to each, following the practice of rank-ordering each 
transcript to each of the set of targets for closeness of fit, and rating for quality.   Results 
were calculated for both rankings and ratings, which turned out statistically significant: 
For rankings, p = 0.048; and for ratings p = 0.025.19
 Other successful replications of the SRI research were performed by Chotas 
(1978) and by Schlitz and Deacon (1980; p < 0.05).   Altogether, as of 1984 a review of 
remote viewing experiments in the civilian community found 28 published studies, of 
which more than half (15) were significant at p = 0.05 or better (where only 1 in 20 
significant experiments would be expected at most by chance).   Also, 18 unpublished 
studies were found, 8 of which reported statistical significance. (Hansen, Schlitz, and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Schlitz & Gruber, 1981) they published a re-judging and analysis correcting for the 
possible flaw, which yielded a smaller, but still significant effect, at  p = .0016. 
 19Though still statistically significant, these scores were not as robust as in the 
previous experiment.  The experimenters suggest possible explanations (see Schlitz & 
Haight, 1984, 45). 
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Tart, 1984)  
 
‘Failed’ Replications 
 It is important here to consider several of the apparently failed replications.  In 
1979, Karnes and Susman published what they termed a “remote viewing” study 
involving 90 subjects (described alternately as “remote viewers” and “receivers”) divided 
into nine perceiver groups.  The target pool consisted of 20 buildings of varying shapes 
and designs, observed from varied indoor and outdoor perspectives.  Of these buildings, 
nine were included in the target pool, nine were kept to contribute “noise” to the 
experiment, and two were used for two control groups of 25 participants each.   
 The Karnes/Susman experiment protocol departed noticeably from the standard 
Puthoff/Targ-inspired pattern.  In that sense, this experiment does not constitute an actual 
replication of the Puthoff/Targ protocol, nor does it actually test any sort of remote 
viewing model, as I will shortly explain. Despite this, it is often included among that set 
of experiments cited as unsuccessful replications of the remote viewing research 
paradigm. 
 The Karnes/Susman experiment differed from the Puthoff/Targ model in the 
following ways.  First, instead of viewer attempting to describe verbally and sketch the 
target site, participants in this case were given booklets containing 18 color photos, 
somewhere among which would be the picture of the actual site to which the“sender” 
(beacon) had been sent.  “Receivers” were to attempt to “communicate” with the sender, 
while the sender tried to “transmit” perceptions about the target back to the receivers.  
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Receivers would then indicate on the answer sheet which photo represented the target 
they thought the sender was attempting to communicate to them. According to the 
authors, “It seemed reasonable that, if the receivers are capable of verbally describing 
and drawing sketches of their impressions of the sender’s location, they should be 
equally, or perhaps more easily, capable of simply visually recognizing color 
photographs of the sender’s location” (Karnes & Susman, 1979, 472).    
 This means of eliciting responses from the participants had the virtue of allowing 
a straightforward statistical assessment of the results, thus dispensing with the need for 
subjective evaluation and, hence, the requirement for blind judging.  
 One further provision of the protocol allowed the subjects to make as many 
guesses as they wanted among the 18 choices.  This Karnes and Susman felt was justified 
because in the Puthoff/Targ approach viewers could record as many verbal impressions 
and as many sketches as they felt desirable within the 15 minutes time constraint; thus, 
making selections from among a set of possibilities was presumed to be commensurate 
with sketching and recording internal impressions. 
 A second difference from the Puthoff/Targ protocol was that Karnes and Susman 
felt that there was no way of actually assessing what constitutes ‘chance’ in the 
Puthoff/Targ model, so two control groups were added.  This was justified because 
according to their assessment chance did not necessarily constitute 1/x (as is typically 
assumed), where ‘x’ represents the number of possibilities in the target-choice space, or 
in this case, 1/18 = chance for each receiver, since there were 18 possible choices, with 
only one being correct.   Instead, the authors maintained that the measure for a chance 
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outcome had to be empirically-derived.20  This added feature seems to make no 
difference one way or the other for the Puthoff/Targ model (notably since, as actually 
executed in the Karnes/Susman experiment, the chance value arrived at by the control 
groups seems to have differed little from 1/18).  But it does add an additional level of 
complexity to the execution of the experiment. 
 Finally, the third difference from the Puthoff/Targ model was that multiple sets of 
viewers were employed, as this was deemed a more efficient way to develop 
experimental findings.  (This final provision also seems relatively innocuous as far as the 
Puthoff/Targ model is concerned, especially since, as we have seen, others have taken 
similar liberties with the model and shown success with it.) 
 Karnes/Susman’s completed analysis at the conclusion of the experiment showed 
that the receivers had performed merely at chance, leading to the conclusion that the 
experimenters found “no support for the reliability and validity of the paranormal 
phenomenon termed ‘remote viewing’” (p.479).   They did note a slight statistical bias in 
favor of a remote viewing effect, which they attributed to the fact that, since receivers 
were allowed to guess as many times as they wished, those who made the most guesses 
were also likely to include the correct target among their accumulated choices.  In fact 
correct guessers made on average twice as many guesses as those who did not.  
Therefore, merely on the basis of a larger number of attempts the odds were in favor of 
more frequent guessers including the correct target among those guesses.   
Karnes/Susman felt that this amounted to a “response bias” interpretation, and 
                                                          
 20Why this was presumed to be the case was not further explored. 
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extrapolated it to the Puthoff/Targ protocol, in which viewers can respond verbally and 
graphically as much as they like within the time window for the experiment (usually 15 
minutes), and therefore are likely to accidentally have more ‘correct” data in their results 
which the judges then proceed to correctly match.  This Karnes and Susman considered 
“especially damaging to a ‘remote viewing’ interpretation” (Karnes & Susman, 1979, 
477). 
 But there are serious flaws in the Karnes/Susman ‘replication’ far beyond what 
one should expect in a true attempt at replicating a previously successful experimental 
paradigm.  First, the “response bias” interpretation fails in a free-response form of remote 
viewing such as the SRI model.  As a viewer’s responses accumulate in a trial in which 
no ESP effect is present, details that are only accidentally correct will be “snowed under” 
by the larger volume of incorrect data.  So, assuming for the moment the absence of ESP 
in a trial, increased verbal and sketching responses are more likely only to inject added 
noise.  This will tend to decrease the chances of a correct match instead of increase them, 
as Karnes/Susman conclude.  This is so because the absence of signal and presence only 
of noise increases the likelihood that the data in some part would match any or even 
every target in a pool – in every case a judge would end up with merely random matches. 
(Puthoff & Targ, 1975; Smith, 2005) 
 Second, from the outset Karnes and Susman seem to have misunderstood and, 
hence, misconstrued the principle involved in the remote viewing protocol.  They 
apparently assumed that remote viewing was a telepathic phenomenon, and inexplicably 
set up their experiment in such a way as to test for telepathy, and not for remote viewing 
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– which is a form of clairvoyance.21  As such, the Karnes/Susman experiment appears to 
set up a straw-man against remote viewing.  Third, there is insufficient diversity in the 
target set.  In a pool consisting only of architectural targets, there are too many 
isomorphisms and structural overlaps for satisfactory 
  disambiguation of subtle impressions.  This alone could seriously diminish the 
statistical strength of a presumed effect. 
 Finally, though using the booklets of photos allowed for easy statistical 
evaluation, it raises a serious problem for successful outcome of a true remote viewing 
experiment.  Contrary to what Karnes and Susman believed, it is in fact not reasonable to 
expect their booklet approach to be as successful as that used by SRI.  The Puthoff/Targ 
approach of having the viewer sketch and describe perceptions of the target attempts to 
exploit human subconscious perceptual processes which most ESP research indicates 
constitute the primary mechanism for such phenomena, and to minimize conscious 
ratiocination and analysis which, when encouraged, injects copious noise into the process 
(Puthoff & Targ, 1975).   
 The Karnes/Susman approach of having the viewer select from a series of photos 
maximizes conscious analysis and limits the role of subconscious-level perception, from 
which the data should be expected to emerge.  This has the potential to significantly 
increase the ratio of noise to signal.  
 A subsequent attempt at a replication of the SRI model by Karnes, et al (1979), 
                                                          
 21I say “inexplicably,” since in the earlier remote viewing literature with which 
they claimed to be familiar the clairvoyant nature of the remote viewing task was 
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one that also seemed to indicate a failure of remote viewing, was only marginally better 
constructed.  This protocol included some trappings of the actual remote viewing 
experimental model, in that rather than marking an answer sheet according to photos in a 
booklet, receivers were asked to provide free-form verbal and sketched impressions.  
Two trials were conducted, plus a control group was included.  Trial 1 included ten 
receivers, who were introduced to the sender/beacon before the experiment, and a 10-
member control group, who were not.  Feedback was presented to both the experimental 
group and control group at the end of the trial.  Trial 2 included 20 receivers, but 
apparently differed from Trial 1 in that participants received no feedback at the end of 
their sessions.  (Unfortunately, the published description of this experiment is vague in a 
number of details – including precisely how the control group functioned and what its 
results indicated –  and fails to describe the procedure for Trial 2 altogether.)  A 
convoluted judging procedure involving 120 independent judges operating under four 
different conditions produced results that again reportedly showed null statistical results 
for the remote viewing effect. 
 Unfortunately, this attempted replication, too, was flawed.  It still presumed to 
test a telepathic model.  The senders were instructed to record impressions “of the target 
site that they were trying to convey to the receiver” (p.965), and to “concentrate on the 
target surroundings and to endeavor to convey telepathically” these impressions (p.967).  
As before, this sets up a scenario that may well be a test for telepathy, but not remote 
viewing.  If such an experiment fails to show positive results (and if the judging and the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
explicitly stated. 
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statistical analysis presented can be trusted, it did apparently fail), then it is telepathy, and 
not remote viewing that is unconfirmed. 
 Karnes et al (1981) performed one further failed ‘replication’ attempt, which was 
published in a non-peer-reviewed journal.   A number of the same issues were apparent 
with this experiment as had been present in the two previous studies.  This one, even 
more so than the others, for example, demonstrated a bias towards the telepathic model.  
Participants were divided into “sender/receiver” pairs; the “sender” was supposed to 
transmit “his/her impressions” (p.68).  Subjects were selected by self-report “based on 
their previous successful experiences with paranormal communications” (p.69), and so 
on.  There was no precedence for this in the SRI protocol. 
 Additionally, once again a large number of judges were used (64), but the judging 
process is not clearly explained in the published report.  It seems that the 64 judges were 
divided among the resulting trials, with four judges independently judging each trial.   
The target pool was as before a mixture of indoor and outdoor structural features and, 
once again, there was significant overlap between several members of the target set, 
especially the indoor ones.  Complexity of the experiment was increased by added 
variables being tested – e.g., feedback vs. no-feedback condition, presence or absence of 
a learning effect over multiple trials, etc.  Because of the latter, some sets of participant 
pairs performed six trials, while some performed only two (the test for both conditions, 
unfortunately, was undermined by a further procedural requirement that sender/receiver 
pairs switch roles after each trial). 
 Perhaps the most problematic aspect of this experiment, though, was the choice of 
 197
participants.  Instead of naive or previously-tested remote viewing subjects, the 
experimenters elected to use self-proclaimed psychics.  They based this choice on the 
assumption that, “the psychic awareness of self-proclaimed psychics should be stronger 
than that of inexperienced subjects,” and felt it was “reasonable to assume that reliable 
remote-viewing should be more easily demonstrated with experienced psychic subjects 
than with inexperienced subjects.”  They emphasized that these were “self-proclaimed 
psychics,” who “claimed” to have a strong track record in such arcane skills as “trance 
regressions, psychometry, psychic communications with one another, programmed 
dreaming, and psychokinesis” (pp. 68-69; my emphasis). 
 But there are three things wrong with this participant pool.  The first is that, even 
if these subjects are capable in these alleged psychic skills as claimed, the skills differ 
significantly from what is expected in remote viewing.  Second, the qualifications of the 
experimental recruits were accepted on their own claims – no preliminary testing or 
checking appears to have been done to verify that there was at least some substance to the 
claims being made.  This means the experiment then devolves from testing for a remote 
viewing effect, to a generalized test of the claims of competence of this particular set of 
subjects.  If the test fails, it does not necessarily mean that remote viewing has failed – 
only that these subjects’ assurances that they can perform the task were empty or 
misguided.22  The third problem is that a set of participants was selected with pre-
                                                          
 22To be sure, in a more subtle way this is a feature of any test of a presumed 
human ability – that the subjects can indeed produce the behavior.  But to select subjects 
based solely on the basis of their own claims that they can perform as requested ups the 
ante in this regard. 
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existing notions about how the phenomenon should be experienced and how the effect 
should be produced.23  It is doubtful that the few preliminary instructions from the 
experimenters would be able to significantly change the internal habits and practices 
these subjects had habitually relied upon before.    
 All things considered, it seems this series of presumed replications fail to measure 
up to the requirements necessary to adequately falsify claims as to the reality of remote 
viewing. 
 
 Other attempted but failed replications and quasi-replications of the Puthoff/Targ 
model include Rauscher, et al (1976), Allen, et al (1976); and Solfving, et al (1978).  
However, each of these showed noteworthy departures from the general Puthoff/Targ 
format, either due to design, or error.  Rauscher, et al (involving a single viewer, eight 
trials, and five judges) for example, mismanaged the feedback portion of the experiment 
(which is presumed crucial to the Puthoff/Targ model), such that the viewer on at least 
some occasions either received no direct feedback or received it out of sequence – which 
could lead to conflation of results or viewer confusion.  Further, the experimenters 
themselves acknowledged that the target set was insufficiently diverse, which because of 
too much similarity between targets may increase the difficulty of the discrimination task 
for the judges, resulting in lower statistical scores.  Still, despite the statistical non-
                                                          
 23Indeed, Puthoff and Targ were already on record that a reason for the remote 
viewing research protocol was to bypass “occult” and other metaphysical theories about 
ESP that not only reflected a non-scientific attitude, but tended to get in the way of 
accurate results (Targ & Puthoff, 1977, 6; Puthoff & Targ, 1975; Puthoff & Targ, 1976, 
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significance of the evaluation, the experimenters were impressed that “only a high degree 
of coincidence could account for some of the correlations between the actual target and 
subject’s descriptions” (p.43). 
 Allen, et al, involved a three-person team, the members of which rotated duties 
between ‘receiver,’ beacon, and experimenter, for a total of 12 trials, which was a 
significant departure from the Puthoff/Targ model.  (The fact that the remote viewers 
were called ‘receivers’ in this experiment suggested that the researchers were also 
laboring under the mistaken notion that remote viewing is premised on telepathy.)  
Further, the receivers were given feedback only from the beacon person upon his or her 
return, and then only in verbal form  – the receivers did not visit the target sites post-
experiment, nor were they shown photographs of the location as was the case in 
successful replications.   Finally, the three blind judges were allowed to use differing 
judging methods according to choice – one judge visited sites and matched transcripts to 
the targets using a sum-of-ranks method, whereas the two other judges used a 12-item 
rating sheet when they visited targets, which allowed a degree of quantification. 
 Solfvin, et al was an attempt, among other things, to see if prior meditation 
training would affect remote viewing results.  After preliminary meditation training, the 
session began with a beacon person being randomly selected from the participant pool 
and sent to a target.  The group meditated for 20 minutes, then tried “to experience what 
the agent was experiencing” for five minutes (once again suggesting a bias towards 
telepathy).  The participants were then asked to self-judge which target the beacon person 
                                                                                                                                                                             
330; Smith, 2005, 94-98). 
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had visited by choosing among randomized photos and descriptions of  four possible 
targets in the given set.  Scoring was by majority vote.  There is no indication of how 
many participated other than that there were seven target sets of four targets each, and no 
statistical analysis of the remote viewing portion of the experiment are included in the 
published report other than to indicate results were non-significant. 
 These latter attempted replications and the three involving Karnes are often cited 
as persuasive evidence against remote viewing, but as can be seen, their value in that 
regard is at best questionable.  In the next chapter I will discuss what is considered by 
many to be the most serious challenge. 
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Chapter 8:  Remote Viewing (continued) 
 
 
 In the preceding chapter, after describing the early research supporting the 
existence of the ESP-based remote viewing phenomenon I considered some of the failed 
replications and quasi-replications that have often been cited as counter-evidence to the 
RV effect.  A more important response to the early remote viewing work is that of Marks 
and Kamman (1978 and 1980/2000).  Their response consists of two parts:  A series of 
failed attempted replications, and an analysis of the published claims of successful 
remote viewing studies – primarily that of Puthoff and Targ presented in the IEEE paper 
– for unreported or undiscovered flaws.  I will consider the Marks/Kamman replication 
effort first.   
 Between 1976 and 1978 the two psychologists conducted 35 remote viewing trials 
gathered into five experiments.  They claimed to have followed the Puthoff/Targ model 
explicitly, and in their 1980 book report their findings and draw up the general outlines of 
a beacon-style experiment, mentioning the random selection of the target, and giving 
brief summaries of what both the viewer and the outbound team were expected to do.  
Yet after evaluation by multiple blind judges they reported that  
None–repeat, none–of the results was statistically significant.  In not a single case 
did a judge do better than chance at ranking the transcripts – a total of twenty sets 
of judgments and not a single significant result. (Marks & Kamman, 1980, 19-20 
– emphasis in the original).  
 
  Their failed replication and associated analysis have stood for years as the 
quintessential falsification of the remote viewing model, and are frequently and  
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ubiquitously cited in critical works on the subject of ESP.  Their conclusions deserve 
closer scrutiny.  
 How explicitly did they follow the standard protocol?  Based on what they have 
published,  that is difficult to tell.  Though we do have the general outlines of the 
experiment, there are many important details left out.  For example, though they specify 
that each target used was randomly selected, there is no mention of blinding conditions.  
Additionally, except in one case there is no discussion of target pool size or composition, 
target selection criteria, target-pool management, nor target-pool security.  In most 
successful remote viewing experiments, all these details are offered.   Marks and 
Kamman specify the number of judges and how the transcripts were checked for ancillary 
cues or clues.  There is a hint that sum-of-ranks was used to evaluate the viewer 
transcripts against the various targets (transcripts were “rank ordered” by the judges “for 
appropriate fitness to the location” – p. 19).  But there is no mention further of statistical 
analyses, nor is there a display of results beyond the fact that “none–repeat, none“ were 
statistically significant.1   
 It might be argued that, given the non-significant results produced, it was not 
essential for such details to be presented when it would be necessary in case a significant 
effect was being claimed.  However, this would be a mistake.  In a case where attempted 
replications are used to refute claims for the existence of a certain phenomenon such as, 
in this case, remote viewing, it is essential for the researchers arguing against the 
                                                          
 1This is ironic, since Marks and Kamman chastised remote viewing researchers 
for flawed or incomplete reporting. 
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phenomenon to make their procedures and analyses just as transparent as that which is 
expected of researchers who argue for it.  Otherwise, it is impossible to tell whether the 
researchers producing negative results might not in some way, intentionally or otherwise, 
be biasing their results against the phenomenon being tested. 
 In the one experiment for which they do provide more details, the final one, there 
are some hints as to procedure, but also some suggestion of possible flaws in their own 
approach.  First, there is an indication that Marks and Kamman made the same error as 
Karnes and others, in assuming that remote viewing was telepathic in nature 
(“...everybody concerned seemed to believe that Chris and Sally had communicated at an 
extrasensory level...” [p.39]).  Further, there is a suggestion there may be some issues 
with the judging procedure.  For this final experiment (seven trials, one viewer), there 
was only one judge, when the previous experiments had all had five judges each.  The 
experimenters expressed great satisfaction with their choice for judge, Pavel Tichy.2  
Tichy was an accomplished logician and they seemed to consider this a high qualification 
for judging remote viewing results.   
 However, whatever Tichy’s other accomplishments (and they were noteworthy), a 
logician is likely to be a poor choice for a remote viewing judge.  The reason is this: 
logicians tend to be analytical and linear in their approach to problem-solving.  But what 
is called for in remote viewing judging is more often an holistic approach, with a 
propensity for global thinking and pattern recognition.  Of course, now that many years 
                                                          
 2“If anybody was motivated and capable of making accurate matches, Pavel Tichy 
was” (Marks & Kamman, 1980, 23). 
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have gone since his death, there is no way to tell whether Dr. Tichy possessed these 
qualities as well.  But more promising choices for judge would have been a studio-art 
instructor, visual artist, or an accomplished photographer. 
 It is also difficult to tell anymore whether Tichy’s judging work was in any way 
inferior to what might otherwise be expected, since as far as could be determined, Marks 
and Kamman never made public any of the transcripts and other raw data.  However, 
there are some indications of judging errors.  Notably, on what arguably might otherwise 
have been the easiest and best match of the series, the judge violated a cardinal rule of 
remote viewing evaluation by selecting a viewer response on the basis not of how the 
target itself looked or was composed as compared to the transcript and sketches.   He 
instead chose a different transcript based on the fact that the accompanying sketch 
closely matched a distant scene that could only be seen by looking directly away from the 
designated target.  But one should judge a transcript/target match based only on the 
intended target and its immediate vicinity, not on anything that might be seen at a 
distance or in a different direction. (Targ, 1994; Puthoff & Targ, 1978.)  One cannot say 
that Tichy or the other judges in case of the preceding 28 trials did not otherwise follow 
sound judging procedures.  But the fact that the one instance that Marks and Kamman 
chose to illustrate a judge’s performance in the series turns out to be flawed raises at least 
some reason for concern about the rest of the judging. 
 The Marks and Kamman remote viewing replication series may or may not be a 
good example of a failed replication of the remote viewing research model.   Given the 
relative paucity of details about their process, though, and a few tantalizing hints that 
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point to possible flaws in their own work, whether the Marks and Kamman replications 
gain any ground against remote viewing claims is at best inconclusive. 
 
Protocol Artifacts 
 A far more important objection lodged by Marks and Kamman against the early 
remote viewing work appeared first in Nature (Marks & Kamman, 1978), to be further 
elaborated in their later book (Marks & Kamman, 1980; Marks, 2000).  This work was 
intended as a direct rebuttal to the Puthoff/Targ experiments published in Nature (1974) 
and the IEEE journal (1976).  The essence of the Marks/Kamman argument was that the 
raw data transcripts of Pat Price’s nine remote viewing trials contained enough 
extraneous comments and cues that judges could produce statistically-significant 
rankings even in the absence of any ESP effect whatsoever.  Marks and Kamman 
suspected that comments in the body of the transcript reflecting banter between the 
interviewer and viewer such as those mentioning target locations visited in earlier trials 
in the series, and side-comments about feelings after a certain number of experiences, and 
so on, could make it possible to accurately rank-order the transcripts without needing to 
even consider the content of the purported remote viewing results themselves. 
 After a drawn-out and clearly irksome process, in which Puthoff and Targ 
allegedly alternately refused access to the original materials or failed to deliver them as 
promised, Marks and Kamman acquired the transcripts from a third party and did their 
own examination, finding indeed the clues they had expected to discover.  Eventually, 
they arranged two separate rejudgings of their own.  The first was performed in the actual 
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target locations in California by two research psychologists who compared five of the 
nine transcripts (with ancillary cues and comments expurgated) to the target sites 
themselves, producing non-significant results, as Marks and Kamman had suspected 
would be the case if there were no ancillary cues to help.  In the second rejudging 
process, which Marks and Kamman called “remote judging,” the eight individuals 
involved rank-ordered the transcripts (with ancillary comments and clues included) 
without ever visiting the actual target locations, ostensibly relying exclusively on the 
clues contained on the unedited transcripts.  All eight produced highly significant 
rankings, three of which were as good or better than that of the one SRI judge for whom 
Marks and Kamman had individual results.  A similar counter-experiment was done with 
six of the nine transcripts from the first Hella Hammid series that had also been reported 
in the 1976 IEEE paper, and which allegedly also contained extraneous cues.  (Marks & 
Kamman, 1980, 27-35) 
 This indeed posed a serious challenge to the credibility of at least the earliest 
Puthoff & Targ results, and by extension other of their studies for which less raw data 
was publicly available.  The SRI researchers were victims of their own attempts to 
anticipate critics’ objections.  Apparently concerned that if any alterations were made to 
the transcripts they would be accused of selectively reporting evidence, Puthoff and Targ 
had taken care to pass unedited transcripts to the judges (Puthoff & Targ, 1976, 335).  
What may thus have been intended as an attempt at scientific openness turned out to be a 
pitfall, and Marks’ and Kamman’s criticism seems persuasive.  
 However, though clearly valid, the Marks/Kamman critique turns out not to be as 
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powerful as public wisdom has come to believe.  There are reasons to think that, while 
these first Price and Hammid studies are flawed enough that the very high significance 
value may be less trustworthy, the results nonetheless do demonstrate an unambiguous 
remote viewing effect.   The first and most important of these reasons is the attempts 
made by Puthoff and Targ, and a colleague, Charles T. Tart, to examine the impact of the 
Marks/Kamman criticism.  Tart, who was not affiliated with the original research, 
engaged another independent judge to carry out a rejudging.   After ascertaining that the 
new judge had no prior exposure to any of the Price results, Tart provided her with all 
nine transcripts, not only expurgated of suggestive ancillary cues and comments, but also 
fully randomized and accompanied by a randomized list of the target sites (Tart, et al, 
1980, 191).  The judge visited each target site and rank-ordered every transcript from 1 to 
9, matching 7 of the 9 correctly, yielding a sum-of-ranks statistical analysis significant at 
p < 10-4.   A further analysis, which Tart described as “an exact factorial method,” 
yielded significance at p = 2.2 X 10-5.  Furthermore, the judge reported that, “with the 
exception of two transcripts that did not seem to correspond to any site, the remaining 
seven transcripts each showed high correlation to one (correct) site and low correlation to 
the others.”  
 By this time, parts or all of four of the best transcripts of the nine had been 
published in various books and science papers to illustrate some of the striking matches 
that had accrued in the Price series.  Marks (1981, 177) objected that “it is not 
permissible to include material for re-judging which has already been published or which 
may be available in some other form.”  Mark’s concern was that the judge might 
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subliminally recall the correct matching order from a report he or she had read or heard, 
or the judge could intentionally look up the previous material to guarantee a good result.  
To avoid these two possibilities, Marks felt that only the five un-published transcripts 
should have been used in any rejudging.  The possibility of the judge experiencing 
subliminal recall of something she had seen or read is perhaps conceivable –  if 
improbable.  Cheating is more feasible, at least in principle.  But Tart’s conscientious 
effort to assure the judge’s independence and integrity seriously vitiates Mark’s objection 
on this count.    
 It is also important to consider the nature of the transcripts that Marks wanted 
excluded.  All four of them were prima facie matches for the targets they were first-place 
rankings for.  By “prima facie match” I mean a viewer’s description captures the target 
location so well and bears so little resemblance to any other target in the pool that there is 
no question as to which target it describes.  Importantly, the target pool selected for these 
experiments by otherwise uninvolved SRI officials were well chosen for heterogeneity 
and orthogonality, as can be verified in Puthoff and Targ (1975), (1976), and (1977).  
(This is in contrast to the often overly-homogenous target sets selected for some of the 
failed replications, as discussed above.)   Brief summaries of the four transcripts in 
question are as follows: 
 
Target 1 – Hoover Tower.  Price’s response:  “The area – I have a place – it seems 
like it would be Hoover Tower” (Tart, et al, 191).   
 
Target 4 – Redwood City boat marina.  Price’s response:  “a little boat jetty or 
little boat dock along the bay...I see the little boats, some motor launches, some 
little sailing ships, sails all furled, some with the masts stepped and others are up.  
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Little jetty or little dock there” (Puthoff & Targ, 1977, 50-51). 
 
Target 7 – Allied Arts Plaza (an arts and crafts plaza featuring extensive floral 
beds and shrubbery, surrounded by Mission adobe style architecture and many 
smalls shops and kiosks.)  Price’s perceptions included numerous references to 
flowers, redwood arbors, a marketplace atmosphere, pathways, decorative ponds 
and a fountain, etc.  The description  was “accurate in almost every detail,” as can 
be verified by the complete transcript, in Puthoff & Targ (1977, 52 & 63-68). 
 
Target 9 – Rinconada recreational swimming complex:  Price “said that he saw a 
circular pool of water, about a hundred feet in diameter (it was actually hundred 
and ten feet in diameter). He also saw a rectangular pool about 60 by 80 feet on a 
side (this pool happens to be 75 by 100 feet). He went on to describe a concrete 
block house, which is also at the site.”  Price also sketched a quite accurate 
diagrammatic representation of the complex, including both pools and the 
blockhouse (though with a left-to-right reversal, and including features not 
present at the time of the viewing).  (Targ, 1996) 
 
 
 There is a certain logic to Marks’ and Kamman’s point about excluding 
previously-published material from a rejudging.  But on the other hand, it doesn’t seem to 
be an essential requirement if the judge’s blindness can be reasonably assured, as Tart 
did.  More significantly, Price’s descriptions are of such high quality for these four 
sessions that neither ancillary clues, unconscious memory recall, nor even cheating were 
necessary for judges to rank them as first round hits.3
 In a subsequent letter to Nature in 1986, Marks lodged a further objection.  He 
had by then acquired from Puthoff copies of not only the nine original, unexpurgated 
transcripts but also of Tart’s expurgated re-judging ones.  Marks expressed 
dissatisfaction with how the ancillary clues had been redacted.  For instance, he was 
concerned that one phrase was still included that might have cued a judge as to the proper 
                                                          
 3It does raise some question as to Mark’s and Kamman’s other motivations for 
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match for the first transcript  (“the feeling that one can’t or won’t be able to do it, and 
shouldn’t even try it”).  Marks implied that the phrase expressed a hesitancy in the face 
of an initial session of the new experiment, hinting this was the first trial.  However, even 
if a judge had tried to leverage this “clue” into a correct choice, the issue is moot, as the 
target for the first trial was the Hoover Tower which, as we have seen, was an 
unambiguous prima facie match, for which a clue would have been superfluous.  The few 
other problems Marks cites seem equally unsupportable. 
 Finally,4 in a further rebuttal to the Marks/Kamman allegations, Puthoff and Targ 
(Tart, et al, 1981, 24-25) did a statistical re-analysis taking into account the cues present 
in the raw transcripts.  In their calculations they assumed that the cues would be used “to 
maximum advantage.”  But their analysis indicated that even by the most conservative 
statistic, “non-independent assignment of transcripts to target sites” decreased the 
significance to p = 3.9 X 10-4 (as compared to the original figure of  p = 2.9 X 10-5), 
which Puthoff and Targ deemed “still a quite significant result.” 
 
 Though seriously flawed, the Marks/Kamman analysis was an important 
contribution to remote viewing research.  Even before this objection became known some 
experimenters had recognized the problem and were taking care to check their raw data 
for inadvertent clues prior to judging.  But once the Marks/Kamman critique was 
                                                                                                                                                                             
wanting them excluded.  
 4I say “finally” here in the interest of space and time – though there are other 
points on which Marks and Kamman could be attacked. 
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published, those safeguards quickly became standard procedure for all responsibly done 
remote viewing research. 
 The Marks/Kamman criticisms miss the mark as a way of accounting for 
successful remote viewing results for the following reasons: 
 
1) A re-analysis by a judge unaffiliated with the previous experiment using 
transcripts with all potential cues removed still produced highly significant 
results. 
 
2) A statistical re-analysis by Puthoff and Targ which took all possible cues and 
embedded suggestions into consideration also continued to yield highly 
significant results. 
 
3) Marks and Kamman failed to adequately perform their own rejudging of the 
Price material.  They claim all rejudgings were done “utilizing only the clues” on 
the transcripts (Marks, 2000,49; Marks & Kamman, 1980, 30).  For this to have 
occurred, all data would necessarily have to be expunged from the transcripts 
except for the alleged cues, and the judging would have to commence based on 
this minimalist data set.  Otherwise, there is no way to guarantee that the judges 
do not rely on possible ESP-derived content in the test of each transcript to aid 
with the matching.  Marks and Kamman do not mention removing all data and 
leaving only the clues, nor is there any indication such measures were taken. 
 
4)  Further experiments published not long after the nine-trial Pat Price and Hella 
Hammid sets did not have, and in some cases due to design could not have had 
the flaw found in the Price set.  Subsequent experiments done at the SRI 
laboratory incorporating precautions recommended by Marks and Kamman 
continued to produce significant- to highly-significant results. 
 
5) Successful replications done by experimenters other than those at SRI 
continued to produce significant and highly-significant results while taking the 
precautions recommended by Marks and Kamman. 
 
 When the first edition of Marks’ and Kamman’s Psychology of the Psychic was 
published in 1980, there may have been some reason to question the original remote 
viewing research and replications, since there was still only a relatively small number of 
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trials (certainly not yet even 200) available in only a few publicly accessible studies.  
However, by the time Marks published the second edition of the book in 2000 (some 
years after Kamman’s death), there was much less justification – and justification has 
grown even less in the intervening years since that time.  I will here briefly turn to the 
much larger body of remote viewing material published post-1980.   
 
Precognitive Remote Perception 
 After Bisaha and Dunne’s series of successful remote viewing experiments in the 
1970s, Brenda Dunne moved to Princeton University where she joined Robert Jahn, a 
prominent physicist and dean of Princeton’s School of Engineering and Applied Science.  
Jahn was founder and head of the Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research (PEAR) 
laboratory.  Dunne’s earlier precognitive remote perception (PRP) experiments lead to a 
long research program at PEAR based on the preliminary SRI-inspired precognitive 
remote viewing model.  Jahn and Dunne preferred the “remote perception” terminology 
over the more widely-used “remote viewing” because they felt it more accurately 
captured the phenomenology encountered by participants, which is generally 
acknowledged to include more sensory modalities than just visual experience. 
 With some refinements, PEAR’s PRP protocol remained the same in principle as 
that sketched in the Puthoff/Targ IEEE paper as further elaborated by Dunne and Bisaha.  
One of the advantages of the precognitive aspect of the paradigm was that it eliminated 
some of the sources for potential error and sensory cuing.  Since at the time a PRP trial 
was conducted no one knew what the target was to be, it would be impossible for sensory 
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leakage to the perceiver (‘viewer’) to occur. 
 Further contributions of the PEAR PRP research program involved improvements 
in judging, evaluation, and statistical analysis of trails results (Nelson, et al, 1996).  
There had always been issues with the subjective nature of the judging techniques used in 
remote viewing research.  But due to the experiential content of remote 
viewing/perception results, there was no substitute for at least some level of evaluation 
by human judges who could identify fine distinctions in the raw data, could assess 
approximate quality of fit between the candidate target and a percipient’s perceptions, 
and who could draw conclusions from non-quantifiable results such as drawings and 
sketches.   
 The motivation behind provisions for blind judging, randomization protocols, and 
such statistical tools as sum-of-ranks and direct-count-of-permutations was to convert 
subjective, qualitative evaluations performed by human judges into quantitative measures 
that could not only be more easily compared to results from other similar research, but 
also allowed objective evaluations that were buffered from well-known weaknesses such 
as confirmation bias in human-based assessments.  This came at a cost of a loss of 
sensitivity to the quality of the data.  A transcript merely had to be a better match than 
any of the others to be ranked first against the correct target.  Whether it was only a 
marginally better description or a high-quality, near-photographic match (as a certain 
percentage of trials produce), could not be taken into account.  Still, it was a relatively 
small price to pay for allowing subjective interpretations to be transformed into objective 
measures. 
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 Recognizing some of the problems with the standard ways of assessing remote 
viewing/perception results, PEAR experimented with a variety of statistical scoring 
systems before settling on five binary systems that were largely based on an evaluation 
tool of 30 binary descriptive queries that provided a more fine-grained way of turning 
subjective judgments into quantified data  (Dunne & Jahn, 2003, 213).    Examples of the 
elements that could be assessed included outdoor vs. indoor, water present or absent, 
whether the setting was noisy or quite, expansive or confined, and so on (p.211).   Binary 
parsing such as this reduced subjective interpretation to a minimum, since whether (for 
example) water is present or absent at a location is an objective matter requiring little 
subjective reflection by a human perceiver  to arrive at a correct determination.  The 
process has a further virtue in that it allows easy machine-based processing.  A large 
number of targets can be canvassed in advance of any experimentation and  coded with 
the 30-element questionnaire, to arrive at a fairly unique profile for each site.  Then, once 
a trial has been evaluated using the same 30 elements, this can be machine-scored against 
the target set and objectively compared and ranked against the possibilities.  According to 
Dunne and Jahn, “this descriptor-based process had the advantages that such ranking 
could proceed on a more standardized analytical basis and that many more alternative 
targets could be ranked by the computer than by a human judge” (p.211).  
 Interestingly, each of the five binary scoring systems explored by PEAR, when 
evaluated against one another and against the original sum-of-ranks approach, shows 
largely consistent cross-system results.  In other words, though they do produce some 
differences in final outcome of their statistical analyses of the same data sets, these 
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outcomes, system to system, are close enough to being the same.  This is important 
because it constitutes a confirmatory “cross-check” verifying the soundness of the 
approach and the accuracy of the evaluations over all.  It also allowed the PEAR lab to 
use the least complex analytic procedure that produces sufficiently consistent results. 
 Employing a comparatively sizable number of assessment variables has the 
further benefit of recapturing some of the nuance present in the perceiver’s subjective 
experience.  But it has had a somewhat unexpected downside, as well, in that scores have 
tended to become less robust as perceivers, aware of the specific data expected in the 
binary query set, direct their attention to those elements (p.215).  This moves the 
perceiver away from the intuitive mental state most amenable to perception-at-a-distance 
and into a more consciously analytical mode, which experience has shown tends to 
attenuate veridical perceptions. (p.230)  
 Nonetheless, the PEAR precognitive remote perception program has over two 
decades produced overall robust results.  During its life, the program has amassed nearly 
1,000 PRP trials.  Of these, 653 were considered formal trials suitable for statistical 
evaluation.5   Statistical analysis demonstrated results very highly significant at p = 3 X 
10-8 (p. 207). 
 
Classified Department of Defense Studies 
                                                          
 5The balance of 300-some-odd ‘informal’ trials were largely exploratory in 
nature, or not as tightly controlled, and therefore did not reach the PEAR standards for 
inclusion in the overall statistical evaluation, though their cumulative success ratios 
would have enhanced PEAR’s results. 
 216
 The military-funded SRI-International program continued uninterrupted 
throughout this entire era.  Because of the classified nature of the program, most of the 
research was not openly published.  But some occasionally was, notably a contribution to 
a symposium of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in 
1979.  (I will discuss most of this set of experiments in chapter 10).  The article that was 
subsequently published (Puthoff, et al, 1981) in the symposium proceedings mentioned 
the completion of “more than 100 experiments in the remote viewing of targets ranging 
from objects in nearby light-tight canisters to geographic sites at transcontinental 
distances, viewed from locations which include shielded Faraday cages and a submerged 
submarine” (p.37). 
 Nine years after the AAAS symposium, the classified program (now under 
nuclear physicist Dr. Edwin May – Targ had departed in 1982, and Puthoff in 1985) was 
directed by the Defense Intelligence Agency to publish a comprehensive review and 
summary of psychoenergetic6 research produced by the SRI laboratory from its official 
start on 1 October 1973 through 30 September 1988, the end of the Fiscal Year.  The 
entire research effort over the program’s 15-year history amassed 25,449 trials conducted 
under a number of different protocols.7  According to May,  
                                                          
 6‘Psychoenergetics’ was a term borrowed from Soviet usage to denote the entire 
category of ostensible mental events typically attributed to ESP, psychokinesis, and 
related phenomena. 
 7This number only includes the work done specifically at SRI-International and 
does not include several thousand more operational and informal experimental trials 
performed by the active duty military arm of the program at Fort George G. Meade, MD 
and at the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) at Aberdeen Proving 
Grounds, MD. 
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analysis indicates that the odds that our results are not due to simple statistical 
fluctuations alone are better than 2 X 1020 to 1 (i.e., 2 followed by 20 zeros).  
Using accepted criteria set forth in the standard behavioral sciences, we conclude 
that this constitutes convincing, if not conclusive evidence for the existence of 
psychoenergetic functioning. (May, et al, 1989, 2)   
 
The nearly 26,000 trials were conducted within 154 experiments involving 227 individual 
participants (p. 5).   
 Of these overall trials, 24,440 were evaluated remote viewing trials, 19,675 of 
which were relatively short-duration forced-choice type trials aimed at trying to use RV 
to reliably obtain alpha-numeric type information.  These yielded statistical significance 
at p = 6.12 X 10-14 (but only a small effect size, as the task proved to be only very 
marginally successful).  The 3,790 “search” trials (attempts to use RV to indicate hidden 
locations of objects or persons) were less significant (p = 4.53 X 10-3) but had an also 
relatively small effect size.  However, the standard laboratory remote viewing trials (n = 
966) demonstrated a robust effect size, and were very highly significant at p = 4.33 X 10-
11.8  This was particularly the case for the subset of six experienced viewers who had 
long been affiliated with the SRI program (some of them retired military remote 
viewers).  Their subset of 196 remote viewing trials showed a strong effect size and 
yielded significance at p = 3.49 X 10-8.  (May, et al, 1989, 13)  The clandestine program 
continued to add to these results, and I will discuss some of these later in chapter 10. 
 Some of the later SRI data emerged in the peer-reviewed parapsychology 
                                                          
 8Nine operational intelligence-collection RV sessions (out of 106) were also 
conducted under sufficiently controlled circumstances as to be scientifically-admissible 
and statistically-analyzable.  These nine were significant at p = 3.45 10-5, with a very 
strong effect size. 
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journals.  One example of this was a 1994 article by Russell Targ reporting on a series of 
trials used to test a new concept-analysis judging tool which allowed an even finer-
grained parsing of viewer response content versus target details.  Six inexperienced 
remote viewers each worked with an interviewer under double blind conditions and 
following standard beacon protocols to perform six sessions each once a week.  Four of 
the six produced results that were highly significant at p < 8 X 10-5, with a large effect 
size. 
 Besides the already-discussed PRP work at the PEAR laboratory, Targ and a 
varying assemblage of associates continued to publish results into the present century, as 
did May and some of his joint researchers, by 1990 now moved from SRI to another 
government contractor, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).  As 
mentioned, some of this material will be discussed later, but some of will be considered 
below, in a brief discussion of the last of bodies of evidence to be presented against the 
claim of Universal Physicalism. 
  
ASSOCIATIVE REMOTE VIEWING (ARV) 
 Associative remote viewing attempts to retro-temporally convey the outcome of a 
future event to a perceiver in the present.  As such, it is a targeting methodology, rather 
than a specific way of doing remote viewing (RV) itself (any RV method that produces 
reasonably accurate results may be employed in the ARV process).  Once again, it 
remains undetermined whether a retro-causative effect or a precognitive element is at 
play.   Early on in the government remote viewing program researchers found that merely 
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asking a viewer to predict a future event with two possible outcomes would produce only 
chance results (Puthoff, 2009; Targ & Harary, 1985, 82).  One hypothesis suggested that 
the inference-producing role dominated by conscious, left-brain-hemisphere processes 
served to confuse the viewer’s perceptions, resulting in non-significant results. 
 But an alternative was available.  As noted above, the remote viewing protocol is 
intended to allow a viewer to produce often high-quality verbal and sketched descriptions 
of targets otherwise inaccessible to normal perception before and during the time of the 
viewing.  Available data suggested that a viewer could discern a target that would be 
presented some time in the future.  A protocol was developed to take advantage of this.  
If two targets were associated with the two possible outcomes of a future binary event, 
then perhaps the viewer would describe with sufficient accuracy the target associated 
with the correct outcome of the event as it was realized in the future.  This, then, would 
lead to drawing the correct conclusion as to which outcome would be realized in the 
future.  A simple ARV protocol proceeds as follows: 
1)  A person (often referred to as the “tasker”)  selects a target pool of two 
objects.  These objects must be as orthogonal as possible from each other (for 
example, a pencil and an apple) so that even poor quality remote viewing results 
can distinguish the correct target from the decoy.  The viewer must be kept fully 
blind to both targets until after conclusion of the event to be predicted. 
 
2)  A future event with at least two mutually-exclusive possible outcomes is 
chosen for prediction.  For practical reasons the selected event will usually have a 
binary set of possible outcomes, though events with multiple outcomes can also 
be managed with ARV.  Representative types of events include team sports 
contests; stock or currency values (up vs. down); and so on.  The viewer may (but 
does not need to) know what event is to be predicted. 
 
3)  The tasker assigns one of the targets to each of the outcomes.  The apple might 
be associated for example with the Texas Longhorns winning a football game, 
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while the pencil could represent the A&M Aggies winning instead. 
 
4)  The tasker and the viewer agree on a future time after the realized outcome of 
the event for the viewer to be presented with the feedback object associated with 
the outcome that will actually be realized.  The viewer will usually only be shown 
the target associated with the correct outcome, and not be shown the target which 
was associated with the outcome that failed to be realized. 
 
5)  Using his or her preferred remote viewing method, the viewer produces a 
transcript of verbal and sketched responses describing as clearly as possible the 
impressions that are received of the appearance and configurational aspects of the 
object which will later be shown at the appropriate time as feedback.  Once 
completed, the viewer transmits the transcript to the judge sufficiently prior to the 
event to allow a careful judging, and execution of indicated action. 
 
6)  The judge is given access to the two objects and compares the viewer’s 
transcript to each.  The judge decides which target is best matched by the 
viewer’s transcript. 
 
7)  The selected match represents the predicted outcome of the experiment.  If, for 
example, the viewer’s description is “red, round, sweet smelling,” and he or she 
sketches a roughly spherical shape, the judge will likely conclude that the apple is 
a better match than the pencil and, therefore, the Longhorns will win the football 
game. [Since this result is produced before the event has reached a conclusion, 
action could in principle be undertaken, such as bets placed in the case of a 
sporting event, or stocks bought (or sold) prior to market close.  In a commercial 
enterprise such action might actually be taken; in an experimental context the 
events are merely used as an otherwise non-predictable outcome.] 
 
8)  At the appointed time after the event has taken place and an outcome decided, 
the tasker presents the viewer with the correct object to complete the feedback 
loop and confirm to the viewer the intended target. 
 
 The protocol is resistant to fraud.  Since the outcome of the ESP-component of 
the experiment must be decided and declared in advance of the culmination of the event, 
it becomes hard for an unprincipled researcher to fraudulently alter results.  The actual 
outcome of the event is in most cases a matter of public record, and thus also cannot be 
tinkered with.   
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 There are several conflating factors that can degrade the ARV results (but none 
known that can artificially enhance them).  The first of these is called “displacement,” the 
tendency of viewers to sometimes perceive and describe the wrong target, or even parts 
of both targets.  Because of this, some ARV applications projects (e.g., those investing 
large sums of money) only act on results that are sufficiently unambiguous, and will take 
a “pass” on any that do not meet a certain threshold (Targ, et al, 1995). 
 Another conflating factor is the judging process itself.  The judge is expected to 
employ standard (that is, non-ESP) faculties in analyzing and comparing the viewer’s 
transcript to the possible targets.  But different judges have different levels of 
discriminatory, pattern-recognition, and analytical abilities.  Thus a less-competent judge 
may produce weaker results than one who is proficient in the task, without the underlying 
ESP effect produced by the viewer being any stronger or weaker.  Quality of judging thus 
acts as a constraint on reported results9 which at best may present a slight degradation to 
the strength of results and at worst a serious decrement. 
 A further potential conflating factor is error in experimental set-up, including 
poor selection and matching of target sets.  If insufficient attention is paid to the qualities 
of individual targets and, further, to which targets are matched together, results can be 
seriously affected.  For example, if a mounted snarling wolf’s head is used as one target, 
and a soup strainer used for the other, viewers may be subconsciously repelled from 
                                                          
 9It is conceivable, but hard to verify, that some judges might exercise some ESP 
ability of their own, and thus enhance results – though this would seem to be relatively 
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describing the frightening visage of a wolf, even if it turns out to be the correct target. 
 These issues illustrate the factors that may affect the results of ARV experiments.  
On the other hand, they also suggest that results produced in ARV experiments are likely 
to be conservative measures of ARV experimental outcomes.  Thus, when positive results 
are produced, we can have added (if hard to quantify) reassurance that an ESP effect is 
indeed manifest.  
 
Evaluating ARV Experiments 
 There are two ways to evaluate the outcome of an ARV experiment.  One can 
qualitatively examine the prima facie evidence for indications of a success (or failure).   
Or one can consider the judging results in terms of hit/miss in predicting the outcomes of 
the selected events and analyze them statistically.  
 The qualitative, subjective approach, is essential to providing the raw material for 
the judging process which produces quantitative results.   However, it is in itself not 
crucially helpful from the perspective of an overall scientific evaluation, nor useful for 
comparative analysis across sets of experiments of the same type and order.  However, 
prima facie examination can be valuable in improving experimental protocols, increasing 
understanding of human factors affecting the experiment and providing data to inform 
decisions as to action to be taken.   
 Still, the best and most assessable evidence from a scientific standpoint would 
seem to come from the quantifiable approach, which involves a judge analyzing the ARV 
                                                                                                                                                                             
unobjectionable from a research standpoint. 
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transcript and making a decision as to which of the two targets in the pool it best 
matches, after which the judge’s choice is either justified or invalidated by the 
subsequent event over which he or she has no control.  In a sense, it is a way of 
converting the subjectivity inherent in the remote viewing evaluation process into an 
objective measure that can be statistically analyzed.  This latter approach is the one I 
shall rely on in presenting ARV results (with some recourse to actual example ARV 
results for illustrative purposes).   
 
Survey of Results 
 Though relatively unexplored as a psi methodology, ARV has already generated 
impressive results among a small group of professional and amateur researchers.  I will 
present a full summary of those I have been able to locate that are sufficiently well-
attested.   
 In three pilot studies in which I myself participated, the results were as follows: 
Experiment A (3/5/2002 - 6/5/2002):   19 Attempts, yielding 14 correct, 3 
incorrect, and 2 passes.10  Statistical analysis yields a p value of p = 0.006, or 
odds against chance of 1 in 167 (statistically significant). 
 
Experiment B (8/3/2002 - 12/2/2002): 39 Attempts, yielding  22 correct, 15 
incorrect and 2 passes.  P = 0.16, yielding odds against chance of approximately 
one in six, which is not statistically significant. 
 
Experiment C (10/12/2002 - 12/5/2002)11: 14 Attempts, 8 correct, 3 incorrect, and 
                                                          
 10A pass occurs when the results are so ambiguous that no decision can be made 
with any level of confidence.  For statistical purposes, passes are not counted, and totals 
are adjusted accordingly. 
 11Experiments B & C were run concurrently, with different (and unaffiliated) 
researcher/taskers, but the same viewer. 
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3 passes.  Results yielded P = 0.11, or odds against chance of one in nine (also not 
statistically significant). 
 
All three experiments taken together yield a highly statistically significant result of p = 
.003, or one chance in 333 that the results were produced by chance.  Experiment B 
produced the least-significant results, though they were still noticeably positive in the 
same direction as were the other two experiments.  The researcher in experiment B used a 
different approach than was used in the other two experiments (in which researchers 
personally selected and paired the target photos).  In this case Researcher B loaded a 
large set of target photos into a computer, which randomly selected two-photo sets for 
each trial.  This meant that several photo-pairings were sub-optimal, producing either 
pairs that were too similar or that were seriously unbalanced in terms of interest levels 
between targets (e.g., interesting vs. bland in the same target set).  As a consequence, 
several of the remote viewing transcripts and, hence, the judging decisions were less than 
optimal as well, showing noticeable displacement between targets.  There were 
nonetheless a number of high-quality results and unambiguous “hits” even in this set of 
trials. 
 ARV is less formally attested than any of the four research paradigms I am 
discussing in detail here, largely because it has not been widely discussed in the 
literature.   As far as I have been able to determine, there are only a small number of 
published studies in peer-reviewed publications (though more are in the works as I write).  
However, there has been a comparatively large body of carefully-done informal and pilot 
studies whose results have been made available to the public, and taken together these 
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turn out to be quite persuasive.12
 Some early associative remote viewing experiments and their results are as 
follows:  
The first known associative remote viewing experiment occurred in 1977, as reported in 
Puthoff, Targ, & May (1981; also, Puthoff 2009; Targ, 1984; Smith, 2005).  In this 
experiment two separate remote viewing attempts were made from the Taurus, a deep-
submersible research vessel.   With a viewer aboard, the Taurus submerged 
approximately 500 miles from the intended targets – which in this case were locations, 
one for each viewer, respectively, to which two researchers acting as ‘beacons’ had been 
directed via a random selection process out of a target pool of six possible target 
locations.  Viewers were blind to the entire target pool.   
 The participating remote viewers (one male and one female) worked double blind 
while in the Taurus, one while at the 170 m. level (558 ft.) in 340 m. (1,115 ft.) deep 
water.  The other viewed while the submersible rested on the bottom in 78 m. (256 ft.) of 
water.13  At the conclusion of the viewing, each viewer was given access to a sealed 
envelope containing photos of each of the six possible target sites.  The viewer was 
required to match his or her results to one of the six photos.  On the back of each photo 
                                                          
 12Thanks to the structure of the ARV process (as mentioned above), successful 
results produced by individual researchers are more trustworthy than is perhaps true of 
other experimental paradigms, since lapses in protocol are most likely to actually degrade 
reported results and are highly unlikely to enhance them artificially. 
 13The primary purpose of the experiment was to determine if an environment 
shielded from electromagnetic influences would promote or degrade remote viewing 
performance.  The ARV aspect of it was a secondary experiment. 
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(hence “associated” with the target) was a different message that might be sent to a naval 
submarine on patrol, such as “Surface for radio contact” or “Return to port.”  Both 
viewers correctly matched their results to their respective correct target photo (and, 
hence, to the correct message).14
 In 1980 two informal ARV trials were attempted in the offices of the Radio 
Physics Laboratory of SRI-International (Targ & Harrary, 1984).  Each used a group of 
five different possible targets, and both trials successfully identified the correct target.  In 
1982 Puthoff (1984, 2009) produced 127 correct out of 202 trials, yielding a highly 
significant result of p < 1.6 X 10-4.  A consensus analysis honed this further for 
applications.15   Also in 1982, Targ and Harary (1984; and Harary & Targ, 1985) 
replicated this experiment, running nine trials, again with the silver futures market as the 
event-generator.  All nine were successful.16   
 With some refinements, Targ et al (1995) replicated this experiment, again using 
the silver futures market.  Of 18 trials, 12 were acted on (the other six rated as ‘passes’), 
                                                          
 14This of course leaves out the predictive element typical of most recent ARV 
research.  But it nicely demonstrates the principle behind the “associative” aspects of the 
ARV protocol. 
 15This was both a scientific experiment and an applications-oriented project.  The 
overall task was to predict the course of the silver futures market over a sequence of 30 
trades.  Using consensus analysis, correct decisions were made 21 times out of the 30, 
resulting in gross earnings at the level of investment totaling approximately $250,000.  
The researcher’s share was $25K, which was committed to establish a Waldorf school in 
Palo Alto, California. 
 16The experiment was subsequently reported in the Wall Street Journal (Larson, 
1984). A later experiment against the silver futures market failed after two trials and was 
discontinued due to significant financial losses when the experimenters tinkered with the 
protocol. 
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producing 11 correct descriptions, yielding p = 0.003.17
 A number of recent studies have been exhaustive in their approach.  From 1998 to 
2005 an independent researcher named Greg Kolodziejzyk conducted 3,630 trials, 
achieving 1,922 hits.  This produced results of p = 0.0002, or one chance in 5,000 that 
results were due to chance.  Kolodziejzyk’s method used a computer-automated process 
to pick and pair targets so he could act as viewer while the computer served all aspects of 
the tasking function.  (Kolodziejzyk, n.d.)  
 Another mass study by researcher Marty Rosenblatt is still ongoing, but the 
results tabulated up through 16 March 2009, are as follows: 
 Hits Misses Passes Success Rate18 p value Odds against 
chance
2004 6 5 10  .545   --  -- 
2005 37 27 52  .578   .084  1 in 11 
2006 71 54 93  .568   .054  1 in 18 
2007 153 113 185  .575   .006  1 in 169 
2008 241 195 233  .553   .012  1 in 81 
2009 258 214 243  .547   .019  1 in 51 
Total countable trials are 1,374 with 766 hits, yielding a p value equal to .0000112, with 
                                                          
 17For technical reasons only seven silver-commodity trades were recorded as 
executed, of which seven were in the correct direction.  Though officially recorded in the 
protocol, all trades were only notional, the lead author having apparently learned his 
lesson. 
 18Hits divided by total hits+misses. 
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odds against chance of one in 90,000.  (Rosenblatt, 2009) 
 As should by now be apparent, even in the relatively young associative 
remote viewing protocol, results far beyond chance are being produced.19  ARV 
experiments continue to be pursued.  Most recently, for example, as a class project a 
group of University of Colorado students and their advisors conducted an ARV project 
with the closing figure of the Dow Jones Industrial Average as its targeted event (Laham, 
Smith, & Moddel, 2008).   A consensus judging process was used across the results of 10 
viewers.  A total of 67 individual trials were performed, producing 13 misses and 54 hits.  
The judging recommended seven investment decisions, all of which were successful, 
yielding p <.0.01.  One of the participants invested $10,000 of his own funds, as 
indicated by the ARV results.  At the end of the seven trial series the account totaled 
$26,000, for a $16,000 gain (+160%). 
  
 There is to be sure, much additional evidence for ESP than just the four 
experimental paradigms I have covered.  Extensive research has been conducted in dream 
telepathy, other forms of clairvoyance, and other forms of precognition. One prominent 
research trajectory is the Ganzfeld approach, which has been widely explored with a 
number of variations for nearly three decades.20
                                                          
 19In private conversation, I have learned of a number of other informal 
experiments that have been done, reportedly with successful results.   I have not been 
able to report these however, for various reasons, including poor record-keeping on the 
part of the researcher and desires by researchers to keep themselves or their projects 
private. 
 20I will briefly describe the Ganzfeld procedure in chapter 10. 
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 But now we need to determine whether the evidence introduced in the 
previous four chapters really does constitute a violation of the causal argument and, 
hence, causal closure – and further, whether the evidence should be ruled to be 
admissible. 
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Chapter 9:  Evaluating the Evidence – Precognition/Reverse Causation 
 
 Now that I have covered the four research paradigms I am offering as candidate 
closure violators, it is time to see how well they fit the requisite criteria to be counted as 
intermittently-truncated causal chains (ITCCs).  I shall consider each in turn, first as to 
it’s status as a closure violator, and second as to how far we can trust the data as evidence 
of closure violation.  Here is how each experimental protocol exemplifies intermittently 
truncated causal chains: 
1a. Staring:   
Initiating cause (“exiting” portion of causal chain) – research participant distantly 
staring at subject through one-way television link with subject insulated from 
either physical influence or conscious awareness of the staring event.  
 
Consequent effect (“re-entering” causal chain) – subject’s nervous system 
exhibiting a stimulus signature, which is then picked up by instrumentation, 
which produces a record. Or, alternatively, statistically significant number of 
correct guesses during staring episodes.   
 
Causal gap: causal connection between the staring activity of the assistant and the 
nervous system stimulation of the subject.   
 
Apparent closure violation: spatial. 
 
1b.  DMILS: 
 
Initiating cause (“exiting” portion of causal chain) – intentional influence directed 
by ‘helper’ or researcher ‘towards’ sequestered subject.   
 
Consequent effect (“re-entering” causal chain) –  subject’s nervous system 
exhibiting an unaccountable stimulus (correlated with helping episodes), which is 
then picked up by instrumentation, producing a record. Or, alternatively, 
statistically significant results in various activities during ‘activation’ episodes.   
 
Causal gap: causal connection between the intentional activity of the assistant and 
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the nervous system stimulation/improved performance of the subject.   
 
Apparent closure violation: spatial. 
 
2a.  Remote viewing:  
 
Initiating causal chain (“exiting” portion of causal chain) – tasker’s selection of 
target to be remote viewed, followed by double-blind (or greater) tasking 
provided to viewer.  
 
Consequent effect (“re-entering” causal chain): Viewer perceives veridical target-
related data and records it.   
 
Causal gap: Viewers’ receiving and recognition of ostensibly blind tasking; 
viewer accessing target and acquisition of veridical target data.  
 
Apparent closure violations: Spatial. 
 
2b.  Precognitive Remote Perception: 
 
Initiating causal chain (“exiting” portion of causal chain) – target pool is 
prepared.  At a designated point in the future, beacon person/team visits a 
randomly-selected target.  viewer instructed to perform remote viewing against 
target to be selected in the future, then viewer performance of remote viewing 
task.  
 
Consequent effect (“re-entering” causal chain): Prior to selection of target and 
beacon visiting it, viewer perceives veridical target-related data and records it.   
 
Causal gap: Viewers’ receiving and recognition of ostensibly blind tasking; 
viewer accessing target and acquisition of veridical target data both at a distance 
and in the future.  
 
Apparent closure violations: Spatial and temporal. 
 
3. Presentiment:   
 
Initiating cause (“exiting” portion of causal chain) – Selection of target pool and 
loading into properly-configured computer.  Participant is connected to 
monitoring machinery and baseline condition established.  Participant indicates 
readiness to proceed.  Program begins.   
 
Consequent effect (“re-entering” causal chain):  Computer randomly selects either 
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a calm or disturbing photo and presents on the screen.   
 
Causal gap: Generation of pre-stimulus autonomic response in participant prior to 
selection and presentation of photo.   
 
Apparent closure violations: precognitive.. 
 
4.  Associative remote viewing:  
Initiating causal chain (“exiting” portion of causal chain) – Tasker’s selection of 
event to be predicted; tasker’s selection of binary target set. Double-blind tasking 
provided to viewer.   
 
Consequent effect (“re-entering” causal chain): Viewer perceives veridical target-
related data from target to be revealed in the future, and records the data.  Judging 
to select correct target.  Action taken as indicated by selected target.  Event 
outcome is determined.  Viewer is presented with feedback.   
 
Causal gap: Viewer reception, subconscious recognition of the specific 
assignment; viewer accessing target yet in the future.  Acquisition of veridical 
target data.   
 
Apparent closure violations: precognitive, and (in some cases) spatial. 
 
 
 I propose that the two main types of effects demonstrated by these experimental 
paradigms are: 1)  perception/action at a distance after all possible physical mechanisms 
have been excluded; and 2) precognition (often labeled in the literature as ‘reverse 
temporal’ causation or ‘retrocausation’) produced under the same exclusionary 
conditions.  I further propose that these two effects constitute powerful evidence of 
violations of causal closure in the form of what I have styled “intermittently truncated 
causal chains” (ITCC), thus providing evidence that closure and, hence, physicalism are 
false, at least in their universal sense.   
 But my asserting these proposals raise an obvious question.  Can we be sure that 
these phenomena really do demonstrate violations of closure?  There are a few arguments 
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offered to counter the idea that psi phenomena really do present a threat to physicalism.1  
In this chapter I shall focus on precognition/retrocausation, and then follow with a 
discussion of perception-at-a-distance. 
 
Precognition/Retrocausation2
 Precognition has often been considered to be conceptually interchangeable with 
the notion of retrocausation, because, depending on one’s perspective, the phenomenon 
can be characterized either as perception reaching forward in time, or instead a future 
event reaching into the past to exert causal leverage.  As I will shortly discuss, this 
interchangeability may be only apparent and has led to confusion.   
 In my consideration I include under “precognition” all the time-displaced effects 
discussed in preceding chapters.  One may object that presentiment cannot accurately be 
described as precognitive, since the measured effects involve reflexive autonomic 
functions operating below the threshold of awareness.  However, whatever sub-conscious 
processes are at work must parse between whether a stimulus that will be presented a few 
seconds into the future is innocuous or, instead, emotionally disturbing.  Such a parsing 
would seem to require some capacity to not just perceive, but to recognize and 
understand the content of a photo and decide whether that content was alarming or 
                                                          
 1These arguments presuppose there are real phenomena to be explained.  
Arguments against the legitimacy of the evidence are considered in the next chapter. 
 2There are several terms that have been used to capture this notion: 
“retrocausation,” “reverse causation,” and “backwards action” are the principle ones, and 
are largely synonymous.  I will use any and all of these more or less interchangeably in 
the following discussion, depending on utility. 
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instead calming.  Arguably, it would seem that some cognitive process, even if 
subconscious, must be at work.3
 The philosophical debate over precognition dates back decades, but in the 
mainstream philosophical literature was most heavily pursued in the 1940s through 1960s 
(though it has continued sporadically since).  There are three main sources of impetus for 
the backwards causation debate.  The first of these originated with anecdotal reports and, 
later, research on precognition.  The controversy sparked by precognition claims was 
later joined by conjectures about the possibility of time travel, and now most recently by 
micro-physical effects that allegedly show that causation at a sufficiently fundamental 
level of physics can work backwards against the otherwise normal time stream.   In fact, 
it appears that these two cases – precognition and microphysical reverse causation – are 
the only retrocausal phenomena for which any evidence has been produced.4  This fact 
shall become important later in this chapter. 
 The crux of the reverse causation debate is whether some event B in the future 
can bring into existence or at least causally interact with an event A sometime in its past.  
Of course, the phrase “causally interact” implies the ability of B to change A, which has 
                                                          
 3Admittedly, those experiments where evoked potentials stimulated by flashing 
lights at the sender are monitored in the receiver involve no presumed cognitive parsing 
of subconscious input.  But these type of experiments are of such relatively small number 
that it seems reasonable just to include them within the class “precognition,” since the 
remote perception channels involved are likely the same as those activated in 
precognitive phenomena.  It is just that there is no cognizable content presented. 
 4Precognition by far produces the most fodder for examples or thought 
experiments crafted to wage the reverse causation debate.  More recently, time travel 
scenarios have come increasingly to play.  But unlike for precognition, there is no 
evidence for time travel. 
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led to worries that if acknowledged as real, then reverse causation implies at least some 
future events can change at least some facts about the past.  Though a question about 
violations of the standard temporal order seem to be at the root of the debate, it can be 
seen as really a debate about causal order – which in our world seems clearly bound 
together with temporal order.  I do not propose in this discussion to try to resolve any of 
the long-standing metaphysical issues surrounding the nature of time or its perception by 
humans, only so far as they impinge on my central question: does precognition plausibly 
demonstrate a violation of causal closure?  In that sense, questions about time are 
secondary to issues about causal order, since precognition seems to violate the former 
mainly because it appears to violate the latter.   
 This raises an argument that is still unresolved.   On the one hand are those who 
consider the idea of retrocausation as implying “changing the past” and that such a claim 
constitutes a logical impossibility.  As Broad (1937) describes this position,  
No amount of empirical evidence would give the slightest probability to the 
hypothesis that there are squares whose diagonals are commensurate with the 
their sides, because this supposition is known to be logically impossible.  Now a 
great many people feel that the hypothesis of veridical supernormal precognition 
is in this position. 
 
Among those who feel the allegation of logical impossibility is an insurmountable 
objection to precognition is Anthony Flew.  Flew (1954) quotes an earlier article in 
Science News, in which the author noted that “precognition – with its apparent 
implication that causation can work backwards in time – seems to violate one of the 
essential presuppositions of science” (Knight, 1950).  Flew responds with the assertion 
that the “‘apparent implication’” that precognition may involve backward causation “is 
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not one which any phenomena whatever could have – for that the cause must be prior to 
(or at least only simultaneous with) the effect is not a matter of fact but a truth of logic” 
(p.45).  Any claim that the past might be changed – that is, “that what has been done 
might itself now be undone...is a piece of nonsense” (p.48).  Agreeing with Flew in this 
instance, Larry Dwyer observes 
I take it that changing the past would involve something like undoing what has 
been done or doing what had not been done.  It would, therefore, seem to involve 
a change in the truth values of statements about the past, not merely on epistemic 
grounds (resulting from a change in our evidence regarding the events in 
question) but because of a change in the events themselves.  This would indeed be 
nonsense... (Dwyer, 1987, 384)5
 
Max Black argues that “to speak of an effect preceding its cause is as absurd as to speak 
of Tuesday preceding Monday” (1956, 55), and Graham Oddie (1990) presents a 
compelling argument not necessary to fill out here, that the past is “fixed” and cannot be 
changed.6   
 Together, these positions express what Broad (1937) refers to as the “causal 
objection.”  What the causal objection amounts to is that, at the time a person has a 
mental impression (Broad calls it an “image”) of what (apparently) eventually turns out 
to be a future event, the future event “cannot have had any causal descendants,” and its 
                                                          
 5As we shall see, Dwyer does not endorse Flew’s main conclusion that this is 
problematic for precognition. 
 6In this sentiment Flew, Black, Dwyer, Oddie, and others have good company.  
Diodorus’s “Master Argument” takes as one of its conditions that every past truth is 
necessary, hence unchangeable – from which he argues for determinism.  Hans Kamp’s 
(unpublished) “The Logic of Historical Necessity” seems to support the position.  Some 
other relevant sources from a tense-logic standpoint are Thomason and Gupta (1980) and 
Von Frassen (1980). 
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causal precursors for the most part are usually inaccessible to the possessor of the 
(apparently) precognitive impression.  “How, then,” Broad queries on behalf of critics of 
reverse causation, “could we possibly account for the occurrence in this person at this 
particular moment of an image which is pro-presentative of this particular future event,” 
since the thus-foreseen event “had no causal representative, either ancestor or 
descendant, in the experient at the time” that the precognitive impression was received? 
(p.190) 
 
 On the other side, there are those who reject the accusation that the notion of 
backward causation is incoherent, and believe that they indeed see evidence of reverse 
causation in certain research experiments.  Advocates of precognition/reverse causation 
respond to criticisms in different ways.  Michael Dummett provides an account which 
does as little violence to conventional positions on causation as possible.  He proposes a 
Humean-style “quasi-causal” explanation, in which a habitual conjunction of future-
causes B with past-events A is sufficient to acknowledge a causal process is indeed 
taking place.  (Flew, as will shortly be mentioned, takes serious issue with this account.) 
 Broad, on the other hand, tries to show that the critics’ beliefs in the “logical 
impossibility” of precognition can be broken down into three fallacies.  The first of these 
fallacies he calls the epistemological objection, which he describes in the following way: 
In order for one thing to have a relation with something else (even the relation of “being 
cognized”), both have to exist.  However, in precognition the thing being cognized 
doesn’t yet exist, therefore “non-inferential veridical precognition” is a contradiction.  
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Broad responds by arguing that our notion of memory is of a similar logical pattern, 
given that we have memories of events and states of affairs which no longer exist.  Since 
we don’t have a problem with accepting memories as bearing true relations to states-of-
affairs which no longer exist, we can’t lodge an attack on precognition without throwing 
the status of memory into question.  
 The second “fallacy” Broad calls the causal objection.  At the time the 
precognition occurred, the event being foreseen “had no causal representative, either 
ancestor or descendant, in the experient at the time when his [precognized impression] of 
it occurred.” (Broad, 1937, 190).  The objection then follows:   there is no causal story to 
account for this alleged awareness of some future event, and therefore some other way of 
accounting for it must be looked for (such as imagination, fraud, error) that does fit 
within a conventional causal context.  Broad argues against this objection by enumerating 
all the possible ways of accounting for apparently veridical instances of precognition and 
showing that the prima facie explanation of some kind of “supernormal” information 
transfer from the future to the past offers the least absurd explanatory avenue. 
 Broad’s final fallacy is the fatalistic objection, a restatement of the argument that 
if precognition is real, it must mean the future is fixed and there is no real free will.  But 
if free will exists, then precognition must not be plausible.  Broad’s response to this 
objection, trading on a difference in connotation between “determined” and 
“determinate,” is rather obscure, and of little present consequence, given widespread 
doubts about the nature of free will in the face of physicalist theories current today that 
embody only deterministic and indeterministic causal patterns. 
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 Of Broad’s three proposed fallacies, the causal objection seems the most 
pertinent.  Philosophical developments over the past several decades seem to have 
deprived the fatalistic objection of much of it relevance, and the epistemological 
objection can be shown to collapse into the causal objection with the right analysis.7
 But it seems plausible that if the past is indeed fixed, then once the past is already 
past, backwards causation is in fact impossible (whether “logically” or not is moot), thus 
generating what Broad has called the ‘causal objection.’  Yet it is hard to avoid the fact 
that a significant body of evidence demonstrates ostensibly retro-causal effects.  So how 
are these two apparent diametrically-opposed facts to be reconciled?  One attempt 
appeals to certain interesting features of physics, and is an argument not so much against 
the possibility of  precognition/retrocausation as evidence of a non-physical effect, so 
much as it is an attempt to elucidate a mechanism by which this seemingly “paranormal” 
effect can be shown to actually fit within the physicalist context.8  
 
The Physics “Arrow of time” Argument 
 The argument for reverse causation from physics observes that many of the 
fundamental laws of physics seem to be time independent.  That is, such laws are “time 
symmetric” in that they would presumably work whether time runs forward or backward 
                                                          
 7Briefly, if knowledge depends on causal relations between facts and events in the 
world on one side and human perception and cognition on the other, then the causal 
problems of precognition would by their nature play into epistemological issues 
concerning precognition. 
 8See, for example, Puthoff et al (1981); Radin (1997 & 2006); Bierman & Radin, 
2000.  
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through them.  Margenau notes, “...we can choose the direction of time as we please so 
far as the laws of mechanics are concerned” (1954, 85).  The Wheeler-Feyneman theory 
of electrodynamics requires the micro scale symmetry of time and causation.  And both 
the so-called “quantum eraser” experiment and Wheeler’s delayed-choice thought 
experiment (Wheeler & Zurek, 1984) further seem to point to a fundamental reverse-
causation principle in physics.   
 If so, some people argue, then perhaps precognitive results are merely the 
consequence of some as-yet unidentified physical process running in reverse.9  We might 
refer to this as the “arrow of time” argument, in that these sorts of arguments often hinge 
on the supposed bi-directional nature of time (as demonstrated by the aforementioned 
atemporal physical laws).  The argument runs something along these lines: We have 
evidence for an apparently time-reversed precognitive effect.  We also have reason to 
believe that there are time-reversed phenomena in micro-scale physics.  It stands to 
reason that if retrocausation is possible at the micro scale, we might plausibly eventually 
find a way of linking the two scales in some future, more fully-developed physics.  
Therefore, we should (at least provisionally) accept precognition as a legitimate 
phenomenon. 
 However, if we rely on the arrow of time argument to attempt to reconcile physics 
and precognition, we run into two sets of concerns. The first is philosophical, and the 
second physical.  Since they are more quickly dealt with, I shall consider the physical 
                                                          
 9A similar, but much larger argument – that perhaps an eventual fully completed 
physical explanation of the world will find a way to bring psi phenomena into an 
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issues first.  There are two problems that arise from the arrow-of-time argument from the 
perspective of physics.  The first is that the retrocausative effects themselves are open to 
question and interpretation.  A quantum physics counterexample to the standard flow of 
time that has lately been proposed is the so-called delayed-choice experiment proposed 
originally by physicist John Archibald Wheeler (Wheeler & Zurek, 1984) as a thought 
experiment, and supported by experiment in 2007 (Jacques, et al, 2007).  Conceptually, 
the experiment is a further elaboration on Young’s double-slit experiment, which 
demonstrates the duality of quantum particles.  Individual photons passing through an 
appropriately-configured device which includes two small apertures spaced closely 
together will manifest wave-like properties if measured one way, but will instead 
demonstrate particle-like qualities if measured a different way. 
 Wheeler’s delayed-choice thought experiment follows this design, but adds one 
feature: the ability to change the measuring method once the photon has passed 
unobserved through the aperture but before it reaches the terminal measuring device.  If 
one sort of measurement device is in place, the photon registers as a particle.  However, 
if that is removed and the other substituted after the photon exits the double-slit device 
but before it is measured, it will register as wave-like, as if it had retroactively “changed 
its mind” according to the change in observation means. 
 Those who advocate a microphysics solution to the reverse causation conundrum 
argue that since there is evidence at the photon level that some reverse-time effects can 
occur, then it stands to reason that there may be a macro-level effect within physics that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
explanatory framework suitable to physics – will be engaged in the concluding chapter. 
 242
can account for precognition.  However, there are some questions to be begged here.  
This delayed-choice phenomenon occurs on a micro-scale both physically and 
temporally.  It involves photons, one of the smallest known units of matter, and is 
literally less than a picosecond (>1/trillionth of a second) in duration.   
 There are many effects present at the quantum level that work because they occur 
too rapidly to make a difference – for example, QM theory allows matched particle pairs 
to emerge out of the vacuum (“something out of nothing”) and then self-annihilate, just 
so long as they do it in a very restricted amount of time.  Or consider other well-known 
quantum phenomena, such as the particle/wave duality demonstrated by the double-slit 
experiment, where the type of measurement makes apparent ontological difference to the 
quantum object being studied; the quantum wave function collapse which, according to 
certain QM interpretations requires an act of observation to occur; or Heisenbergian 
uncertainty, again involving measurement, where one can know with precision either the 
position or the velocity of a particle, but never both.   Any of these phenomena would 
constitute violations of the laws of nature were they scaled up to the classical level.  But 
it is clear they don’t scale up.  Instead, any classically-awkward effects such as these are 
damped-out long before they become part of larger-scale systems.  There seems no 
reason to suppose – and no evidence to support the speculation – that possible 
retrocausative quantum effects would scale up any better. 
 A second question relating to the physics issues of reverse causation involves the 
actuality of the phenomena.  To a significant degree, the few instances of apparent or 
theorized backwards causation greatly depend on which interpretation of QM one 
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subscribes to, or on the mathematical model one employs to solve some of the relatively 
thorny difficulties in some QM explanatory domains.  For example, backwards causation 
in the Wheeler-Feyneman electrodynamics theoretical framework are a consequence of 
certain mathematical strategies aimed at resolving recalcitrant problems left by other QM 
interpretations.  However, the consequences predicted by the mathematics is, in fact, 
unobservable.  According to Margenau, a reverse-time construct is built in for the sake of 
the theory, not necessarily because it actually happens.  So in the theory “...whenever you 
see an electron’s world line extending downward (from future to past), reverse its arrow 
and assign it to a positron” (1954, 86).  Indeed, “the mathematics is indifferent to the 
direction of the world lines” (p.87), and unless time reversals are accepted conceptually, 
it “encumbers an otherwise beautiful theory.”  But “allowing time reversals...makes the 
theory singularly significant, powerful, and true” (p.88) –  even though no observation of 
the actual physical entities demonstrates any sort of time reversal in fact. 
 So exactly what is the ontological status of these sorts of reverse-causation 
claims?   Perhaps it is just a necessary conceit of the mathematics to tidy up an otherwise 
insoluble problem.  Or perhaps a subsequent reinterpretation of QM will resolve seeming 
conflicts in ways that do not require an appeal to retrocausation.  While it seems 
premature to rule out the possibility of certain retrocausitive microphysical explanations, 
it seems just as premature to rule them in, as well. 
 It might be well to keep in mind Hugh Mellor’s comment on how the notion of 
the time-invariance of physical laws may apply to backwards causation.  He observes that 
Goedel “infers that backward time travel is possible because some solutions of the 
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equations of general relativity allow it.  But this assumes that anything which is 
‘physically possible’ (i.e., compatible with physics) is really possible: i.e. that only 
physics can limit metaphysical possibility.  And that’s nonsense” (Mellor, 1991, 197). 
 The next set of concerns surrounding the arrow-of-time argument are 
philosophical, and there are two of these as well.  The first problem is that the arrow-of-
time argument is logically troublesome.  Though it is true that a retrocausative physical 
effect would help to preserve the cause-precedes-effect pattern of standard causation 
(merely running in the opposite direction), it requires that only one or a few threads in 
the time stream run backwards (since it is clear on observation that the main time stream 
continues to flow in its customary direction).  Effectively, such a retrocausal thread 
“swims upstream.”  But no causal theory allows a single cause and single effect to stand 
alone and isolated.  All causation occurs in a larger context in which both an individual 
cause and its individual effect are influenced by and in turn influence other causal chains.  
Indeed, an isolated, single-link causal chain with one cause and one effect, should such a 
thing plausibly exist, would be epiphenomenal and, hence, undetectable.  One would 
expect, then, to find not just one isolated reverse-tracking cause-and-effect pairing, but a 
full causal chain of causes followed by effects followed by causes, and so on, with all the 
considerable disruptive ramifications from such a contrarian chain emanating upstream in 
time.   
 In other words, if our pairing of a future cause correlating with a past event is an 
arrow-of-time effect, we should see (even if only in retrospect) a causal history 
approaching from the future, engaging the future event, continuing chain-wise through to 
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the past event, then proceeding on up the time stream against the current, like salmon 
returning to spawn.  At least, that is how it should appear to us, if the arrow-of-time 
argument is correct.   
 Yet that is not at all how it appears.  The time stream seems to flow smoothly 
from past to future with nary a contrarian ripple – precognitive reports being the only 
macroscopic exception.  Even if the time stream as a whole were reversible,10 a 
contrarian causal chain (or chains) would be immediately obvious.  Even in the 
precognitive case all we see that goes against the usual temporal flow are the future 
cause and the past event.  And these sorts of apparently causally-reversed events are 
accompanied only by forward (“downstream”)-moving causal cascades typical of any 
standard cause –> effect chain happening in the usual order of things. 
 An example from associative remote viewing is probably the easiest way to show 
this.  At time t-zero, the viewer draws an accurate sketch of an apple, which unbeknownst 
to her is indeed one of two objects (the other is a pencil) selected for the target pool by 
the tasker and respectively assigned to one of the two possible outcomes of event e which 
will occur at time t-plus2.11   Seeing the viewer’s sketch of the apple, the tasker is caused 
to undertake a certain action  (betting, buying, selling, etc.) at t-plus1, in anticipation of 
the occurrence at t-plus2 of the event whose outcome is being predicted.   At time t-plus3 
                                                          
 10As Sarah Waterlow observes: if time and causality could go either direction, 
then “backwards causation...would be no more mysterious than forwards; but nor would 
it even seem any more mysterious or for that matter any less commonplace.  And this 
[supporters of backwards causation] have never claimed” (1974, 382).  
 11Members of target pool set may be selected at any point up until immediately 
prior to t-plus2, the time of occurrence of the event whose outcome is to be predicted. 
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the tasker hands the viewer an apple according to protocol, closing the temporal feedback 
loop.  This action at t-plus3 –  the handing-of-the-apple event – initiates a standard 
downstream causal cascade, unfolding various ensuing cause-generated events, such as 
the viewer’s subsequent eating of the apple, her developing a sense of satisfaction for a 
job well done, bystanders experiencing amazement at such a seemingly miraculous turn 
of events, and the tasker’s subsequent acquiring of a new luxury auto with his winnings.   
 All these follow-on events occur in the standard causal and temporal order, with 
time flowing from upstream to downstream, and the causal chain keeping pace 
appropriately.  The viewer’s sketching the picture of an apple at t-zero seems only able to 
be correlated to (and thus we might be inclined to say “caused by”) the presentation of 
the apple to the viewer by the tasker at t-plus3, thus initiating an apparently “retrocausal” 
event pointing backwards in time, up the temporal stream.  But there is no identifiable 
continuation of a retrocausal chain from either the feedback event at t-plus3 or the 
sketching-of-the-apple event at t-zero, nor does any reverse-causal chain precede (in the 
conventional cause-precedes-event order) the predicted event occurrence at t-plus2 (that 
is, proceed upstream against the temporal current toward the t-zero event), contrary to 
what one would expect to see if there were indeed some kind of physics-related arrow-of-
time temporal reversal involved.   
 The second philosophical problem with the arrow of time argument is that it is 
ontologically troublesome.  If a single causal thread (or even multiple ones) runs counter 
to the usual temporal flow, one would expect to find conflicts and paradoxes galore as the 
thread moves up against the temporal stream.  Causal chains moving in opposite 
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directions frequently would, it stands to reason, clash in unexpected ways as they cross 
each others’ paths and the paths of chains proceeding in the normal direction of temporal 
flow.    
 To continue our salmon-in the-stream metaphor, as our salmon swim upstream to 
spawn, they are bumping and colliding as they go with even larger throngs of other 
salmon heading downstream towards the open ocean, leading to patches of significant 
turmoil, perhaps damage to fins or scales, and certainly impedance of the normal flow of 
fish. Yet we do not see anything analogous in the temporal flow – time and causality 
seem to proceed in a generally orderly fashion from past, through present, towards future, 
with no apparent downstream-vs.-upstream collisions to roil the waters and confuse 
causal histories.  This suggests that if the arrows of causation and time are potentially 
reversible, they could only go one direction at a time.  In other words, they could go 
either forward or backward, but never a little of both. 
 It seems, then, that precognition in a normal causal framework must be an 
impossibility, but the microphysical solutions offered as a seemingly-feasible palliative 
are unable to account for it.  Yet very strong evidence of precognitive, retrocausal effects 
persist and demands an explanation.  What are we to do? 
 
Changing the Past 
 I suggest that the whole notion of “backwards causation” as generally conceived 
(that is, in terms of a future event changing a past event) mischaracterizes what is 
actually being claimed, at least as far as precognition is concerned, and leads to insoluble 
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problems.  To see why, consider how the problem of reverse causation is almost always 
expressed.  Backwards causation is generally objected to in somewhat the following 
terms: “An event B in the future causes/affects/changes an event A in the past.”   This 
formulation, however, leaves the points of reference as vague and ambiguous – an event 
in the future (“the future” with respect to whom or what?) exerts causal influence to a 
greater or lesser degree on a past event (again, “past” with reference to what observer, 
and when in time relative to both events?).  The usual assumption here is that the past 
event has already transpired and become embedded in the upstream temporal record.   
 Unfortunately, as discussed briefly above, this brings up one of the most 
persistent objections to backward causation – that to suggest that it is possible (both 
logically and metaphysically) to change the past is incoherent.  So, for example, 
according to Flew, “It would seem to follow that it must be wrong to speak of a present 
event bringing about a past effect; since this could only be a matter, either of undoing 
what has already happened, or of making to have happened what has not happened” 
(1973, 366).  This becomes clear in considering what it would take to “change the past.”   
 First, though, in what sense does the past “exist”?  There are two ways we are 
aware of the past.  In the relatively short-term (that is, within the longest life-span of a 
living human), we are aware of the past through personal memories.  And in long- and 
also in the short-term, we are aware of the past by the vestiges and evidence it leaves: 
books, photos, ruins, monuments, corpses, shards, flint points, cave murals, organic 
residue, residual Carbon-14 levels, geographic strata, red-shift, residual cosmic radiation, 
and so on.  We know these traces and vestiges of past events and states of affairs exist.  
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We don’t know if there is any sense in which the myriad interweaving chains of actual 
events that created these artifacts and traces actually exist in any meaningful ontological 
sense.   
 One way of thinking about the unfolding of time might present it as a single wave 
of activity (cause/event interactions) milliseconds (or less) deep that sweeps along 
through the universe working on the world’s raw materials as it encounters them and 
leaving vestiges of events in its wake.  One may think metaphorically of the temporal 
wave (perhaps, “the present”) as being much like a line of army ants marching abreast 
through a tropical forest, converting the jungle in front of it into an altered landscape that 
it leaves behind.  In this sense, the future exists only as potential, and the past consists in 
only these vestiges plus the memories resident in the sentient beings who are caught up in 
the moving temporal wave.   
 Alternatively, as some (perhaps implausibly) maintain, the past may continue to 
persist as a discrete ontological entity, events and causal chains frozen as they occurred, 
and as the present advances into the future, events and links in uncompleted causal chains 
continue to accrete, piled in sequence one on top of another like strata in an immensely 
deep geological formation stacked earliest to most recent.12
 If either model is correct, then what does it mean to change the past?  In the first 
scenario – that of a “sweeping wave” of change –  the past consists in only memories (if 
                                                          
 12There is also the view that the entire time-stream is actually a fixed continuum, 
every part of which exists at every moment, and only human perceptions “move” along it 
in some sense, giving the impression that time is continuously unfolding.  But as far as 
the past is concerned, this scenario is identical to the one I have just outlined. 
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the events are recent enough) or the vestiges – the evidences of past events – remaining 
behind.  Changing the past would mean in some way revising the physical remains and 
what contemporaneous memories are relevant. If one were, for example, to reach back 
and alter the fate of one victim of the battle of the Alamo, so that he survived instead of 
died, then not only would the fact of his (non) burial and the location of his grave be 
changed, but the entire cone of evidence that comes into being through his actions and 
their ramifications throughout the downstream reach of time must be created or 
accounted for.   If our Alamo survivor becomes a builder, then structures come into 
existence, as well as public records, dispositions of materials, displacement of other 
structures, persons, or artifacts and – if he has subsequent offspring – new lives and their 
vestiges must be generated as well.  Even in the second description of time, where the 
events of the past continue to persist ossified in time, the physical vestiges must be 
altered as just described, plus the entire frozen time-stream must be altered as well, 
spreading ramifications downstream as the present continues to advance.13  But effecting 
such draconian alterations – as nearly any change of the past would seem to require – 
seems highly implausible, which accounts for objections proclaiming the logical 
impossibility of reverse causation – and with it precognition. 
 There are other arguments supporting the impossibility of changing the past.  
One, explicated by Anglin (1981), is perhaps best described as a “causal loop paradox,” 
                                                          
 13This recalls Ray Bradbury’s short story “A Sound of Thunder,” which depicts a 
group using a time machine to go back into the time of the dinosaurs, where one man 
inadvertently crushes a butterfly, and upon their return they discover the world 
disturbingly altered from what it had been.    
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where an event is the result of a cause of which it in turn is the cause.  For example, 
person A fulfills an action the following day which was seen in a dream the night before.  
But the action would not have been performed without A’s dream as impetus, and the 
dream would not have occurred without the action taking place the following day.  This 
is thought to present a paradox which closes off a part of the time stream, and it is argued 
that this is impossible.  Mellor (1981) particularly makes a strong case against the 
possibility of causal loops.14
 Some reject such closed-loop arguments against reverse causation.  Anglin, for 
example,  observes that even ‘normal’ causation, when followed far enough, either turns 
out to be circular or results in an infinite regression.  “If one continues to inquire in this 
fashion, asking about each cause in turn, one runs into either an infinite chain of causes 
or else a circle” (Anglin, 1981, 90).   Huw Price specifically addresses Mellor, arguing 
against “the feeling that backward influence would lead to causal lops, and hence to 
paradox,” and giving an analysis that “this is not so, providing the past effects are not 
accessible by irrelevant determinations before their cause takes place” (Price, 19884, 
315).  Price’s (and others’) response moved Mellor to recapitulate his position (Mellor, 
1991), constructing a reductio ad absurdum that does seem to confirm the causal paradox 
argument against reverse causation.  I shall, however, not go into any of these arguments 
in any detail.  In a few pages I will argue that what is claimed about certain species of 
                                                          
 14Susan Weir agrees with Mellor: “This is not a possible causal process,” she 
affirms (1988, 203).  And (in an insight I owe to Dan Bonevac)  Thomason’s and Gupta’s 
(1980) tense logic treats time as having a branching structure, which models that included 
even small causal loops would invalidate. 
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precognition does not commit us to any sort of closed causal loop, thus avoiding this 
debate altogether.  
 Another influential argument attributed to Pear and Flew, but outlined explicitly 
by Black (1956) has come to be known as the “bilking argument.”  In arguing that we 
should reject any notion that a future event can be the cause of an event that precedes it, 
Black suggests that “we can arrange for T [the future event] to disagree with A [the 
preceding event]” (p.54), and thus show that there is no future-to-past causal action, by 
waiting to see what the preceding event A predicts, and then “arranging” for the future 
cause T not to occur.    
  Borrowing now from Oddie (1990), the bilking argument in its basic form goes 
something like this: Let future event c be the apparent cause of preceding event e.  We 
can, on observing the occurrence of e, arrange for c to fail to occur, thus establishing that 
no retrocausal link exists, because e happened even in the absence of c.  If, on the other 
hand, we nevertheless try to produce c and despite our best efforts are unable to do so, 
this does not demonstrate either a necessary or sufficient causal dependency backwards 
from c to e, but could also be accounted for by some forward causation dependency that 
we simply haven’t yet identified.   
 Black illustrates his version of the bilking argument with a fanciful example of 
Harry Houdini, who under hypnosis can predict perfectly how a future series of coin 
tosses will turn out.15  For the sake of the argument Black stipulates that no conventional 
                                                          
 15Thus in the passage quoted above from Black, ‘A’ stands for Houdini’s ‘answer’ 
and ‘T’ stands for a coin toss. 
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explanations (such as fraud or trickery on Houdini’s part, or a common causal ancestor 
for both events, or some other hidden forward-causal feature linking A with T, or that any 
prior event causes A) can account for Houdini’s coin-toss-guessing prowess.  Black 
“bilks” Houdini by artificially arranging for the coin tosses to either not be performed at 
all, or to come out in a pattern we choose that differs from the one the hypnotized 
Houdini predicts.  In the latter case, if we find that our coin tosses do in fact falsify 
Houdini’s predictions, then we have evidence that no reverse causation is present.  If, on 
the other hand, we find we cannot manage to produce our own pattern of tosses, even 
though the pattern that is produced differs from Houdini’s predictions, this is not 
evidence of retrocausation so much as some as-yet undiagnosed form of standard forward 
causation. 
 Oddie’s own notional example employs a psychic, “Cassandra,” who predicts 
whether a person, “Stanley,” will consume a macaroon or an eclair at the following 
morning’s tea.  Oddie, like Black, rules out alternative explanations for Cassandra’s 
apparent success (such as fraud, inference from presently-known facts, and so on).  But 
he sets up the problem in a somewhat different way.  Reverse-connecting Cassandra’s 
prediction P of macaroon (or eclair) consumption to the future act of consumption C are 
two causal chains.  The first one links Stanley’s eclair consumption CE to Cassandra’s 
prediction of eclair consumption PE.  (Oddie calls this “Causal connection 1.")   The 
second links macaroon consumption CM to Cassandra’s prediction of macaroon 
consumption PM (Oddie’s “Causal connection 2").  Oddie takes these chains as being of 
equal causal valence and, in fact, seems to be proposing that for his argument they should 
 254
also be taken to exist simultaneously and to possess actual causal power (“there must be 
at least two obtaining causal connections from later to earlier,” and they must provide “an 
immediate causal connection” between CE/PE and CM/PM. [Oddie, 1990, 75]). 
 The bilking argument goes through when Cassandra predicts that, say, Stanley 
will eat an eclair and Stanley later instead eats a macaroon.  This “breaks” one of the 
causal chains (Connection 1, or the CE/PE link), thus falsifying Cassandra’s precognitive 
claims.  (Though Oddie’s construction of it seems somewhat odd, indeed.  No claim of 
precognition suggests that a causal link extends simultaneously from each of the possible 
future causes back to its respective possible prediction, as Oddie seems to be proposing.  
In fact, a “precognizer” would only recognize the possibility of one causal chain – the 
one being predicted.  If, on the contrary, the alternate future event turns out to be the case 
rather than the predicted one, the claimant would merely be considered wrong, rather 
than some causal chain being “broken.”) 
 
“Affecting” vs. “Changing” 
 Before examining what is wrong with the bilking argument, let us return first to 
my claim that vagueness in placing the reference points in describing retrocausation is 
what leads to the objection against precognition.  Do veridical precognitive impressions 
really require that an event in the past be created or changed?  The answer is, in fact, no.  
In the standard way of discussing the issue, future-changing-past is described as if being 
observed from a vantage point either at some midpoint – perhaps the “present” with event 
B still future and event A now buried in the past – or as if being observed from some 
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notional objective point off the time stream altogether.  But this way of setting up the 
problem entails that creating/changing event A will require the draconian (and 
implausible) changes in upstream-embedded evidence and memories that I described 
above as being required were we to literally to change the past. 
 Another, somewhat-related and equally erroneous way of looking at it takes the 
observer’s point of reference to be co-located with future event B.  From this perspective 
it doesn’t matter if the observer is at B in the future or whether B is located with the 
observer in the present.  In either case, event A remains embedded in the past, with the 
usual implausible consequences implied by any causative relation from B to A.  
 But neither of these constructs actually matches what is being claimed in 
precognition, and this erroneous formulation is what generates the confusion.  The 
solution was actually hinted at by Michael Dummett in a 1964 article in The 
Philosophical Review.   First accepting the prima facie asymmetry of both time and 
causality (that is, its downstream unidirectionality), he then considers a thought 
experiment based on an Orthodox Jewish injunction against retrospective prayer.  
Retrospective prayer is blasphemous because it enjoins God to attempt a logical 
impossibility – change an event in the past that has already happened.  Dummett’s 
rejoinder was that retrospective prayer is not as blasphemous as it seems, and the worthy 
Jewish theologians mistaken since, if God knows the future, then he already knows at the 
time of the event that you will utter your retrospective prayerful plea at a specific point in 
the future.  If he so wills he can take measures at the time the event transpires according 
to his knowledge of the future to ensure the outcome you will later be pleading for 
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regarding your present circumstances.16
 So, if it is possible for a human to also possess at least a modicum of 
foreknowledge (such as through precognition), “then a similar rationale could be 
provided for actions designed to affect the past, when they consisted in my doing 
something in order that someone should have known that I was going to do it, and should 
have been influenced by this knowledge” (Dummett, 1964, 344; his use of the phrase 
“affect the past” rather than “affect the present before it becomes the past” serves 
somewhat to obscure the important point).  Regrettably, Dummett decides he “shall not 
pursue” this point, thus missing an opportunity to make an important breakthrough in the 
argument surrounding the logical impossibility of changing the past. 
 If he had gone on, this is what he might have proposed:  That rather than event B 
in the future creating or changing an event A embedded in the past, with all the requisite 
trouble that would bring about, B in the future is really only affecting event A in its 
present, and this makes all the difference in the world to the case.  In the retrospective 
prayer case, God does not change a past event from one with a bad outcome to one with 
an outcome in accord with your future desires.  Rather, he looks forward in time to your 
pleadings, decides to accommodate them, and as the event in question occurs, he affects 
the event in its actual ‘present’ to come out a certain way.  Thus, nothing in the past 
requires changing, and nothing in the present is changed, either, since in the present the 
                                                          
 16Descartes, in his Principles of Philosophy (1:40-41) seems to imply that, though 
God has predetermined what is and what will come to be (hence implying that humans 
themselves are unable to change the past), what is and what has been are contingent on 
God’s predetermining, and hence, could have been different – and perhaps still can be, 
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event is still happening.17  The event merely unfolds the way it is influenced to and, as 
the present moves on towards the future, the event becomes embedded in the past just as 
God (or a human actor with some bit of foreknowledge) intended it to be.  Notice that 
this is no different from the way the time stream unfolds naturally, but instead of God 
“deciding” which way events unfold from present to future, deterministic influences 
without benefit of knowledge from the future bring about how the present moves into the 
future. 
 A second opportunity to capture this point hinted at by Dummett was narrowly 
missed by Bob Brier (1973), writing in the Southern Journal of Philosophy.  In the 
article, Brier responded to criticisms Flew (1954) had registered against Dummett’s 
(1954) notion of “quasi-causation.” Brier meant to defend Dummett by objecting that 
although it “would be nonsense” to consider altering the past, yet “one could readily 
make use of the distinction between changing the past and affecting the past.”  In other 
words, “...by a present action cause something to have happened which would not have 
happened otherwise” (p.361).   Flew (1973) rightly complained that Brier had seemingly 
arbitrarily offered up this notion “as if [Brier] were referring to something which had 
only to be mentioned to be remembered as an old familiar.  But [is instead] a distinction 
                                                                                                                                                                             
contingent on God’s will. 
 17A caveat is needed here, as this idea of “changing the present” isn’t quite right.   
As is brought out by Peimin Ni (1992), technically one cannot “change” the present.  Ni 
argues that if one were to change the present one would have to bring about a situation 
where one was both doing X and not doing X, and this is a logical contradiction.  It is 
rather the future being changed as the present unfolds into it.  But talk of “changing the 
present” is not so serious a violation of this concept that we can’t go on using it here for 
convenience. 
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which he has himself just now introduced” and left unexplained.    
 Larry Dwyer (1977) came to Brier’s defense, sketching out a response much 
along the lines hinted at by Dummett (1964).  Using a hypothetical time-travel 
illustration, Dwyer argued that it is logically possible to go from a position in the future 
to a point in the past of that future, and affect an earlier event during that event’s future, 
before the then-present completes the process of moving into the past.  As indicated 
above, one is not changing something if one is merely influencing (“affecting”) it to turn 
out a certain way as it is unfolding. 
 In Dwyer’s hypothetical case, a man travels back from the present in a time-
traveling rocket ship to instruct the Egyptians in how to build the Pyramids.  Yet there is 
no logical impossibility or temporal paradox generated.  This is because, even though  
events in, say, 1978 (e.g., the pulling of levers and twisting of dials in the rocket) 
are causally efficacious in bringing about events in, say, 3000 B.C. (e.g., the 
arrival of the rocket)...the time traveler does not undo what has been done or do 
what had not been done, since his visit to an earlier time does not change the truth 
values of any propositions concerning the events of that period.  Thus even before 
the time traveler enters his rocket in 1978 to begin his successful mission to the 
year 3000 B.C., an accurate catalogue of all the events occurring in Ancient Egypt 
that year would include an account of his arrival from the sky, as well as an 
account of his various actions and reactions in that new environment. (Dwyer, 
1977, 383-384) 
 
As Dwyer has it, it is a mistake to think of the rocket leaving now and going back into the 
past to effect changes.  Rather, to be accurate one must take it from the Egyptian 
perspective, that a rocket has come from the future and landed in the present, to help 
create history as it happens, not after it has occurred.  “It seems to me there is a clear 
distinction to be made here, between the case where a person is presumed to change the 
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past, which indeed involves a contradiction, and the latter case where a person is 
presumed to affect the past by dint of his very presence in that period” (Dwyer, 384).  
 To be sure, there is no evidence that rocket ships can travel between future and 
past.  But there is extensive evidence that human perceptions can travel between future 
and present.  Contrary to how it has over decades often been described, precognition does 
not involve an event “reaching back” into the past to influence a temporally-earlier event 
and all its causal descendants.  Rather, it is best to think of it as a person in the present 
“reaching forward” to bring back information that affects an event or events now, as the 
present unfolds.  Indeed, this is exactly how precognition seems – as if one is 
(figuratively, though sometime almost literally) “looking” into the future for information.  
It is never experienced as if projecting from the future back to influence the past.18  Of 
further relevance, it is also only the case that information is obtained from precognition 
process,.  Information may be a vehicle of causation, but seems itself not to be a causal 
agent.  While some may want to insist that one can still view this as the future affecting 
the past, I argue that this is a mistake in perspective carrying little metaphysical weight.   
 The best test of this is to show how it works out in our two main examples of 
laboratory precognition, presentiment and associative remote viewing.  In a presentiment 
experiment, the participant’s autonomic state is being monitored instrumentally in real-
time as events unfold.  The upstream event (event A) happens in the present as an 
unexpected activation of certain autonomic functions seconds in advance of event B, the 
                                                          
 18Though there is a notion of “retrocognition” in which one seems to access a past 
event and under some conditions produce veridical information about it.  But this is both 
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revealing of a disturbing image in the near future.  Since the monitoring is occurring in 
real-time (the ‘present’), it is obvious no past event is being changed.  But, clearly, an 
event unfolding in real time is being affected, coupled in a cause-like correlation with a 
downstream (future) event yet to transpire. 
 In the case of associative remote viewing, a remote viewer in the present is asked 
to describe an object that will not be revealed to her for hours to days into the future.19   
In this case, the present event A is the perceiving, sketching, and describing of the target 
to be observed in the future.  The future event B is the showing of the object to the 
viewer hours or days hence.  In either case, it is clear the present is being influenced by a 
conscious, intentional act to unfold in a certain way, and nothing is being changed from 
some way it had already become. 
 There is another way talk of the “future changing the past” gets it wrong.  Though 
it is usually the notion of precognition that is being addressed, logical constructs of the 
argument are almost always put together in more general terms that can embrace any 
category of causally linked event-pairs.   In an example consistent with precognition, if 
one talks of future event B causally affecting past event A, this could be fulfilled by John 
at earlier time t making a sketch of whatever presently unknown object he expects to be 
presented with at later time t+1.  It could also be fulfilled by Shelia dreaming at t+2 of 
the very car wreck which she then narrowly avoids the next day at t+3 because she 
                                                                                                                                                                             
conceptually – though not experientially – different from precognition.  (Smith, 1005) 
 19In precognitive remote perception, of course, it is a location to be visited in the 
future, rather than an object or photo. 
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remembers her dream just in time to keep from going through the intersection when an 
oncoming truck runs a red light.  However, the kind of past-changing language typically 
describing the pattern of Future Event B causing-to-occur Past Event A could just as 
easily be fulfilled by a boulder tumbling down a hillside five years from now, bursting 
through a time warp and causing a landslide that buries a city today.  Or it could also be 
fulfilled by someone striking a match day after tomorrow, which ignites a fire that burns 
a hundred square miles of California today.20   
 
Bilking Argument Revisited 
 In light of the foregoing, I return here to a discussion of the bilking argument.  
The argument has two serious weaknesses as a proof against reverse causation.  First, the 
argument only applies to precognition, not other hypothetical forms of backwards 
causation.  The argument couldn’t work, for instance, against the burning-match example 
of reverse causation just mentioned above, because no intentional agent is involved with 
the upstream (‘present”) A-event of the causal chain.   For the bilking argument to work, 
there must be at least one intentional agent involved – the one at the earlier event point A 
– who makes the epistemic connection between (“gains knowledge of”)  the present event 
and the future cause.   
 Such an intentional agent is at work in the case of associative remote viewing, in 
that the viewer at A knows to access the future event B that is satisfied by the unveiling 
                                                          
 20Never mind puzzling over how such things could occur.  It’s doubtful they can, 
as we presently shall see. 
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in his or her presence of the intended target at a specified time two days in the future.   It 
also works just in case a psychic at a time at or before event A (igniting of the fire) 
reports a perception that event B (striking of the match) will occur two days hence.  
However, without such precognitive access we could not know that a fire today is ignited 
by a match struck day after tomorrow, so we wouldn’t be looking to prevent the future 
causal B-event, and thus would not stop it.  This problem thwarts the bilking action and 
invalidates the argument. 
 On the other hand, the bilking argument fails against precognition as well.  
Remember, to succeed the argument requires that we first learn the content of present 
event A which consists in the predicting of the nature of future event B.  Upon learning 
A’s content, we then await the arrival of the time-point when future event B is to occur, 
and arrange either for B not to occur, or for B to be changed so as to come out differently 
than predicted.   
 But is this really sufficient to prove that there is no causal link between a future 
event and a past one?  I would argue no.  Rather than “bilking” a precognitive prediction, 
what has occurred instead is that the forward-moving causal chain C2 has merely 
preempted the original causal chain C1 which would otherwise have been realized had 
the preemption not occurred.  This is captured by the counterfactual example: “The 
thrown ball would have broken the window if William had not jumped up and caught it 
in his baseball mitt.”  There is nothing special in preemption – it happens all the time.  
And simply blocking original causal chain C1 by interposing an interloper, C2, does not 
at all show that the C1 was causally impotent, any more than it would in a standard 
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forwardly-causal case. 
 For an ARV experiment, the bilking argument would be even less plausible.  This 
is because preventing the B-event – the feedback phase of the experiment, the revealing-
of-the-apple – will not necessarily “bilk” the process after all.  How is this the case?  For 
clarity I present it stepwise below: 
1) The event E actually being predicted (stock close, athletic event) by the 
association of target objects is intermediate between present event A (remote 
viewing sessions) and future event B (feedback to viewer), and,  
 
2) E can be so chosen such that the bilking of B has no power to halt the predicted 
event (e.g., the closing price of a stock or the resolution of a sporting event on 
day-zero, neither of which can be interfered with by processes normally within a 
bilker’s control). 
 
3) The members of the associated target set (e.g., apple and pencil) are selected 
and associated with outcomes even before the occurrence of the predicted event. 
 
4) The tasker knows upon closing of the market or completion of the sports event 
(thus, again, even before feedback-event B) which target object will be presented 
to the viewer.  So bilking of event B alone will not halt the process, since the 
correct target has already been selected and indicated, even if it has not yet been 
presented to the viewer. 
 
5) Some remote viewing results have shown that viewers can sometimes produce 
veridical results even if they never receive feedback (Targ et al, 1985; Targ, 
1996; Smith, 2005; May, 1989). 
From the preceding it is questionable that an ARV experiment could be ‘bilked’ by 
interfering with the downstream B event.  But what if B were bilked earlier in the 
process, say along the following lines:  the judge is prevented from learning the outcome 
of the stock closing or the game, and thus the judge does not know the final outcome of 
the predicted event and B cannot take place.  Or even earlier, the judge is prevented from 
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even forming a target pool in the first place.  In informal ARV experiments 
circumstances similar to these have transpired for various reasons.   Usually, the remote 
viewer produces nothing correlating to either target (this is trivially the case in those 
situations where a viewing was done but no target pool had been selected, as there was 
nothing specified to be viewed).  But as noted above, this is not really a case of “bilking” 
so much as a straightforward causal preemption that can occur when any causal chain is 
blocked by some other interfering one. 
 
Time Loops 
 But what of closed time-loop paradoxes – do they not pose an insurmountable 
problem for precognition?  Again, I argue no.  Consider the case Anglin (1981) borrows 
from Carl Jung, wherein an individual arrives in Spain and upon entering a certain street, 
recognizes a scene from a previous dream.  In the dream he had perceived a cathedral in a 
city square, “which exactly corresponded” to the scene he now sees before him.  Now in 
a waking state, he decided to go towards the cathedral, but then remembers turning right 
and going around the corner to another street in his dream, so makes that choice instead.  
Rounding the corner, he is immediately confronted with “the carriage with the two 
cream-coloured horses” precisely as he remembered them from his dream (p.90). 
 Note the circular causal structure of this example.  As Anglin points out 
(assuming for the argument’s sake that the story was veridical), “his turning right at the 
corner in reality was caused by his remembering that he did so in the dream.”  But the 
dream, being precognitive, was presumably brought about by his future presence in the 
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city, his turning that corner, and then his seeing of the carriage.  So his dream caused him 
to turn the corner, but his turning of the corner caused him to so dream.  This yields the 
causal structure I specified earlier in the chapter when first introducing closed temporal 
loop paradoxes: “person A fulfills an action the following day which was seen in a dream 
the night before.  But the action would not have been performed without the dream as 
impetus, and the dream would not have occurred without the action taking place the 
following day.”  So an action causes an effect which causes the action, in an endless 
cycle.  This is deemed a paradox and is thus, according to Mellor’s argument (1981, 
1991), impossible.  But it is not, I shall argue, impossible for certain species of 
precognition.  Consider a case I learned of recently through personal correspondence.    
I’d purchased an unusual carved opal and had it set into a ring.  In my dream I 
was sitting in my old VW Bug with my hands on the steering wheel so that I 
could see tops of both hands and my ring looked horrible – the stone was gone 
and ugliness was there instead. 
 
One to two days later I was moving – putting my hands into deep weeds to pull 
stuff out and so forth and loading into and onto my car.  Finally loaded up I got 
into the car – started it up and put my hands on the steering wheel – just like in 
my dream.  OMG!!!!! The opal had fallen out of the setting. What was left was a 
broken apart cork under-padding.  And it looked horrible – exactly like in the 
dream, only in color – the dream hand [had been] in black & white or gray. 
 
I jumped out of the car with the intention of retracing my steps of the previous 3-4 
hours. I ran to the first area that I had worked – an area of small pebbles – 
standing there on the pebbles I realized the futility of looking further. Then I 
looked down and there right between my feet was the opal lying face up – had it 
even been face down it would have been hard to distinguish from the pebbles.  I 
picked it up and subsequently had it reset and still wear the ring today. (Potter, 
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2009) 
Note that though this account involves a precognitive dream that (taking its veracity for 
granted) depicts actual events which subsequently transpire, there is no closed causal 
loop here.  The dreamer receives information in her dream about a future event (that the 
cherished stone is missing from the ring), but no actual further action is presented in the 
dream.  Her subsequent actions occur in a non-pre-specified, apparently fully agented 
manner.  She then goes on about her life.  In this case, it seems, any precognitive form of 
retrocausation that may be involved is not prohibited by Mellor’s proscription of closed-
loop paradoxes.   
 But it also seems the missing opal story could have presented just such a 
forbidden loop had it, say, lasted a little longer or added some additional features – such 
as portraying the dreamer exiting the car, going to the spot, and finding the stone.  If such 
had occurred in the dream, then in reality, we see an explicit formal similarity to the case 
Anglin worries about being a paradoxical closed loop.  It may strike us as odd, though, 
that the mere adding of a sequel to the original dream should nudge us over the border 
into forbidden territory.  Let us reexamine the causal chain at work here, adding our 
notional sequel.  The dreamer dreams of her ring missing its stone, her actions upon 
noticing the stone is missing, and culminates with her finding the missing stone.  Two 
days later she revisits the dream in the waking state discovering, just as she remembers 
from her dream, that the stone is missing.  Now alerted, she recalls from her dream that 
she exits the car, goes to a specific location, and finds the missing item.  She goes 
through the motions she remembers from her dream and indeed locates the stone.  Then, 
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as in the previous instance, she goes on about her life.   
 We discover here the same variety of apparently closed causal loop objected to by 
Mellor and Anglin: the dream portrays certain future actions and choices of the dreamer.  
Some time after waking, the subject of the dream, guided by recollections of what was 
dreamed, executes the actions as remembered which – of course – provides the 
precognized content of the earlier dream.  But then the dreamer goes about the rest of her 
life.  At best, it seems, there is but one loop, and it is merely informational, and not causal 
except in the very limited way that general information is causal in informing decision 
making for action.  The dreamer in this case could have chosen to look somewhere else 
for the stone, or left without it, just as the dreamer of the Spanish city could indeed have 
elected to go on to the cathedral, which interested him more, rather than satisfy his 
curiosity by choosing instead to turn the corner.  In either case, the loop is only gone 
round once, and then each dreamer moves on down the time stream.  So it brings to 
question whether the sort of causal loop condemned by Mellor and Anglin is really the 
vicious paradox it seems. 
 Now consider how this works out in the cases of presentiment and ARV.  In 
presentiment, there is a standard forward causal chain that has the following links: 
1) At time t the participant takes her place in front of the computer and is wired 
for autonomic monitoring. 
 
2) At time t+1 the monitoring equipment detects and records an autonomic 
arousal indicative of the imminent portrayal of a disturbing image on the 
computer screen. 
 
3) At time t+2 the computer randomly selects a photo from its target data base 
and displays the image on the screen. 
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4) The experiment concludes. 
 
Contrary to what occurs in the cases of the dreams, no action is prescribed for the 
participant by the experience in the presentiment case.  Yet some kind of perceptual 
content clearly passes between future (t+2) and the present (t+1), else no unconscious 
reaction indicating the pending display of an objectionable photo would have occurred.  
There is a causal loop here, but it is neither closed nor paradoxical. 
 Consider now the associative remote viewing case, which has a forward-moving 
causal chain as follows:   
1) At time t the viewer is asked to describe the object he will be presented at time 
t+3 in the future. 
 
2) At time t+1 the tasker/judge selects the target pool, and associates each target 
object with an outcome of the event to occur at time t+2. 
 
3) The to-be-predicted event duly occurs at t+2, and the judge learns at that time 
which target object should be later presented to the viewer at t+3. 
 
4) At t+3 the judge presents the viewer the correct target object. 
 
5) The experiment concludes. 
 
Once more, there is some sort of loop uncaptured by conventionally-perceived causation 
that facilitates perceptual content passing between the future (t+3) and the present (t).  
Yet this loop, too,  is neither closed in the way the precognitive dream sequences were, 




 Nothing up until now explains how event B affects A causally.  As Broad puts it:  
“...there seems to be no possible causal explanation of why a certain image which I now 
have should correspond to any future event or to this rather than to any other of the 
infinitely numerous events which will happen from now onwards” (1937, 194).  But that 
they in some way are related seems unmistakable.  A subject in a presentiment 
experiment manifests autonomic arousal before disturbing photos, but remains unaroused 
before pastoral scenes.  The viewer in an ARV experiment sketches strikingly similar 
representations of the target photo she is shown, sufficiently clearly that a judge makes 
the correct selection tagged to the outcome of a future event as much as 70-80% of the 
time when chance would be 50%.  
 Skeptical of precognition though he is, Antony Flew would have to consider 
seriously this juxtaposition of  events, the dependency of whose earlier outcomes on 
future events are so strongly apparent.  In arguing against Dummett’s Humean “quasi-
causal” theory, Flew attacks Hume for failing to recognize that, not only do we attribute 
causation to the constant conjunction of one event with another, but that it goes beyond 
that.  A constant conjunction of one event that regularly occurs when a preceding event 
occurs, continues especially whenever – and only when – we intentionally undertake to 
bring the occurrence about by introducing the precursor event often and under controlled 
circumstances.   “We are not, as [Hume] seems most of the time to be suggesting, 
confined to noticing that A and B always come together, and in that order” Flew 
contends.  “But can check our guess that A is the cause of B by bringing about A and 
seeing whether B follows; and if we are right we can regularly produce B by bringing 
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about A.”21
 As large volumes of experimental evidence show, we can indeed with fair 
reliability produce one event by bringing about another which is clearly paired with it.  It 
just so happens that this occurs in what is standardly considered to be the “wrong” order, 
and it happens without any discoverable causal mechanism. 
 So this is where we stand:  I am persuaded I have successfully argued that when 
properly construed, precognition as influencing the present from the future is logically 
consistent.  But we still have no way of accounting for it.  The available proposals to give 
precognition a physics explanation are unconvincing and unlikely.  Yet it is unavoidable 
that a significant body of well-supported evidence exists for precognition when, 
according to the principles of science as presently understood, no such evidence should 
possibly exist. Further, for each of the precognitive events incorporated into this body of 
evidence, we know the starting point of a causal chain, and we know its ending point.  
But there are no discernable causal links between the two, yet we have strong reason to 
think they are causally linked and are not just coincidental.  We also can be fairly 
confident that they are not merely correlated due to separate links back to some common 
ancestor.  
 Besides the seemingly reversed direction of causation inherent in precognition, 
another of its features that opponents find unsettling is precognition’s lack of temporal 
                                                          
 21Oddie (1990) agrees on this point: “In performing an experiment to test the 
hypothesis we force an A-type event to occur and see whether a B-type event results.”  
He elaborates further on the need to make sure any relation between A and B events is 
strictly causal and not one of correlation attributable to some earlier common cause. 
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contiguity between cause and effect.  That this contiguity is seen as important for our 
concept of forward causation is argued by Sarah Waterlow (1974).  “The temporal 
continuity of cause and effect is something we cannot afford to drop from the concept of 
causation as a relation between earlier and later events, if that concept is to preserve the 
implication s that the term ‘causation’ would suggest” (p.376).   
 Consider a time gap between the cause and its effect that is empty of anything that 
is causally relevant, leaving us “no ground for expecting the effect to occur at or within 
any given time...after the cause.”  Waterlow suggests the upshot would be that we would 
then “lack any rational basis for our procedure of matching up particular cause-events 
with particular effect-events” (pp.377-378).   We would have no temporally-founded 
reason to associate a cause with any number of effects that might occur downstream of it. 
 We see a similar problem with precognition (at least of the sort I have in mind), 
though temporally reversed, in that downstream (future) cause B is linked to an upstream 
effect A in the present, and yet across instances of precognition there seems to be no 
fixed intervening time interval where the effect dependably follows the cause (in other 
words, time intervals from B –> A may vary with each individual case of precognition).    
 There are two ways one might respond to this problem.  First, the human 
intentionality inherent in a precognitive event identifies the two events which are 
correlated one with another.  It is not just ‘any old’ future cause and ‘any old’ present 
effect that are in question, but a very specific linkage of the two, which is recognized in 
advance by the precognizer as arranged according to the experimental protocols.  
Secondly, in an experimental setting the start and end points can be specified (e.g., the 
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sketching of the apple will occur at t-1, whereas the presenting of the apple will occur at 
t+1).  If the expected future causing-event and present caused-effect occur as specified 
(especially if this happens numerous times over iterations of trials), we have a strong 
empirical case for causal linkage despite the presence of apparently un-causally-filled 
temporal gaps between.  This at least partially meets Waterlow’s criteria that “events of 
one kind can only be supposed to cause events of another on the assumption that any time 
gap between them would be of regular length” (p.378).22
 My argument, of course, is not that there is no causal connection between future 
cause and present effect.  But if reverse causation within the physical domain is not the 
answer, then what might be?  Taken together, the future-influencing-the-present 
argument and the irrelevance (and perhaps non-existence) of micro-scale time reversals 
strongly argues that precognitive data is evidence for intermittently truncated causal 
chains, or ITCCs.  Described in chapter four above,  ITCCs (I contend) strongly indicate 
violations of the causal closure assumption.  Indeed, consider the discussion of 
spatiotemporal locality presented in that chapter.  For spatiotemporal causation to hold, 
both spatial and temporal locality have to be consistent.  It is not enough for a complete 
set of causes to occur in sufficiently close spatial proximity to their effect.  Appropriate 
temporal causal contiguity is also essential.  If spatial locality holds but temporal locality 
is violated, yet a causal effect nevertheless occurs, it becomes a case of non-local 
causation unaccountable by physical explanation other than through appeal to brute 
                                                          
 22Merely having a regular time interval between cause and effect is not yet 
sufficient to establish causation, though, according to Waterlow. 
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relationships – which I discussed in chapter four as being physically problematic.  
However, such non-local causation is exactly what we would expect to see in an ITCC 
involving a temporal violation of causal closure. 
But how could an ITCC work in the present case?  If human perceptions were not 
restricted to the confines of the time-space continuum, then it would be a (conceptually) 
simple matter to “pop out” of the present and “pop in” to the future to access the future 
event, much in the case of migrating salmon, where water flows from upstream to 
downstream around a dam through a fish ladder, allowing the salmon on their way to 
spawn to get around the dam by taking the fish-ladder detour upstream, avoiding the 
otherwise insurmountable obstacle.23  Of course how this might work in terms of 
“mechanism”24 remains completely mysterious – as would be the expected case if a truly 
non-physical aspect of the universe were involved.25
                                                          
 23Worries about precognition and the free will problem are not relevant here.  
Though some who argue for precognition speak as if it is always successful, in reality 
precognitive results only reach significance if an “assured future” is involved – that is, 
future feedback is guaranteed to be presented.  When precognition is aimed at predicting 
future events in the broader future time-stream, success plummets, suggesting that in 
general the future is indeed not  fixed in the way some metaphysical models presume. 
 24“Mechanism” in scare quotes here to show it is a place-holder word for 
whatever thus-far unspecified process is involved – which may, in fact not resemble a 
“mechanism” at all. 
 25At least two conceivable “fish-ladders” that may be available: a timeless non-
physical domain that perhaps (thinking wholly speculatively) consists in a realm of pure 
consciousness or intentionality (though see Chalmers, 1996, for a serious consideration 
of this).  An equally speculative candidate is the oft-discussed notion of parallel worlds.  
How either would allow ingress and egress between human consciousness and the 
physical world is unknown and, perhaps, unknowable.  Most importantly, either option 
entails the falsity of the causal closure assumption. 
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Chapter 10:  Evaluating the Evidence – Perception-at-a-Distance 
 
 My task in analyzing the notion of reverse causation in terms of precognition was 
fairly involved.  I first had to determine whether the idea of a future event changing the 
past really was logically inconsistent in principle, as some argue.  I discovered that 
regardless of whether the notion is logically inconsistent, changing an event embedded in 
the past does seem to be impossible or, at the very least, highly implausible.  In the 
process though, I argued that framing precognition in terms of reverse causation is 
generally a mistake.  A different, more accurate formulation would make precognition a 
matter of the present being affected from the future and that, as far as precognition is 
concerned, changing the past is in fact not even on the table.   
 I further argued that micro-physical accounts of backwards causation are unlikely 
to be explanations of macro-level effects such as those displayed in precognition.  I went 
on to argue that neither the bilking argument nor closed temporal loops seem to pose 
obstacles to at least certain varieties of precognition.  Finally,  provided what I take to be 
convincing reasons why precognitive ESP effects I have offered as evidence do serve as 
provocative candidates for violators of causal closure.   
 My next task will prove to be somewhat easier and less complicated – to show 
that ESP action-at-a-distance (which I prefer to describe as “perception-at-a-distance”) in 
its various guises also presents persuasive evidence for a closure violation. 
 
Perception at a Distance/ESP 
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 I make the following claim: Certain kinds of ESP allow a perceiver to obtain 
impressions, experiences, and information about a distant location, object, event or living 
being even in the absence of any physical or physically-related channels of 
communication or sources of information between the target and the perceiver.  For my 
purposes here, I shall refer to this as “perception at a distance,” a terminological choice 
that implies a kind of action at a distance, but one using perceptual channels and 
mechanisms.   Action at a distance requires something to act and something to be acted 
upon.  As I discussed in chapter four, action-at-a-distance in normal usage implies 
“local” causation – a transfer of causal influence through a medium, through adjoining 
objects or constituents, or via waveforms that may propagate through space.  To support 
my overall claim against causal closure it is necessary to show “non-local”1 causation – a 
causal effect unaccountable through physical or physically-related  mechanism.  Recall 
again from chapter four that spatially local causation requires a complete set of causes to 
occur in sufficiently close spatial proximity to their effect.  If it can be shown that certain 
phenomena violate spatial locality, then a physically-unaccountable non-local causal 
effect has been demonstrated.    
 There are only two known physical modalities through which causation can be 
passed along from one spatial location to another.  The first is mechanical – adjacent 
physical bodies interact to conduct a causal impetus from its initiation through to its 
terminus.  I include many notions of “physical bodies” under this description, ranging 
                                                          
 1Again, as distinguished from quantum nonlocality, which I will discuss more 
thoroughly in a few pages. 
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from particles to large macro-scale objects.  I also include a broad spectrum of forces and 
interactions under the general category ‘mechanism’ – momentum, expansion, rotation, 
induced vacuum, chemical reaction, leverage, hydrodynamics, air pressure, hydraulics, 
and so on are a few of the mechanical forces or causal interactions that may transfer 
causality through to effects that occur distantly from their original progenitor causes.  
Under my definition certain perceptual modes – olfaction, gustation, tactile experience, 
and audition – can be categorized as being fundamentally mechanistic.2  Two of these, 
audition and olfaction, approximately count as modes of perception at a distance.  
Despite this, though, it is clear that mechanical processes cannot explain the information 
transfer displayed in remote viewing, precognitive remote perception, and associative 
remote viewing, and we can quickly dismiss from our consideration the possibility that 
mechanical means is explanatory in this context. 
 
Electromagnetism as a Causal Explanation for ESP 
 The second modality that might plausibly be a candidate explanation for 
perception at a distance is electromagnetism (EM).  Electromagnetism already plays a 
role in normal perception at a distance, the main example being vision, which relies 
almost exclusively on interaction of biological structures with electromagnetic impulses 
to provide visual perceptual experience.  And unlike mechanistic action at a distance, 
electromagnetism operates virtually instantaneously (over terrestrial distances) and can 
                                                          
 2Ignoring for now the electro-chemical aspects of brain processing of sensory 
inputs. 
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propagate through space and (to some degree) intervening barriers.  This description 
begins to show more resemblance to the phenomena reported in the types of ESP under 
consideration.   Indeed, historically it was long thought that one form of 
electromagnetism or another would be found to explain ESP.3   Nevertheless, there are 
strong reasons now to believe that electromagnetism cannot be an explanation for ESP.   
The first of these is philosophical. 
 If electromagnetism were to offer an explanation for the kind of ESP under 
consideration here, it would by its nature require some form of information transmission.  
C.D. Broad (1953, 37ff) offered a thought experiment based on a typical card-guessing 
clairvoyance experiment typical of the sort conducted at the time.4    Consider a setup 
where the percipient would be asked to describe the face of the sixth card from the top in 
a stack of specially-designed cards placed face down on a table in another room.  The 
cards are opaque and have identical backs, but their faces vary as to number and color of 
either circles or squares printed on them.  
 Say the front of the sixth card down contains eight squares printed in red ink, then 
the task of the percipient will be to determine four things without using any normal 
                                                          
 3Even today, many individuals unfamiliar with current research in the field 
espouse a naive view that “brain waves” emanating from the subject’s head explain ESP. 
 4Though I don’t include “card-guessing” clairvoyance experiments as part of my 
evidence, there is a very large experimental data base containing scores of thousands of 
such trials, demonstrating very high statistical significance (even excluding some 
controversial cases, such as the Soal/Shackleton research).  I refer to card-guessing 
because it is the case Broad uses, and the same argument goes for other clairvoyant 
claims as well, such as remote viewing.  It is also an argument, by the way, why 
Superman could have no such thing as X-ray vision. 
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sense-perception modality:  which is the sixth card down; that there are eight shapes on 
its face; that they are square; and that they are red.  Visible light would not allow the 
percipient to “see” the card.  If some other kind of transmissive electromagnetism were 
involved, it would have to possess the following features: It would have to either be 
received and transduced within the brain of the perceiver, or it would have to be 
generated and projected by that same brain, and emanations rebounding from the face of 
the card be received and transduced.  It would have to penetrate no deeper than the sixth 
card down and no further – that is, the five cards above it would in some sense have to be 
penetrable  by or “transparent” to the perceiver’s inspection so that the intervening 
images would not conflate the percipient’s impressions.  The cards below the sixth would 
have to remain opaque for the same reason. 
 Whatever field or force involved would have to be able to detect and resolve for 
shape, number, and color scheme – all otherwise detectible only in the visible spectrum.  
As Broad describes it, “we shall have to suppose that the percipient’s body is being 
stimulated by some kind of emanation from the front of the sixth card in the pack, 
although the back of the card is towards him.  We shall have to suppose that the five 
cards which are on top of the selected one are transparent to this emanation, though they 
are not transparent to light” (38).  
 Needless to say, no electromagnetic phenomenon is able to accomplish such a 
feat.  To insist that any form of transmissive phenomenon can make this kind of 
clairvoyance work means that we must, as Broad concludes, “suppos[e] that the physical 
difference between the [markings on the front of the cards] and the background, which 
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makes the former selectively reflect red-stimulating light-waves and the latter 
indifferently reflect a whole mixture of light-waves, is correlated with another physical 
difference which is concerned with another and unknown kind of emanation.”  Broad 
observes with some irony that “this is certainly not very plausible.” 
 The situation with remote viewing is not much different.  In RV, similar cases of 
color, number, shape, plus other features of a target both concrete and abstract must be 
accessible to a viewer at varying distances, orientations, and despite a variety of 
intervening shielding.  If a transmissive model seems implausible in a simple card-
guessing case, it seems much more so across the range of remote viewing contexts.   
 This argument allows us to rule out a priori wide sections of the electromagnetic 
spectrum (Smith, 2005).   Thus, frequencies above the visible light spectrum are easily 
excluded.  Gamma radiation, the top end of the spectrum, and X-rays have insufficient 
penetrating power to account for long-distance remote viewing, are strictly line-of-sight, 
and are incapable of carrying the kinds of information available in remote viewing.  
Lower frequencies down through ultra-violet are easily blocked by intervening materials, 
and are also not information bearing.  The visible spectrum and infrared range are also 
excluded because they are easily shielded.   That leaves the sub-infrared radio spectrum, 
from microwaves down to extremely-low-frequency end of the EM continuum.  From 
their wide use in communications, we know these wavelengths can be means of 
communications, but it is unlikely that human brain structures could avail themselves of 
these frequencies without customary hardware-intermediaries such as receivers or 
transmitters.  This is beside the fact that even radio frequencies cannot capture things 
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such as color and number on the face of a card. 
 The second argument against electromagnetism as an explanation of ESP in 
general and remote viewing in particular is more specifically empirical.  It consists of a 
variety of experiments aimed at eliminating various segments of the EM spectrum as 
conduits for ESP and particularly remote viewing data.  There are two branches of the 
argument.  First, some portion of the electromagnetic spectrum might be a candidate as a 
carrier of remote viewing-related information.  Remote viewing trials done in an 
unshielded environment accessible to that portion of the EM spectrum demonstrate a 
certain general level of success and quality.  An experimenter could create an 
environment that fully or partially shielded out that part of the EM spectrum, and do a 
series of remote viewing trials maintaining all other constraints as before.  If success 
levels and/or quality droped off or if null results were obtained, that would be evidence 
that the shielded portion of the spectrum may play an enabling role in remote viewing 
functioning.  More trials would be called for to verify the results (perhaps tweaking other 
variables to make sure no other condition played a role), but there would be reason to 
believe EM is at least a part of the explanation of RV (and hence ESP).  If, on the other 
hand, the trials showed generally equal success and quality as those performed under 
non-shielded conditions, then it seems reasonable to dismiss the shielded part of the EM 
spectrum as causally relevant to RV/ESP (though additional confirmatory trials might be 
advisable as a check).  I shall call this the Blocking Argument. 
 The second branch of the argument works this way: Different parts of the 
electromagnetic spectrum have different properties.  If certain features of the remote 
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viewing process are shown to be incompatible with specific properties inherent to 
relevant segments of the EM spectrum, then we can rule out those segments of the EM 
spectrum that demonstrate this incompatibility as contributing causally to remote 
viewing.   I shall call this the Incompatibility Argument. Experiments have been 
conducted exploring both the blocking and incompatibility branches of the argument.   
 
The Blocking Argument 
 The entire sub-infrared range of the  EM spectrum is susceptible to empirical tests 
supporting the blocking argument.  This range includes millimeter waves and 
microwaves, as well as short-, medium-, and long-wave radio, plus extremely-low-
frequency (ELF) radio waves.   For a significant portion of this range, blocking is simply 
accomplished by performing experiments inside a Faraday-shielded enclosure that 
attenuates significant portions of the EM spectrum.  In the case of the SRI experiments, 
remote viewing trials were conducted with the viewer sequestered inside such an 
enclosure, and in some cases with the target enclosed inside and the viewer outside.  The 
Faraday cage used in the Puthoff/Targ research produced 120-dB attenuation in the 15 
kHz - 1 Ghz frequency range.5   Many of the SRI remote viewing experiments described 
in chapter seven made full or partial use of electromagnetic shielding, as did a number of 
the DMILS (“direct mental interaction with living systems”) studies discussed in chapter 
                                                          
 5This covers the radio frequency bands from the mid-ELF range at the low end to 
the lower portions of the microwave range.  The upper microwave and millimeter range 
do not require specialized shielding because they are easily scattered or blocked by 
typical building materials and fall off quickly with distance. 
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six.  Yet in all cases the presence or absence of EM attenuation seemed not to affect the 
quality of the experimental results. 
 A second shielding experiment had the lower end of the ELF range specifically in 
mind.   Due to their long range and penetrating power, shielding out the lowest ELF 
signals requires a large thickness of intervening material.   A sufficiently deep 
underground cavern or mine, for example, would significantly shield for ELF.  But by far 
the best attenuator of any radio signal is sea water.  Because of its electrically conductive 
nature, sea water is even more effective than fresh water and even earth, such that only 
the lowest ELF frequencies penetrate very far below the surface.  To test the shielding 
hypothesis against ELF as a causal contributor to remote viewing, parapsychologist 
Stephan Schwartz arranged through his contacts to give the SRI program access to a 
research submersible (as briefly described in chapter eight).   
 Originally, four trials were planned, but the submersible’s dive schedule was 
altered, making only two trials possible.  For one trial, the vessel was positioned at a 
depth of 170 meters in water 340 meters deep.  In the second trial it lay on the bottom in 
78 meters of water.  Both trials took place with the beacon team 500 miles away.  Targets 
were selected for the beacons using a blind, randomized process from two different six-
target pools (one pool for each experiment).  Both trials produced one-out-of-six first-
round hits, significant at p = 0.028.  Because only two trials were done, effect size was 
small.  And though significant ELF-wave attenuation was achieved (almost 70-dB in the 
lower ELF range), ELF was not eliminated altogether.  (This would have required a depth 
of perhaps 1,000 meters, which was logistically beyond the resources available).  
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(Puthoff et al, 1981; Puthoff & Targ, 1977) 
 The “Deep Quest” submarine experiment, as it is often referred to, did not 
altogether remove ELF as a causative factor in ESP.  But despite significant (if not 
complete) ELF attenuation, the two remote viewing trials produced quality as high as any 
previously seen, which seems to point away from ELF as a possible explanation.  When 
taken in light of incompatibility research, as described below, the argument against EM 
becomes greatly persuasive. 
 As May says with respect to blocking ELF in remote viewing experiments, “too 
few data were collected under known shielding conditions to make definitive statements 
with regard to shielding...The trend, however, is clear: electromagnetic shielding does not 
inhibit psychoenergetic acquisition of target material” (May et al, 1989, 20). 
 
The Incompatibility Argument 
 The incompatibility argument adds confirmation to some of the reasons already 
considered for excluding the EM spectrum as a way of explaining remote viewing and 
ESP.  For example, millimeter and microwaves are excluded by appropriate shielding, 
but they are also easily eliminated by the incompatibility argument, since just by their 
nature they are relatively short range (attenuated by atmosphere) and line-of-site (unable 
to follow the curvature of the earth).  Though not as susceptible to these problems as 
millimeter and microwaves, much of the rest of the radio spectrum further down – even 
as far as long wave (LF, or ‘low-frequency’) are affected by both distance and line-of-site 
constraints (though to decreasing degrees as wavelength increases).   
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 To show remote viewing incompatibility with these parts of the spectrum, SRI 
conducted several long-distance remote viewing trials.  One experiment included five 
trials, with viewers in Menlo Park, California, remote viewing beacons who had been 
sent by blind, randomized protocol to two different targets in New York City (Grant’s 
Tomb and Washington Square Fountain); and one trial from Menlo Park to New Orleans, 
Louisiana (the Louisiana Superdome); plus one from New Orleans to Menlo Park (a bank 
plaza); and finally one from New York City to Ohio Caverns in Ohio (this had the added 
feature of shielding by virtue of being up to 150 feet underground).  (Puthoff, et al, 59-
68) 
 There were other (some previously mentioned) replications of long-distance 
targets, among them Bisaha and Dunne (1979a – Wisconsin to Eastern Europe), Schlitz 
and Gruber (1980/2001 – Detroit to Rome), Schlitz and Haight (1984 – North Carolina to 
Florida); and Targ et al (1984 – Moscow to San Francisco), plus numerous trials against 
varying targets world wide by the classified military program (Smith, 2005).  All these 
together show that the upper-, mid-, and (to some extent) low-range radio frequencies can 
be excluded as causally-relevant for ESP. 
 Though definitive for the higher ranges of the radio spectrum, long-range remote 
viewing experiments were less persuasive for ruling out the lowest-frequency bands, 
since some of these radio waves (especially in the ELF band) can travel long distances 
and are relatively unaffected by intervening obstacles.  Though all radio waves propagate 
linearly, under the right atmospheric conditions lower-frequency waves can be reflected 
and reach around the globe, and ELF particularly has a curve-following characteristic 
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that allows ELF waves to guide around the planet.  ELF waves are a special case in other 
ways, as well.  They travel the farthest and penetrate the most deeply into obstacles and 
intervening substances, to the extent that they are the only form of radio communications 
means with submarines (though bandwidth is very limited, and only the most 
rudimentary messages can be sent).   
 So a different sort of experiment had to be designed to test for the causal 
relevance of these characteristics for RV and ESP.  Lower-frequency radio waves have at 
least two features that can be checked using remote viewing experiments.  The lower the 
frequency, the less the amount of information that can be carried.   ELF, for example, has 
a very low information transmission rate, amounting to only a few bits per minute in the 
lowest ranges.  Further, longer-frequency waves are less able to resolve smaller-scale 
objects.  The longer the wave length, the larger the object must be to be to be detectable 
and resolvable at that wavelength.   
 From the perspective of information transmission, the amount and scale of 
information received in a high-quality remote viewing session suggests that lower-
frequency radio waves cannot account for the phenomenon – especially considering the 
remote-viewing production of sketched images, which require relatively high bandwidth.   
To test a size-resolution hypothesis, the SRI researchers conducted a series of 
experiments against targets of decreasing scale.  The technology series, mentioned in a 
previous chapter, used a target pool of mid-sized objects, such as computer terminals, 
shop equipment, typewriters and teletype terminals, and so on. (Puthoff & Targ, 1976; 
1977)  The next series of targets consisted of ten small items secured in light-proof film 
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canisters secured against sensory leakage to the viewer and other participants, and kept 
altogether out of the viewer’s presence prior to and throughout the entire duration of each 
trial.6  These were remote-viewed one at a time over a several-day period.  Subsequent to 
this experiment, a further iteration was performed, this time using 1 millimeter-by-1 
millimeter microdot photographs.   
 These and other experiments returned statistically-significant results, with 
transcripts demonstrating comparable quality to those produced by larger-scale targets. 
The researchers commented that “we thus obtained evidence that small objects can be 
discriminated by psi processes, and that the channel functions down to at least the order 
of a few millimeters spatial resolution.”  This level of resolution “would seem difficult if 
not impossible to accommodate under an ELF hypothesis” (Puthoff et al, 1981). 
 
 The following attempts and observations have been made to determine what role, 
if any, electromagnetism may play as an explanation for ESP: 
 
* DISTANCE:  Long-range remote viewing and remote perception experiments 
showed that low-frequency portions of the EM spectrum could not explain remote 
viewing results. 
 
* SHIELDING:  Remote viewing and DMILS experiments have been conducted 
under a variety of shielded conditions designed to exclude various portions of the 
EM spectrum, with no discernible decrease in general significance or quality of 
results. 
 
                                                          
 6In fact, by the design of this experiment no one knew the nature or identity of the 
target – not even the beacon person – until after completion of the trial.  This was 
intended to verify the long-standing presumption in the SRI research that a “sending” of 
information was not involved. 
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* SCALE:  Remote viewing experiments have been performed with a variety of 
targets of decreasing scale with no discernible decrease in general significance or 
quality of results. 
 
* DATA RATES:  Information transfer rates in remote viewing/remote 
perception trials are too high to be accounted for by lower-frequency EM 
radiation. 
 
With the successful precognitive experiments such as the PEAR lab’s precognition-based 
protocol and the ARV experiments discussed in chapter eight (which can’t possibly be 
explained by either a linearly-propagating signal or field emanations, both of which are 
confined to real-time) factored in, it becomes highly implausible to consider 
electromagnetism as a candidate to account for remote viewing and ESP.  
 
Non-locality/Quantum Entanglement 
 So having ruled out mechanism and electromagnetism as ways of accounting for 
the phenomena under consideration for causal-closure violators, what is left?  One 
remaining feature of physics has often been offered up as a way of explaining ESP 
without having to wander outside the physical universe to do it.  Quantum nonlocality 
(also known as quantum entanglement) has been established theoretically and 
empirically.  It demonstrates an interesting and real phenomenon at the quantum level, in 
which matched particle-pairs can be “entangled,” after which they show correlated 
behavior that is synchronous and independent of spatial separation.  If for example a pair 
of photons have been appropriately entangled, then by intervening to change an attribute 
of one, the equivalent attribute of the entangled “sister” photon will instantly register the 
opposite value of the property so altered.  This occurs despite the distance between the 
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entangled pair up to galactic scale or beyond, and instantaneously – with no elapsed time. 
 Because this demonstrates a cause-like behavior independent of time and 
distance, parapsychologists and consciousness theorists have proposed nonlocal 
correlation as a candidate physical explanation for otherwise physically-recalcitrant 
consciousness-based data and phenomena such as ESP.  Those who have at least 
entertained a quantum non-local explanation for puzzles of human consciousness range 
from parapsychologists (Puthoff and Targ 1977; Schwartz, 2007; Jahn & Dunne, 1986, 
1987/2009) to scientists (Penrose, 1989; Hameroff, 1994), to philosophers (Chalmers, 
1996). 
 It is understandable why researchers and theorists might find quantum nonlocality 
attractive as an explanation for ESP.  For one, ESP and related phenomena demonstrate 
attributes that could be described as “nonlocal” in the way they behave – e.g., seeming 
independence of distance, apparently instantaneous occurrence, apparent causal 
independence (that is, initiating event and subsequent results show no discernible causal 
link), and so on.  The apparent analogical parallels between how parapsychological 
events occur and how quantum nonlocal ones occur is explanatorily attractive to many 
researchers.  Second, if quantum nonlocality can successfully accommodate 
parapsychological nonlocality, then ESP becomes acceptable within physics, and hence 
physicalism.  The argument between the two paradigms evaporates, and controversies go 
away.   
 Unfortunately, convenient as it might otherwise be, I do not see that quantum 
nonlocality is capable of explaining ESP.  First, the kinds of correlations one sees in 
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parapsychological phenomena – at least of the sort I am considering here – seem to be 
clearly causal, whether or not we are able to identify the entire set of causal linkages 
from start to finish of the relevant causal chains.  On the other hand, quantum nonlocal 
events are distinctly acausal.  They are mathematically-correlated consequences of 
certain features of quantum field theory between the instances of which there is provably 
no causal linkage.7
 Second, contrary to the case with ESP-related phenomena, quantum nonlocality is 
non-information-bearing (Lange, 2002, 280).8   Quantum theory dictates that no 
information is passed by virtue of the entanglement relation.  Finally, the nonlocal 
quantum phenomenon is of insufficient scale to account for the macro-level effects that 
are involved with such ESP phenomena as remote viewing.  A physics-based non-local 
explanation for remote viewing and similar behaviors would require reliable 
entanglement of human-scale biological systems with each other and with equally-large 
scale or greater non-biological objects.  This seems prima facie highly implausible, and is 
                                                          
 7How this can be I freely admit to finding completely inscrutable – we humans 
are, after all, incurably fond of framing the world in terms of cause and effect.  However, 
I have seen quantum nonlocality worked out mathematically in a fairly comprehensible 
way on a couple of occasions, and several physicists have carefully attempted to explain 
it to me.  Despite my otherwise lack of comprehension, I am persuaded they are correct 
as to the acausal nature of the phenomenon. 
 8I say this despite currently-ongoing efforts to engineer some kind of 
communication ability using entangled photons.  The artificial constraints necessary to 
isolate the photons so as to preserve the entangled relation from being ‘disentangled’ 
through contact with the environment would seem to rule out the conditions necessary 
outside of an appropriately-designed containment procedure.   An appropriate analogy 
might be electricity – it exists in a natural state, but is not a means of information transfer 
unless artificially controlled through telegraph or telephone, etc. 
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certainly not supported by any known aspect of physical theory – nor does it seem likely 
to be. 
 But if mechanism, electromagnetism, and quantum entanglement are unable to 
explain relevant ESP phenomena – what then?  We are left with the point that I argue for 
– that despite the persuasive and persistent evidence for ESP-type effects, there is no 
satisfactory explanation to be found strictly in the physical world.  I conclude that 
perception-at-a-distance such as that present in remote viewing and related effects is 
evidence of intermittently-truncated causal chains that include some extra-physical links 
to complete their causality. 
 In this and the previous chapter I have tried to argue persuasively that the ESP 
evidence I have described in relative detail is evidence for my thesis, that causal closure 
and, therefore, the universal formulation of physicalism is false.  Now I turn to a 




 There are, to be sure, those who are dubious about the sort of evidence I have 
presented.  A common complaint heard among those who are skeptical but less careful in 
their use of language is that “there is no evidence” for parapsychological effects.  As I 
have shown, this objection is groundless, for there is a large body of such evidence for 
ESP and related effects.  Sometimes skeptical voices complain that there is no evidence 
when they really mean this as shorthand for “there is no evidence that is 
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uncontroversial,” or “there is no evidence that I will accept,” or “there is no evidence that 
is scientifically respectable.”  It is to this last phrasing of their argument to which I next 
turn. 
 Evidence fills a number of important roles in science: Some argue that, in its form 
of observed instances of base phenomena, it sometimes provides the raw material which 
leads first to hypothesis formation and then on to theory development (Hanson, 
1958/1983; Achinstein, 1996, 181).  Necessary here is clarification of a point that is often 
tacitly assumed, but seldom overtly stated.  Phenomena may lead to the formulation of a 
hypothesis, but nothing can count as evidence until a hypothesis exists to which it can 
refer (Adler, 1989, 231).  Once a relevant hypothesis is established, then some or all of 
the source phenomena (plus other, newer evidence) can count as evidence for the 
hypothesis, but not before.  This is more than a mere bookkeeping rule.  Until the 
hypothesis exists there is no context and no explanatory framework for 
phenomena/evidence to be counted for or against.   
 Some would argue that parapsychology, lacking as it does an explanatory 
theoretical context (to be discussed shortly) does not therefore produce “evidence.”  
However, in the context in which I am considering the body of research, this is too facile 
a dismissal.  Parapsychological findings do constitute evidence in the theoretical context 
of universal physicalism, as they present evidence against the fundamental thesis.  Since 
they are thus members of the set of all evidence with a bearing on physicalism they do 
count in this domain as evidence so long as they meet other criteria for what is to be 
considered scientifically-admissible. 
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 Evidence functions to add confirmation to true hypotheses.  But it has a dual-
edged role.  It can also count against a false hypothesis.  Evidence of the right kind is 
necessary to distinguish the superiority of one hypothesis over another.  And in a 
predictive role, evidence serves to confirm not only a given hypotheses, but the larger 
theoretical context of which it is a part.  My next step is to examine the evidence 
presently under consideration to see if it meets minimum acceptability requirements for 
the roles just mentioned.9  
 Evidence functions as an indication that a certain condition or state of affairs is 
the case.  Scientific evidence can be concrete or, more rarely, abstract, and may be 
considered to consist in events, relations, traces, residue, objects, and so on.  
Controversially, evidence may be subjective, that is (for example) noticeable and 
reportable by only one person on introspection and not easily accessible to public 
observation.  Or, alternatively, it may be objective – in principle observable and 
reportable by any appropriately situated and equipped observer.  Items of evidence may 
be of different values or weights, and these weights may change according to the 
circumstances and background context in which the evidence is embedded.   Relative 
weighting of evidence is conferred by intentional systems, e.g., conscious entities such as 
human beings (and perhaps higher animals).   Bayesian probability calculus is often 
called upon to provide a framework in which to think about how evidence counts (is 
weighted) in telling for or against hypotheses, etc.  However, for our purposes here it is 
                                                          
 9I don’t mean here to discuss the vast range of concerns, problems, and 
considerations that revolve around the theory of evidence.  I will limit my discussion to 
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important to identify what features we should expect or demand in order to know whether 
individual bits or packages of evidence can be considered as appropriately vetted in terms 




 I have found little thus far in the philosophical literature arguing for a specified 
set of criteria that must be met for evidence to count as scientific.  It may be that 
evidentiary criteria of this level are more specialized than is required for philosophical 
analysis.  For my purposes here, though, such a list would be useful.  I have managed to 
winnow out a number of qualifications that may plausibly count as qualifiers for 
scientific evidence.  These are relevance, independence, diversity, repeatability, 
accordance, publicity/objectivity, and congruence. 
 
Relevance  
 That evidence which more strongly and directly supports a hypothesis, the more 
relevant it is for confirmation of that hypothesis.  This is an intuitive concept for which 
there is some Bayesian support (Glymour, 1983/1975).  In a Bayesian sense, we might 
say that relevant evidence increases the posterior probabilities of a conjecture, 
hypothesis, or theory.  It is clearly important to determine whether a given piece or body 
of evidence is orthogonal to what is required to support a given hypothesis, or whether it 
                                                                                                                                                                             
what we might agree makes evidence count as scientific. 
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weakly supports one hypothesis while more strongly supporting another, or whether 
instead it fully supports the hypothesis to which it is pointed.  In many cases the 
relevance of evidence is immediately obvious.  In some cases it may not be so obvious, 
and in still other cases its relevance may not be determinable until other evidence is 
collected and assessed against the hypothesis in question.   An important role played by 
relevance has to do with judging the degree of irrelevance certain evidence might hold 
for a given hypothesis it might originally have been intended or thought to support.  This 
criterion has important bearing on the important process of disconfirmation – the flip-side 
of confirmation – which can advance the process of scientific discovery by helping us 
eliminate options and competing explanations that turn out to have flaws or are otherwise 
unsatisfactory.  (Hempel, 1945/1983, 12)   
Relevance and the ESP Data: 
 Broadly, all four categories10 of ESP evidence that have been considered are 
relevant in a number of dimensions.  First, the accumulation of evidence from all four 
categories seems clearly to increase the posterior probabilities in terms of establishing 
that an anomalous effect is present.  Conversely, specific elements of the various 
experimental designs seem to increase the likelihood that known physical explanations 
are ruled out.  Examples include provisions for shielding of various types in DMILS, 
staring, and remote viewing protocols, blinding and randomization requirements in all 
four paradigms, temporal offsets in presentiment, PRP, ARV, and some DMILS 
                                                          
 10As a reminder, the four are: Presentiment, DMILS (“direct mental interaction 
with living systems”) and Staring, Remote Viewing, Associative Remote Viewing. 
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protocols, and so on.  Finally, evidence generated from experiments in each of the 
individual categories increase the posterior probabilities that each of those paradigms are 
valid, as well.  The fact that the evidence appears to raise the posterior probabilities of a 
causal closure violation but do not improve the posterior probabilities of the universal 




 Evidence presents stronger confirmation if it comes as a result of a separate 
evidentiary chain, as opposed to some other piece of confirmatory evidence that itself 
stems from the same source as other evidence.   Elliott Sober (1989) observes:  “[I]f I 
examine...two dependent effects, there is a higher probability that I will obtain relevant 
information – a match. However, if I examine the independent effects but manage 
nonetheless to obtain a match, that information will be weightier than a match obtained 
on dependent effects” (p.285).  Sober shows in his analysis that individual pieces of 
evidence from the same source do add confirmatory value in assessing the truth-value of 
a hypothesis.  But, as is not just plainly intuitive but supportable as well through 
Bayesian probability calculations, independence confers a noticeably higher level of 
confirmation than does its opposite (p.280).    
 The danger inherent in lack of independence (especially if a common dependent 
source of evidence goes unrecognized) is illustrated by a real-world example from 
Vietnam, told me years ago by a senior Army master sergeant whom I supervised.  An 
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independent informant had regularly been paid for information he provided about Viet 
Cong and North Vietnamese Army movements in South Vietnam.  On gaining some new 
intelligence, the informant went the rounds of various US installations and units selling 
the same information to each.  None of his customers knew about any of the others, and 
reported the newly acquired information through their channels as fresh intelligence.  The 
higher-echelon agency assigned to analyze data acquired from the field treated the 
information as if coming from several different sources, assigning it much higher 
probability, and hence confirmatory value, than it would have merited had it been 
realized that the evidence originated with the same source.     
 As Sober notes, seeking independent evidence can be risky. “I could be 
conservative; by examining the dependent effects, I maximize my chance of obtaining 
relevant information, however, paltry.  Or I could gamble; by examining the independent 
effects, I run a greater risk of obtaining useless observations, but a match between 
independent effects, should I observe one, would be worth more than a matching of 
dependent effects” (Sober, 1989, 286). 
 
Independence and the ESP Data: 
 There is broad fulfillment of the independence criterion both within each of the 
research paradigms I have detailed, and across categories as well.  Within each of the 
four categories, results are not just produced by one researcher or one lab.  In most cases, 
each research entity (laboratory, institute, activity) within each of the four categories 
features a variety of experimenters and subjects.  Results are usually not dependent on 
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one person in a given lab, nor are results dependent on one lab within the category.  
Though those ESP experimental paradigms with the shortest histories (e.g., presentiment, 
ARV) tend to have the smallest number of sources of research data (labs and 
experimenters), even in these there is a variety of sources of successful results and new 
findings that increase the level of independence for the accumulating evidence. 
 Moving up to the category level, there are four independent sources of evidence, 
each addressing a somewhat different (and generally independent) aspect or species of 
ESP phenomena.  There is, to be sure, some cross-category participation of researchers 
(for example, Schlitz in DMILS but also remote viewing; Radin in presentiment and 
DMILS; May in remote viewing and presentiment) which acts to generate some level of 
interdependence.  To a degree, this is unavoidable given the limited resources available 
to the field.  But in any case, it seems a relatively minor constraint on the independence 
factor, given the still fairly wide variety of researchers, phenomena, and unique 
experimental protocols that belong mostly or exclusively within a single category. 
 
Diversity  
 Diverse evidence is more confirmatory than less-diverse evidence.  On a Bayesian 
account, “diverse evidence better confirms a hypothesis than does the same amount of 
similar evidence (Wayne, 1995).  Collins (1992) suggests that “the more different an 
experiment to its predecessor, the more confirming power it has” (p.34).  And according 
to Horwich (1982, 8), “We think that theories are better confirmed by a broad spectrum 
of different kinds of evidence than by a narrow repetitive set of data.”    
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 But what does it mean for evidence to be “diverse”?  Diversity requires a plurality 
of items or instances – a singular item cannot by definition be “diverse ,“ so we will be 
interested in diversity between or among instances or items of evidence.  For the 
purposes of this discussion, perhaps it will be less confusing if I use a plural form to 
capture this, hence, rather than “evidence” I will use “evidences.”  In what ways can 
evidences be diverse?  It seems there might be at least two ways: perhaps they spring 
from diverse sources.  Certainly, variety of sources conveys diversity.  But as we saw 
above, that is also what constitutes evidential independence.  And in any case, evidence 
can come from the same source and still be diverse.  So while there may be a connection 
or overlap between independence and diversity, there must still be something more to the 
diversity criterion.   
 Better, perhaps, would be that the evidences themselves are of diverse qualities, 
regardless of whether they have common or independent origins.  So, for example, in an 
experiment to determine whether the refractory properties of a translucent material meet 
a certain prediction of a hypothesis being tested, one might vary the angle at which a 
beam of light strikes the surface.  This would provide a range of values within a certain 
domain.  But one could increase evidentiary value by varying the wavelength, dispersion 
pattern, or intensity of the light source, thus introducing additional dimensions of 
evidence that might be telling for the hypothesis being examined.   
 In an example from a different discipline, if one were seeking evidence to confirm 
or disconfirm a certain hypothesis about the religious practices of an extinct culture, one 
could focus on the painted ceremonial patterns on numerous pottery shards from various 
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digs in a specific region.   This would presumably confer a degree of source 
independence, but would amount to a generally similar type of evidence.   But to include 
a more diverse set of evidentiary support, one might in addition examine funerary 
practices, dispersion and frequency patterns of the shards, or markings and patterns on 
other surfaces, such as rock walls, clothing items and weapons, and so on.   
 This added diversity of evidence adds confirmatory power in a somewhat 
different way than does independence of sources.  Since hypotheses, and by extension 
theories more often than not make not just one prediction, but a complex of inter-related 
predictions, diverse evidence may serve to confirm a variety of predictions or even add 
unexpected confirmation to features that were either not currently being tested or were 
previously not recognized as being linked or associated. 
 Along with Wayne (1995) we must keep in mind, though, that  “Clearly, 
judgments of diversity are always made relative to a given theoretical context; what look 
like disparate phenomena in one context may appear closely akin in another” (p.115).   
Acknowledging a point he attributes to Glymour, Wayne observes that “the 
methodological value of diverse evidence is that it reduces the chances of a spurious 
agreement between an hypothesis and a body of evidence, thereby reducing the chance 
that an hypothesis will be confirmed yet be wrong” (p.10).    
 
Diversity and the ESP Data: 
 By its nature, independence conveys diversity as the number of independent 
sources of results increase.  We have seen that there is a least a medium level of 
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independence in the ESP data.  Diversity is also increased by varied tests of the same 
phenomenon or prediction of a given hypothesis, by varied tests of different phenomena, 
features, or predictions relevant to the same hypothesis, and by fortuitous evidence that 
may be encountered not as a direct result of the experimental process (for example, 
Bierman’s discovery of evidence for presentiment in mainstream studies that were not 
originally conducted to test presentiment).  If we take as our hypothesis something like 
“There are extra-physical features to the universe” (the corollary to: “Causal closure – 
and hence the universal formulation of physicalism – is false”), there is both category-
level diversity and internal diversity that increases the confirmatory value of the ESP 
evidence.  At the category level, four different research paradigms produce evidence 
supporting the thesis where, if the thesis were false, none should.   
 Internally, an array of different approaches within each of the paradigms enhance 
diversity, as illustrated below: 
 
Presentiment – Experimenting with a diverse set of stimuli (e.g., affective 
images; noxious sounds; electric shock; color/color name mismatch; reverse 
habituation).  Monitoring a variety of indicators (e.g., skin conductance; blood 
volume; heart rate; gastro-encephelography; EEG; fMRI). 
 
DMILS -- Staring vs. DMILS; direct attention monitored by skin conductance vs. 
remote facilitation of tasks measured by button pushes; monitoring a variety of 
physiological measures (skin conductance, ideomotor response, blood pressure, 
etc.); tests of a variety of different biological systems (e.g., fish, gerbils); fMRI 
vs. EEG; biological systems interacting with machine-based systems. 
 
Remote Viewing – Varied target sets (geographic locations; mineral samples; 
photos; large objects; small objects; microdots; etc.).  Varied tasking means 
(beacon teams; coordinates; sealed envelopes and other containers).  Varied 




Associative Remote Viewing and Precognitive Remote Perception  – 
Experimenting with temporal displacement vs. real time in remote viewing. 
 
 
In addition, experimenting with different judging and analysis methodologies adds a 
certain level of diversity as well.  If evidence of a significant effect persists (and even if 
its level of significance may vary) across different judging and analysis procedures, it 
provides added support for the existence of the phenomenon. 
 The fact that evidence for an extra-physical effect is demonstrated across this 




 I take ‘repeatability’ not to be the same as ‘replicability,’ in that replicability 
seems to require more than that it just be a repeat of an experiment that produces the 
same outcome, and encompasses not just the notion of repeatability, but also of 
independence and diversity.  I shall consider replicability in the next chapter.11  Evidence 
that can be reproduced by the creation of the same or closely similar circumstances in 
which it was first observed in a repetitive way more strongly confirms a hypothesis than 
does a singular occurrence of such evidence.  Repeatability does not conflict with the 
principle of independence, as it says nothing about whether the same source or different 
                                                          
 11Since ‘repeatability’ and ‘replicability’ are generally used interchangeably in the 
literature, my differentiating between the two is, perhaps, unorthodox.  But I believe 
there is a distinction that is being conflated when the two are taken to be synonymous. 
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sources contribute to the evidential repetition.  Obviously, independent repetition in most 
cases provides stronger evidence than does repetition by the same source, and constitutes 
one ingredient for replication.  In the sense I have in mind, repeatability might generally 
be considered reproducing experimental results by the same researcher or laboratory.    
 But even same-source repetition lends additional strength to evidence (Sober, 
1989).  The value of repeatability from a confirmatory perspective is that it gives reason 
to believe that the reported effect or result was not merely the consequence of an 
aberration, error, or singular anomaly never to be encountered again.  Further, it may be 
seen to demonstrate at least the beginnings of law-like behavior, and increase our 
opportunities to study, observe, and evaluate the evidence thus produced.  Repeatability 
may even contribute to the diversity criterion.  
 
Repeatability and the ESP Data:  
 Repeatability varies within the four categories under consideration.  Not every 
attempt succeeds, and not every success is of the same magnitude.  In many cases, the 
reasons for this are well understood (habituation in presentiment experiments, for 
example).  Further, as with many research protocols in more mainstream sciences, 
repeatability is sensitive to deviations from the recipe in the successful experimental 
protocol being repeated (as was seen in my discussion of remote viewing).  This alone 
accounts for a number of the experimental repeats that failed or yielded diminished 
results.   
 To be fair, as I mentioned in chapter five and elsewhere, researchers often tweak 
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protocols in the hope of discovering sensitivity parameters, boundary conditions, or new 
dimensions to the effects being studied.  In cases such as this, an apparently unsuccessful 
repetition may not be the failure it appears, if it thereby demonstrates a limiting factor to 
the effect under consideration.  A clear example of this was seen in the Ganzfeld 
research.12  A series of experiments were conducted using the Ganzfeld protocol but 
substituted audio stimuli in place of the traditional (and successful) visual stimuli.  The 
researchers freely admitted they were testing the boundaries of the Ganzfeld paradigm, 
and did not necessarily expect significant results.  Nonetheless, the skeptical literature 
often cites these as “failed” replications of the Ganzfeld protocol. 
 Still, success has been demonstrated in the majority of attempted repetitions 




 Acceptable evidence must be produced in accordance with well-formed and 
scientifically-trustworthy methods and techniques.   “Accordance” does not require that 
acceptable methods cannot be newly-introduced or innovative.  Otherwise no progress 
                                                          
 12In its simplest form, the Ganzfeld protocol involves a “receiver” in a secure 
room relaxing in a recliner with ping-pong ball halves taped over the eyes, and pink noise 
played through headphones to establish a slightly altered ‘receptive’ mental state.  
Meanwhile, a “sender” in a distant room tries to transmit an image from a pool of four 
targets, while the receiver verbalizes any impressions she perceives.  After the session, 
the receiver is shown the randomized set of four possible target and self-judges which 
photo was “sent.”  Chance is 25% correct, but overall Ganzfeld results range around 35% 
and are highly statistically significant (Radin, 2006). 
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could be made in science methodology, nor could accommodations be made for new 
discoveries that might point towards or even mandate new methodology.  Accordance 
does require that new methods be consistent with proven scientific practice, such that 
they be no less rigorous than previously-accepted methodologies, and that they otherwise 
be in accord with the standards and procedures of science. 
 
Accordance and the ESP Data:  
 The evidence-producing practices in the parapsychology research I am 
considering generally accord with the accepted procedures of science.  Indeed, 
parapsychology in general has in the past and in some respects continues in the present to 
represent the cutting edge in science.  For example, the electroencephalograph (EEG) 
was invented to track ESP-related experiences.  Double-blind protocols, randomization 
procedures, and meta-analytical and other advanced statistical techniques now ubiquitous 
in science were originally pioneered in parapsychology (Hacking, 1998; Bosch, 2004; 
Pratt et al, 1966; Radin, 2005).   
 The studies considered here generally employ standard scientific measures, 
though in some cases they employ innovative adaptations or create new methods, 
procedures, and designs (for example, Bem’s “mere exposure” protocol, or Radin’s 
presentiment model).  Pains are taken to maintain a sound scientific foundation in 
process, even if the phenomena being examined are themselves controversial.    
 Despite this, the quality of some of the research is mixed.  Among the qualified 
researchers that have contributed to the studies I have considered there are no clearly 
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badly conducted studies, in the sense of obvious negligence in ignoring standards and 
procedures that might be expected of competent scientists.  Still, there have been 
mistakes and gaps in the protocols of some studies in each category.  For the most part, 
lesser-quality studies were generally present in the early stages of each of the paradigms 
– which is not unusual even in mainstream sciences.  Peer-review and critical appraisals 
then do their job, refining protocols and ferreting out weaknesses, errors, and oversights 
to produce sounder procedures and more trustworthy results.  Examples here might be the 
cues inadvertently left in the early SRI remote viewing experimental transcripts, and the 
implementation of changing standards in skin-conductance response measuring 
techniques in the DMILS research.  In each of these examples, later work incorporated 
suggested changes into experimental designs, improving the quality of research practices. 
 It is expected in science that as a research paradigm matures, procedures get 
better, yet if an effect is present positive results will still continue to be found.  One 
skeptical complaint lodged against ESP research is that as the experimental protocols get 
tighter and more refined, effects fall off and eventually disappear altogether.  This has, 
for example, sometimes been the case with forced-choice card-guessing clairvoyance 
tests and dice-rolling experiments that were the mainstay of early parapsychology 
experiments.  Disappearing results have often been attributed to the “decline effect,” – 
strong effects demonstrated at first, followed by a decline in significance to the point of 
extinction of the effect.  Skeptics blame this on errors generated by sloppy protocols, and 
allege that as controls get better, false-positives disappear, resulting in null results.  
Though parapsychologists disagree and have their own explanations for the decline, that 
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is less germane to this discussion.  In the four paradigms I have considered, increasingly 
careful protocols have not led to extinguished results, and though effects sometimes vary 
among experiments, it turns out that significant effects are still manifest. 
 This persistence of effects is crucial.  ESP experiments must be conducted in 
accordance with the best scientific practice.  In fact, for parapsychology accordance may 
be the most important of the evidentiary criteria.  As I discuss in the next chapter, 
parapsychological effects must survive elimination of any source of artifact, false-
positive, sensory leakage or cuing, and so on to even hope to be accepted as real.  
 
Publicity/Objectivity 
 Since by virtue of its privacy, subjective evidence fails to carry the weight that 
more public kinds of evidence bears, the best evidence for science is always objective 
when available – that is, a piece or body of evidence must not be accessible to just one 
person, but must be observable and reportable by anyone who can arrange to be in the 
right place at the right time under the right conditions and, when required, with the 
correct equipment.  Thus, to be counted as scientific, evidence must be accessible to 
science, so it can checked, tested, verified, and applied in a clearly objectively public 
way.   
 Even if the causes or events themselves are in principle unobservable (quantum-
level particles, for example, or mental states) their traces or vestiges must be 
demonstrable and capable of public examination.  Subjective experience may be 
veridical, but so long as it remains subjective it can’t be shown to be veridical.  Thus, if 
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the domain of a given body of research involves subjective experience, such as is the case 
with much of psychology and parapsychology, means must be developed to render the 
subject evidence objective.  Accordingly, special techniques and tools have been created 
for parapsychology to accomplish the objectification of subjective phenomena.  The 
methodology mentioned above – EEG, double-blind procedures, randomization, meta-
analysis, and other statistical methods – were developed or adapted to render subjective 
or ephemeral data more objective. 
 
Publicity/Objectivity and the ESP Data:  
 Much of ESP consists of internally-experienced mental states, subconscious 
processes, or externally-demonstrated phenomena whose public manifestations are but 
the tip of the iceberg where the phenomena are concerned.  But parapsychology has a 
wide range of tools and methods to uncover with some reliability the presence of effects.  
More obviously, the self-report of subjects in specifically consciousness-based 
phenomena such as remote viewing (both prima facie and statistical) allow open 
inspection and comparison.  For those phenomena that seem exclusively or nearly 
exclusively non-conscious (presentiment and staring/DMILS), experimental techniques 
have been developed to bring internal processes out into the open through behaviors 
(button pressing in attention facilitation, for example).  Medical monitoring equipment 
such as skin-conductive measuring devices, EEG, heart-rate monitoring equipment, and 
even electrogastrograms have been adapted and pressed into service.  Results have been 
subjected to generally rigorous statistical analysis to ensure as clearly as possible that 
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demonstrated results are best explained as being due to ESP. 
 
Congruence 
 The more closely a piece of evidence can be accommodated without contradiction 
within an existing body of evidence that already supports a hypothesis or theory, the 
more strongly it confirms the same hypothesis or theory.  This criterion might have been 
termed coherence, but I have elected to use congruence.  Coherence denotes 
compatibility – a harmonizing or fitting in, or being consistent with other evidence.  
Congruence, on the other hand, not only includes coherence, but also conveys the sense 
of active agreement, converging towards a particular position, or mutual support.  New 
evidence is congruent with a theoretical context if it is not just compatible (coherent) – 
that is, fits in with other, already integrated evidence – but indeed brings something 
contributory to the explanatory value of the theory.  Some evidence could be coherent 
with any number of theories or hypotheses.  But it would not necessarily be congruent 
with them in the sense I mean it.   
 Additionally, evidence that conflicts with a hypothesis or theory may not be 
incoherent, except in terms of the theory with which it conflicts; it may in fact be 
perfectly intelligible in all other contexts.  But evidence can be incongruent without 
becoming incoherent or unintelligible, even when it conflicts with a deeply entrenched or 
dearly held theory.  Lack of congruence, therefore, is not necessarily a sign of the un-
scientific status of a piece of evidence (indeed, may even be an indicator of superior 
scientific value over evidence that supports an erroneous but widely accepted theory).  
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However, incongruent evidence may not be accepted as facilely as is evidence that is 
congruent, and merits closer scrutiny because of its incongruence.13
 Congruence is the only criterion necessarily violated by evidence that is 
contradictory.  Contradictory evidence, if it is revolutionary in a Kuhnian sense (that is, 
incommensurate with an established theory-base but nonetheless true) may well meet all 
other evidentiary criteria but, because it fails to agree with the theory it challenges, it is 
also incongruent with much (though not necessarily all) of the supporting evidence for 
the theory it puts under pressure. 
 
Congruence and the ESP Data:  
 ESP data is not necessarily congruent with the bulk of scientific evidence, but it 
does not necessarily conflict with it, either.  This is only true, though, if one entertains 
the possibly of extraphysical causal interaction with the physical world (though such 
interaction would not have to be extensive).  ESP data is systemically incongruent with 
the universal physicalism thesis.  Since the ESP data is evidence against the causal 
closure assumption, it is at odds with any formulation of universal physicalism, which is 
the root of the incompatibility, and hence incongruence, of the two.  (In chapter 12, I 
shall entertain the suggestion that a fully-completed physical account of the universe 
might find a way of reconciling itself with ESP, but for now will consider them 
incongruent.)  
                                                          




 Not all of the seven evidentiary criteria I propose need be present to render some 
evidence scientific.  One would expect accordance, publicity/objectivity, and relevance to 
be high on the list.  But some well-accepted evidence may lack diversity – perhaps it is 
only producible in a certain way, or is so strongly congruent that other confirming 
instances are not essential.  In many science disciplines (cosmology, paleontology, 
evolutionary biology, geology, to name a few), repeatability may not even be possible.  
Still, even if it is not necessary that evidence meet all, nor even most of these seven 
categories, the more that are present increases our confidence in questionable cases that 
the data is worthy of consideration from a scientific perspective.  We have seen that, at 
least based on this brief survey, the parapsychology data seems to be well-credentialed in 
terms of characteristics we might expect admissible scientific evidence to display. 
 Although, as Braithwaite states “no amount of empirical evidence suffices to 
prove any of the hypotheses in the system, yet any piece of empirical evidence for any 
part of the system helps towards establishing the whole of the system” (Braithwaite, 
1953/1983, 49).  In other words, evidence from different but related domains has a 
confirmatory effect on the whole.  The same holds for ESP.  Evidence from a variety of 
researchers, labs, and varied in-principle replications all strengthen the hypothesis that 
ESP exists. 
 A final, important implication applies here:  If one wishes to dismiss the ESP 
evidence on grounds that it is not scientific, he must take into account whether the data 
he is dismissing meets the criteria expected of scientific evidence.  Given my argument 
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here that it does, he must show that these criteria are not central or important to whether 
evidence counts as scientific or not or, on the other hand, he must show that the evidence 
I have assessed does not satisfy the criteria.  Otherwise, by rejecting the parapsychology 
evidence as unscientific, he also throws into question all mainstream scientific evidence 
as well, since it is vetted on the same principles.  This seems a rather steep price to pay 
just to be rid of some inconvenient facts. 
 
Total Evidence 
 There is one final concern to address before leaving our discussion of evidence.  
This is the often asserted “total evidence” requirement.  As Carnap has observed, “in the 
application of inductive logic to a given knowledge situation, the total evidence available 
must be taken as basis for determining the degree of confirmation” (Carnap, 1950, 211).   
This can be interpreted to mean that for confirmation to be truly reliable – truly scientific 
– all and every bit of evidence that might have bearing on a given hypothesis or theory 
must be collected, examined, and analyzed.  It certainly makes sense; in an inductive 
process it is always possible to encounter evidence that requires a reinterpretation of 
previous data, mandates a change to the direction of a program of scientific exploration, 
or even shows such a program to be invalid.  It is only possible to rule out unpleasant 
surprises (or, if necessary, accommodate them) by corralling all the evidential wildlife 
and taming it. 
 Those who are aware of this requirement realize almost immediately, though, that 
the requirement is unrealizable in practice.  For most conceivable research programs in 
 312
science the possible evidence domain is certainly indefinite, and likely in many cases 
infinite.   Further, practical constraints may render the securing of some – and perhaps 
much – evidence impossible.   Hempel agrees that the value of the total evidence 
requirement is obvious.  It is possible, he suggests, that two true inductive observation 
sentences can support each of two contradictory theses respectively, which is clearly 
problematic.  In principle, the total evidence requirement can alleviate this by revealing 
how the two are to be reconciled.  Hempel credits Ayer with pointing out that if one starts 
with only part of the evidence, we can assign probabilities to a given hypothesis that 
continue to change as we consider ever bigger slices of the total evidence.  It is only with 
the total evidence that the probabilities become fixed.  (Hempel, 1960, 451-452) 
 However, “formal logic...does not tell us what statements to believe or to act on; 
indeed, the notion of accepting certain statements, like that of total evidence, is pragmatic 
in character and cannot be defined in terms of the concepts of formal (deductive or 
inductive) logical theory” (p.453).   For Hempel, then, the problem with the total 
evidence requirement is that it is not pragmatic.  In most important cases there is far too 
much evidence, and it is too complex for us to have a practical hope of capturing it all.  It 
is, though, possible to exclude evidence that is irrelevant to the hypothesis being 
examined. 
 Ways have been explored to reduce the overwhelming burden levied by the total 
evidence requirement, while reducing as much as possible exposure to the consequences 
of restricting the evidentiary net too severely, thus excluding important or necessary 
evidence.  Adler, for example, examines Goldman’s position that all ‘total evidence’ 
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requires is that a subject examine just that evidence that is available at a given time and 
place.  This Adler judges too weak.  It runs the danger of letting the subject too easily off 
the hook.  There should at least be a presumption that a rational actor be able to recognize 
that some epistemic positions are simply too weak to justify drawing sound conclusions 
from available evidence.  Further, we are justified in holding a certain expectation of the 
competence of an actor who proposes to draw evidence-based conclusions – that she will 
exercise due diligence to gather additional relevant evidence beyond what may 
immediately and easily be available.  Still, Adler recognized that meeting the demands of 
a fully-fledged total evidence requirement is an unreasonable (perhaps even irrational) 
proposition, and that the total evidence requirement must be constrained, even if there is 
as yet no obvious consensus on how that might be done.  (Adler, 1989)  
 The obvious impracticality of the total-evidence requirement has not stopped 
some from insisting it be met by parapsychologists.  In “A Field Guide to Critical 
Thinking,” Professor James Lett says this: “The evidence offered in support of any claim 
must be exhaustive – that is all of the available evidence must be considered,” and he 
goes on to discuss how various paranormal claims violate this stipulation (Lett, 1990).   
This is clearly just a restatement of Carnap’s total evidence requirement.   
 There are two responses possible.  Even if we do levy the requirement for total 
evidence on ESP – surely that does not mean that every bit of evidence for the physical 
universe be gathered before we can render a verdict on ESP?  After all, as I mentioned in 
my treatment of the congruence criterion, ESP evidence and most, if not all of the facts 
about physical objects, laws, properties, and systems do not conflict.  For ESP to be true 
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only requires that there be some further extra-physical feature to the universe that under 
certain conditions be causative.  So the total evidence for psi might include facts 
generated in ESP research, psychological facts (both known and presently unknown) 
about humans (and perhaps other autonomous complex systems, such as chimps, 
dolphins – and chicks), facts concerning logic and reasoning, plus any properly-
developed counter evidence (those opposed to the notion of ESP are, after all, bound by 
the same rules as those in favor of it).  At least with this point in mind, the requirement 
for total evidence carries no more weight against ESP than it does any other science-
based argument. 
 The requirement to consider the total evidence actually wields a two-edged blade 
that cuts physicalism even more than it does ESP.  This is because physicalism is a 
universal claim, while ESP is not.  For universal claims it is even more important that not 
just evidence for the universal proposition being tendered must be considered, but also 
evidence that counts against it.  “If you are willing to be selective in the evidence you 
consider,” Lett continues, “you could reasonably conclude that the earth is flat.” 
 This is true enough (as the existence of the Flat Earth Society proves).  But as can 
readily be documented, physicalists notoriously ignore or dismiss ESP evidence from any 
consideration.  One could consider this in itself a violation of the total evidence 
requirement, and the cynical might suspect that physicalists wish to maintain their own 
version of the flat earth theory. 
 A physicalist might defend herself against this implication by raising the question 
of just how much energy science should be required to spend in investigating claims for 
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anomalous findings and minority views.  In a Kuhnian context one might argue that 
science may have some responsibility in this regard.  But, as Fales and Markovsky (1997) 
tell us, “no discipline can afford to devote serious attention to every unorthodox notion 
that comes over the horizon” (p.511).    
 In terms of ESP, physicist Stephen Weinberg agrees: “...should we not test 
astrology and telekinesis and the rest to make sure that there is nothing to them?”  He 
does not think so. “At any one moment one is presented with a wide variety of innovative 
ideas that might be followed up,” but there is “simply no time.”   As far as 
parapsychological and other phenomena are concerned “the conventional answer would 
be that this evidence must be tested with an open mind and without theoretical 
preconceptions.”  But he does “not think that this is a useful answer.”   
For all of us, there is simply no alternative to making a judgment as well as we 
can that some of these ideas (perhaps most of them) are not worth pursuing.  And 
our greatest aid in making this judgment is our understanding of the pattern of 
scientific explanation. [O]ur discovery of the connected and convergent pattern of 
scientific explanations has done the very great service of teaching us that there is 
no room in nature for astrology or telekinesis or creationism or other 
superstitions.” (Weinberg, 1992, 48-50) 
 There is, to be sure, good sense behind this.  Obviously, resource-rich though 
science is by most standards (many billions of dollars a year, after all, are spent on all 
levels of research), there is always far more valuable research that could be done were 
there not finite limits on the available resources.  It stands to reason that science should 
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not be expected to try to validate every frivolous unorthodox claim that one crackpot or 
another cares to raise. 
 But there is a certain disingenuousness to the way this argument is used against 
ESP.  It is not unreasonable to ignore a speculative pursuit for which there is little or no 
well-controlled research that produces evidence on its behalf – palmistry, for example, or 
aura-reading, or even astrology.14  Contrast this, though, with the literally thousands of 
successful experiments that have produced evidence of parapsychological effects, and 
were done under acceptable scientific standards.  It seems implausible to consider 
parapsychology to be no more relevant – and no more worthy of investigation – than, say, 
numerology.  In terms of supporting evidence and scientific credentials, parapsychology 
is in a class by itself, beyond anything else that gets lumped uncritically under the 
heading “pseudoscience.” 
 “If it could be shown that there is any truth to any of these notions,” Weinberg 
himself says, “it would be the discovery of the century, much more exciting and 
important that anything going on today in the normal work of physics.”  Leaving aside 
for the moment whether he really believes what he is saying, one wonders why, given the 
magnitude of legitimately-conducted research generated by scientific parapsychology, 
                                                          
 14Perhaps, though, we should not be so ready to dismiss astrology altogether.  
Though nowhere near as well attested as ESP, there are at least two controlled studies 
that show an unaccounted-for “Mars effect” – one by proponents, and one by skeptics.  
First is that by Michel Gauquelin and various associates, which plausibly showed that 
athletic prowess correlated with a certain position of Mars in the Zodiac.  The second, 
ironically, is a study done under the auspices of the highly-skeptical Committee for the 
Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP), which unexpectedly 
confirmed Gauquelin’s findings. 
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someone as astute as Weinberg would not recognize both the qualitative and quantitative 
gulf that separates parapsychology from all the other “paranormal” pursuits within which 
he lumps it. 
 Perhaps it is only that he is unaware of just what evidence is available in 
parapsychology – and that is, to be sure, a likely explanation.15  But other possible 
reasons why this may be have to do with arguments that continue to be raised against the 
possibility of ESP.  I will consider these in the next chapter. 
                                                          
 15Though as quoted above, Weinberg does think we know enough about 
“scientific explanation” to rule out a priori any possibility of ESP. 
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Chapter 11:  Arguments Against the Evidence 
 
 
 Despite the fact that the extrasensory perception evidence I present largely meets 
the criteria one might reasonably expect of scientifically-admissible evidence, it is 
generally dismissed by the mainstream.  Though there are sociology- and psychology-of-
science issues that contribute to this rejection, there is a general set of complaints and 
objections that are used to undermine the acceptability of the evidence and the field as a 
whole.  I will not try to address these exhaustively, but will consider some of the most 
frequent or prominent objections to show that they are of questionable value in 
undermining the parapsychological evidence. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE EVIDENCE 
Allegation 1:  Parapsychology is the only discipline that relies exclusively on statistical 
evidence to prove its claims. 
 This argument does not express a concrete objection or criticism.  It is usually 
lodged in a context or with an emphasis that conveys a negative connotation.  For 
example, Antony Flew says, “the very concept of ...and not just the best available 
evidence for the reality of psi, is essentially statistical.”  Ray Hyman, one of the most 
respected of parapsychology’s critics maintains that “parapsychology is unique among 
the sciences in relying solely on significant departures from a chance baseline to establish 
the presence of its alleged phenomenon” (Hyman, 1995, p.3-51).  Let us examine the 
tacit argument that is implied by these statements.   
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1)  Parapsychological results consist only in statistical values.   
 
2)  Any science worth its salt should produce at least some results that are 
concrete and substantive.   
 
 3)  The status of a science producing results that are only statistical in nature is 
suspect.  
  4)  Therefore, the scientific status of parapsychology is questionable.   
 
 
 But is this a sound argument?   Consider the second premise first.  Is it true that 
the scientific status of a body of research should be questioned if statistical results are its 
only evidence?  Though I know of no science that produces exclusively statistical results 
(save, perhaps, for statistical science itself), it seems dubious to question scientific status 
based solely on the kind of evidence it produces, so long as the evidence is legitimately 
and  rigorously obtained, and is correctly interpreted.   Population genetics, for example, 
is largely statistical yet is still considered fully scientific. 
 The first premise is also dubious.  Do parapsychology results consist only in 
statistical evidence?  The answer is, in fact, no – the assertion is mistaken.  The idea of 
ESP producing exclusively statistical evidence seems to be a holdover from card 
guessing experiments where most of the effect was in fact only statistically detectable 
(see Flew, 1987).  Even at that time, though, this statement would not have been true.  
Other aspects of parapsychological research at the time involved investigation of reports 
and prima facie effects which, by their nature, couldn’t even be analyzed statistically.  
Indeed, Louisa Rhine, J.B. Rhine’s wife and a researcher in her own right, was prominent 
in just these kinds of investigations.  
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 Further, parapsychology has along the way added research paradigms that also go 
beyond the mere statistical – for example remote viewing or the Ganzfeld protocol, 
which provide concrete evidence in the way of sketches, three-dimensional modeling, or 
verbal reports.  Though ESP evidence is nearly always statistically analyzed, to claim 
that the evidence is “only” statistical is to miss the point of statistics.  Often, statistics are 
used to compile the values of dozens or hundreds, or even thousands of individual, 
concrete events in the world.  The events are not mere numbers, but are real things that 
the numbers manipulated by statistics merely represent.  For example, no one would 
argue that a star baseball player’s batting average was “only statistical evidence” for the 
existence of an event that involved an actual person swinging an actual bat at an actual 
ball.  Nor does the fact that a particular remote viewer’s sessions, when ranked blindly 
against the set of possible targets, yields a statistically significant score of p = 0.005 
constitute “only statistical evidence” for an actual set of remote viewing trials.  To say 
that all evidence produced by parapsychology is “only” statistical is to deny the 
ontological concreteness of what the statistics represent, and is a category error. 
 To be sure, parapsychology relies heavily on statistics to disambiguate results, 
and certify that conclusions are not based on confirmation bias (drawing conclusions 
from ambiguous data based on what one wants the data to prove).  Statistics are also used 
to render prima facie and qualitative data into quantitative measures that can be more 
objectively compared across bodies of research.  In that, parapsychology is in good 
company with much of the rest of science.  As R.A. Fisher stated 
In order to assert that a natural phenomenon is experimentally demonstrable we 
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need, not an isolated record, but a reliable method of procedure. In relation to the 
test of significance we may say that a phenomenon is experimentally 
demonstrable when we know how to conduct an experiment which will rarely fail 
to give us a statistically significant result. (The Design of Experiments (1960) 
Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh. 14) 
 
Ray Hyman, one of the critics cited above on the use of statistics in parapsychology 
research, undermines his own case.  After complaining that the only evidence 
parapsychology presents is statistical in nature, he also rejects the use of prima facie 
evidence that is offered in ESP research because it isn’t possible to evaluate it 
statistically (Hyman, 1995, p.3-71).  
 
Allegation 2: Parapsychology is the only science where an effect is only ever negatively 
defined. 
 Typical expressions of this concern are, for example, from James Alcock (2003):   
"...parapsychology is the only realm of objective inquiry in which the phenomena are all 
negatively defined, defined in terms of ruling out normal explanations” (p.33).  
Psychologist and parapsychologist John Beloff put it this way:  “The field...must be 
unique in one respect, at least: no other discipline, so far as I know, has its subject matter 
demarcated by exclusively negative criteria.  A phenomenon is, by definition, paranormal 
if and only if it contravenes some fundamental and well-founded assumption of science” 
(Quoted in Flew, 1987, 93).  And Hyman, once again, weighs in: “Operationally, the 
presence of anomalous cognition is detected by the elimination of all other possibilities. 
This reliance on a negative definition of its central phenomenon is another liability that 
parapsychology brings with its attempt to become a recognized science” (Hyman, 1995). 
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 The point being argued by this objection hinges on the requirement that all 
possible physical explanations be ruled out before a result can be accepted as deriving 
from extrasensory perception.   Accordingly, parapsychology is alleged to be the only 
science where the existence of an effect is only ever negatively defined.  This is the 
corollary of my observation in chapter four that in order to isolate a psi effect, one must 
first exclude all other possibilities.1  As Oddie (1990) explains it, to rule out anything but 
ESP an experiment must certify that A is a cause of B, while ruling out correlation from a 
common causal ancestor, an alternative causal chain, or some form of coincidence.  
 
It is also to rule out the possibility that the correlation is the causal by-product of 
some quite distinct common cause of A and B...But how does experimentation 
ensure this?  How do we know that the process of experimentation is not itself the 
causal by-product of some common cause of that process of experimentation and 
the occurrence of B? ...We can rule this possibility out in principle if the whole 
experiment is not itself totally caused by what has gone on before it.  That is, if 
the experimenter is a free agent, or can at least arrange to have the experimental 
set-up triggered by an uncaused event, then there is no other (total) cause of the 
experimental set-up.  If the experimental set-up is (at least partially) an 
indeterministic affair then we cannot appeal to a common cause to explain the 
correlation.  Thus barring sheer coincidence the only explanation is that A-tokens 
cause B-tokens.  (Oddie, 1990, 73-74) 
 
Oddie captures here the value of double-blind protocols and randomization that have 
become the norm in parapsychology research.  These are parts of the process essential to 
                                                          
 1There have been  some extreme reactions to this feature of psi.  For instance, as I 
will explore in more detail below, one critic of ESP research said he would prefer to 
believe that space aliens kidnap people and plant thoughts in their brains, rather than 
accept any sort of psi explanation.  At least the space-alien hypothesis has the virtue of 
being accommodated under physicalism.   One peer-reviewer of the seminal Puthoff/Targ 
IEEE paper on remote viewing retorted, “This is the sort of thing I wouldn’t believe even 
if it were true!” (Smith, 2005)   
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rule out causal influences other than those being examined.  (This also indirectly provides 
another response to the complaint about the use of statistics in ESP research – the 
requirement for randomization all but necessitates a statistical presence in any research 
protocol in which it is employed.) 
 There are a couple of responses possible to the “negative definition” concern.  
First, one might ask – “so what?”  How does this actually tell against the legitimacy of 
parapsychological discoveries – is it a logical argument against it?  It doesn’t seem to be.  
Is it an empirical argument?  Again, apparently not.  It seems to be largely a 
psychological objection.  Those who lodge it seem to feel that it is somehow unseemly 
that parapsychology relies on negative conditions, or that this somehow makes 
parapsychology arguments weaker.  Maybe it just so happens that there is a small class of 
sciences, parapsychology among them, which require negation of all other possibilities to 
validate results. 
 This response leads into a second one – isn’t this in some degree true of any 
science?   Each piece of evidence in any science must be shown not to be the 
consequence of some other force, cause, or event other than the one under consideration, 
otherwise it cannot unambiguously count as evidence for the phenomenon being 
examined.   Many conventional science experiments require that possible external 
influences or sources of contamination be excluded before the results can be trusted.  The 
greater the degree that other explanations can be excluded, the greater the confirmatory 
value of the evidence for the phenomenon or hypothesis being supported.  
 There are numerous instances in the sciences where a phenomenon or entity can 
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only be identified in the absence of all other explanatory factors.  One example comes 
from physics itself.  In attempts to isolate quarks which are widely accepted as theoretical 
entities, but for which empirical evidence is highly desirable for added confirmation of 
the underpinnings of quantum physics, physicists have created “quark detectors.”  Quark 
detectors are carefully positioned and employ sophisticated shielding so as to exclude all 
other possible sources of intrusion into the detection device that might mimic behaviors 
postulated of quarks.  According to theory, quarks are able to penetrate the kinds of 
shielding incorporated into these detectors, but few other particles, fields, or forces can.  
Thus, if all other influences can be excluded, whatever then trips the detector must be a 
quark.   
 Cosmology provides an even better example.  Researchers noticed that the 
universe’s rate of expansion could not be accounted for by the amount of energy and 
matter observable in the physical universe.  They were forced to postulate “dark” matter, 
which cannot be detected through normal observational means, but which can be 
indirectly discerned by their gravitational and other effects on observable matter.  
Loosely expressed, then, whatever can’t be shown to be regular matter must by the 
process of elimination, be “dark” matter.  Admittedly, the notion of dark matter is not 
accepted uncontroversially.  But it is not rejected as being unscientific merely on the 
basis of its being “defined negatively.” 
 What seems to be the sticking point for critics of parapsychology is that there are 
gaps in the causal story that apparently cannot be fit into any explanatory scientific 
narrative.  So even once all alternative explanations are excluded – thus defining the 
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phenomena “negatively” – we are left with an explanatory vacuum.  But what is 
worrisome to those who find the “negative definition” troubling is otherwise confirming 
for my own thesis – that the ESP results I have cited are real evidence for intermittently 
truncated causal chains (ITCCs), and demonstrate that psi has an extra-physical 
component.  If my claim is true, this is exactly how the phenomena would behave.  There 
would be gaps in our ability to physically account for the effects and, since physical 
explanations are all we can appeal to, “negatively defining” and “ruling out” are the 
options on the table.   If the “ruling out” can be done conclusively – and hence, 
convincingly – then from a scientific standpoint it doesn’t matter that some oppose it.   
 It does however, demand scrupulously careful protocols so the ruling-out is as 
persuasive as possible (though there will be those whom no amount of evidence, whether 
negatively or positively arrived at, will convince).   
 
Allegation 3: The “File Drawer” Effect – Compiled parapsychological effects are only 
significant because there are large numbers of unsuccessful studies that were never 
published. 
 
 The so-called “file drawer” argument was originally introduced by 
parapsychologist J.B. Rhine (Palmer et al, 1960).  It has been lodged against the apparent 
success of parapsychology research for decades and, despite good reasons to dismiss it, is 
currently still resorted to by many critics.  It is the nature of statistics to be sensitive to 
the ratio of positive outcomes to negative ones.  An incomplete accounting of both 
positive and negative outcomes skews the overall statistics.  Bodies of research in which 
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a large proportion of unacknowledged results lean in one direction only, will have 
misleading statistical results.  Therefore, it is essential that all available data be 
considered when performing statistical analyses.  Note that this is a form of the “total 
evidence” requirement, but one in which there is no alternative to considering all the 
evidence.  (Fortunately, in most of these cases the set of available data is finite if, 
sometimes, large in quantity.)  In practice, it is rare that every statistically-relevant datum 
is included in evaluations.  But if the vast preponderance of data is considered, a few 
missing bits are seldom noteworthy.  However, the claim as applied to parapsychology is 
that much of the negative data is missing, while mostly positive data gets published, thus 
seriously biasing the results towards high significance.   
 There are three ways of arguing against this claim.  First, it is possible that there 
is a “neutral” or even “positive” file drawer problem as a negative one.  A 1984 review of 
remote viewing by Hansen, et al (1984) discovered a file drawer of 18 studies, eight of 
which were significant.  While ten negative versus eight positive studies added to the 
overall corpus of remote viewing research would slightly move the overall significance of 
the remote viewing findings back towards the negative, the shift would be trivial – 
nowhere near enough to offset the overall significance of the total results.   
 An earlier review by skeptical parapsychologist Susan Blackmore (1980) 
examined the field of Ganzfeld research for selective publication of results, and found 32 
unpublished studies.  Twelve of these were never completed and one could not be 
analyzed due to methodological reasons.  Fourteen of the remaining 19 studies followed 
the prescribed Ganzfeld methodology sufficiently well to be included in the analyzed set.  
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Of these 14, five (just over a third) were statistically significant.  Blackmore concluded 
that “the bias introduced by selective reporting of ESP ganzfeld studies is not a major 
contributor to the overall proportion of significant  results”' (p. 217).2   Remote viewing 
researcher Ed May told me that he had a number of statistically-significant studies that he 
had just not bothered to publish.3  Parapsychologist Stephan Schwartz also recently 
communicated to me that in terms of a presumed negative file-drawer effect,  “Research 
has shown that it is rather the reverse.  People like me had a number of successful studies 
they had done that they had just not gotten around to writing up” (Schwartz, 2009).4  And 
in a telephone conversation with Dean Radin in early 2009, he told me he, too, had some 
positive studies that he hadn’t taken the time to publish. 
 A second argument against the file-drawer accusation is that, for the several 
decades the parapsychological community has made a virtue of full-disclosure by 
insisting that all data be published, whether positive or negative.  The Journal of 
Parapsychology regularly publishes reports of failed studies in a variety of 
parapsychology fields, and Parapsychological and other conferences feature reports of 
negative results alongside those presenting positive findings.  (Radin, 1997, 79)  This 
contrasts with the mainstream scientific community, in which negative reports are seldom 
published (Giles, 2006). 
 Finally, there are statistical tools that allow the assessment of whether and to what 
                                                          
 2Chance in this set of Ganzfeld experiments would be 25%  
 3Edwin May.  Email correspondence.  29 October 2009. 
 4Stephan A. Schwartz, Email correspondence, 4 September 2009. 
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degree there is a file-drawer problem.  The first of these amounts to a reductio ad 
absurdum:  start with the total statistical significance of all combined published studies of 
a certain type, and calculate how many unpublished non-significant studies of the same 
paradigm would be required to render the overall results non-significant.  If the number 
of hypothetical unpublished studies is a number of such magnitude that it would be 
highly implausible for that many studies to exist given the known number of researchers 
in the field and the logistical constraints required by that sort of research protocol, then 
one can conclude that even if there is a file-drawer effect, that cannot account for the 
significance of the published studies.  Michael Scriven (1956a) was one of the first to 
recognize the value of this argument.  He noted that the amount of time required to do an 
experiment plays a role in the possibility of file drawer (though Scriven did not use this 
term)  – if it takes a long time, there is less likelihood that many unsuccessful ones have 
been done and not published. (p.237, n.4). 
 As Radin (1997) explains, “because it is impossible to know how many other 
studies might have been in file drawers, it is common in meta-analyses to calculate how 
many unreported studies would be required to nullify the observed effects among the 
known studies” (p.80).  A meta-analysis of the Ganzfeld studies conducted jointly by 
parapsychologist Charles Honorton and skeptic Ray Hyman showed that a ratio of 15 
unpublished non-significant studies would be required to offset each published 
significant one – for a total required of 423 studies in the file-drawer (and this assumes 
no unpublished positive studies).  Hyman agreed with Honorton that a file-drawer artifact 
could not account for the positive Ganzfeld data.  (Radin, 1997, 80; Hyman & Honorton, 
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1986) 
 A further file-drawer analysis of dream ESP studies showed that 700 unpublished, 
non-significant dream studies would be needed to offset the positive results reported in 
the published literature.  Since there were approximately 20 dream researchers active in 
the field, this boils down to require 35 unpublished non-significant studies for every 
experiment that each of the 20 researchers published.  As Radin points out, the average 
dream experiment involved 27 sessions.  For the file-drawer explanation to work would 
therefore require 18,900 dream ESP sessions, lasting one night each.  That amounts to 
18,900 nights, or 50 years’ of data that would have to have gone unreported. (Radin, 
2006, 111-112)   
 To show that these sorts of meta-analysis really do work, I will cite one more 
meta-analysis designed to detect whether a file-drawer artifact was present.  The early 
staring studies were meta-analyzed and a file-drawer effect was discovered there.  Two 
findings of the analysis showed that the file-drawer error derived from the poorly-
controlled, close-proximity staring studies (Radin, 2005, 98).5   It further showed that 
“the mean effect size for close-proximity studies might be inflated due to implicit 
learning of subliminal cues” – in other words, there was sensory leakage that contributed 
to the overall significant effects, just as many reviewers had suggested. 
 Though none of the meta analyses (except those involving staring) covered the 
data I have been considering, the findings from both the Ganzfeld and dream-ESP studies 
                                                          
 5The meta-analysis also showed, however, that the ten best-controlled staring 
studies (which I included in my earlier discussion) were not vulnerable to these problems. 
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can perhaps be extrapolated – at least provisionally – to support the credibility of other 
bodies of research in the field.  At the time the Ganzfeld and dream-ESP studies were 
conducted, there was no expectation by the researchers conducting them that they would 
be examined for file-drawer artifacts.  Nonetheless, post hoc evaluation showed no file-
drawer effect.  This indicates one of two things – either that the majority of all research 
produced positive results – or  that the researchers voluntarily followed good research 
practice that requires all results to be published (or both).   
 If professional parapsychologists pursuing the Ganzfeld and dream-ESP work 
were committed to good research practice, one could with more confidence expect 
similar good practices to be followed among other professional parapsychologists who 
were researching presentiment, DMILS, and remote viewing.  Beyond this, prima facie 
evaluation allows us to recognize from the quantity of successful studies that were 
published that numbers of unpublished, non-significant studies orders-of-magnitude 
beyond what was published would be required to account for the data.  (For instance, the 
40 or so successful DMILS studies would require somewhere around 800 non-significant 
studies to bring them to chance levels; and given the greater volume of remote viewing 
work, a notably higher number would be required there). 
 
Allegation 4: Successful parapsychology experiments usually show serious 
methodological flaws that render them inadmissible. 
 
 This criticism is more substantive than either the statistical objection or the 
“negative definition” complaint.  It is, though, closely related to the “negative definition” 
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issue, in that it is basically the requirement that if extrasensory perception is to be taken 
as the explanation for an observed effect, all possible alternative explanations must be 
ruled out.  So the argument can be stated in this way:  If a methodological flaw exists that 
might account for prima facie or statistically-significant results, one cannot conclusively 
accept ESP as the explanation for the results.  Such flaws have been found.  Therefore, 
parapsychology results are invalid. 
 There are three ways to answer this.  First, it is important to note that a flaw that 
might possibly account for all or part of an apparent effect does not necessarily actually 
account for that effect.  Often, this concept is abused by those seeking to undermine the 
ESP research.   A critic may offer an alternative explanation that describes how the effect 
might have been achieved through some flaw in the experiment.  However, to be valid as 
an argument, the flaw must be shown to actually be plausibly present in the experiment, 
and this is often not done.  Such an allegation of a flaw, without demonstrating that the 
flaw was plausibly present, does not count against the experiment.  While the burden of 
proof rests squarely on the claimant when a legitimate flaw is shown to be present, the 
burden shifts to the critic if a flaw is claimed that is either not obviously present in an 
experiment, or that is too fanciful to be plausible.6   It is also necessary to show that a 
flaw that has been identified is one that really does undermine the data.  Not all flaws are 
                                                          
 6As an unscientific aside (though it illustrates the case), I once heard an interview 
on National Public Radio with skeptic James “the Amazing” Randi, where he debunked a 
claim that someone had exploded a television screen using mental powers.  Randi said – 
apparently in all seriousness – that he could duplicate the effect merely by throwing a 
brick through a television screen.  Therefore the mental explanation was false.  The claim 
might have been (and no doubt was) false on other grounds.  But surely Randi’s objection 
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relevant to the findings.  Finally, one must be sure that features identified as flaws really 
are flaws.  An example of this occurred in a review published in Nature of Dean Radin’s 
book The Conscious Universe.  The review claimed that Radin had incorrectly performed 
his meta-analyses, and that the extremely high significance values he had claimed for 
compiled parapsychology results were mistaken.  Radin was in the end proved right, but 
the ensuing controversy required the intervention of Nobel Prize winner Brian Josephson 
and physicist Nick Herbert before Nature would acknowledge it.  Despite that, it is still 
popularly believed that Radin’s statistical conclusions were in error.7
 Second, as possible flaws have been discovered and pointed out, measures have 
been taken to eliminate them in subsequent experiments.  It was already growing harder 
even two decades ago to find real flaws in many of the parapsychology research 
paradigms.  As early as 1988, for example, in a study for the Army Research Agency 
prominent skeptic Ray Hyman was having difficulty finding flaws in parapsychology 
research sufficient to account for strong effects (Smith, 2005, 372).  And in a 1995 
review of the government-sponsored research, Hyman candidly admitted he could find no 
methodological flaws that could account for the obvious effects demonstrated: “I cannot 
provide suitable candidates for what flaws, if any, may be present” (p.3-54), which he 
admits three times in his analysis of the data.8  
                                                                                                                                                                             
cannot be taken seriously. 
 7The entire controversy can be reviewed on Josephon’s website at 
http://www.tcm.phy.cam.ac.uk/~bdj10/psi/doubtsregood.html 
 8Because of his credentials as a scientist (professor of psychology at the 
University of Oregon) and his long experience in examining parapsychology research, 
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 In the same study, statistician Jessica Utts made a further argument against the 
flaw hypothesis: “The various experiments in which [significant effects have] been 
observed have been different enough that if some subtle methodological problems can 
explain the results, then there would have to be a different explanation for each type of 
experiment, yet the impact would have to be similar across experiments and 
laboratories.”  Basically, the argument is that despite improved methodologies; and 
despite different types of experiments – each with unique flaws should any be present; 
and despite research being conducted in different laboratories with different researchers – 
if flaws were the cause of the effect one would expect ESP experimental results to be far 
less robust and much more uneven than they are shown to be.  But the effects are still 
present and the results far too consistent to be produced by presumed methodological 
flaws. 
 
Allegation 5: To be taken as trustworthy, scientific findings must be replicated.  But 
parapsychological results are not replicable, therefore they do not count as legitimate 
scientific results. 
 
 In the previous chapter, I drew a distinction between repeatability and replication.  
Repeatability I considered to be a simple feature of a valid experiment in which, when 
the experiment is redone as close in procedure as possible to the original, it produces 
similar outcomes.  Most theorists would likely consider this just replication by another 
name.  However, I argued that replication has three components, drawn from among the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Hyman has often been appointed to oversight boards and blue-ribbon panels by 
government agencies specifically to evaluate psi experiments. 
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criteria I listed as desiderata for scientific evidence.  These components include 
repeatability (in other words, at least conceptually the same experiment is being 
repeated).  But also included are independence and diversity. 
 I find some support for this distinction in the literature.  Though Collins (1992) 
takes the two as being synonymous (“Repeatability, or replicability [I will use the term 
interchangeably],”  p.18) – he subsequently suggests that there is more to the notion than 
mere repeatability.  If a follow-on experiment “is too like the first then it will not add any 
confirmatory information...confirmatory power, then, seems to increase as the difference 
between the confirming experiment and the initial experiment increases” (p.34), 
suggesting that an element of diversity is important to the concept of replication.  He also 
argues for independence as a criterion for replication.  “A run conducted by another 
experimenter on the same apparatus is still more impressive [than merely a run by the 
same researcher], and a confirming run observed with a similar apparatus built and run by 
another experimenter is even better” (p.34). 
 But care must be exercised:  “For an experiment to be a test of a previous result it 
must be neither exactly the same nor too different.”   Having too much diversity in a 
replication may lead to two problems.  First (in an example from Collins), suppose a new 
development in physics is discovered by experiment.  Suppose further that it is confirmed 
by a very diverse replication, using an experimental design and equipment far different 
from the original, by someone originally skeptical of the first set of findings.  Despite the 
fact that “the differences between first experiment and second experiment were 
maximized,” it turns out the replication was done by a “skeptical fairground gypsy who 
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had generated the confirmatory result by reading the entrails of a goat!” (pp.34-35).  In 
this case, it would seem the confirmation was tainted, pointing up the fact that even 
successful replications are not always helpful if they stray too far from the paradigm 
being examined.   
 The second (and, it seems to me, more likely) problem that can occur if a 
replication includes too much diversity is that possibility of failure goes up as the 
replication strays further from the concept and execution of the original experimental 
design.  This is not a problem if the intent it to test boundary conditions and limits.  But it 
is a problem if those looking for confirmation of the original lay too much worth on the 
replications as a replication if marginal replications fail, as I mentioned previously with 
regard to Ganzfeld experiments. 
 Now for the allegation: The claim that “ESP results aren’t replicable” argument 
breaks down into three sub-assertions:   
1)  No ESP experiments replicate in any way.    
 This complaint is heard most often in informal settings, and seldom in exchanges 
involving critics and skeptics who are well-versed in parapsychology (though, see Rao, 
1984, 22-23 for a case where the claim was lodged as a serious academic objection).  
Still, it is widely believed by mainstream scientists and a broad cross-section of the 
skeptical community.  From the four domains of evidence I have presented it is obvious 
that this general statement is mistaken, and requires no further discussion. 
 
 2)  Psi experiments don’t replicate consistently (e.g., sometimes they do, 
sometimes they don’t). 
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   There is more substance to this objection.  As we have seen, there are times when 
repetitions and replications fail, and the reasons for the failure are obvious.  However, 
there are instances of failures when it is unclear why they have failed.  Inconsistent 
replication is not necessarily an indication a phenomenon does not exist.  What it does 
indicate, however, is that the phenomena involved are not well understood.  There are 
clearly conditions, environments, functional boundaries, and so on that remain obscure, 
and which can only be defined by further trial-and-error experimentation.   
 The history of magnetism as a phenomenon may serve to illuminate this point.  
Before a fully developed electromagnetic theory became available, magnetism was 
somewhat of a mystery.  We can imagine that when it was first discovered, it was unclear 
as to the conditions under which magnetism was present.  Under certain conditions it was 
attractive, under others it was repulsive.  And under still others, it was inert.   Some 
materials manifest magnetic properties, while others never did.  And some possessed no 
magnetic properties at first, but became magnetic with sufficient time and exposure.  
 By analogy, this somewhat describes the situation we encounter with extrasensory 
perception and other relevant parapsychological phenomena.  One major difference is 
that magnetism by comparison is a fairly simple property whose basic operating 
parameters could be determined through elementary trial-and-error folk experiments, 
even when no explanatory theoretical context was yet at hand to account for it.  
Parapsychological phenomena, on the other hand are much less tractable if only because 
they deal with complex adaptive biological systems (humans) and involve frequently 
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subjective experience that must be objectified through indirect means (much as in the 
case of psychology in general).  This means that on occasion replications fail for 
unknown reasons.  This does not mean that there is nothing there to replicate. 
 
3) Even when psi experiments show relatively frequent replication, it is not 
precise – in other words, each series of attempts produces results that while 
similar, still vary from one experiment to the next. 
 
    This is the crux of the objection concerning ESP and replication.  “As has often 
been noted in criticism of parapsychology,” writes Patrick Grim, “the experimental 
results do not appear to be consistently repeatable” (Grim, 1987, 141).  No one disagrees 
that the consistency of many replications differ from one successful replication to another 
with respect to significance levels, quality of results, and so on.  This complaint goes 
beyond the problem of incomplete understanding of the phenomena as I discussed above, 
to hinge on a faulty notion of replication.  Karl Popper observed that “all repetitions 
which we experience are approximate repetitions”; that they are not identical to the 
original experiment; but that they are “only more or less similar” (Popper, 1959, in 
Collins, 1992, 29).  In a provocative article in Nature, Jim Giles explores the replication 
controversy in mainstream science.  He finds that “It is simply the case that the 
replication of results, a process absolutely central to science, is not always possible,” and 
asks rhetorically “what happens when attempts to replicate an interesting experiment fail.  
At what point does ‘unreplicated’ give way to ‘unreplicable’?” (Giles, 2006, 344)    
Indeed – in some disciplines (e.g., paleontology and cosmology) “results are corroborated 
rather than reproduced” (p.345). 
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 Surprisingly, replication is relatively rare in mainstream science, as Giles 
discovered in trying to track down replications of a number of scientific reports in Nature 
(pp.344-345).   Rao notes that “in normal science, repetition of an experiment or the 
possibility of it is not a matter of primary experience.” (Rao, 1984, 22).  Collins affirms 
this: 
  
One important and ironic support for the common sense view is that replication of 
others’ findings and results is an activity that is rarely practiced...Science reserves 
its highest honors for those who do things first, and a confirmation of another’s 
work merely confirms that the other is prize worthy.  A confirmation, if it is to be 
worth anything in its own right, must be done in an elegant new way or in a 
manner that will noticeably advance the state of the art. (1992, 19) 
 
 This changes with parapsychology (and other borderlands of science).  “It is only 
when the existence of some phenomenon is cast into doubt,” Collins says, “that attempts 
are made to use replicability as a test” (p.20).   Rao explains why:  “in controversial 
sciences and when anomalous claims are made, replication takes on greater importance 
because questions that are of secondary concern in normal science are now raised to a 
level of primary importance.” 
 This tells us that there is no escaping the focus on replicability that has been 
aimed at the parapsychological enterprise.  But it is not as onerous as many believe, as in 
an interesting way it makes parapsychology more like the rest of science.  This is so 
because it turns out that, even in mainstream science, replication is not the cut and dried 
process that a naive view takes it to be.  Inexact, imprecise replications are more common 
in mainstream science than most are aware, not just in parapsychology.  Giles reports on 
examples of replications (both observational and experimental) gone somewhat awry in 
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astronomy and biology – one, possibly because the original results were wrongly 
interpreted; the other because would-be replicators couldn’t get the procedure down 
properly.  This was the issue with a case documented by Collins, the attempted 
replication of the TEA CO2 laser.  Even though detailed schematics were published and 
scientists interesting in replicating the device were able to consult directly with the 
originators, attempted replications failed eight times (including one major government 
lab).  (Collins, 1992; Rao, 1984) 
 Giles observes that “it is often hard to tell whether an inability to replicate a result 
is due to a group’s failings or a flaw in the original” design.  The problem may even be 
inherent in the phenomena one investigates.  An example from biology presented by 
Hempel (1945, 19), challenges the expectation that monozygotic twins are identical in 
appearance.  They never are – in some cases there are only subtle differences, but in 
some cases differences are significant.  And attempting to predict behavior traits from 
genetics and environment is notoriously imprecise.  Psychology, the discipline with most 
in common with parapsychology, has problems with replication – often in the same ways 
as does parapsychology.  What we see, then, is that it is not just parapsychology that has 
a problem with replication, but it exists in mainstream science as well.  That by no means 
lets parapsychologists off the hook.  But it does indicate that struggles with replication 
are not reasons to reject it as a science, nor to dismiss the evidence it provides. 
 
Allegation 6: Fraud is prevalent in parapsychology, and much of the success of 
parapsychology research was dubiously obtained . 
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 The argument of fraud is often the final resort of critics when confronted with 
successful parapsychological results for which they cannot otherwise account. (Pinch, 
1979; Hardin, 1981; Hansel, 1981; Brewer & Chinn, 1994; Lin, 2007)  This argument is 
traceable at least as far back as Hume’s “Of Miracles,” in which Hume declares that he 
would sooner believe a miracle was perpetrated by fraud, even if implausible, than first 
accept that a miracle really had occurred (Hume, Enquiries, x:91; Pinch, 1979, 332; 
Hardin, 1981).  The perception of parapsychology as a field with a high rate of fraud 
likely dates to the 19th Century, when a number of spiritualists and trance-mediums were 
caught counterfeiting various ghostly effects.  Critics also often conflate scientific 
parapsychology with the realm of “popular parapsychology,” which adds to a false 
impression of lack of methodological care, and openness to cheating.    
 However, fraud as an explanation for scientific parapsychological effects is much 
less tenable today.  Researchers have continually tweaked protocols to make them 
increasingly resistant to the possibility of fraud – not because researchers are otherwise 
likely to cheat, but because of the need to eliminate any possible loop-hole that could be 
exploited as a way of accounting for positive results without having to consider that 
extrasensory perception is real.   
 It is possible that occasional instances of fraud might still be present in 
parapsychology.  But it certainly cannot be prevalent, and in any case could not account 
for the extensive positive results.  Skeptic Ray Hyman admits the incidence of fraud is 
relatively low in scientific parapsychology, but also alludes to a further relevant point 
that is a consequence of hints of fraud, whether true or false:  “The few, but well-
 341
publicized, cheating scandals that were uncovered ...worked against parapsychology's 
acceptance into the general scientific community” (Hyman, 1995, p.3-47).  Though fraud 
is not unknown in mainstream science, finding it there does not have nearly the impact on 
legitimacy as it does in parapsychology.  Cheating by one or two scientists in, say, 
physics, is not generally taken to reflect on the integrity of all physicists.   Catching one 
or two parapsychologists falsifying data would tend to damage the reputations of all 
parapsychologists, deserving or not, though with no more justification.   Ironically, 
parapsychologists as a class are likely to be more trustworthy for two reasons – they 
know they are under scrutiny, and the benefits of fraud that may accrue in mainstream 
science (lucrative grants, better employment prospects, increased support) are all but 
unavailable to parapsychologists.  Perhaps even more ironically, parapsychologists tend 
to be even more vigilant in watching for fraud among their peers.  Contrary to popular 
perception, few skeptics have detected instances of fraud in scientific parapsychology – 
but parapsychologists themselves have been active in ferreting out possible fraudulent 
research.  (Rhine, 1974; Hansen, 1990) 
 As it stands, the argument from fraud in parapsychology is dubious.  Even if fraud 
is present, it is likely to be at too small a scale to bias overall results.  In a argument 
similar to that used against the likelihood of methodological flaws, Utts observes, “If 
fraud were responsible [for claimed parapsychological effects].it would require an 
equivalent amount of fraud on the part of a large number of experimenters or an even 
larger number of subjects” (1995, p.3-30).  Were fraud of any significant degree present 
in parapsychology, keeping it hidden among a group of individuals as relatively large and 
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 An argument very often launched against parapsychological evidence is that it 
lacks theoretical justification.  The argument runs something like this: grant for the sake 
of the argument that ESP evidence was produced by accepted rules of scientific research; 
that it was not produced by fraud; and that it is not the result of erroneous interpretation – 
that, in short, it was legitimately produced and can be taken to be on par with other 
sufficiently respectable scientific evidence.  Yet this is still not enough for us to take ESP 
seriously, because there is no acceptable theoretical context that can explain such 
evidence.  And without such a theory, science is justified in rejecting it, despite its 
provenance and bona fides. 
 An excellent example of this argument was lodged by Steven D. Hales against a 
thesis argued for by Robert Almeder in favor of death survival, specifically reincarnation.  
Almeder had offered what Hales adjudged to be “the best set of arguments for the thesis 
that some people survive their deaths” that Hales had ever seen.  Almeder presented a 
number of evidential accounts such as apparitions, possession, reincarnation, 
mediumship, and so on, and then concluded that so strong was the evidence that “one 
would be irrational not to believe in life after death” (Hales, 2001, 336).  I have no 
interest here in defending the thesis of death survival, the empirical evidence for which I 
believe is notably weaker than that for ESP.  However, the form of the argument Hales 
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uses in rebuttal to the survival hypothesis can, as he insists, “be employed against all 
paranormal claims that are inconsistent with what are antecedently considered the best 
theories of the world” (Hales, 2001, 343).    
 The argument Hales aims to refute is the following: “If there is such-and-such 
evidence, then we should believe in reincarnation; there is such-and-such evidence; 
therefore we should believe in reincarnation.”9   But he argues that even the best 
evidence is insufficient to prove reincarnation is true.  The reason is that the evidence for 
reincarnation is crucially different than other kinds of scientific evidence in that it is 
inconsistent with our “best theories.”  In fact, “reincarnation is not consistent with either 
our best empirical theories or with our best philosophical theories about the mind” all of 
which involve some form of materialism (pp.338-339).   So no matter how good the 
empirical evidence for reincarnation is, since there is no theory accompanying it, we 
should reject it.10  “Suppose one were to argue in the following way,” Hales suggests 
  if we are justified in believing theory T (e.g., materialism about the mind), and we 
know that T implies not-p (e.g., that there are no reincarnating Cartesian egos), 
then we are justified in believing not-p.  Add to this, á la Almeder, that we are not 
justified in believing not-p, on the grounds that there is evidence in favor of 
reincarnation.  Therefore, by modus tollens we are not justified in believing that 
                                                          
 9Framed in this perhaps somewhat oversimplified way, my own argument might 
go something like this: “If there is such-and-such evidence, physicalism (at least in part) 
is false.  There is such evidence.  Therefore physicalism is false.”  The ‘such-and-such’ 
locution can be replaced by “ESP,” so: “If ESP is real and non-physical, then physicalism 
is false.  Evidence is strong that ESP is real and non-physical.  Therefore, physicalism is 
likely false.” 
 10Hales here approvingly cites Sir Arthur Eddington: “one should never believe 
any experiment until it is confirmed by theory,” apparently missing the point that 
Eddington was facetiously objecting to a position closely resembling that which Hales 
advocates. 
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theory T is true. (339) 
 
But this, Hales believes, leads to “extreme skepticism.”  All theories, even the best 
attested ones, have some anomalous data in their backgrounds that could serve as counter 
evidence.  But there is “no a priori way” of sorting out what of this anomalous data may 
be truly anomalous, as opposed to that which may eventually turn out to be 
accommodated under existing theory, which of it is merely a result of flawed procedures, 
which is attributable to fraud, and so on.  So just because we run into data that is 
inconsistent with our best theories, that is no justification to reject the data without a 
suitable explanation as to why it is false.  To do otherwise results in an epistemic impasse 
where “no theory is justified” if there is any contrarian evidence against it.  Hence, it is 
better to hold to a well-attested theory and assume that it is the contravening evidence 
that is misconstrued or ill-formed.   
 At first this objection seems reasonable.  But at this point Hales goes seriously 
astray.  Epistemic conservatism requires, he believes, that “any hypothesis that explains 
the data in a way consistent with our best theories is, ceteris paribus, superior to any 
explanatory hypothesis inconsistent with our best theories” (p.341, emphasis added).  
And he means this to be taken to its logical extremes.  “[E]ven a far-fetched explanation 
like mind-controlling [extra-terrestrials] is superior to reincarnation” (p.343) because of 
the way it preserves physicalism in the face of a Cartesian onslaught.  There are 
“indefinitely many such hypotheses” which can sustain a physicalist explanation in the 
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face of a non-physical explanation.11   Based on Bayesian prior probabilities, he believes 
that even the most obscure and poorly-defended physicalist hypothesis trumps even the 
best attested antiphysicalist evidence.  
 This may not reflect the position of other physicalists; perhaps there is a threshold 
beyond which they are more likely to take anti-physicalist evidence seriously.  But what 
Hales argues in summing up his position, most physicalists should find more congenial.  
Since most scientists and philosophers have the same starting position of physicalism 
with regard to the mind, they are strongly inclined to conservative explanations that 
reconcile anomalous data consistently with physicalist theories.  Hypotheses that do this 
are “epistemically superior” to any that are contrary to physicalism.  This, according to 
Hales, is a “desideratum” that parapsychologists mistakenly “fail to heed” in believing 
that the evidence they have is persuasive. 
 Hales sums up his argument with an appeal to the history of science.  One should 
not abandon an important explanatory theory until one has an equally good or 
(presumably) better one to put in its place – even if the older one is obviously deficient.  
“[I]t would have been epistemically wrong-headed,” he observes, “to abandon 
geocentrism and its epicycles without its Copernican (and perhaps Keplerian) 
replacement.”  This is something with which Jaegwon Kim agrees.  “To motivate the 
discarding of a framework, we need independent reasons – we should be able to show it 
to be deficient, incomplete, or flawed in some fundamental way, independently of the 
                                                          
 11Note that Hales does not endorse a space-alien-practicing-mind-control-on-
humans thesis.  He considers this highly implausible.  It just is less implausible than is 
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fact that it generates puzzles and problems that we are unable to deal with” (2005, 30).  
To illustrate the point, Hales calls upon an amusing analogy of a “dark-sucker” 
hypothesis for light bulbs, versus the standard light-emitting hypothesis.  There are many 
pieces of evidence to support a dark-sucking hypothesis, such as the fact that the room 
fills with dark as soon as the dark-sucking bulb is turned off, and so on.  But the dark-
sucking theory fails because it fails to cohere with our best theories, which offer better 
alternative explanations against the dark-sucking thesis. 
 There are four ways in which Hales’ argument begs the question.  First, his 
argument that one should ignore anomalous data in the interest of theory preservation 
depends greatly on what quantities of data are under consideration.  In the face of a few 
data elements that seem unreconcilable with the preferred theory, his points seems 
reasonable.  But it hardly follows that just because we can safely wink at a trivial amount 
of contrary evidence we should without twinge of conscience, be able to turn the same 
blind eye to much larger quantities of it.  Any theory is likely to rapidly erode as the 
quantity and quality of the anomalous data increases.   In terms of ESP, Hales’ argument 
seriously underestimates the amount and quality of the data available.  As Kuhn has 
argued, sufficient quantities of well-attested anomalous data can seriously undermine 
established theories. 
 Second, as Hales illustrates in the light-emitter vs. dark-sucker case, our best 
theories have far better explanations for how a light bulb lightens a room than does the 
competing dark-sucker challenger.  However, in the case of parapsychology, once one 
                                                                                                                                                                             
reincarnation – or, by extension, ESP. 
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removes all the mundane explanations: cuing, sensory leakage, methodological flaws, 
fraud, and so on – our “best theories” have nothing to offer as an explanatory alternative. 
 Third, Hales misses the point of the parapsychologist argument: that the reason 
why what are considered the best theories are considered the best is because in the case 
of extrasensory perception the proponents of the “best” theories have all along ignored or 
marginalized the evidence for claims that threaten their position.  If that data were fully 
and properly taken into account, perhaps the “best” theories would no longer count as the 
best. 
 Finally, on the matter of theory change, it is true that one should be careful of 
abandoning a theory that works in the absence of anything suitable to replace them.  “For 
a false theory (with high verisimilitude) may yet be the only hope to guide research,” 
Jonathan Adler notes.  “It is better, that is, than no theory at all.  Refutation at t requires 
rejection in principle, but not rejection at t” (1989, 237).  Hales and Adler join a long list 
of distinguished opponents of parapsychology in this sentiment.  But to see where they 
all miss the point, consider the construction of Hales’ argument.  Both this “dark-sucker” 
versus light-emitter theory and the geocentrism vs. heliocentrism pairing represent the 
superiority of certain epistemically-complete theories in which consequences can be 
deduced and demonstrated from objective observations.  Both sets of theories are or 
conceivably could be (in the dark-sucker case) constituent theories of physicalism.  But 
the universal formulation of physicalism – that everything is physical – is of a different 
character and quality than are its constituent theories.  It is open-ended, in that short of 
total evidence no amount of data can come close to fully confirming it.  Contrastingly, in 
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the case of heliocentrism, the theory is falsifiable in principle in a Popperian sense, but 
we would be hard-put to actually falsify it in reality.  This is not because falsifying 
heliocentrism would be hard to do if it really were false.  It would be hard to do  because 
we already have almost all the evidence that could ever exist on whether the Sun really is 
the center of the Solar System, such as to make the theory virtually incontrovertible.  As 
much as we can know anything in science, we know that the planets revolve around the 
Sun in elliptical orbits that follow precise rules for which we have a multiplicity of 
diverse, independent confirmatory evidence.  The universal formulation of physicalism 
has no such support.   
 Hales and many others make the following argument:   For one theory to replace 
another it is necessary that the replacement provide equal or better explanatory power 
across all the phenomena that the theory being replaced covers.  If there is no suitable 
replacement theory that can explain all the phenomena, then it is better to stick with an 
imperfect or even false theory rather than have no theory at all.  There is no such 
explanatory theory for ESP.  Therefore ESP evidence gains no traction against 
physicalism.    
 But this argument is fallacious.  Those such as myself who take seriously 
evidence for extrasensory perception, do not offer it as a replacement for the well-
established framework of theories that comprises the explanatory context for the physical 
world.  ESP is no threat to the vast bulk of constituent theories under physicalism, only to 
the universal meta-claim to exclusivity.   
 Universal physicalism is a metaphysical claim about the universe and is not itself 
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an explanatory theoretical  framework in the same sense as, say, cosmology or virology.  
Indeed, universal physicalism is a thesis that is over and above – and to some extent 
independent of – its subordinate constituent theories.  On the one hand, the discoveries, 
structure, subject matter, and methodologies of chemistry, biology, geology or even 
physics are for the most part unaffected whether universal physicalism is true or not.  On 
the other hand universal physicalism draws upon all the physical and special sciences for 
support of its only claim – that everything is physical.  And the support thus lent is rather 
weak – for example, chemistry is about physical things.  There is no plausibly non-
physical evidence against chemistry as there is against universal physicalism.  Since 
chemistry falls under the umbrella-theory of physicalism, that part of physicalism is 
demonstrably physical.  But for the most part the physical and special sciences don’t 
directly say anything about whether the universal claim itself holds or not.   
 Everything doesn’t have to be physical for seismology, optics, or particle physics 
to retain their legitimacy.  The reality of ESP does not undermine chemistry; it is no 
threat to biology, geology, thermodynamics, astronomy, genetics, paleontology, zoology, 
physics, and so on.  But it is a threat to universal physicalism.  Ironically, it is also a 
perceived threat to psychology, possibly the one science that seems to feel most 
threatened by ESP12 (though other social sciences may feel the resultant pinch).  
Psychology is only vulnerable, though, insofar as certain features of mind turn out not to 
be physical – causing a certain discomfiture to the prevailing metaphysical commitment 
                                                          
 12It is perhaps thus no accident that psychologists represent a sizable contingent 
among the skeptical ranks. 
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in psychology that everything mental must be physical – while leaving the bulk of 
psychology unscathed. 
 What all this means is that extrasensory perception requires explanation, but is 
not obligated to include a full-blown replacement theory for physicalism as a fully-
featured theory.  Perhaps an explanation for parapsychological phenomena would have a 
starting point somewhat along these lines: “There are features to mind and the universe 
that are non-physical.”  On the face of it, this formulation seems minimalistic.  It would 
clearly require some filling out.  But some details are already available, and with further 
study many more could be added.   
 The following specification should suffice for a start: “Some things in the world 
are non-physical.”  Notice, this is construed at the same hierarchal level that the universal 
formulation of physicalism occupies: “Everything is physical” is of the same level of 
specification as “Some things are non-physical.”13  Note as well that the ESP claims 
carry the same metaphysical weight as a minimal physicalist claim: “There are things that 
are physical” vs. “There are things that are non-physical.”  These two claims are 
compatible.   
 Universal physicalism, however, makes a more radical claim:  Not just some 
things – nor even most things – but everything is physical.   Extrasensory perception is 
very much incompatible with this, even if ESP’s claim is merely existential, rather than 
universal.  But the incompatibility goes both ways.  “Everything in the world is physical” 
                                                          
 13Note that “everything” and “something” are meant to be taken strictly as general 
placeholder terms, and not as a commitment to what kinds or categories the “things” thus 
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is itself incompatible with the claim that “There are some things in the world that are 
non-physical.”   
 The “Everything in the world is physical” claim is much harder to defend than is 
the claim “everything in physics is physical,” or the claim that “everything in chemistry 
is physical.”14  As I have, I think shown, the claim that “There are some things in the 
world that are non-physical” is easier to support.  It is apparently not much harder than 
that to show that everything in physics is physical – whether those who disbelieve it are 
willing to be persuaded or not. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
referred to belong. 
 14Ignoring, of course abstracta and possibly some relations. 
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 Eleven chapters ago I set out to discover whether physicalism could be falsified.  
I have established that extrasensory perception is a real phenomena based on sound 
scientific evidence.  I have shown that, as a consequence of ESP being real, universal 
physicalism as construed now and for the foreseeable future, is false.  I have nearly, but 
not completely succeeded in showing that any future universal description of physicalism 
is also plausibly false.  I will now expand on these conclusions. 
 My argument began with an examination of the universal formulation of 
physicalism, to see in what way it might prove vulnerable.  I noticed that physicalism 
was based on inductive evidence and its truth grounded in a robust inference-to-the-best-
explanation (ITBE).  Several things soon became clear:  First, that the usual 
antiphysicalist arguments failed – not because they were false, but largely because they 
were inconclusive enough that they were easily overcome by physicalism’s presumption 
of truth; second, that physicalism’s weak point seemed to be the causal closure 
assumption – which specifies that no causation can intrude into the physical world from 
beyond it.  If closure could be shown to be false, then universal physicalism would 
automatically follow. 
 I came to believe that the best falsifier would be a causal chain that started inside 
the physical universe, exited it, then reentered at some further point.  This would be an 
intermittently truncated causal chain – an ITCC – and if I found one, it would be 
evidence that closure, and hence physicalism, was false.  I first found and presented four 
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research paradigms that seemed to fit the bill as ITCCs to work as closure-violators.  But 
then I had to show that they really counted as closure violators by exploring various non-
closure-violating alternative explanations for both precognition and perception-at-a-
distance.  Finding no alternatives, I next had to assess the evidence for the candidate 
violators against seven criteria expected of legitimate scientific evidence.  My candidate 
closure violators passed muster.  Finally, I argued that several long-standing criticisms 
against the credibility of my closure violators were themselves not credible.   
 Now that I have found not just one, but four categories of closure-violating 
ITCCs, with numerous actual instances of causal closure violations within each 
paradigm, I am confident I have achieved my goal of offering a credible, substantive 
challenge to the universal physicalism claim.  I am equally confident that my challenge 
will not be met with equanimity from those whose careers and personal beliefs may be 
invested in physicalism.  
 But despite the data I have presented and my supporting arguments, I am not as 
confident that I have also attained my further objective:  to show that physicalism – in its 
universal construal – is false.  I will get to that shortly. 
 I wish to be clear at the outset what is being argued.  I expressly do not assert that 
physicalism as a thesis about the physical world is false.  In fact, this cannot be done, as 
the world described by the theoretical components of physicalism is clearly physical.  Up 
to this point, the form of my argument might be considered simplistic: Physicalism 
claims that nothing exists that is not either physical or strictly a consequence of physical 
facts; a certain category of evidence strongly attests that there are at least some non-
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physical features involved with the universe in some way; thus, physicalism is false.   As 
Melnyk says,  
physicalism is false if there is even one causal or contingent token – past, present 
or future – that falls within the scope of [the physical world] and that is neither a 
token of a physical type nor a physically realized token of a functional 
type...Whether there exists any direct evidence against [physicalism] is an entirely 
a posteriori matter. (Melnyk, 2003a, 175) 
 
The evidence I have provided demonstrates many causal tokens that can’t plausibly be 
described as either a physical type or a physically realized functional token. 
 Up to this point, my thesis is not especially novel.  Many over the years have 
argued informally, and a few formally, that parapsychology phenomena are convincing 
testimony against the universal formulation of physicalism.  Where my argument is 
unique is in the way I have tried systematically to place the evidence in a framework of 
argumentation that shows its evidentiary value to its best advantage. 
 
Implications for Physical Science 
 There are those who will be disturbed by the implications of my argument.   
Physical scientists, for example, might be among the worriers at first.  But soon I think 
they will realize that there is no reason why they should be particularly bothered by my 
conclusion.  Whether physicalism is universally true or not affects their research domains 
very little.   As Barbara Montero says, denying causal closure  
would not amount to the denial of a compete physics...that is, one can deny that 
physical effects have only physical causes while accepting that science can 
nonetheless provide a complete (causal) explanation of all the physical effects. A 
fortiori, our dreams of a complete science of the physical world need not be 
shattered if we were to deny [closure] (2003, 177). 
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 If scientists are dubious or distrustful, let them learn the appropriate protocols and 
do their own replications.  Despite complaints from the popular media of “millions 
wasted” on ESP research, as it stands, parapsychology has been a shoe-string effort since 
its inception.1  More attention from objective, mainstream researchers would be 
welcome.   
Limiting Physical Explanation 
 There will be some who might become anxious about the admittance of a non-
physical element to the universe, for fear it may take something away from science.  A 
frequently-voiced complaint about Cartesian dualism is that, if the world really is divided 
up into physical substance and mental (e.g., non-physical) substance, such that the mental 
substance was wholly other than physical, there would be no way to know anything 
conclusive about one entire aspect of the universe.   
 If extrasensory perception does bespeak non-physical causality, many who take it 
merely at first blush worry that it poses the same threat as Cartesianism.  According to 
Montero, denying closure “is thought to amount to the view that there are phenomena 
that will permanently elude scientific explanation.  In Kim’s words, if the physical world 
were not causally closed, then ‘to explain some physical events you must go outside the 
physical realm and appeal to nonphysical causal agents and laws governing their 
                                                          
 1If one were to tally up all the monies spent on parapsychology over the past 130 
years, it would pay for perhaps ten MRI machines, or just over half of one F-18 Super 
Hornet, the Navy’s best jet fighter (compare that to the almost $4 billion price tag of 
CERN’s Large Hadron Collider – which would buy 73 Super Hornets, or 1,300 MRI 
machines). 
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behavior!’” (Montero, 2003, 178)2   
 The worry here goes mostly to the nature of mind.  But it is not necessarily the 
case that acknowledging some non-physical aspects to the universe (especially to mind) 
leads to a dead end. Even if human minds have features that tie into some non-physical 
aspect of the world (as ESP seems to demonstrate) that does not mean that the mind is 
completely – or likely even mostly – outside the range of physical exploration.  Physical 
aspects of the mind and brain must still be explored, and just because some element of 
mind may be non-physical does not put it beyond our ability to learn something about it 
(the same could be said for Cartesian minds, for that matter).  Mental components of 
various parapsychological phenomena clearly have effects in the physical universe – 
otherwise, we would not have significant correlations between helping episodes and EEG 
traces or fMRI results in DMILS experiments, or accurate sketches and 3-D models 
produced in remote viewing sessions.  These components can still be explored, if only to 
explicitly define where the junction between physical and non-physical may be.  I return 
to my earlier discussion of dark matter for an analogy.   
 By definition (and experiment) dark matter is undetectable by standard 
observational methods and instruments.  Yet scientists think its presence is demonstrated 
by the gravitational effects it seems to exert on the rest of the universe.  It may not be 
directly observable, but indirect measures point to its existence.  The same is somewhat 
                                                          
 2For some, the worry here is how the existence of a non-physical aspect to the 
world might undermine dreams of a neatly-packaged explanation that ties all of our 
theories together in one integrated bundle.  But this kind of closure is a psychological, 
not a scientific need, and in any case, if there is a non-physical aspect to the world, it 
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true as well for our observations of the subatomic particles that populate our theories of 
standard matter and energy.  We have no direct observational data of electrons, protons, 
or neutrons – we instead rely on indirect indications, such as tracks in cloud chambers or 
in sensitive emulsions.  Yet we learn new things about unobservables all the time.  No 
doubt there are things about a non-physical domain we might never learn.  But to 
conclude therefore that there is nothing objective we could learn is short-sighted.  In 
ways similar to how we find out about quarks, we may through inference, 
instrumentation, and experiment with the best ESP-detectors we have access to – humans 
– discover much we would never have otherwise suspected.  
 One can see the importance of acknowledging non-physicality (assuming that, as 
my argument implies, it is real) on a possible-worlds account.  Possible worlds analysis is 
often used to show the modal force of various propositions.  It is often called on to 
illustrate physicalism, to wit: “minimally physical duplicate” (MPD): Physicalism 
implies that any minimally physical duplicate world will be a duplicate simplicitur, 
meaning that there is nothing over and above the physical.  However, if psi is real – and 
influential – then a world without it could never be a MPD of a world with it (that could 
only work if non-physical phenomena are epiphenomenal).  Therefore, a world with 
causal non-physical inputs will physically look and be different from a physical world 
without it, even if that world contains every physical particle and every physical cause 
the psi-influenced world does.  This is what ESP experiments mean to show on the mid- 
                                                                                                                                                                             
does no good to wish it away. 
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to large-scale3 – that situations otherwise in all respects similar will have different 
outcomes depending on whether there is input from TCCs or ITCCs. 
 
Implication of Rejecting the Data 
 There is a corollary to the preceding principle.  If we reject the data and retain our 
faith in universal physicalism, and nevertheless the universe does have non-physical 
features which we ignore, that could in its own way undermine the progress of science.  
Suppose there are some features of the physical universe that to be understood require a 
full understanding of how non-physical interactions influence them.  Without a 
realization of the interaction, scientists might research indefinitely and either come up 
with no solution, or with a theory that never quite matches the phenomenon being 
examined.  It is also possible that scientists might try to understand a phenomenon that 
ultimately cannot be understood at all by physical science because of some 
unacknowledged non-physical component.  In that case years and resources might be 
used up and still reach no conclusion.  That doesn’t mean such research would be useless 
– there would still be much about the physical universe that might be discovered.  But 
even complete physical theories would be unachievable, and science would not know 
why.  As it appears for now and for any physicalistic explanatory frameworks we can 
reasonably anticipate, the latter point describes the status of scientific understanding of 
                                                          
 3That is, from the level of anomalous autonomic nervous-system (ANS) activation 
(mid-scale as compared to micro-scale nuclear and sub-nuclear phenomena) to the level 
of accurate sketching and 3-D modeling of target locations through anomalous processes 




The Problem of Religion 
 Another concern that will occur to some revolves around the question of religion.  
Might I not be re-opening the door to the “Demon-Haunted World” of religion and 
superstition made famous by astronomer and noted skeptic Carl Sagan (1995)?   Probably 
not.  Michael Scriven (1956) draws an analogy between religious beliefs, that is “beliefs 
in the existence of a specifically religious experience that involves communication with a 
supernatural being, or a specific act of creation involving homo sapiens, or miraculous 
healing,” and this view of parapsychological phenomena.  Where religious claims differ 
from parapsychology claims, Scriven notes, is that claims of psi experience generally 
focus on the actuality of the phenomena in question, whereas religion makes 
metaphysical claims that have “specific theoretical import,” which are in addition 
“disturbingly evanescent.”  Of course, my thesis goes beyond just arguing for the reality 
of psi phenomenon, to the implying of a metaphysical argument – that the physical world 
is in fact not all there is; that the evidence argues for some non-physical aspect of the 
universe as well.  Metaphysical claims are notoriously difficult (if one were a logical 
positivist one might even say impossible) to ground.  But my implied argument leaves a 
gap between the existential claims for extrasensory perception and the often dogmatic 
metaphysical claims of religion.   
 Readers tempted towards criticism of this position should be cautious, however: 
Even if my argument implies the existence of some non-physical aspect to the universe, I 
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propose no explanation, description, doctrine, or assumption about what that aspect might 
turn out to be.  The possible solutions range from mere property dualism as argued for by 
David Chalmers and others, to a realm of influence on the same level of ontology as 
matter, with only ephemeral impact on the physical world, to a companion non-physical 
world keeping pace with our own, to a full-blown spiritual realm peopled by angels, 
supreme being(s), and so on.  My project does not commit itself to any one of these 
views, and I am in fact decidedly not trying to imply the latter – though if my argument 
goes through, even such a religiously-relevant domain will be shown to be possible 
(though by no means to be taken as granted).    
 When I was giving an overview of this project to someone very early in the 
process, my interlocutor exclaimed, “why, you’re trying to prove the existence of the 
human soul!”  I am, however, doing no such thing.  Nothing that has gone before in these 
pages, and nothing that follows will prove, or even indicate the existence of the human 
soul or any other ontologically non-physical being.  On the other hand, die-hard 
physicalists are likely to find my thesis disconcerting, since what I’m arguing for does 
seem to allow the possibility that human souls or other such entities exist.  But merely 
allowing for an uncomfortable possibility should not stand in the way of nor be held 
against a sound argument well-grounded in evidence. 
 
 There will be those who want to push back against my argument.  They may 
respond that my conclusion is premature.  As both Duhem and Quine have in their own 
ways argued, hypotheses and theories are tested not in a vacuum, but in a larger, 
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interconnected theoretical framework, and an apparent falsification may be waylaid by 
calling upon auxiliary hypotheses or adjusting the theory somewhere else in the 
explanatory schema.  On these grounds, there are two ways a physicalist might respond 
to my argument:  1)  Perhaps there is some aspect of physical theory we have overlooked 
or which has not yet been discovered which can account for these seemingly non-
physical phenomena; and 2) even if there are some non-physical features of the universe 
physics doesn’t account for, that doesn’t invalidate those implications of the doctrine 
which apply to the physical aspects of the universe (for example:  some physicalists have 
been willing to tolerate the possibility of epiphenomenal non-physical properties).   
 
A Weaker Version of Physicalism? 
 I shall entertain the first of these objections later in this chapter.  But as to the 
second, I already acknowledged that I have no objection to the idea that recognizing there 
may be things that are non-physical does not negate the status of all the things that are 
physical.  Rather, I defend a much narrower assertion than the falsity of all of physical 
science.  My argument is that the universal construal of physicalist doctrine, that 
everything is physical (or a consequence of physical facts), is false.  As I have said 
before, this leaves the bulk of physicalism as it pertains to the physical and special 
sciences unscathed.  It further in no way undermines science’s continuing project of 
exploring the physical properties, entities, qualities, principles and relationships wherever 
that might lead.  For the most part, science can go on essentially the same as before.  If 
anything, it gives science more to do: explore the boundaries of this newly acknowledged 
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frontier of reality, and find out more about how it works.   
 More specifically, I dispute the sort of contention illustrated by Melnyk in the 
following passage: 
 
But despite their nonidentity with properties that are mentioned as such in 
fundamental physics, mental properties are nevertheless physical in the following 
broader sense: the mental properties of all actual possessors of mental properties 
are only ever realized by the appropriate role playing of their possessors’ 
fundamental physical properties.  Nothing in the nature of mental properties rules 
out the possibility that they should have been realized by properties of some 
utterly different kind, even by ectoplasmic properties (if such there could be); but 
in fact, they never are. (Melnyk, 2003a, 8). 
 
By ‘current physics’ Melnyk means: “...those theories that are the object of consensus 
among current physicalists,” determined by looking through physics textbooks. (Melnyk, 
2003a, 15)  But this has the effect of preserving a status quo, even if it is wrong. 
 Both Melnyk (2003a) and Kim (2005) talk about connecting up macro objects, 
events, properties, and so on to “functional types” as a form of physicalistic reduction.  
These functional types are not necessarily physical – they just depend on physical 
realizers to exist, physicalism being true.  But (psi being real) why can’t some functional 
types be realized by non-physical causes?   Some may worry that I appear about to 
advocate dualism as a solution, but that is not necessarily the case.   
 My account may in fact imply a “dualistic” solution without arguing for a full-
blown substance dualism in the Cartesian sense.   A dualist solution violates only closure, 
not necessarily determinism.  Extra-physical causal chains can legitimately integrate into 
our physical and natural laws through the principle of preemption.  Deterministic causal 
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chains are frequently derailed or sidetracked by other preempting deterministic causal 
chains.  The only difference here would be the origin of the causal chain in question.  
Once it irrupts into the physical domain, it behaves like any other physical causal chain.   
 But that is all I need say about this here, and it is only in anticipation of those who 
may be uncomfortable with where my argument might lead now that I have undermined 
physicalism as a universal doctrine.  That is my only goal with this project, though I 
might at some later date gladly undertake a  follow-on objective of exploring where all 
this might lead. 
 
Can ESP and Physicalism be Reconciled? 
 There remains one final challenge to my thesis which I must do my best to 
dispose of.  A frequent response to the claim that extrasensory perception is an important 
counterexample to physicalism runs along these lines: We all know that our 
understanding of the physical world is incomplete.  Is it not just as likely that a fully-
developed physics will have grown to include these for-now apparently extra-sensory, 
extra-physical phenomena within its explanatory framework?   Jeffrey Poland has 
anticipated this argument: Perhaps “. . any intractable phenomenon could be downwardly 
incorporated into the physical bases, thereby sparing physicalism from embarrassment. 
The physical, being open-ended and evolving, could incorporate whatever is required to 
keep physicalism afloat” (Poland, 242; emphasis in original).  
 As physicist Jean Burns has observed 
It is, of course, possible that an addition or extension to known physical laws 
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could be made which takes into account the action of consciousness.  Presently 
known physical laws were never intended to describe consciousness, but only 
matter.  And the history of physics shows that radical additions to physics are 
sometimes made as new phenomena are taken into account.  Nevertheless, if psi is 
real, a radical extension of physical laws, which takes into account the action of 
consciousness, would have to be made...so evidence for psi need not be 
considered conclusive if some alternative explanation which falls within the 
purview of presently known laws can reasonably be offered (Burns, 2005, 72). 
. 
 And One ESP-friendly philosopher, Michael Scriven, put it this way: “It 
is...proper to exhibit considerable skepticism about claims that conventional science and 
parapsychology are incompatible, and also about the diametrically opposed conclusions 
that are drawn from this incompatibility” (Scriven, 1956) 
 Here is the challenge: How do we know a completed physics will not eventually 
be able to fully accommodate extrasensory perception and other kinds of 
parapsychological phenomena among physical forces and laws?  To start with, it seems 
obvious that the parapsychology evidence I have cited, plus much more that there was 
not space to explore in this project, clearly falsifies current physics.  If the psi data is 
legitimate – and if (as I briefly argued in chapter 10) one rejects its legitimacy one must 
question the legitimacy of any scientific evidence produced in conventional research 
domains as well – then causal closure has been violated many times and physicalism, as a 
universal claim, is convincingly falsified. 
 As I have said before, this most definitely does not mean that every physical 
claim is false.  Indeed, every entity and every relation that has been shown to be physical 
or dependent on physical facts remains just as true and scientifically real as it was before 
I launched this argument.  And everything else that scientific investigation may find to be 
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physical will also be legitimately physical.   I do not falsify physics or physical 
investigation.  I just show there is a boundary marking the edge of the physical domain. 
 One might ask, doesn’t what we know of the history of science tell us that the 
current scientific paradigm must be false?  Yes, of course, but it tells us about a different 
kind of falseness than what I have shown.  Modern science is considered false in terms of 
being incomplete with regard to some future, fully-realized science.  It is not false in this 
way, though, quite so dramatically as how the geocentric theory of the universe was false 
in comparison to the heliocentric theory that eventually supplanted it.   Rather, today’s 
physics may be false with regard to a future physics more in the way Newtonian physics 
was “false” (in terms of being incomplete, with associated false conclusions) in 
comparison with General Relativity and Quantum physics.   
 My argument is not against a scientific theory per se, but with a metaphysical 
claim about scientific theories, a claim that says the current scientific theories show that 
the physical world is all there is.  It is that metaphysical claim that has been falsified.  
 But isn’t it possible that psi will eventually be fully reconcilable within a physical 
explanatory context once we have a fully realized physics, with completed reductions of 
all the special sciences to the fundamental forces of the universe?  I am not sure whether 
those who say this are aware of just how far-out a claim it is –  one that reaches into some 
indefinite future in which a certain state of affairs might come to pass, the likelihood of 
which we have no way of reckoning.  But it is a popular position, so I shall entertain it.  
There are two ways one might respond to this “futurist” claim.   
 One is to suggest that perhaps physics already very nearly is complete.  Despite 
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obvious risks there are those who argue for this.  Nobel Prize-winning physicist Steven 
Weinberg (1999, 1992), for example, has expressed some confidence that we are nearing 
completion of an overall physical account of the world.  Certainly, there will be details to 
clean up, but we are almost there (he speculated in 1999 that we will have a rough outline 
of the final product by 2050).4   If this is so, then maybe we are a lot closer to a 
resolution than we thought.  And if that is so, then it looks somewhat unlikely that there 
will be any reconciliation between parapsychology and physicalism.  This is because, as 
it stands now and for the reasonably foreseeable future, physicalism and 
parapsychological effects look to be prima facie incompatible – meaning, that if the 
research I have presented is reliable, then universal physicalism is very likely false.  
Because of the way parapsychological effects conflict with the laws of physics, and 
considering the likelihood (by extrapolation and based on Weinberg’s testimony) that 
natural law as we understand it now will nonetheless still provide the general outline of 
any foreseeable physics, it seems reasonable to conclude that ESP and universal 
physicalism will never see eye to eye.  
 Having a fully-completed physical account of the world doesn’t equate to 
knowing every physical thing in the universe.  We could (arguing against the “qualists”) 
have a complete physical story about how humans perceive and process color, right down 
to a full physical explanation of the experience of color.  But we may not know what 
colors are on the far side of a moon in a distant galaxy (in fact, we probably won’t).  We 
                                                          
 4Certainly, the “end of science” has been predicted before.  But this time there 
seems more reason to think so – if only because we now much more than we did the last 
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could, though, have a full story of how the brain works (barring possible non-physical 
affects) and the odds are very good that if future physics looks anything like present 
physics, there will not be a physical explanation for ESP. 
 But what if there is no “end of physics” in 2050?  Can’t we argue that Weinberg 
is incurably optimistic and the possibility of such a full story of the physical world is 
going to be delayed indefinitely far into the future and, if it is finally realized, look 
dramatically different than physics looks today?  Shouldn’t we then wait to declare 
universal physicalism dead until we have the coffin and all the nails?  Then maybe it 
won’t be physicalism that gets buried, but extrasensory perception as a non-physical 
phenomenon.   
 What I am calling the “futurist” position requires such an open-ended claim, that 
it is hard to respond to.  We certainly would be justified in leveling a charge of Popperian 
“ad hoc-ism” at anyone making it.   As I discussed in chapter four, Karl Popper famously 
accused both Marxism and Freudianism of being unfalsifiable and, therefore, 
unscientific, because every time an objection was raised to some part of the theory, an 
appropriate “just-so” story (to borrow a term from Kipling and Gould) could be found 
that would either divert the force of the objection or incorporate it relatively unexplained 
into the theory. 
 So then the question to pose to physicalists is this:   “How long until you would 
finally acknowledge that the universal construal of physicalism is false?  I have provided 
plausible evidence that falsifies physicalism. You suggest that, since physics is not yet 
                                                                                                                                                                             
time the end of science was predicted. 
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complete, if we wait long enough for science to catch up, we may eventually find that a 
physical explanation can account for the phenomena I propose as a falsifier.  Is there ever 
a point where the likelihood of such a possibility becomes so small that you will 
eventually concede?”   
 There is, of course, no answer to this, since there is no way to know how long 
before – or even whether – we will arrive at a sufficiently definitive account of the 
universe, such that we can be certain we know whether extrasensory perception and 
physicalism are, after all, compatible.  Of one thing we can be sure – under the conditions 
specified in the objection, it is likely to be a very long time.  (But it is hard to escape the 
suspicion that what this amounts to is an excuse to hold on to a certain set of physicalist 
beliefs as long as possible.)  On those grounds alone, one would think ad hoc-ism would 
be a legitimate indictment of physicalism.  However, Popper himself eventually realized 
that too fierce an insistence on falsification and too stubborn a resistance to ad hoc 
explanations was not in the best interests of science.  There really are times when an ad 
hoc explanation is true, and it is needed to preserve a legitimate theory.  There is, 
therefore, no answer possible to the physicalists’ plea for patience.  But I submit that the 
burden of doubt has now shifted towards physicalism, and that if it doesn’t feel so yet, 
physicalism really ought to be on the defensive. 
 
A NEW INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION? 
 My project never proposed to come up with solutions to any problems, nor 
answers to any questions – save, perhaps, the question that the majority were not asking, 
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Is physicalism true?  For the most part, people look askance at arguments that tear down 
a theory with nothing new to offer in its place – which often strikes us as being both 
unproductive and vaguely mean-spirited.   In this case, however, just showing the error of 
physicalism is valuable, and contributes to progress in a round-about but nevertheless 
indispensable way.   If science is in fact working under a false theoretical construct – one 
that admittedly allowed great progress in certain directions, but which pursued a course 
that ignored certain fundamental questions – then being awakened from that dogmatic 
slumber would indeed be a positive thing (even if those so startled out of their sound 
sleep are grumpy about it).  Waking up would also allow research to be done in 
additional directions that hold more promise of answering those same mysteries and 
questions.  If the parapsychology project has substance, and is important, then science 
under the thrall of physicalism has been too much, too long like the drunk looking for his 
keys under the street light because that’s where the light is. 
 In chapter two, I quoted Braithwaite on how evidence serves to confirm 
hypotheses that make up the structure of a scientific system.  Though one piece of 
empirical evidence may support a hypothesis, only one bit is not enough to prove it, 
because it could happen that the hypothesis is right about that one thing, while being 
wrong about everything else.  But this is true about every piece of evidence that comes to 
support the hypothesis.  It could be right about all those instances, but still wrong about 
everything else.   This is why counterexamples work – because they show what might be 
believed to be a proposition that is true about the whole world because it has so many 
confirming instances, is actually false in its universal claim. (Braithwaite, 1983, 46) 
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 Physicalism is a general thesis about the entire universe (and the nature of mind 
in particular).  Since physicalist doctrine rests almost exclusively on inductive (hence 
empirical) evidence, it can be confirmed by any number of true empirical facts, and (as 
we discovered back in chapter three)  not be proved true without an examination of every 
fact in the universe.   Yet, it can nominally be proved false by the right kind of 
disconfirming evidence.   
 Consider a case, though, of what we might call “dualistic” physicalism.  Dualistic 
physicalism encompasses the entire physical world, but shares the universe (and perhaps 
interacts) with certain non-physical features of existence.  Dualistic physicalism is not 
vulnerable to a counterexample, because it is not a general thesis about the universe; all it 
says is that some (or even most) aspects of the universe are physical.  Since dualistic 
physicalism acknowledges the presence of non-physical properties and entities as co-
inhabitors of the universe, merely demonstrating that “there is something non-physical” 
poses no threat whatsoever.5   
 We are, however, not dealing with dualistic physicalism, but universal 
physicalism.  Just as it is essentially impossible, given the epistemic limitations of 
humans, to prove universal physicalism true (see chapters two and three), it is also 
impossible to prove it false.  As the “futurist” argument for a fully realized physics 
demonstrates, physicalism is, in this sense, inherently unfalsifiable.  And, surprisingly, in 
this sense so are the non-physical components of dualistic physicalism.  Even if the 
unobserved causal properties of ESP and related phenomena are non-physical – for which 
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I hope I have made a persuasive case – it is just as impossible to prove conclusively that 
they are since, as in the case of physicalism, one would have to examine the entire 
universe to make absolutely certain that there was not some reticent physical feature 
tucked away in some far galaxy that proves a key to a physical explanation of ESP.   
 However, unlike the inconclusiveness of the knowledge, conceivability, and 
intentionality arguments for mind and consciousness I discussed in chapter three, the 
inconclusiveness of what could be termed the “ESP argument” against physicalism 
makes it far less vulnerable, since unlike the antiphysicalist arguments covered in chapter 
three, the ESP argument rests on robust empirical evidence.  More importantly, the 
evidence can be demonstrated in a physical context without having to be physical in 
origin.  The ESP evidence is for that reason much more of a challenge to physicalism 
than any argument thus far presented. (Skeptics are aware of this, which may be why they 
are so resistant to the evidence on which my argument is based.) 
 Even though I have only been able to prove my thesis to somewhere in the 90th 
percentile (missing only a suitable response to what some speculative, distantly future 
physicalist account might possibly be able to reply), I believe my argument seriously 
confronts and (hopefully) vigorously rattles the complacency of physicalist dogma.  At 
the very least in some measure my argument undermines the inference to the best 
explanation which has long been the foundation of the physicalist enterprise.  No longer 
should it be said with any confidence that a physical explanation is the certain, or even 
the most likely account for every phenomenon encountered in our world.  Indeed, I feel 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 5Cf. Hempel, 1983, 11; Braithwaite, 1983, 46. 
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justified in arguing that the physicalist ITBE should be replaced by another, more 
complete inference-to-the-best explanation:  
 That the universal claim of physicalism is false, and that some phenomena 
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